DEMOSTHENES' USE OF EPIDEICTIC COMMONPLACES IN HIS DELIBERATIVE SPEECHES AGAINST PHILIP

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Critics both ancient and modern have universally ranked Demosthenes as the greatest of Attic orators. While it is true that Demosthenes' personal morality and political judgment have received serious criticism in both ancient and modern times, even his most vehement detractors acknowledge the power of his oratory.[1] Drerup, for example, denounces the Third Philippic as "the most malicious and deceitful agitative speech of a responsible statesman," while conceding its power as an "artistic accomplishment."[2] Demosthenes' oratory is vulnerable to the charge of "malice" and "deceit" because it relies for its power not on clarity of rational argumentation but on emotional appeals which, as recent scholarship has revealed, often enough conceal factual misstatements and logical fallacies.[3] For Henry Lord Brougham, nineteenth-century classicist, statesman, and admirer of Demosthenes, however, it is precisely this choice of emotional appeals in preference to "great closeness of reasoning" that is to be applauded in Demosthenes' speeches:

> Chains of reasoning, examples of fine argumentation, are calculated to produce their effect upon a far nicer, a more confined, and a more select audience. . . . But such a display of his powers was not suited to that Athenian audience. What was wanted to move, to rouse, and also to please them, was a copious stream of plain intelligible observations upon their interests--appeals to their feelings--recollections of their past, and especially their recent history. . . .[4]

In fact, although Brougham documents the logical fallacies in the arguments of several of Demosthenes' speeches, he appears to approve of them as evidence of the orator's skill:

> The more striking allusions and illustrations by which he enforces them, are not always such as would bear close examination if considered as arguments, although they are always such as must, in the popular assembly to which he addressed them, have wrought a wondrous effect.[5]

What Brougham admires in Demosthenes' speeches is their power relentlessly to "strike the audience," to appeal to their passions and to excite their feelings through the skillful use of illustrations and allusions calculated to drive home the point at hand. The orator is able to move rapidly through a variety of topics because he chooses to draw the material of his speeches from the common experiences of his audience:

> Hence a very short allusion alone was generally required to raise the idea which he desires to present before his audience. Sometimes a word was enough for his purpose. . . . Some such apt allusion has a power--produces an electric effect--not to be reached by any chain of reasoning. . . . Such apposite allusions--such appropriate topics--such happy hits (to use a homely but expressive phrase), have a sure, an irresistible, a magical effect upon a popular audience.[6]

This dissertation will concentrate on a single major category of "allusions" or "topics" by which--as Brougham recognized--Demosthenes was able to "strike" his audience. In his deliberative speeches against Philip I will explore Demosthenes' use of epideictic commonplaces identifiable in the six extant Athenian epitaphioi. I will attempt to clarify and illustrate the function which the commonplaces serve within Demosthenes' larger persuasive strategy in each of the speeches discussed. I will show that Demosthenes used these patriotic phrases and themes, which evoke a heroic image of Athens as leader among Greeks and victorious champion of Greek liberties, to rouse the Athenians'

traditional civic ambitions and to ignite their passions against Philip. I will provide evidence that Demosthenes sought in these commonplaces a portrayal of Athenian identity which he could place in opposition both to the ominous threat posed by the "foreign" military machine of Philip emerging in the north and to the new, pragmatic economic policies of Eubulus in Athens. That is, I conclude from a reading of the speeches that Demosthenes perceived enemies on two fronts. To the north he saw an expansive and aggressive Macedonian power which would not rest content until Athens and all Greece had been drawn within its domain. Within Athens itself he saw the administration of Eubulus as a leadership prepared to relinquish Athens' traditional imperial ambitions for the sake of short-term economic benefits. With the aim of persuading the Athenian assembly to oppose both adversaries, without and within, Demosthenes, I will argue, chose to recall to the memory of his audience a vision of Athens at the peak of its imperial power and to clothe these recollections in the familiar patriotic phrases of the Athenian epitaphioi.

The funeral speeches from which the commonplaces cited in this dissertation have been drawn are those of Gorgias, from which only a short fragment has been preserved (Diels-Kranz[6] 82 B 6); Pericles, as represented by Thucydides in book two of his history (II 35-46); Lysias (II); Plato, as contained in his Menexenus (236d-249c); Demosthenes (LX); and Hyperides (VI, also preserved in somewhat fragmentary form). The first funeral speech to be reliably attested is Pericles' speech in honor of the Athenians who died fighting in the Samian War, 440 B.C.[7] Of this speech nothing remains except a few phrases quoted by Aristotle

and Plutarch, of little value for our purposes.[8] The fragment of Gorgias, probably written shortly after his visit to Athens in 427, is generally considered the earliest of the extant funeral speeches.[9] Pericles' speech of 431 is earlier than Gorgias'. If the account of it in Thucydides, however, was among those parts of the History written after 404, it may have been influenced by the subsequent development of the tradition after 431, including Gorgias' speech.[10] Gomme's sober arguments for dating Thucydides' rendition of the speech shortly after its presentation in 431 are, nevertheless, not easily dismissed.[11] It is sufficient for our purposes that both Gorgias' and Pericles' speeches represent the state of the Athenian funeral speeches in the late fifth century. The Lysianic epitaphios purports to honor the Athenians fallen in the Corinthian War of 394-387 B.C. Although scholars have expressed widely varying opinions about its authenticity, the earlier defense of the speech by Walz has received confirmation in the persuasively argued 1959 dissertation of J. Klowski.[12] The genuineness of Plato's Menexenus appears now to be generally accepted, and debate continues about its intent rather than about its authenticity.[13] Sykutris and Maas have established the genuineness of Demosthenes' funeral oration, which is said to be the speech that he delivered after the battle of Chaeronea, 338 B.C.[14] The funeral speech of Hyperides, parts of which are missing or mutilated, was delivered in 322 for the men who died in the Lamian War.[15] All of the extant epitaphioi may be safely dated to the late fifth or the fourth century.

Nonetheless, these six speeches, one of them extant only in the form of a brief fragment, would seem to be paltry evidence upon which

to base any sound generalizations about typical Athenian practice. Because such epitaphioi were delivered annually in the Kerameikos, apparently in both wartime and peacetime, the total number of funeral speeches actually delivered in the fifth and fourth centuries will have been very large indeed.[16] Of the speeches remaining we may doubt that those of Gorgias and Lysias were ever delivered, since neither author was Athenian.[17] We know that Plato's is an invention for literary purposes. We are left with the speeches of Pericles, Demosthenes, and Hyperides, and in the case of Pericles' speech the extent of Thucydidean influence remains unresolved. The speeches might, in any case, be expected to be atypical simply because they are the creations of extraordinary authors. Nonetheless, the similarities of form and content among these few surviving speeches suggest that--despite the uniqueness of each due to its authorship, context, or purpose--they are all closely following a well defined, common tradition. As Ziolkowski has demonstrated in his 1963 dissertation, the five complete or nearly complete epitaphioi exhibit the same structure: "Prooemium (Introduction), Epainos (Praise), Paramythia (Exhortation), and Epilogue (Conclusion)."[18] Moreover, according to Ziolkowski, the speeches are developed around the same "general topics," to which he, following Ps.-Dionysius, assigns the term topos.[19] In the Epainos, for example, certain common topics recur: praise of the ancestors (topos genos), praise of Athens (topos patris), and praise of the dead (topos praxis).[20] Finally, the topoi are illustrated throughout the speeches by use of specific statements which reflect traditional points of view about the topoi. These statements Ziolkowski calls "commonplaces."[21] Appendix II

of this dissertation lists twenty such commonplaces together with the epitaphic passages in which they occur. George Kennedy has referred to the "formulaic quality" of the epitaphioi:

> The most interesting rhetorical feature of such speeches is the highly formulaic quality which they achieved almost immediately. Not only general organization but the topics to be mentioned became traditional in the way that gradually happened in other forms of oratory and poetry. The religious nature of the occasion no doubt helped to effect this; it was a kind of rite. . . . The traditional funeral oration led the way toward a traditionalism in all of literature.[22]

If even the common structures and general topics of these speeches legitimate speaking of their traditional "formulaic quality," even more so does the recurrence of the specific words and phrases used to develop these topics. As Ziolkowski describes it, " a tradition of praise existed, even though it was not so formal as that presented by the later rhetoricians."[23]

The "tradition of praise" to which Ziolkowski refers may aptly be termed an epideictic tradition and the words and phrases used to praise Athens in that tradition may be called epideictic commonplaces. Whatever may have been the origin of these commonplaces or however much they may be reflective of the common values of the Athenians, the Athenians heard these commonplaces every year on those solemn, moving, ritual occasions when they remembered their fallen sons, brothers, fathers.[24] Buchheit writes of the impact on Plato of the yearly commemoration of the dead, the influence of Isocrates, and the role played by praise, glory, and honor in Athens:

> Halten wir uns vor Augen, dass Platon alljährlich die Totenfeier und den Nomos des Epitaphios Logos erlebte, dass er Zeitgenosse des Isokrates war, der die Lobrede stark entwickelt und gefördert hat, dass Lob, Ruhm, und Ehre in der athenischen Polis und bei jedem

> einzelnen eine ausserordentlichen Rolle spielten, so werden wir es fast selbstverständlich finden, dass Platon auch einen Standpunkt gegenüber der Lobrede, wie sie zu seiner Zeit bestanden hat, bezieht und uns darüber in seinen Werken Aufschluss gibt.[25]

If Kennedy is correct to see in the Athenian funeral speeches the most traditional and formulaic of oratorical forms to come down to us from ancient Athens, then we can expect that the funeral speeches preserved, fixed, and transmitted to each generation the vocabulary of praise applicable to Athens even in other contexts. As the public oratory of praise of Athens it was the epideictic tradition of Athenian patriotism, and we may assume that the commonplaces of that tradition had power when used in other contexts precisely because they were communicated to the Athenian people every year in the Kerameikos at the graves of their fallen loved ones in a ritual of national grief, commemoration, and exultation.

To speak of an "epideictic tradition" and to designate epitaphic commonplaces as "epideictic" requires a definition of the term. The definition of epideictic, however, remains a scholarly challenge. Unlike forensic or deliberative oratory, which are easily definable in terms of their context (courtroom or political assembly) and purpose (persuasion to a verdict or a policy), the term epideictic has been applied to so many kinds of oratory that it appears to be a convenient designation for all oratory that is neither forensic nor deliberative. As Burgess has described the problem,

> Since the time of Aristotle a large body of Greek oratory has been classified under the title "epideictic." The term, as we shall see, was used to some extent before his day, but not with the definiteness of application which Aristotle's Rhetoric gave to it. Like many other rhetorical terms among the Greeks, the word ἐπιδεικτικός held at different times or at the same time quite different meanings.[26]

The result of the diversity within the tradition has been the failure of modern scholarship to find a definition of epideictic that speaks for the majority of ancient rhetoricians. J. R. Chase has pointed to the arbitrary character of the definitions proposed:

> In most instances scholars have been more concerned with what they found in so-called epideictic orations than what the ancient theorists and critics said about epideictic as a rhetorical concept. Such practice is risky. Orators then, as now, did not feel compelled, in a given oration, to "stick to the subject," much less to a predetermined class of oratory with all of its special techniques and topics. Hence, if one really tries, he can find evidence in many panegyrics or funeral orations to support any definition of epideictic that strikes his fancy.[27]

Chase himself reviews classical theory from the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum and Aristotle to the treatises of the Second Sophistic and concludes that "the dominant concept of epideictic was oratory of praise and blame"; the term stood only secondarily for display.[28]

In his major monograph on the theory of the genos epideiktikon, V. Buchheit also attends to the theorists, from Gorgias to Aristotle.[29] Because Buchheit is convinced that the "Lobrede" is "Kern der uns angehenden Lehre bei Aristoteles und in der Rhet. ad Alex." and that "die Anweisungen letzlich alle um sie kreisen," he has made his investigations of the epideictic genre, in fact, a study of the theory of the ancient encomium.[30] He excludes the epitaphios from consideration and in his book refers to the epitaphioi only in passing because the funeral speech "in der Theorie des 4. Jhds. keine Rolle spielt und erst in der kaiserlichen Techne auftaucht."[31] Nonetheless, his results are suggestive for the funeral orations as much as for the encomia which are the focus of his interest. His results may be summarized as follows: Basic to the encomium is auxesis (amplification) and its corollary, synkrisis,

both of which he traces throughout Greek literature to the time of Homer. They are expressive of the fundamental aim of life for Greeks--praise, glory, and the achievement thereby of immortality. Gorgias' intention was to use auxesis as a means to demonstrate the power of speech. Following Protagoras in the intent τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν, he made of his Praise of Helen a display of the ῥώμη λόγου. Isocrates, moved by a "high estimation of glory" and "boundless ambition" (p. 41) to surpass all previous rhetoricians, developed a new form of encomium exploited for educational purposes. To serve that educational purpose an encomium must ὠφελεῖν, χρήσιμον εἶναι; it must deal with subjects that are "large, noble, generous, and concern public affairs" (Isoc., Antid. 276, μεγάλας καὶ καλὰς καὶ φιλανθρώπους καὶ περὶ τῶν κοινῶν πραγμάτων). Hence, Isocrates gave to the encomium an ethical thrust, but his ethical values were those of popular culture (pp. 38-83). In his third chapter (pp. 84-188) Buchheit deals with the philosophical theory of the encomium. Plato wrote no systematic treatise on rhetoric, but his dialogues reveal that he viewed rhetoric as the artistic tool of dialectic in the service of philosophy. For Plato as for Isocrates the encomium had educational value, but to give an encomium in Plato's sense was to seek to know the Truth and to express it in suitable form (p. 106). Its legitimate goal could not be merely the expression of conventional popular values (pp. 84-108). Buchheit devotes the largest portion of his monograph to Aristotle, who developed Plato's teachings into a systematic theory which differed radically from that of the Sophists, as represented by Isocrates and the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum. For Aristotle the

epideictic genre is concerned with ἦθος and with the ἀρεταί. Hence, it is linked as closely as possible to ethics and cannot be understood apart from ethics (pp. 114-5). The ἀρεταί praised in encomia are to be ἀγαθὰ τῆς ψυχῆς which produce ἔργα (p. 134). All other goods--that is, so-called natural goods such ás τιμή, πλοῦτος, and σώματος ἀρεταί--are worthy of praise only for the person who possesses the ἀρετή of the soul. Whoever possesses the inner arete is termed σπουδαῖος, and for him everything is worthy of praise, but only for him and in relationship to him (p. 139). Hence, it is the character of the person who possesses arete that is decisive for Aristotle's concept of the encomium. Only an individual kalos/agathos is the worthy object of an encomium, and only a kalos/agathos may worthily present an encomium. Epideictic is praise of καλά (pp. 108-88). In a final chapter Buchheit returns to the sophistic strand of rhetorical theory by addressing the "codification of a sophistic theory of the encomium" in the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum (p. 189). It lacks the high ethos of Isocrates, draws its proposals for objects of praise from popular values, and is less concerned with the suitable form for portraying true arete than with the effective methods for creating the impression of arete, whether truly present or not. In this the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum returns to the rhetorical theory of Gorgias.

It will be recognized that, by choosing to pursue a theory of the genos epideiktikon by concentrating on the encomium ("Lobrede"), Buchheit inevitably was led to define epideictic in terms of content. He denies vigorously that the model or prototype of epideictic oratory is the display speech ("Prunkrede"), and he thereby reduces style to

secondary importance. In fact, both Aristotle and the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum confirm Buchheit's position. The seven εἴδη (species) of oratory listed in the first chapter of the Rh. Al. are categories of content, not of style, and the first task the author of the treatise sets for himself is the description of the topics appropriate to the various species. Although Aristotle begins his discussion of his three εἴδη by defining them in terms of οἱ ἀκροαταὶ τῶν λόγων, this innovation may be more a display of his ingenuity at classification than a substantive attempt at definition. For he moves on immediately (1358b 8) further to define the three genres in content terms similar to those in the Rh. Al.: ἐπιδεικτικοῦ δὲ τὸ μὲν ἔπαινος τὸ δὲ ψόγος. Similarly, the τέλοι of the three genres are defined in terms of content rather than of style (1358b 27-28): τοῖς δ' ἐπαινοῦσι καὶ ψέγουσι τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσχρόν. Also as in the Rh. Al., Aristotle first develops his discussion of each genre around the subjects and topics appropriate to them. Content is at the center of his interest. As he later defines epideictic oratory (1367b 28), ἔστιν δ' ἔπαινος λόγος ἐμφανίζων μέγεθος ἀρετῆς (Praise is language that exhibits the magnitude of arete.).[32] Both the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, our best example of a fourth century sophistic treatise, and Aristotle's Rhetoric, the outstanding philosophical treatise, place content at the center of their definition of epideictic. For both, epideictic is the oratory of praise and blame.

Because Buchheit chose to exclude the epitaphioi from his study of the epideictic genre one might object that the conclusions about epideictic that follow from his monograph do not apply to

epitaphic speeches. Aristotle, however, clearly intends to include them. In Book II of the Rhetoric he is again discussing the subjects of the three genres of oratory, and he writes that the speaker must be in possession of their "basic facts" (τὰ ὑπάρχοντα). (1396a 6) He then provides examples in turn for συμβουλεύειν, ἐπαινεῖν, ψέγειν, and κατηγορεῖν and ἀπολογεῖσθαι (1396a 7-23). With regard to praise he writes the following (1396a 12-15);

> ἢ ἐπαινεῖν [πῶς ἂν δυναίμεθα], εἰ μὴ ἔχοιμεν τὴν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχίαν ἢ τὴν ἐν Μαραθῶνι μάχην ἢ τὰ ὑπὲρ Ἡρακλειδῶν πραχθέντα ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων; ἐκ γὰρ ὑπαρχόντων ἢ δοκούντων ὑπάρχειν καλῶν ἐπαινοῦσι πάντες.
>
> Or how should we be able to praise [the Athenians] if we did not have the sea battle at Salamis or the battle at Marathon or the deeds they did for the Heracleidae or other similar actions? For all base their praise on what are or are thought to be noble actions.

Aristotle is not here prescribing subjects for praise, but illustrating from common practice the fact that praise is universally aimed at the celebration of καλά. The examples he gives are those that we know to be standard subject matter of the epitaphioi. They are also to be found in Isocrates' Panegyricus (54-56, 86-89, 96-98). Both the epitaphios and panegyric stand as legitimate components of the epideictic genre alongside the encomium, and their subjects are designated as epideictic subjects, the standard subjects of praise.

In this dissertation I contend that, not merely the subjects of the epitaphioi (Marathon, Salamis, etc.), not merely their topoi (genos, patris, praxis), but the commonplaces used to develop those topoi and interpret those subjects are traditional "formulaic" features of epideictic oratory. Epideictic, as the oratory of praise and blame,

sought its appropriate subjects, topics, and commonplaces, and, if the epitaphioi are at all representative of general practice, used and re-used them. Perhaps the subjects, topics, and commonplaces of epideictic oratory originated in other contexts. Kierdorf may be right to adduce Herod. IX 72 as evidence that the traditional epitaphic subjects had their origin as political propaganda in international debate. The commonplaces themselves are certainly reflective of popular values and may appear in a variety of contexts.[33] It is my contention, however, that, as praise of Athens, they are logically elements of the epideictic genre whatever their origins or derivative uses and that, moreover, as elements of the annual epitaphioi, they will have been inextricably associated in the Athenian consciousness with the official oratory of praise of Athens, i.e., with a powerful instance of epideictic oratory. Therefore, despite the uncertainties in defining the epideictic genre and in establishing the relationship between epideictic and the commonplaces preserved in the epitaphioi, I conclude that the epitaphic commonplaces may reasonably be designated as "epideictic" and that, when Demosthenes resorted to these commonplaces in his deliberative speeches, he was intentionally incorporating epideictic elements in them.

In a recent monograph, The Art of Demosthenes, Lionel Pearson has provided evidence for the use of forensic material in Demosthenes' deliberative speeches.[34] The intent of his book, as Pearson describes it, is to discuss

> the development of the orator's style, how it differs from that of his predecessors and how his early addresses in the Assembly are different from the later speeches, and how he learns to adapt his forensic style so that it becomes the style of the Philippics.[35]

The specific aspects of the forensic style with which Pearson concerns himself are Demosthenes' "narrative and his devastating ability to characterize his opponents":[36]

> Deliberative oratory, according to orthodox teaching, was different from forensic, but the more successful speeches of Demosthenes [the Philippics], which were designed to influence public policy, are written in the forensic manner. They are worked out in terms of attack and defense; his task as he sees it, in the Philippic orations, is to convince his hearers that Philip is guilty and that Athens has been shamefully treated and should take action against him.[37]

Pearson emphasizes that Demosthenes adapts narrative from his forensic style for use in his deliberative speeches because narrative is an effective tool for the appeal to character:

> It seems that, as in the law courts, he thinks he has a better chance of achieving his object by appeals to character; and he therefore appeals to the undesirable character of Philip and his political opponents and the patriotic character of his audience, which he claims to share with them. When narrative is introduced, it is in order to illustrate Philip's character and aims and to contrast the present weakness of Athens with the true Athenian character which their history reveals.[38]

The appeal to character, one form of the argument from probability, carried special weight in Athenian courts and received wide sanction because of the unavailability of more credible evidence. As Dover writes,

> In a culture in which documentation was rudimentary, effective techniques for the detection of crime virtually unknown, and the use of forensic evidence hamstrung by the absence of cross-examination and bedevilled by suspicion of organized perjury, the question, "Which of the two parties is likely to be in the right?" was of the highest importance, and the character of each party, as revealed by his past record as a patriotic and generous citizen was crucial to this question.[39]

Since the speeches delivered between 351 and 340 have as their one principal aim to convince the Athenians that Philip is their first and most dangerous enemy, it is understandable that Demosthenes would draw

on his experience in forensic oratory to attack Philip in the manner of a skillful and ruthless prosecutor, illustrating the violence and self-serving immorality of his character, indicting his political and military activities, and inferring from both his hostile intentions. Demosthenes' resort to the narrative strategy of the lawcourts indicates the difficulty he faced in demonstrating Philip's hostility to Athens. In the absence of clear, indisputable evidence of Philip's belligerent intents, Demosthenes was placed into a dilemma similar to that of the prosecutor in the lawcourts whose only resort was to appeal to character through use of narrative. Pearson's recognition of Demosthenes' dependence on the resources of forensic oratory in his attacks on Philip is a helpful contribution to the understanding of the Philippics.

Although Pearson has identified the formal origin of Demosthenes' attacks on Philip's character in forensic oratory, he does not recognize Demosthenes' dependence on epideictic oratory for his portrayal of Athenian character. The mixing of oratorical genres which Pearson recognized in the case of deliberative and forensic oratory applies equally to deliberative and epideictic oratory. Aristotle says as much explicitly in his Rhetoric (1367b 37-1368a 1, 7-8):

> ἔχει δὲ κοινὸν εἶδος ὁ ἔπαινος καὶ αἱ συμβουλαί. ἃ γὰρ ἐν τῷ συμβουλεύειν ὑπόθοιο ἄν, ταῦτα μετατεθέντα τῇ λέξει ἐγκώμια γίγνεται. . . . ὥστε ὅταν ἐπαινεῖν βούλῃ, ὅρα τί ἂν ὑπόθοιο· καὶ ὅταν ὑποθέσθαι, ὅρα τί ἂν ἐπαινέσειας.
>
> Praise and public debate have a common nature: For what you might propose in a public debate becomes encomium by a shift of wording. . . . Therefore, if you wish to praise, look at what you might propose; if you wish to make a proposal, look at what you might praise.[40]

In the Philippic speeches Demosthenes indicts Philip, citing his behavior as illustrative of his character. But, while he repeatedly chastises present Athenian behavior, he is careful to distinguish their present behavior and their true character. The marks of their character and the truth about their identity are not to be found in their present behavior but in the traditions of their past history. Their present behavior, Demosthenes continually asserts in the Philippics, is unworthy of these traditions and untrue to the character they have received from their ancestors.

The distinction is important because Demosthenes cannot stand before his fellow Athenians as their prosecutor, asking them to serve as both defendent and jury. He can prosecute the foreign criminal Philip, as Pearson suggests, and demand from the Athenians a vote of condemnation and punishment. But he can hardly serve any useful deliberative purpose or expect any favorable response by requiring the Athenians to impose a verdict of guilty upon themselves. In the Philippic speeches, as Pearson recognizes, Demosthenes is not concerned to make a case against the Athenians. He does not accuse them of injustice or criminality. His concern is to make a case <u>for</u> Athens and <u>for</u> the Athenian character. Pearson's discovery of Demosthenes' dependence on forensic narrative clarifies Demosthenes' method of bringing his case against Philip and of illustrating "the present weakness of Athens." It does not, however, help to understand the orator's method of illustrating and commending "the true Athenian character which their history reveals."[41] I argue in this dissertation that for his portrayal of true Athenian character Demosthenes resorts not to forensic narrative

but to epideictic commonplaces, to the conventional vocabulary of praise of Athens evidenced with particular compactness and recurrent public impact in the Athenian epitaphioi. To gain for his audience a verdict of guilty he attacks Philip in the forensic style. To move his audience to active retribution against the guilty one, however, he appeals to the bravery, nobility, and justice of the Athenian national character, employing the recognizable vocabulary of the epideictic tradition.

Apart from the contribution this dissertation will make to the understanding of Demosthenes' persuasive strategy in the speeches against Philip, it will provide additional evidence of the interconnectedness of the three rhetorical genres of Attic oratory.[42] It will support the assertion of Chase that orators, then as now, "did not feel compelled, in a given oration, to 'stick to the subject,' much less to a predetermined class of oratory with all of its special techniques and topics."[43] In the case of Demosthenes' Philippics I will not attempt to prove that Demosthenes was the first or sole speaker to use epideictic commonplaces in deliberative speeches. Passages in his speech On the False Embassy suggest that the resort to epideictic themes may not have been unusual before the Athenian assembly. There he speaks of Aeschines as the first to marshal epideictic subjects against Philip (XIX 303-4):

> τίς ὁ τοὺς μακροὺς καὶ καλοὺς λόγους ἐκείνους δημηγορῶν, καὶ τὸ Μιλτιάδου καὶ τὸ Θεμιστοκλέους ψήφισμ' ἀναγιγνώσκων καὶ τὸν ἐν τῷ τῆς Ἀγλαύρου τῶν ἐφήβων ὅρκον; οὐχ οὗτος;
>
> Who was it that contributed to public discussion those lengthy, heroic speeches and read the decrees of Miltiades and Themistocles and the oath that the ephebes take at the temple of Aglaurus? Wasn't he the one?

Demosthenes here deplores the fact that after having brought to bear all possible rhetorical weapons, including even documentary evidence from the period of the Persian wars, against Philip, Aeschines had since proved himself to be Philip's champion and had told the Athenians "to forget the ancestors and to repudiate those who speak of the old trophies and sea-battles" (XIX 16 307).[44] We have no grounds for the assumption that Demosthenes was first to use the epideictic subjects or the topoi and commonplaces which would accompany them. As this dissertation will reveal, Demosthenes resisted use of the traditional subjects, mythical or Persian, while he made full use of the commonplaces by which these traditional subjects were normally developed and interpreted. In the Philippics we will not find either the mythical references to the Amazons, Heracleidae, or Adrastus, nor the conventional references to Marathon, Salamis, and Plataea. We will find increasing use, however, of the commonplaces which expressed the conclusions about Athens drawn traditionally from those paradeigmatic events in Athens' history. Demosthenes' paradeigmata, as we shall see, are drawn largely from the period of the confederacy and empire, in evocation of the period of Athens' hegemony. For it is to commend the image of Athens as preeminent leader of Greeks that Demosthenes calls upon the resources of the epideictic commonplaces.

The research lying behind this dissertation was conducted, first, by identifying and listing the commonplaces that recur in the epitaphioi.[45] As an aid to that task the prior work of Ziolkowsky proved invaluable.[46] After listing the identified commonplaces I surveyed the Philippics, Olynthiacs, and the speech On the Chersonese to

locate occurrences of the commonplaces.[47] None are apparent in Olynthiacs I and II. Although Olynthiac III contains what appears to be a number of allusions to commonplaces, most are disputable, and they appear to play a less significant role in the persuasion of this speech than in the Philippics. Extended analysis, therefore, was limited to the four Philippics and the speech On the Chersonese. These embrace the major decade of Demosthenes' political career (351-340 B.C.) for which political speeches survive and during which the development of his use of commonplaces may be traced. The analysis to which these speeches were subjected included the establishment of the occasion so far as possible within the results of current historical research into the period; identification of the major aim of each speech and its primary strategy for reaching that aim; determination of the function of the commonplaces within the general persuasion of the speech. Finally, I summarize the major discoveries and trends observed in the course of the speech analysis and draw from them implications for the understanding of Demosthenes' oratory and of the Attic oratory of his time.

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER I

[1]For an exhaustive introduction to the negative assessments of Demosthenes in antiquity, see E. Drerup, Demosthenes im Urteile des Altertums, Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Altertums, Band 12, Heft 1-2 (Würzburg: C. J. Becker, 1923). Among recent critics see above all E. Drerup, Aus einer alten Advokatenrepublik, Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Altertums, Band 8, Heft 3-4 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1916, reprint ed. New York: Johnson Reprint Corp., 1967). Cf. J. B. Bury, A History of Greece, 3d ed. rev. by Russell Meiggs (London: MacMillan, 1951), pp. 736-37, "Demosthenes used his brilliant gift of speech in the service of his country; he used it unscrupulously according to his light--the light of a purblind patriotism . . . . His policy was retrograde and retarding . . . . He did not grapple seriously with any of the new problems of the day; he did not originate one fertile political idea." For a summary of other major nineteenth and early twentieth century critics, primarily German, see J. R. Knipfing, "German Historians and Macedonian Imperialism," AHR 26 (1920-21): 657-71.

[2]Advokatenrepublik, p. 113, "So bleibt für mich die dritte philippische Rede zwar als Kunstleistung die gewaltigste, nach Tendenz und Ausführung aber die gehässigste und verlogenste Hetzrede eines verantwortlichen Staatsmannes, die kaum von der Proklamation des 'sacro egoismo' Salandras überboten werden konnte."

[3]G. L. Cawkwell has presented, in a series of articles, the most detailed documentation and cogently argued case for the position that the picture of Greek and Macedonian politics conveyed in Demosthenes' speeches is inaccurate and distorted. For the fullest statement of his view, see his Philip of Macedon (London: Faber and Faber, 1978). Although this "popular" book contains citations only of primary sources, Cawkwell provides in the bibliography (p. 208) a comprehensive list of his articles published since 1960, which include the scholarly documentation and argument for the positions he assumes in his book. Reviewers pro and con acknowledge Cawkwell's pro-Philip bias: P. F. Harding, Phoenix 33 (1979): 177, "Cawkwell shows a complete lack of sympathy with the aims, ambitions, and traditions of the Greek city-state. Likewise, he is uncritically critical of Demosthenes. Demosthenes does nothing right." G. T. Griffith, JHS C (1980): 255, "In general, one of the most refreshing features of C.'s book is his unreserved admiration of Philip himself." Whether denouncing or celebrating Cawkwell's assessment of Demosthenes, neither contests the validity of his scholarship.

[4]Henry Lord Brougham, "Dissertation on the Eloquence of the Ancients," Works, vol. 7 (Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Black, 1872), pp. 49, 58.

[5]Brougham, p. 50.

[6]Brougham, p. 49.

[7]For this paragraph I depend in part on the summary of scholarly opinion provided by J. Ziolkowski, "Thucydides and the Tradition of Funeral Speeches in Athens" (Ph.D. dissertation, North Carolina, 1963), pp. 12-14.

[8]Arist., Rh. 1365a 30-3. Plut., Per. 28.8. For a complete treatment of the fragments, see Leo Weber, "Perikles samische Leichenrede," Hermes 57 (1922): 375-95.

[9]W. Vollgraff, L'oraison funèbre de Gorgias (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1952), p. 16.

[10]So J. T. Kakridis, Der thukydideische Epitaphios, Zetemata, vol. 26 (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1961), pp. 5-6.

[11]A. W. Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucycides, 5 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1945-1980) 2: 104, 126, 129-30.

[12]J. Walz, "Der lysianische Epitaphios," Philologus, Supplement no. 29, part 4 (Leipzig, 1939): 1-55. J. Klowski, "Zur Echtheitsfrage des lysianischen Epitaphios" (Diss., Hamburg, 1959). Ziolkowski does not cite Klowski. His arguments for the genuineness of the speech have since been accepted by W. Kierdorf, Erlebnis und Darstellung der Perserkriege, Hypomnemata, vol. 16 (Göttingen: Vandenhoek und Ruprecht, 1966), p. 83, n. 1. Cf. K. J. Dover, Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum (Berkeley: U. Cal., 1968), p. 193, "I see no reason why Lysias should not have composed the Epitaphios." Although it is not necessary for our purposes that Lysias is proved to have written the Epitaphios, proof of authenticity does establish the speech as representative of the early fourth century.

[13]See P. Wendland, "Die Tendenz des Platonischen Menexenos," Hermes 25 (1890): 171-95. M. Pohlenz, Aus Platos Werdezeit (Berlin, 1913), pp. 244ff. K. Oppenheimer, "Zwei attische Epitaphien" (Diss. Berlin, 1933), p. 70. V. Buchheit, Untersuchungen zur Theorie des Genos Epideiktikon (Munich: M. Huebner, 1960), pp. 94-96.

[14]Paul Maas, "Zitate aus Demosthenes' Epitaphios bei Lykurgos," Hermes 63 (1928): 258-68. J. Sykutris, "Der demosthenische Epitaphios," Hermes 63 (1928): 241-58. Defended by M. Pohlenz, SymbOslo 26 (1948): 46-74. For a review of the discussion, see D. F. Jackson and G. O. Rowe, "Demosthenes 1915-1965," Lustrum 14 (1969): 72-73, who

conclude (73), "It now appears that the strong case made for authenticity by Sykutris has not been decisively rebutted; however, scholars accustomed to the magnificence of the Philippics and On the Crown will find it difficult to attribute the oration to the Demosthenes they admire."

[15]G. Colin, "L'oraison funèbre d'Hypéride," REG 51 (1938): 209-266, 305-94. Hans Hess, Textkritische und erklärende Beiträge zum Epitaphios des Hypereides (Leipzig, 1938).

[16]L. Deubner, Attische Feste (Berlin: Keller, 1932), p. 230, "alljährlich." F. Pfister, Der Reliquienkult im Altertum, 2 vols. (Giessen: Töpelmann, 1909-12), 1:190, "jahraus, jahrein." Cf. 2:490, 554.

[17]Of course, Gorgias and especially Lysias may have composed their speeches for others (Athenians) to deliver.

[18]Ziolkowski, p. 29.

[19]Ziolkowski, p. 39.

[20]Ibid., p. 61.

[21]Ibid., pp. 39-40.

[22]George Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton: Princeton U., 1963), p. 154.

[23]Ziolkowski, p. 61.

[24]W. Kierdorf (see above n. 12), pp. 82ff., argues that the epitaphioi reveal a list of traditional Athenian deeds, "Tatenkatalog," which originated not in the epideictic epitaphioi, but in international debate. Cf. p. 107, "Die Übernahme in das andere Genos wird freilich sehr bald stattgefunden haben, zumal nach gesetzlicher Vorschrift nur die jeweils im Staate hervorragenden Redner (diese aber waren ja gerade durch ihre politischen Reden allen bekannt) mit der Aufgabe betraut wurden, die Rede auf die Gefallenen zu halten." For parallels to the epitaphic commonplaces in popular Athenian values, cf. K. J. Dover, Greek Popular Morality (Berkeley: U. Cal., 1974), passim.

[25]V. Buchheit (see above, n. 13), pp. 84-85.

[26]T. C. Burgess, "Epideictic Literature," Studies in Classical Philology 3 (1902): 91-92.

[27]J. R. Chase, "The Classical Conception of Epideictic," Quarterly Journal of Speech 47 (1961): 293.

[28]Chase, p. 299.

[29]V. Buchheit (see above n. 13).

[30]Buchheit, p. 12. H. Ll. Hudson-Williams, rev. in JHS 82 (1962): 165, calls Buchheit's decision not to include the epitaphioi, speeches delivered at panhellenic meetings, and other epideictic forms "a fundamental weakness of this book." J. Brunel, rev. in REA 60 (1961): 478, suggests that Buchheit might better have dropped the term genos epideiktikon from the title. G. Wille, rev. in Gnomon 34 (1962): 757-63, however, appears to affirm Buchheit's limitation of his material and judges his book an "in kritischer Auseinandersetzung mit der einschlägigen Literatur entstandene, kenntnisreiche, lesbar geschriebene und übersichtlich angeordnete Werk." Cf. also CR 12 (1962): 37-38, AJP 83 (1962): 326-29, DLZ 84 (1963): 24-26.

[31]Buchheit, p. 13.

[32]On this passage see Buchheit, p. 166, "Das Wort μέγεθος ist hier deshalb von Bedeutung, weil es genau ins Zentrum der aristotelischen Theorie der Lobrede trifft. Es ist das Aufzeigen (ἐπίδειξις) einer im allgemeinen anerkannten Arete, wobei der Redner die Aufgabe hat, μέγεθος περιθεῖναι καὶ κάλλος (1368a 27-28).

[33]For Kierdorf and popular values see above n. 24.

[34]Lionel Pearson, The Art of Demosthenes, Beiträge zur klassischen Philologie, Heft 68 (Meisenheim am Glan: A. Hain, 1976).

[35]Pearson, p. vi.

[36]Ibid., p. vii.

[37]Ibid., p. 20.

[38]Ibid., p. 134.

[39]Dover, p. 294.

[40]Cf. Quint. III 7.28, Totum autem habet aliquid simile suasoriis, quia plerumque eadem illic suaderi, hic laudari solent. Also Quint. III 4.16.

[41]Pearson, p. 134. (See above, p. 14.)

[42]Cf. D. A. G. Hinks, "Tria Genera Causarum," CQ 30 (1936): 170-76.

[43]Chase, p. 293. (See above, p. 8 .)

[44]Demosthenes may also be mocking Aeschines' somewhat pedantic citation of ancient documents (Cf. Appendix IV, pp. 254-5.). Nonetheless, in the Third Philippic he finally cites his own document. Perhaps he was more conservative than other speakers in drawing on epideictic material.

[45]For a complete listing of the commonplaces represented in the Philippics and a representative selection of epitaphic parallels, see Appendix II.

[46]See above n. 7.

[47]Appendix I contains a list of the commonplaces with citation of the Demosthenic passages in which they occur.

CHAPTER II

THE FIRST PHILIPPIC

In this chapter I will provide a detailed study of IV 2-3, which I believe to hold the key to Demosthenes' persuasive strategy in the speech. Demosthenes' attack on Philip in this speech is both an indictment of his activities and a damaging portrayal of his character; it is the creation of an image of a dangerous enemy whose character nonetheless contains the seeds of its own destruction. Demosthenes' appeal for Athenian action against Philip, however, is also based on character--an image of the Athenian character which the orator draws from Athenian history. In IV 2-3 he illustrates Athenian identity through reference to a paradeigma from Athenian history the import of which he conveys through allusions to several commonplaces. Before treating these two paragraphs I will first give attention to the date and occasion for the First Philippic and to previous analysis of its argument.

By the summer or fall of 351, when Demosthenes, at age 33, delivered his first public speech directed against Philip, he had no doubt established his reputation as a skillful writer of speeches for others to deliver in courtroom prosecution or defense.[1] His many surviving forensic speeches and the three major, politically significant speeches against Androtion, Aristocrates, and Timocrates are evidence of

both the large number and high status of his clients. Nonetheless, in 351 Demosthenes remained a minor political figure, whose few earlier attempts at personal speech-making before the assembly appear to have been ignored. As the prologue to the First Philippic indicates, Demosthenes does not view himself nor expects his audience to view him as one of the "usual speakers" (οἱ εἰωθότες), who habitually addressed the assembly and whose appearance at the rostrum would prompt neither surprise nor indignation. Hence, Demosthenes must justify his decision to speak first on this occasion by reference to the situation that calls for the expression of his opinion and advice.

Both the date and the occasion for the speech remain subjects of scholarly debate. Dionysius (Ad Amm. 725) places the speech in the archonship of Aristodemus, 352/1, prior to Philip's war on Olynthus.[2] In an influential article published in 1893 Eduard Schwartz attacked Dionysius' dating and attempted to establish a date in 349 after the Olynthiac speeches.[3] Although Schwartz's arguments attracted a considerable following, the most recent scholarship supports an earlier date, and the articles of R. Sealey and, especially, G. L. Cawkwell reaffirming the general validity of Dionysius' chronology have not been successfully refuted.[4]

Although the precise occasion for the First Philippic cannot be finally established, Cawkwell is probably right to place it during the lull between Philip's march to Heraeum Teichos in November 352 and the dispatch of Charidemus ten months later.[5] In the previous eight years of Philip's ascendancy his activities could be understood as legitimately directed toward the internal and external security of Macedonia

and of his own rule. He had defended his kingdom from Illyrians, Paeonians, and Thracians to the north, and he had subjected the petty kings of the mountain cantons of Lyncestis, Eordaea, Orestis, Elimia, and Tymphaea to himself by drawing them into the life of his court and by resettling their populations in new towns established in the plains more easily controlled by central authority. He had provided for the defense of his southern borders by seizing Amphipolis, the great fortress strategically located at the mouth of the river Strymon, and Pydna, important for his eventual control of the Thermaic Gulf. Although the Athenians had watched Philip's growing power and assertiveness with anxiety during these early years, they could do little. Their own energies were directed to more immediately compelling problems--the revolt of their allies, Chios, Cos, and Rhodes; the wresting of Euboea from Theban control; and the intrigues within the amphictyony which led finally to the so-called Sacred War.

In the year immediately preceding Demosthenes' presentation of his First Philippic, however, hostilities between Philip and Athens were heightened, first, by the appearance of his forces, for the first time, south of Mt. Olympus, his subsequent inclusion of Thessaly within the Macedonian sphere of influence, and his attempt--only narrowly thwarted by a rapidly dispatched Athenian force--to penetrate Thermopylae for a direct strike at Phocis; and, second, by his march deep into Thrace and his siege of Heraeum Teichos, a fort probably on the Propontis roughly sixty miles northeast of the Chersonese (the modern Gallipoli peninsula). Situated strategically along Athens' precious grain shipping route from the Black Sea and within striking range of Athenian settlements on the

Chersonese, Heraeum was not a stronghold easily to be handed over to one whose intentions were as yet unknown and clearly threatening to Athenian interests. In a fit of alarm, the Athenians resolved to send forty ships, carrying citizen troops, and to finance the expedition through a special tax of sixty talents. When word came that Philip was seriously ill and had been forced to call off the siege, Athens tabled its expedition. With the immediate crisis past, Athens had time to consider the meaning of Philip's ascendancy more deliberately, and it is in the course of these extended deliberations that Demosthenes delivered his First Philippic speech.

Cawkwell proposes that this speech may well fit in the deliberations which led to the deployment of Charidemus with a small force to the area of the Chersonese in September 351.[6] The vagueness of the situation to which the speech is intended to speak would represent well this period of malaise, when no particular aggressions were being experienced or crises reported but when it was known that Philip's illness had not proved fatal and that a renewed unleashing of Macedonian power might be expected at any time. In the past it may be that Demosthenes had not directed a speech against Philip because action, where possible, was being taken. At critical points, after all, troops had been sent out, and when they failed to accomplish their missions, Demosthenes' failure to speak out suggests not that he was restrained by a natural humility but that he was in general agreement with the steps being taken against Philip and had nothing more to offer. With Philip's recovery after the crisis at Heraeum Teichos, however, it appears that Demosthenes had become convinced that Athens must dig in for an extended campaign to

chip away at Philip's power if he was not to be permitted to go on chipping away at theirs.[7]

Scholars today generally agree that the First Philippic marks a new stage in both Demosthenes' political career and in his oratory.[8] Only recently, however, have scholars devoted themselves to the detailed study of its persuasive strategy. Kennedy deals only briefly with the speech in his article on the "Focusing of Arguments in Greek Deliberative Oratory," but the attention he draws there to the relationship between appeals to expediency and appeals to justice and honor in the development of Demosthenes' oratory is a significant contribution to the understanding of his persuasive craft. Although he concludes that Demosthenes' speeches become more persuasive when the orator determines no longer to try to balance expediency and justice but to focus exclusively on expediency, he finds that in the First Philippic "Demosthenes so focuses Athenian interests that the question seems not one of advantage but of necessity, not the choice of a course of action but the adoption of the only possibility.[9]

In the article cited above (note 8), Galen Rowe concentrates his study of the First Philippic on a pattern of recurrences that emerges in the speech, "a subtle process of elaboration and development bringing to light new dimensions of meaning and sensation." Rowe sees in Demosthenes' use of recurrence an "aesthetic mode of persuasion--the satiric."[10] He identifies in the First Philippic a recurrent use of "incongruous," "distorted," "inane," and " paradoxical" images to create for the audience what he calls "a <u>mundus perversus</u> reminiscent of Brueghel's <u>Flemish Proverbs</u>."[11] For Rowe, "the focal point of the oration--the nucleus, in

fact, of subsequent descriptive imagery," is IV 19, a paragraph in which Rowe finds an obviousness and ironic ambiguity of detail that shape the "satiric" form of the remainder of the speech. While identifying satiric elements in the First Philippic, however, Rowe has not been able to explain why the category of satire should be persuasive.[12] If satire is "the vituperatio of laus et vituperatio," how is it to become a persuasive strategy?[13] Pearson suggests that Rowe's use of the term "satiric mode of persuasion" is not "a happy one, because (unlike any satirist) Demosthenes is using ridicule in order to rouse the positive emotions of pride and determination."[14] Such ridicule can become persuasive, I would contend, only because the object of the ridicule is the pathetic corruption of the true Athenian civic identity in current Athenian behavior.[15] It is, furthermore, only because Demosthenes has already affirmed for his audience their true character in IV 2-3 that he can subject their behavior to ridicule in IV 19. It is also the hope held out in that identity that preserves Demosthenes' satire from the vicious abuse that he directs at Aeschines in the speeches On the False Embassy and On the Crown. There the terms of abuse are described by Rowe in an earlier article as techniques of "character assassination."[16] Here, however, Demosthenes' intent is to endorse the Athenian character while exposing its inconsistency with present Athenian behavior. We now turn to the means by which that endorsement occurs in the First Philippic.

In developing a persuasive strategy for his First Philippic speech Demosthenes was faced with two interrelated problems. On the one hand, there was the problem of how to build the Athenians' confidence in their ability to oppose Philip successfully without belittling the

threat he posed to such a degree that they would feel no urgency to take action against him. If Demosthenes correctly judged that the Athenians' hesitancy to institute full mobilization against Philip was due, at least in part, to their fears of his military superiority, the history of his ascendancy since 359 provided evidence for the legitimacy of their fears. To be sure, Eubulus managed in 352 to stop Philip at Thermopylae. In the north, however, Philip had been largely successful, and he had proved already how capable he was of turning even his occasional defeats to best advantage. Demosthenes found it necessary both to assuage Athenian fears about Philip's invincibility and to fuel a sense of urgency that the dangerous (if not irresistible) threat he did pose must be challenged.

Demosthenes' second strategic problem arises partly in response to the first. As we shall see, Demosthenes' strategy in the First Philippic is to shift the Athenians' attention away from Philip to themselves, to what he claims is their passive complicity in Philip's successes. But to do so he will have to write a speech which is largely an attack on the irresponsibility of the audience whose assent he is trying to win. Demosthenes' response is to establish early in the speech an alternative self-image for his audience, a nobler vision of their national identity to which he can appeal. The effect is to establish good-will between speaker and audience through a strong affirmation of the national character that they share. His intent is that his audience hear his attacks on their present behavior not as an abusive denigration of their persons but as a sympathetic revelation of the inconsistency between their true identity evidenced by their past and

their changed habits in the present.

We shall deal first with the first of Demosthenes' two strategic problems: his need to lessen the Athenians' fear of Philip while intensifying their sense of urgency to oppose his threat. These two perspectives on their situation Demosthenes lays before his audience in the first sentence of his argument immediately following the brief prologue:

> Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἀθυμητέον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῖς παροῦσι πράγμασιν, οὐδ' εἰ πάνυ φαύλως ἔχειν δοκεῖ. (2)
>
> First of all, then, Athenians, don't lose heart over the present state of affairs, even if they seem very bad indeed.

The first point he wishes to make, indeed, the major thesis of the speech is that the Athenians need not "lose heart" (οὐκ ἀθυμητέον) at the present state of affairs (τοῖς παροῦσι πράγμασιν). But the major thesis is followed immediately by the minor thesis, that the present situation is "very bad indeed" (πάνυ φαύλως), although not as bad as it may seem (δοκεῖ!). This second, minor, thesis Demosthenes reiterates several times during the speech. A few lines after his opening sentence he asserts flatly that Athens' affairs are wretched: . . . κακῶς τὰ πράγματα ἔχει (2). He affirms that anyone who contemplates the size of Philip's existing power alongside all the outposts Athens had lost and concludes that Philip will be a fearful adversary in war "is thinking straight":

> εἰ δέ τις ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δυσπολέμητον οἴεται τὸν Φίλιππον εἶναι, σκοπῶν τό τε πλῆθος τῆς ὑπαρχούσης αὐτῷ δυνάμεως καὶ τὸ τὰ χωρία πάντ' ἀπολωλέναι τῇ πόλει, ὀρθῶς μὲν οἴεται. (4)
>
> But if anyone of you, Athenians, thinks that Philip poses a formidable military threat when he considers the extent of the power in his possession and all the strongholds the City has lost, he is thinking correctly.[17]

He makes detailed reference to Philip's seizure of Pydna, Potidaea, and Methone (4), to his capture of Athenian citizens at Lemnos and Imbros, his seizure of ships and levy of "untold sums" (ἀμύθητα χρήματ') at Geraestus, and his towing away of the sacred trireme from Marathon, financing his incessant insults and attacks through pillage of the merchant ships of Athenian allies in the Aegean (34). The result of Philip's successes is that Athens cannot "at the moment" (νῦν) provide a military force adequate to meet Philip in open battle; the money is not available for pay or maintenance (23).[18] In sum, Demosthenes portrays Athens as having reached at that moment a crisis in its relations with Philip, a moment when there is no longer time to wait and see what the future might bring: νῦν δ' ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἥκει τὴν ἀκμήν, ὥστ' οὐκέτ' ἐγχωρεῖ (42). If Athens waits to see what will happen, the city will guarantee the wretchedness of its future:

> οὐ γὰρ ἄττα ποτ' ἔσται δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ἀλλ' ὅτι φαῦλα, ἂν μὴ προσέχητε τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὰ προσήκοντα ποιεῖν ἐθέλητε, εὖ εἰδέναι. (50)

> We need not speculate about what is going to happen. No, we need only to know with certainty that what is going to happen will be disastrous if you fail to grasp the situation and show the will to act as becomes you.[19]

As Demosthenes recounts Philip's successes, agrees with the sense that Athens' present affairs are despicable, and suggests that Athens' relations with Philip have reached a turning point that calls urgently for action, he encourages his audience not to despair by locating the source of Philip's successes and Athens' abasement, not in Philip's economic and military superiority or in his canny diplomatic skills, but in Athens' lack of will to resist. That is, he defines Philip's successes and Athens' failures in moral rather than in military

or economic terms. The Athenians can take heart because Demosthenes defines the "worst" of what has occurred in their past dealings with Philip as something within their power to change:

> ὃ γάρ ἐστι χείριστον αὐτῶν ἐκ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος χρόνου, τοῦτο πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα βέλτιστον ὑπάρχει. τί οὖν ἐστι τοῦτο; ὅτι οὐδέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῶν δεόντων ποιούντων ὑμῶν κακῶς τὰ πράγματ' ἔχει. (2)

> You see, what is worst about our affairs from the time now past and gone is, in fact, best for the future. And what, you ask, is that? It is that our affairs are in so miserable a state precisely because you, Athenians, are doing absolutely nothing of what is needed.[20]

Demosthenes' statement is effective because it sidesteps the question whether the "worst" in the dismal history of Athens' losses to Philip may be not that the Athenians failed to do what was needed but that they could not do so. Ignoring the possibility that the demands of the situation (τὰ δέοντα) might have been and might still be beyond effective Athenian response, Demosthenes encourages his audience to believe that a new resolve, an act of will, a stiffened determination, will reverse their fortunes and promise victory.

The grounds for that belief Demosthenes finds in the evidence that Philip has been following precisely the principle of action that he is recommending to the Athenians. It is the difference in their γνῶμαι that has permitted Philip to grow (6-7). Several years earlier, when Philip had none of his present possessions and was forced to act out of weakness, he did not adopt a disposition (γνώμη) that would have stressed how difficult war with the Athenians was likely to be. If he had done so, he would never have acquired his present power (5).[21] Instead, Philip adopted as his principle (γνώμη) the commonplace that "the property of the absent belongs in the nature of

things to those who are present, and the property of the careless to those willing to risk hardship and danger":

> φύσει δ' ὑπάρχει τοῖς παροῦσι τὰ τῶν ἀπόντων, καὶ τοῖς ἐθέλουσι πονεῖν καὶ κινδυνεύειν τὰ τῶν ἀμελούντων. (5)[22]

In Demosthenes' view, Philip calculated correctly that Athens would offer no defense against his aggressions and that, if the Athenians continually absented themselves from the arena of battle, he could not lose. Hence, Demosthenes makes his case that it was not through his use of power that Philip accumulated his growing resources, but through Athenian negligence: οὐδὲ γὰρ οὗτος παρὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ ῥώμην τοσοῦτον ἐπηύξηται, ὅσον παρὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀμέλειαν. (11)[23] It follows that the Athenians' hope lies in their willingness to adopt Philip's policy; if they do so, Demosthenes promises, they will "(God willing) recover their possessions, get back what has been frittered away, and punish Philip":

> ἂν τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ὑμεῖς ἐπὶ τῆς τοιαύτης ἐθελήσητε γενέσθαι γνώμης νῦν, ἐπειδήπερ οὐ πρότερον, . . . καὶ τὰ ὑμέτερ' αὐτῶν κομιεῖσθ', ἂν θεὸς θέλῃ, καὶ τὰ κατερραθυμημένα πάλιν ἀναλήψεσθε, κἀκεῖνον τιμωρήσεσθε. (7)[24]

If a restored will to resist Philip promises the Athenians the chance to reverse their fortunes, Demosthenes adds a second moral argument designed to reinforce Athenian confidence. Demosthenes characterizes Philip as a person who not only lacks real power but who displays the classic marks of a person bent on his own destruction. He compares deliberately the Athenian victory "not many years earlier" over Spartan power (ῥώμη)with Philip's ὕβρις:

> παραδείγμασι χρώμενοι τῇ τότε ῥώμῃ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, ἧς ἐκρατεῖτ' ἐκ τοῦ προσέχειν τοῖς πράγμασι τὸν νοῦν, καὶ τῇ νῦν ὕβρει τούτου, δι' ἣν ταραττόμεθ' ἐκ τοῦ μηδὲν φροντίζειν ὧν ἐχρῆν. (3)

> . . . adducing as evidence, on the one hand, the power of Sparta at that time, which you conquered because you were committed heart and soul to the public welfare and, on the other hand, this fellow's excessive self-assertion at the moment, which unnerves us because we ignore our every duty.

Even in the fourth century hybris (over-growth) continued to imply atê (the blindness that leads to doom).[25] Hence, it is a powerful encouragement to the Athenians to believe that in Philip they are not confronting a ῥώμη comparable to that of the Spartans (though they had, after all, bested the Spartans!), but a hybris which must finally work to their advantage. Demosthenes reminds his audience that Philip is "no god," and the present circumstances are not fixed irreversibly in his favor:

> μὴ γὰρ ὡς θεῷ νομίζετ' ἐκείνῳ τὰ παρόντα πεπηγέναι πράγματ' ἀθάνατα. (8)[26]
>
> Don't believe that his present goods are secured for him as for a god, in perpetuity.

In fact, appealing to universal human experience, Demosthenes asserts that Philip's hybris has already made him the object of hatred, fear, and envy among even those who seem at the moment to be most friendly to him.[27] For, in the portrait that Demosthenes draws, Philip is understood to be increasingly dominated by unrestrained craving (ἀσέλγεια); he indulges in "boastful threats" (ἀπειλεῖ); he delivers "arrogant speeches" (λόγους ὑπερηφάνους).[28] Like the ἄδικος of Aristotle's Ethics and the τύραννος, slave of his insatiable appetites, described in Plato's Republic, Philip is portrayed as a driven man unable to rest content with the holdings he has already brought into subjection to himself; he is always surrounding himself with something more.[29]

To solve his first strategic problem, the need to quiet Athenian

fear of Philip while intensifying the sense of urgency to resist him, Demosthenes, on the one hand, recalls the details of Philip's successes and, on the other hand, attributes those successes not to Philip's skill or strength but to Athens' negligence. An Athenian change of heart, a renewed determination to resist Philip, will turn the tables on their enemy not only because determined action has won them the victory against a strong enemy in the past (i.e., Sparta) but because their present enemy displays not strength, but self-destructive hybris. The entire argument has shifted the discussion from a debate of strategic probabilities to an imaginative portrayal of moral verities.

His focus on moral decision entails, however, a harsh criticism of Athenian negligence. How can such an attack on the Athenians hope to persuade them to accept the point of view of their critic? We turn now to Demosthenes' second strategic problem, his need to gain the sympathy and good will of an audience that is the object of his criticism. Such a polemical speech will require more than the usual attempts at ingratiation of the audience. Pearson points to the tone of the prologue, "which is more modest and in the manner of a plaintiff who thinks it necessary to explain why he is bringing suit."[30] It contrasts with the "self-confident, almost arrogant openings" of Demosthenes' earlier political speeches.[31] Also in contrast with his earlier speeches, Demosthenes deemphasizes himself, according to Pearson:

> In the First Philippic the personal pronoun appears only in the enclitic form, and when he uses the first personal singular form of a verb, it is without an ego, except in the closing paragraph where he is summing up and rendering his personal conclusions.[32]

Finally, Pearson says, Demosthenes in the First Philippic adopts an order of argument normal for the deferential style of forensic oratory:

> Without any hint at the beginning that he has found the right answer, he begins by explaining the situation and its dangers; the solution does not come until, as in a forensic speech, narrative and argument have prepared the ground.[33]

All of these changes in style and structure Pearson understands to be Demosthenes' conscious attempt to gain the εὔνοια of his audience. The changes do suggest that Demosthenes was aware of the second strategic problem which we are addressing, and Pearson is helpful in calling our attention to them. But when he focuses directly on the "harsh words" Demosthenes uses "to describe Athenian ineptness," Pearson's interest in forensic oratory and in Demosthenes' attacks on Philip leads him to define Demosthenes' solution to his strategic problem too narrowly and, hence, inadequately:

> To atone for his severity Demosthenes reminds them what kind of a man Philip is, a man who cannot rest content with his victories but is always trying something new (42); in fact he seems to be drunk from his great successes (49). There is no need to underline the conclusion. If the speech shows that Philip is both guilty and vulnerable, it will have achieved its purpose.[34]

While the speech must show that Philip is guilty and vulnerable, it must also show that Athens has both the hope of successfully punishing Philip and the obligation to do so. It must persuade the Athenians to take action.

Demosthenes responds to this second strategic problem through an imaginative use of historical example. Within the first two paragraphs (2-3) following the prologue he lays the strategic groundwork for the entire speech. Immediately he sets a positive tone for the speech: πρῶτον μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἀθυμητέον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῖς παροῦσι πράγμασι. . . . (First, then, we don't need to be discouraged, men of Athens, at the present state of affairs. . . .")

It is true, of course, that Demosthenes goes on at once to lodge the source of their present discomfiture in their own irresponsibility, but by a paradoxical sleight of hand, he manages to turn their failures into their most promising grounds for hope. For if the problem is their own, then it is within their power to correct. With this rather vulnerable piece of sophistry Demosthenes intends to predispose his audience to listen to his subsequent account of their negligence. He is wise enough not to rest content with this initial statement but immediately contrasts present negligence with recent achievement:

> ἔπειτ' ἐνθυμητέον καὶ παρ' ἄλλων ἀκούουσι καὶ τοῖς εἰδόσιν αὐτοῖς ἀναμιμνῃσκομένοις, ἡλίκην ποτ' ἐχόντων δύναμιν Λακεδαιμονίων, ἐξ οὗ χρόνος οὐ πολύς, ὡς καλῶς καὶ προσηκόντως οὐδὲν ἀνάξιον ὑμεῖς ἐπράξατε τῆς πόλεως, ἀλλ' ὑπεμείνατ' ὑπὲρ τῶν δικαίων τὸν πρὸς ἐκείνους πόλεμον. τίνος οὖν εἵνικα ταῦτα λέγω; ἵν' εἰδῆτ', ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ θεάσησθε, ὅτι οὐδὲν οὔτε φυλαττομένοις ὑμῖν ἐστιν φοβερόν, οὔτ', ἂν ὀλιγωρῆτε, τοιοῦτον οἷον ἂν ὑμεῖς βούλοισθε, παραδείγμασι χρώμενοι τῇ τότε ῥώμῃ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, ἧς ἐκρατεῖτ' ἐκ τοῦ προσέχειν τοῖς πράγμασι τὸν νοῦν, καὶ τῇ νῦν ὕβρει τούτου, δι' ἣν ταραττόμεθ' ἐκ τοῦ μηδὲν φροντίζειν ὧν ἐχρῆν. (3)
>
> In the second place, take heart at this: Those of you who have heard the story from others and those of you who were eyewitnesses will remember how vast Sparta's power was not so long ago and yet heroically and properly you did nothing unworthy of the City. No, you faced up to a war against them in defense of what was rightfully yours. Why, you ask, am I telling you this? So that you may know from empirical observation, Athenians, that nothing is fearful to you when you are on your guard; but if you are neglectful, nothing turns out as you would wish. As evidence [of what I say I am inviting you] to adduce, on the one hand, Athenians, the power of Sparta at that time, which you conquered because you were committed heart and soul to the public welfare and, on the other hand, this fellow's excessive self-assertion at the moment, which unnerves us because we ignore our every duty.

Ἔπειτ' ἐνθυμητέον, in parallel with πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἀθυμητέον, introduces what Pearson calls a "virtuoso passage."[35] It is designed to recall, not the worst (as in 2), but the best of Athens' past.

'Ενθυμεῖσθαι invites the audience to draw conclusions from data, in this case from an event in recent Athenian history.[36] The "data," which Demosthenes assumes to be known to his audience, either from personal experience or from stories told by eyewitnesses, are "how vast the power that Sparta had" in the not so distant past and how "heroically and properly" the Athenians "did nothing unworthy of the City" in response to that Spartan might, but "faced up to their war against them in defense of what was rightfully theirs."[37] For what purpose had Demosthenes adduced this accomplishment? some might wonder. (τίνος οὖν εἵνεκα ταῦτα λέγω;) He responds with a hendiadys (ἵν' εἰδῆτ' . . . καὶ θεάσησθε, ὅτι . . .)which may be translated, "so that you may know through empirical observation that . . . ."[38] The object of the empirical observation is the personal experience of the audience, in the form of either stories heard about or direct participation in a shared event of the Athenian past (καὶ παρ' ἄλλων ἀκούουσι καὶ τοῖς εἰδόσιν αὐτοῖς), now recalled to consciousness (ἀναμιμνησκομένοις). The conclusion Demosthenes intends his audience to draw from their recollection and contemplation of that event is "that nothing is fearful to you when you are on your guard; but, if you are neglectful, nothing is as you would wish."[39] He then repeats the thought conveyed by θεάσησθε, defining it more specifically as παραδείγμασι χρώμενοι and relating his conclusion concretely to his παράδειγμα with the further elaboration, τῇ τότε ῥώμῃ, . . . τῇ νῦν ὕβρει. . . . The Spartan <u>might</u> of that time the Athenians conquered by pertinacious attention to their public life (Cp. φυλαττομένοις), while "this fellow's" present violence, his

excessive self-assertion today, unnerves the Athenians because they give heed to nothing that they should (Cp. ὀλιγωρῆτε).

Although the παράδειγμα functions formally as inductive evidence for Demosthenes' proposition that προσέχειν τοῖς πράγμασι τὸν νοῦν (= φυλάττειν) is the key to Athens' security, Demosthenes intends it to serve as more than logical proof.[40] He is not seeking rational objectivity, nor does he permit his audience to achieve the distancing from the evidence which its valid use as proof would entail (cp. θεάσησθ'). First, and characteristically, Demosthenes chooses for his example an event in Athens' own history and not from common Hellenic lore or from the histories of other states.[41] He does not choose to argue from some universal truth about humanity-in-general but from what he asserts to be specifically true of Athens. His audience, therefore, is not asked to speculate about human nature or about general principles of international power struggles but to seek the patterns of meaning within their own story. Second, Demosthenes here uses an example within the memory of some of his audience. It is more than a chapter in the story of Athens or a recollection of Athens' past glory; it is a living part of his audience's own collective experience: οὐδὲν ἀνάξιον ὑμεῖς ἐπράξατε τῆς πόλεως.[42] He invites his audience to recall their own behavior in the not so distant past. It was they whose bravery and attention to duty made them worthy of their city (καλῶς καὶ προσηκόντως . . . ὑμεῖς ἐπράξατε). It was they who had submitted themselves to war's hazards for their righteous cause (ὑπεμείναθ'). It was their own devotion to public affairs that had conquered Spartan might (ἐκρατεῖτ'). By invoking

an example from their own experience, Demosthenes is able to emphasize the incongruity of their present behavior. The same Athenians who now tremble in confusion before Philip's ὕβρις were the ones who once mastered the ῥώμη of Sparta.

Hans Strohm comments about Demosthenes' use of the παράδειγμα here, "das geht gegen das Sich-nicht-betroffen-Fühlen der Athener." Demosthenes is dealing with a past, "die für die Gegenwart verbindlich und damit gegenwärtig ist."[43] He is correct. But if the example functioned only as binding obligation attacking the Athenians' apathy, it would lose most of its persuasive force. More than a statement of obligation or censure, the example functions here as a strong affirmation of the grand and noble capacities Demosthenes intends his audience to expect of themselves. In their common history they share a unity deeper than the division in their present policy. Through the example Demosthenes recalls his audience to a more worthy image of themselves, as though to say that their identity is not to be derived from their present situation; it has been bequeathed to them by previous generations of Athenians and evidenced in their own most recent past. It is this recovered consciousness of themselves attested in their own story that will make their present behavior appear incongruous and inappropriate. By introducing a speech which is an attack on the Athenians' inaction with an illustration of what Demosthenes intends to portray as their true character, their more authentic identity, he attempts to create good-will with his audience and to avoid the appearance of a direct, even hostile assault, on his fellow citizens. In effect, he is telling his compatriots, "What I shall describe in your present behavior is not

the real you. You and I share a history that reveals us as a quite different kind of people. If we begin to act 'in character' again, our problems today will be overcome quite as successfully as they have been in the past."[44]

The character which Demosthenes ascribes to Athenians is conveyed in IV 3 through highly compressed allusions to four commonplaces:

Commonplaces in IV 3[45]

1. Athenians live up to the ideals of the ancestors and City.

   προσηκόντως <u>οὐδὲν ἀνάξιον</u> ὑμεῖς ἐπράξατε <u>τῆς πόλεως</u>

2. Athenians endure (ὑπομένειν) whatever dangers and toils come.

   <u>ὑπεμείναθ'</u> ὑπὲρ τῶν δικαίων τὸν πρὸς ἐκείνους πόλεμον

3. Athenians act out of commitment to τὸ δίκαιον.

   ὑπεμείναθ' <u>ὑπὲρ τῶν δικαίων</u> τὸν πρὸς ἐκείνους πόλεμον

4. Athenians are victorious over their enemies.

   παραδείγμασι χρώμενοι τῇ τότε ῥώμῃ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, ἧς ἐκρατεῖτ'

   cp. IV 24--οἶδ' ἀκούων ὅτι Λακεδαιμονίους παραταττόμενοι μεθ' ὑμῶν <u>ἐνίκων</u> οὗτοι οἱ ξένοι καὶ ὑμεῖς μετ' ἐκείνων

In this early speech Demosthenes' use of commonplaces is not lavish. In fact, it may appear that the words and phrases combined within a single paragraph are not commonplaces at all, but simply the appropriate language any speaker would choose to describe the Athenian response to Spartan threat. Nor can it be denied that these and other such phrases identified as commonplaces in the <u>epitaphioi</u> are not obviously present in the remainder of the First Philippic. The <u>paradeigma</u> with which these four words and phrases are linked in paragraph 3 is, moreover, not

a familiar or characteristic part of the epideictic tradition, from which one might have expected Demosthenes to draw a reference to Marathon or Salamis, if not to an incident from the standard mythological repertory.

It can be conceded, therefore, that the resort to epideictic themes is far less pervasive or even clearly demonstrated in this speech than it will be in later speeches, particularly in the Third Philippic. Nonetheless, it remains apparent that the one part of this speech in which terminology very close to that of epideictic oratory is used is that one part that links these terms to an historical example for the purpose of defining, praising, and commending Athenian identity. Comparison with the citations of parallels in the epitaphioi confirms the recurrence of these terms, even the unusual ὑπομένω, in the similar context of the funeral speeches.[46] The absence of these words and phrases from other parts of the speech argues for their conscious, intentional employment here. It is as though Demosthenes, in this early speech, believed that he could gain the goodwill of his audience and fix the vision of Athenian identity early in the speech and then continue to draw on that goodwill and confident self-image throughout the remainder of the speech. In the more mature later speeches he will reinforce the Athenian self-image by dispersing the epideictic material throughout the speech, as is particularly true in the Third Philippic. Finally, the reference to the example of the Athenian conflict with Sparta rather than to the traditional mythic or anti-Persian examples more characteristic of epideictic oratory is consistent with Demosthenes' later usage. It will be seen in the chapters that follow that, even as Demosthenes uses the language of epideictic, he normally avoids use of the

conventional epideictic examples. I hypothesize that Demosthenes' interest in examples of conflict within Greece, especially of conflicts between Athens and Sparta, reflects his desire for the restoration of Athens' historic supremacy in Greece. He will see the conflict with Philip less on the model of Athens' great defense of Greece against the Persian invader than in terms of the traditional rivalry for supremacy among the major Greek states--Athens, Sparta, and Thebes. To that rivalry, however, he attaches the emotional power evoked by the slogans, themes and language of the epideictic tradition.

Evidence that Demosthenes' first concern is for the protection of Athenian rights and for the restoration of Athenian supremacy in Greece is to be found in paragraph 5, where he describes the conflict between Athens and Macedon as a dispute over property, which he calls the "prizes of war" (ἆθλα τοῦ πολέμου) for the party that takes the conflict seriously. Following common forensic practice, he places his own point of view into the mind of Philip:

> ἀλλ' εἶδεν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο καλῶς ἐκεῖνος, ὅτι ταῦτα μέν ἐστιν ἅπαντα τὰ χωρί' ἆθλα τοῦ πολέμου κείμεν' ἐν μέσῳ, φύσει δ' ὑπάρχει τοῖς παροῦσι τὰ τῶν ἀπόντων, καὶ τοῖς ἐθέλουσι πονεῖν καὶ κινδυνεύειν τὰ τῶν ἀμελούντων. καὶ γάρ τοι ταύτῃ χρησάμενος τῇ γνώμῃ πάντα κατέστραπται καὶ ἔχει.
>
> But he recognized clearly, Athenians, that all these outposts are prizes of war open to public competition; that by nature the property of those who absent themselves accrues to those who show up and that the property of those who refuse to get involved falls into the hands of those who are willing to exert themselves and take risks. You see, it was precisely by following this principle that he subdued and now holds everything.

Demosthenes recommends adoption of the same γνώμη by Athens (IV 7). If Philip was right to see the property in dispute between Athens and Macedon as ἆθλα τοῦ πολέμου, then the image of Philip and the image

of Athens portrayed by Demosthenes in this speech are congruent. The contest between Philip and Athens is a simple matter of military supremacy, a contest for the prizes of war, a competition between two rivals not unlike the boxing match which Demosthenes in paragraph 40 introduces as a metaphor of the war with Philip.

For this context the four commonplaces which Demosthenes appears to adduce in paragraph 3 are rhetorically potent. Having pointed to Athens' readiness to engage in the competition with Sparta in the recent past, he describes that behavior as consistent with Athenian character (προσηκόντως οὐδὲν ἀνάξιον . . . τῆς πόλεως). He interprets that conflict, and by inference the present conflict as well, as a contest aimed at defense of the rights of Athens (ὑπὲρ τῶν δικαίων). That is to say, the conflict was neither trivial nor irresponsible but necessary to the preservation of Athens' legitimate attributes. For that high purpose Athens was, moreover, willing to endure (ὑπεμείναθ') war, with its accompanying toils and perils. Finally, having demonstrated the will to act for Athens in a manner consistent with Athenian identity, the Athenians were victorious over Spartan might (ἐκρατεῖτ'). With the use of these few commonplaces Demosthenes summarizes his response to the two rhetorical problems that he faces in this speech. His audience is to infer that the present conflict with Philip is at least as threatening to Athenian rights as was the earlier conflict with Sparta. They are to conclude that failure to respond would be conduct historically unbefitting the City. They are encouraged to believe that the will to endure the war with Macedon can only result in an Athenian victory, a point which Demosthenes repeats

for good measure in paragraph 24.

In the later Philippics Demosthenes' resort to epideictic commonplaces will become both clearer and more extensive. Even in this speech, however, Demosthenes' use of commonplaces, though limited, is significant. They are his chief means of defining Athenian identity and of creating a vision of Athenian destiny against which Demosthenes can playfully subject the present behavior of Athenians to ridicule. Even as he derides his compatriots' policy and practice he intends thereby to jolt them from easy complacency to the recollection of their own history, when Athens was champion in the game of war. By couching their recollection of that history in proud epideictic terms he suggests that Athens will as easily win the game with Macedon as it had won the game with Sparta a little earlier, if only Athenians will act the part of Athenians and perform once again deeds that are honorable and appropriate, in a word, worthy of their own identity.

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER II

[1]G. Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton: Princeton U. Press, 1963), p. 207. G. L. Cawkwell, Philip of Macedon (London: Faber and Faber, 1978), p. 79.

[2]Although Dionysius complicates his chronology by separating paragraphs 30-51 from the earlier part of the speech and assigning them, as a separate speech, to the archonship of Themistocles, 347/6 (Ad Amm. 736f.), his division has been generally rejected by both ancient and modern critics. For a discussion, see A. Schaefer, Demosthenes und seine Zeit, 3 vols., rev. 2d ed. (Leipzig: Teubner, 1885-7), 2:66ff.

[3]"Demosthenes erste Philippika," Festschrift Theodor Mommsen zum fünfzigjährigen Doctorjubiläum (Marburg, 1893).

[4]Among those who have followed Schwartz are U. Kahrstedt, Forschungen zur Geschichte des ausgehenden fünften und des vierten Jahrhunderts (Berlin, 1910), p. 121, n. 211; E. Pokorny, Studien zur griechischen Geschichte im sechsten und fünften Jahrzehnt des vierten Jahrhunderts (Greifswald, 1913), pp. 125f.; and A. D. Momigliano, Filippo il Macedone (Florence, 1934), pp. 110 and 112, n. 1.

A date in 352/1 is favored by Schaefer; F. Blass, Die attische Beredsamkeit, 3 vols. (Leipzig: Teubner, vol. 3, part 1, 2d ed., 1893), p. 300; A. W. Pickard-Cambridge, Demosthenes and the Last Days of Greek Freedom (New York and London: Putman, 1914), p. 184; P. Cloché, Démosthènes et la fin de la démocratie athénienne (Paris: Payot, 1957), p. 73; E. Drerup, Aus einer alten Advokatenrepublik, Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Altertums, vol. 8, nos. 3-4 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1916), p. 64 n. 66.

The most recent rebuttals of Schwartz have come from R. Sealey, "Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Some Demosthenic Dates," REG 68 (1955): 81-89, and G. L. Cawkwell, "The Defense of Olynthus," CQ n.s. 12 (1962): 122-27. In an article that fails to take note of Cawkwell, J. R. Ellis, "The Date of Demosthenes' First Philippic," REG 79 (1966): 636-39, tries to make a case for a date no earlier than January 350. His argument could as easily support a date late in 351; Cawkwell's dating remains the most plausible.

[5]Dem. III 4f. and IV 1. G. L. Cawkwell, "The Defense of Olynthus," p. 126.

[6]G. L. Cawkwell, "The Defense of Olynthus," pp. 125-27, and Philip of Macedon, p. 80.

[7]Conventional scholarly wisdom traditionally held that Demosthenes' First Philippic merely articulates overtly for the first time a deep opposition to Philip that Demosthenes had conceived from the beginnings of Philip's reign. Bury, for example (A History of Greece, 3d ed., revised by Russell Meiggs [London: MacMillan, 1951], p. 705), implies that Demosthenes had previously wished to attack Philip when the advance on the Propontis gave the orator "a more promising occasion to urge the Athenians to act, since their own interests were directly involved." Schaefer dates the onset of Demosthenes' vigorous opposition to Philip to his first public speeches (2:57):

> Während der ersten Regierungsjahre Philipps hatte er die öffentliche Rednerbühne nocht nicht betreten, sobald er aber an den Staatsverhandlungen sich zu beteiligen anfing, arbeitete er auch darauf hin seine Mitbürger zu einem kräftigen Einschreiten gegen Philipp anzutreiben.

Recent scholarship however, has pointed to how modest a role Philip plays in Demosthenes' early speeches and noted an apparent change between his speech Against Aristocrates and the First Philippic delivered only a few months earlier. Jaeger, (Demosthenes. The Origin and Growth of His Policy [Berkeley: U. California Press, 1938], p. 114) comments that "Philip's sudden march to the Hellespont upset not only all the calculations on which the official Athenian policy was based, but also those which Demosthenes--the severe critic of that policy--had expounded in his speech Against Aristocrates." Cawkwell adopts an even more radical position (Philip, pp. 79f.): "The speech Against Aristocrates was argued in the belief that Cersobleptes, not Philip, was Athens' enemy in the north. . . . It is inconceivable that the Demosthenes of The First Philippic could have written it, if he had appreciated what was happening. Cf. also Kennedy, p. 223, and Minor M. Markle III, "The Peace of Philocrates, A Study in Athenian Foreign Relations 348-346 B.C." (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1968), p. 12.

[8]Blass (3,1:303): ". . . Ueberfluss an Lebendigkeit, an mannigfachen Gefühlen, an mächtigem Zorn und schonungsloser Bitterkeit."

Jaeger (Demosthenes, p. 123): "The thing that gives this speech its new force is the sense of imminent decision, which inspires the orator's fancy with images of an overpowering and stirring magnificence such as no other eloquence has ever again brought forth.

Pickard-Cambridge (Demosthenes, p. 188): Demosthenes' earlier speeches are "cold" beside "the eloquence of this Speech."

Kennedy ("Focusing of Arguments in Greek Deliberative Oratory," TAPA 90 [1959]: 136): ". . . a new vigor . . . unlike anything in Greek oratory since the fifth century and which involves a return to focus on a single form of argument."

Galen Rowe ("Demosthenes' First Philippic: The Satiric Mode," TAPA 99 [1968]: 363): "A highly pictorial quality distinguishes the First Philippic from Demosthenes' previous speeches."

Lionel Pearson (The Art of Demosthenes, Beiträge zur klassischen Philologie, Heft 68 [Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain,

1976], p. 126): "The First Philippic is different from any of the earlier speeches because it is an emotional appeal, an appeal to the Athenians' confidence in themselves and their pride as free men."

[9]Kennedy (see above n. 7), p. 137.

[10]Rowe, p. 362.

[11]Rowe, p. 363.

[12]Rowe, p. 374 n. 23: "It is beyond the scope of this article to explain how the mimetic aspect of satire is, or can be, persuasive. For an example of how involved such an attempt can become, see Joseph Bentley, 'Satire and the Rhetoric of Sadism,' Centennial Review 11 (1967): 387-404."

[13]Rowe, p. 374, here quotes Ronald Paulson, The Fictions of Satire (Baltimore, 1967), p. 3.

[14]Pearson, p. 127 n. 16.

[15]It is the Athenian identity that is the bearer of the "ethical norms" to which Rowe correctly refers, p. 370 n. 18.

[16]Galen O. Rowe, "The Portrait of Aeschines in the Oration on the Crown," TAPA 97 (1966): 397.

[17]The idea is repeated in II 22. In the Second Philippic (VI 6) he states his disagreement with it. Δυσπολέμητος occurs only here in the authentic speeches of Demosthenes (although it appears in the spurious Answer to Philip's Letter [XI 15] in an expanded version of II 22). In the Panegyricus (IV 138) Isocrates had applied the term to the Persian king.

[18]οὐκ ἔνι ἡμῖν πορίσασθαι δύναμιν τὴν ἐκείνῳ παραταξομένην. . . . οὐ γὰρ ἔστι μισθὸς οὐδὲ τροφή. The νῦν is as important here (and in 41) as Calhoun has shown it to be in the Second Philippic ("Demosthenes' Second Philippic," TAPA 64 [1933]: 1-17). Demosthenes is not saying that Athens could never meet Philip in direct battle, only that the city does not have the resources to do so now. That, of course, is what he finally intends by φαύλως and κακῶς in 2.

[19]The first sentence of Demosthenes' argument had defined Athens' present situation as apparently very bad (2: πάνυ φαύλως ἔχειν δοκεῖ). The last sentence, which looks to a future

Demosthenes claims rests within Athens' hands (50: τὰ λοιπὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡμῖν ἐστί), asserts that the Athenians can know with certainty (εὖ εἰδέναι) that their future will be bad (φαῦλα) if they fail to attend to the facts and do what must be done.

[20]Cf. the similar argument in I 4 and IX 5.

[21] εἰ τοίνυν ὁ Φίλιππος τότε ταύτην ἔσχε τὴν γνώμην, ὡς χαλεπὸν πολεμεῖν ἐστιν Ἀθηναίοις ἔχουσι τοσαῦτ' ἐπιτειχίσματα τῆς αὐτοῦ χώρας ἔρημον ὄντα συμμάχων, οὐδὲν ἂν ὧν νυνὶ πεποίηκεν ἔπραξεν οὐδὲ τοσαύτην ἐκτήσατο ἂν δύναμιν.

[22] φύσει is translated by Vince as "by natural right," by Croiset as "par une loi de la nature." Both translations are a bit excessive. The passage is simply crudely pragmatic about "the way it is," as the preceding metaphor drawn from wrestling suggests. κινδυνεύειν is an Athenian virtue which appears as an epitaphic commonplace. Cf. Appendix I, p. 227; Appendix II, pp. 243-4.

[23]Cp. 5: ἀμελούντων. The noun is relatively uncommon in Demosthenes, appearing here and in 17 of this speech, in I 10 and IX 5, where it is linked with ῥᾳθυμία. In each instance the term is invoked as the basis for Philip's successes. The term combines at once the sense of negligence, carelessness, oversight, and apathy. Cf. LSJ, s.v.

[24]Note the emphatic placement of νῦν at the end of its phrase. Weil comments, "placé avec une certaine rudesse à la fin de la phrase." Cp. 44. τιμωρία of one's enemies is a commonplace of the epitaphioi.

[25]Classical tragedy continued to be performed in the fourth century. Cf. Albin Lesky, A History of Greek Literature (New York: Crowell, 1966), pp. 630f. T. B. L. Webster, Studies in Later Greek Comedy (Manchester: Manchester U. Press, 1953), p. 8. Demosthenes himself quotes Sophocles and Solon, in particular, passages that recall divine retribution on the arrogant (XIX 247f. & 255). Cf. Isocrates VII 4, VIII 102, and Demosthenes I 23: τὸ γὰρ εὖ πράττειν παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἀφορμὴ τοῦ κακῶς φρονεῖν τοῖς ἀνοήτοις γίγνεται· διόπερ πολλάκις δοκεῖ τὸ φυλάξαι τἀγαθὰ τοῦ κτήσασθαι χαλεπώτερον εἶναι.

[26]Cf. 9: ἄνθρωπος!

[27]8: ἀλλὰ καὶ μισεῖ τις ἐκεῖνον καὶ δέδιεν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ φθονεῖ, καὶ τῶν πάνυ νῦν δοκούντων οἰκείως ἔχειν· καὶ ἅπανθ' ὅσα περ κἀν ἄλλοις τισὶν ἀνθρώποις ἔνι, ταῦτα κἀν τοῖς μετ' ἐκείνου χρὴ νομίζειν ἐνεῖναι. On οἰκείως cp. 4. Cf. the abject portrait of the despot in Pl. Resp. 579b-580a.

[28]9. The term ὑπερήφανος is associated with the excess that leads to disaster. Cp. Isoc., XII 196: οὐκ ἐξέστησαν αὐτῶν [οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι] τηλικαῦτα διαπραξάμενοι τὸ μέγεθος, οὐδ' ἔπαθον ταὐτὸ τοῖς διὰ μὲν τὸ καλῶς καὶ φρονίμως βούλευσασθαι καὶ πλούτους μεγάλους καὶ δόξας καλὰς κτησαμένοις, διὰ δὲ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τὰς τούτων ὑπερηφάνοις γενομένοις καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν διαφθαρεῖσι καὶ κατεχθεῖσιν εἰς χεῖρω πράγματα καὶ ταπεινότερα τῶν πρότερον αὐτοῖς ὑπαρχόντων. Arist., Rhet. 1390b30, 1391b1.

[29]9: οὐχ οἷός ἐστιν ἔχων ἃ κατέστραπται μένειν ἐπὶ τούτων. Cf. 42: νῦν δ' ἐπιχειρῶν ἀεί τινι καὶ τοῦ πλείονος ὀρεγόμενος. Arist. Eth. Nic. 1129b 1: ἐπεὶ πλειονέκτης ὁ ἄδικος. Plat., Resp. 573-76, esp. 573a: πόθου κέντρον, 573d, Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ πολλαὶ καὶ δειναὶ παραβλαστάνουσιν ἐπιθυμίαι ἡμέρας τε καὶ νυκτὸς ἑκάστης, πολλῶν δεόμεναι;

[30]Pearson, Art (see above n. 7), p. 123.

[31]L. Pearson, "The Development of Demosthenes as a Political Orator," Phoenix 18 (1964): 101. The prologue appears to have been modeled on the prologue of Isocrates' Archidamus.

[32]Pearson, "Development," p. 104. Cf. Art, p. 114 n. 7: "In the 'First Philippic' the emphasis on self has almost disappeared, and Demosthenes now prefers to say that things 'seem to him' rather than 'I think.'"

[33]Pearson, "Development," p. 102.

[34]Pearson, Art, p. 36.

[35]L. Pearson, "The Virtuoso Passages in Demosthenes' Speeches," Phoenix 29 (1975): 225.

[36]Cf. XXI 54: τί οὖν ἐκ τούτων ὑμᾶς ἐνθυμεῖσθαι δεῖ; LSJ, s.v. ἐνθυμέομαι 4. The term is sometimes paired with λογίζεσθαι (Cf. I 21, IV 31.), which bears a slightly different meaning: "calculate on the basis of data." Ἐνθυμεῖσθαι is used twice in Pericles' Funeral Speech (Thuc. II 40.2, 43.1), on which Gomme comments, "It is a word often found in Thucydides, especially in the speeches, generally in the sense 'reflect on' or 'reflect deeply on.'" A. W. Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, 4 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956-80), 2:123. At IV 43, however, ἐνθυμεῖσθαι is paired with ὀργίζεσθαι, where stress is on the affective rather than the cognitive aspect of the word: "take to heart, be concerned" (LSJ, s.v. ἐνθυμέομαι 2). Perhaps here in contrast with ἀθυμητέον ("despair," "be discouraged") the term bears the meaning "take heart at" or even "be inspired by."

[37]The parallel that Demosthenes wishes to draw between Athens' apparent weakness and its adversary's apparent strength suggests the Corinthian War of 395. The Theban War of 378 has also been suggested. Weil, Harangues, p. 83, among others, declines to choose between the two possibilities. Pickard-Cambridge chooses the Theban War because "it commenced twenty-six years before the speaking of the First Philippic, and would be well remembered by many of the hearers." Demosthenes' Orations (London: Dent, 1954), p. 144 n. 1. But a reference in the speech Against Leptines, which was delivered only three years earlier than the First Philippic, indicates that eye-witnesses of the Corinthian War were still alive: (referring to the Corinthian exiles of 394) ἀναγκάζομαι δὲ λέγειν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ταῦθ' ἃ παρ' ὑμῶν τῶν πρεσβυτέρων αὐτὸς ἀκήκοα (XX 52). It should be noted, however, that elsewhere in this speech (17 and 24) two clear references to the Corinthian War are introduced in a manner that suggests a more remote past than does the reference here: . . . καὶ πρότερόν ποτέ φασιν εἰς Ἀλίαρτον. . . . (17) πρότερόν ποτ' ἀκούω . . . οἶδ' ἀκούων. . . . (24)

ὑπὲρ τῶν δικαίων--Manuscripts A and Y insert Ἑλληνικῶν before δικαίων, but there is no justification for doing so. In a parallel passage in the Second Olynthiac (II 24), where the expression ὑπὲρ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν δικαίων is attested in all the manuscripts, the purpose of the reference to the Corinthian War is quite different from its purpose here: it explicitly contrasts the Athenians' willingness then to sacrifice for the rights of others (ἵν' οἱ ἄλλοι τύχωσι τῶν δικαίων) with their present refusal to fight for their own possessions. J. Luccioni, who attempts to prove that Demosthenes was a panhellenist, has not produced convincing evidence that "même quand Démosthène emploie le mot δίκαια sans adjectif, c'est aux droits des Grecs qu'il pense." Démosthène et le Panhellénisme (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1961), p. 73 n. 1. In the First Philippic the word δίκαιος in any of its forms, appears only here. It most naturally refers to Athens' own just claims or to the claims of "justice" (Croiset--"pour la défense du droit").

[38] εἰδῆτε (codd.); ἴδητε (O.C.T./Blass). Demosthenes commonly introduces empirical evidence in support of a thesis with the word θεάσασθε: III 6 25, IX 55, XVIII 31 147 227, XIX 116 141 174 196. Cf. XXXIX 13 and XXXVII 44 (!). The role of "spectator," "onlooker," "bystander" implicit in the verb (Cf. LSJ s.v. 3) makes it the appropriate term for disinterested, objective observation of data. It is the chance to "see for oneself," cf. θεωρία in Isoc. XVII 4, Thuc. VI 24.3.

[39]It is possible that the phrase may also bear the meaning: "that nothing is fearful to you when you keep [your past] in mind; but, if you pay no heed to it, nothing is as you would wish." Cp. LSJ s.v. φυλάσσω C. 2.

[40]"Auch Demosthenes weiss sehr wohl, dass die Masse durch ein Beispiel leichter zu überreden ist als durch einen mehr oder weniger philosophischen Beweis. So steht das Beweisen dicht neben dem Erklären, und die meisten Beispiele sind zu beidem bestimmt." K. Jost, Das Beispiel und Vorbild der Vorfahren, Rhetorische Studien, vol. 19 (Paderborn, 1936), pp. 178f. On the problem of examples as proofs in Aristotle, cp. Jost, p. 178 n. 3.

[41]On Demosthenes' own preference for οἰκεῖα παραδείγματα see Jost, pp. 163-67.

[42]Demosthenes does not use ὑμεῖς to refer to the distant past. Cf. IX 24, ὑμῖν, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς τότ' οὖσιν Ἀθηναίοις, referring to the fifth century. He pretends to insert ὑμῖν inadvertently in order to highlight the contrast between the earlier era of Athenian power and Athens' present weakness. See Weil, Harangues, p. 328. Jost, p. 239, n. 1.

[43]H. Strohm, "Eine Demosthenes-Interpretation," Gymnasium 69 (1962): 332.

[44]Cf. the contemporary speech On Organization (XIII), in which Demosthenes' persuasive strategy is precisely defined as the raising of hopes and enhancing of Athenian pride through praise of the ancestors. XIII 12, τί δ' ὑμῖν ἐκ τῶν Δημοσθένους λόγων ἀγαθὸν γέγονεν; παρελθων ὑμῶν, ὅταν αὐτῷ δόξῃ, ἐνέπλησε τὰ ὦτα λόγων, καὶ διέσυρε τὰ παρόντα, καὶ τοὺς προγόνους ἐπῃνεσεν, καὶ μετεωρίσας καὶ φυσήσας ὑμᾶς κατέβη.

[45]For a list of the epitaphic parallels to each of these commonplaces, see Appendix II.

[46]See Appendix II.

CHAPTER III

THE SECOND PHILIPPIC

No one seriously doubts that Demosthenes delivered his Second Philippic in 344 B.C. But the precise occasion and purpose of the speech have been matters of dispute since ancient times. It is clear enough that the speech provided the argument for a response to a foreign embassy (VI 28). But what embassy? The speech itself does not say, and scholarly debate has been directed to the interpretation of additional information provided by Dionysius and Libanius. Dionysius mentions envoys from the Peloponnese (ad Amm. I 10: διέθετο πρὸς τὰς ἐκ Πελοποννήσου πρεσβείας). Libanius writes that, although the speech itself does not identify the ambassadors, their identity may be derived from the study of "the histories of Philip" (Hypothesis 2: ἐκ δὲ τῶν Φιλιππικῶν ἱστοριῶν μαθεῖν δύνατον). In the "Histories"--whether the one by Theopompus or Anaximenes or some other--Libanius discovered a reference to ambassadors dispatched to Athens by Philip in 344 to protest alleged Athenian slanders of Philip. He infers that it is this embassy to which Demosthenes alludes in the Second Philippic. At the same time as the embassy from Philip Libanius writes that the Argives and Messenians also sent embassies. In all likelihood Libanius did not find mention of these additional embassies in the "Histories," but appends them as his own conjecture in order to account also for Dionysius' "embassies from the Peloponnese."[1]

G. M. Calhoun, in a 1933 article, has provided a convenient summary of scholarly debate on the identity of the embassy.[2] In the eighteenth century many scholars assumed that Dionysius refers to an embassy from Sparta, "which came to ask aid and alliance against Philip and his Peloponnesian allies, and was opposed by embassies from Philip and also from Thebes, Argos, and Messene."[3] More recent interpreters, among them Schaefer, Pickard-Cambridge, and Eduard Meyer, assumed that Dionysius refers to the Argive and Messenian envoys mentioned by Libanius and accepted the latter's explanation without modification. Grote rejects the possibility of an embassy from Philip as "incompatible with the the tenor of the speech" and refuses to speculate about whence the envoys came since it "does not appear in the oration." Blass rejects envoys from Philip but accepts envoys from Argos and Messenia as the occasion for the speech. On the other hand, Weil and many more recent authors and historians reject the possibility of the presence of Argive and Messenian envoys for a speech that scorns Peloponnesian stupidity and concludes that "the challenge to the pro-Macedonian leaders proves that the embassy was from Philip."[4] Still other interpreters reject Libanius and either follow Grote in refusing to name the embassies (Jaeger) or propose alternative explanations (Sandys, Rehdantz, Hahn).

Perhaps the most ingenious explanation of the occasion for the speech has been devised by G. L. Cawkwell, who proposes that the Macedonian embassy mentioned by Libanius is to be identified with an embassy from Philip περὶ εἰρήνης noted by Libanius (col. 8.8) and with the Macedonian embassy and representatives ἀπὸ τῆς συμμαχίας πάσης cited in other speeches of the Demosthenic corpus (VII 20f.,

XII 18, XVIII 136).[5] In Cawkwell's understanding, Python's embassy brought both Philip's complaints about unfair attacks on Philip in Athens and his proposal for an amendment (ἐπανόρθωσις) of the Peace of Philocrates which probably involved the establishment of a Common Peace for all the Greeks.[6] Cawkwell sees "the whole speech" as a demonstration of "the hollowness of [Philip's] proposals."[7]

The reconstruction of the events surrounding the delivery of the Second Philippic which Cawkwell offers is initially persuasive. It elegantly ties together evidence from widely separated sources and creates a coherent picture out of fragmentary allusions. Close attention to the speech itself, however, raises doubts about Cawkwell's interpretation, however attractive and creative it may appear. For example, the introductory sentence of the speech implies that Demosthenes considers it to be a contribution to a general discussion of Philip's aggressions in violation of the Peace: ὅταν . . . λόγοι γίγνωνται περὶ ὧν Φίλιππος πράττει καὶ βιάζεται παρὰ τὴν εἰρήνην (VI 1). If we are to assume that the subject under discussion is Philip's proposals for an amendment of the Peace and that, furthermore, Python and the Macedonian delegation are present for the discussion, it is unlikely that the thrust of the discussion would be Philip's aggressions. But Demosthenes' introduction makes little sense apart from such a discussion. Similarly, Demosthenes' reference a little later in his prologue to extended Athenian accounts of Philip's "shocking behavior" (Loeb. trans.) implies a debate unlikely to have occurred in the presence of a Macedonian embassy, particularly in response to proposals for an amendment of the Peace (IV 3: οἷα ποιεῖ δ', ὡς δεινά, καὶ τοιαῦτα διεξερχόμεθα).

Perhaps one could make the case that a speech devoted to a description of the reasons δι' ὧν ἐχθρὸν ἡγοῦμαι Φίλιππον (VI 6) appropriately defends Athenian attacks on Philip against the charge of slander and builds distrust before Philip's proposal of ἐπανόρθωσις; but it is inconceivable that even so outspoken a politician as Demosthenes would have delivered such a speech in the presence of "the enemy's" representatives.[8] In short, Cawkwell fails either to demonstrate that the Second Philippic is Demosthenes' response to Philip's complaints and proposals or to explain how it could be a response voiced in the presence of either Macedonians or Argives and Messenians, all of whom he vehemently attacks in the speech.

These unresolved problems invite one to reconsider Calhoun's solution: to discount Libanius' conjectures altogether and to propose that the embassy which prompted the debate, to which the Second Philippic is a contribution, represented Sparta:

> It is at least a reasonable hypothesis that the envoys present in the assembly were sent from Sparta to communicate the activities and intrigues of Philip, which threatened her with destruction, and to ask Athenian aid. . . . The subject of the speech is definitely Philip's preparations to join Argos and Messene in destroying the Spartan power. The conjectures of Libanius are clearly wrong, and the embassies to which he refers must have been received at some other session of the assembly.[9]

Calhoun's hypothesis offers several advantages. First, if the debate has to do with a question of possible Macedonian aggression against Sparta, Demosthenes' introductory sentence becomes reasonably specific to the discussion. For the subject under discussion would be a case in which Philip πράττει καὶ βιάζεται παρὰ τὴν εἰρήνην. Second, a Spartan delegation requesting Athenian help would account for Demosthenes' appeal for <u>action</u>, in particular, action to restrain a

specific Macedonian plan: (VI 3) ὡς δὲ κωλύσαιτ' ἂν ἐκεῖνον πράττειν ταῦτ' ἐφ' ὧν ἐστι νῦν, παντελῶς ἀργῶς ἔχετε. The urgency implied by the repeated νῦν in this speech, as Calhoun points out, suggests a specific crisis calling for effective Athenian response, not the diplomatic maneuvering with long range implications that a discussion of amendment to the Peace would entail. Third, Calhoun's hypothesis moves into prominence Demosthenes' warning that Philip οὐ μέλλει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ξένους εἰσπέμπει καὶ χρήματ' ἀποστέλλει καὶ δύναμιν μεγάλην ἔχων αὐτός ἐστι προσδόκιμος. τοὺς μὲν ὄντας ἐχθροὺς Θηβαίων Λακεδαιμονίους ἀναιρεῖ (VI 15). This ominous claim becomes more than simply an argument in support of a general distrust of Philip which should preclude Athenian agreement to amendment of the Peace; in Calhoun's hypothesis it becomes the central issue of the speech. Its urgency helps to explain Demosthenes' insistence on an active Athenian response "now." Finally, this hypothesis removes from discussion the need to explain how Demosthenes can vehemently attack Philip as well as scornfully refer to the Messenians and Argives and tediously lecture to them in the presence of their embassies. Calhoun's hypothesis removes the need to justify such unlikely behavior.[10]

An obstacle to the acceptance of Calhoun's hypothesis will be the unlikelihood that Philip actually contemplated or began deployment of any such forces against Sparta. Despite Demosthenes' continual attacks on Philip's good faith and his charges of Macedonian violations of the Peace, no clear evidence supports the contention that Philip had in any way violated the Peace during the two years since its

ratification. Between 346 and 344 he was busy in the north, securing his borders; continuing the consolidation and urbanization of Macedon through transfers of its populations; engaging in a defensive campaign against a certain Illyrian king, Pleuratus, in the course of which he suffered a smashed leg and barely escaped with his life; and, finally, in 344, marching into Thessaly, expelling the local tyrants, and reorganizing the country's administration around the traditional four tetrarchies. All of this the Thessalians appear to have greeted with approval and gratitude, as even Demosthenes himself finally admitted in the speech On the Crown (XVIII 43). The problem for Demosthenes was not that Philip had violated the Peace, but that so many Greek states apparently favored and supported his hegemony. They seem to have been relieved to have the presence of a guarantor of peace who would restrain the inter-state rivalries and hostilities that had sapped the strength of the Greek mainland for the preceding half century. Hence, it appears unlikely that Philip would have felt the need to launch a major campaign in the Peloponnese to "destroy Sparta" (VI 15), and, as Cawkwell points out, Demosthenes' subsequent silence on the subject implies that his "confident assertions of 344 (ξένους εἰσπέμπει, χρήματ' ἀποστέλλει) came to nothing."[11]

In order to accept Calhoun's hypothesis, however, we need not assume that either the Spartans or Demosthenes is telling the truth. Perhaps Sparta had given indications that it was about to seek control once again of Messenia and the Messenians and Argives had solicited aid from Philip under the terms of the peace. Perhaps Philip had indeed ordered Sparta to "leave Messenia alone" (VI 13) and made clear his

intent to use force if Sparta failed to comply. It would be understandable if Demosthenes and his associates who shared his fear of Macedonian power were disturbed by such an open invitation to Macedonian intervention in the Peloponnese. It is consistent with Demosthenes' attitude that he should have proposed an embassy to be sent to Messenia and Argos and that, as its head, he should have remonstrated with them for inviting Macedonian interference in their affairs. All of these developments could have taken place without leading to the inference that Philip actually ever acted against Sparta. If Sparta, however, feared the possibility of Macedonian intervention and appealed to Athens for aid, Demosthenes could well have exploited the occasion to argue Philip's violation of the Peace, to enflame Athenian distrust and hostility toward Philip, and to promote resistance to the Peace and ultimate revolt against Macedonian power. As early as his 346 speech On the Peace Demosthenes had counseled acquiescence but implied encouragement of revolt whenever the time was ripe. He may have believed that, with the opportunity for an alliance with Sparta, that time was "now." Hence, a Spartan appeal for Athenian aid against an "imminent" Macedonian attack provides at least a plausible occasion for the Second Philippic. Such a context for the speech may be more consistent with internal evidence than other proposed contexts without violating recent scholarly conclusions about Philip's policy during this period.

While it remains true that the precise occasion for this speech cannot be established with certainty, the larger context within which the speech was delivered will include the possibility of Macedonian intervention in the Peloponnese, Philip's objections to continuing

vocal opposition from such Athenian leaders as Demosthenes and Hegesippus, and Philip's proposals for an amendment to the Peace that would help to diffuse the criticism of his detractors and create a more stable political balance in the Greek mainland. The identification of these dimensions provides a sufficient historical context for the purpose of this paper.

In fact, identification of the precise occasion for the Second Philippic may be less important for an understanding of its persuasive strategy than a grasp of the larger historical development that preceded it. When Demosthenes delivered his First Philippic, Philip's actions in the north were perceived as ominous and threatening. They were uncertain of his intentions and could hardly have interpreted his action against Heraeum Teichos as anything but a potential threat to Athenian interests. The First Philippic provides its own evidence of the unrest that Philip was causing among Athenians in 351.[12] Hence, his strategy in that early speech is less to stress Philip's danger than to encourage the belief among Athenians that they could contain Philip's ambitions if only they resolved to do so. Similarly, at the time of the siege of Olynthus two years later, the three Olynthiac speeches were delivered to an audience that knew Philip's activity to be an attack on Athenian interests in the north. Olynthus, an economically and strategically important city in the area and head of a union of thirty-two cities in the Chalcidice, had sought alliance with Athens and appealed to the Athenians for military assistance against Philip. The issue was not whether Philip was engaged in a hostile action contrary to Athenian interests; the issue was how seriously Athens should view that action

and how feasible it was for Athens to send aid in response.

By the time of the Second Philippic the relationship of Athens and the other Greek states to Philip had changed altogether. Demosthenes had himself worked to gain ratification of the Peace of Philocrates, and however much he and some other Athenians may have resented Philip's manipulation of the negotiation process in order to gain the most commanding control over Greek affairs, the fact is that at the time Demosthenes delivered his Second Philippic speech Philip's hegemony in Greece appears to have been gaining acceptance, approval, and support among the Greek states. Already in his speech On the Peace Demosthenes had felt compelled to warn the Athenians against any activity that might invite a common war against Athens by all the other Greek states![13] In the succeeding two years Messenia, Argos, Thebes, and Thessaly were not alone in apparent approval of Macedonian leadership. The fact that Demosthenes must "beg" (δεηθῆναι) the audience of his Second Philippic to listen to his reasons for regarding Philip as Athens' enemy implies the extent of Philip's support in the Athens of 344.[14] Furthermore, in 346 Isocrates had published his Address to Philip, which applied to the Macedonian Isocrates' dream of a panhellenic crusade against Persia and which invited Philip "to assume leadership of the cause of unanimity among the Greeks and a campaign against the barbarians."[15] This injection of traditional panhellenic ideals and rhetoric into the Greek relationship with Philip illustrates the positive impact that the Macedonian had on at least some Greek intellectuals; at least one scholar has argued that Isocrates' vision was influential enough with Athenians in 344 to have prevented the

possibility of an Athenian-Persian alliance in that year and to have impeded Demosthenes' efforts to create a Hellenic coalition against Philip.[16] In 344 Athenians were no longer convinced that Philip was their enemy, and many of them apparently viewed him as a savior.

The rhetorical problem for Demosthenes in this speech is, therefore, altogether different from the problem posed for him at the time of the First Philippic. He finds it necessary to prove in this speech that Philip is Athens' enemy (VI 6). Because he does not have the concrete evidence to demonstrate overt aggression by Philip against Athens, however, his strategy is to create distrust of Philip's intentions (VI 24, ἀπιστία) by portraying Philip as an ambitious despot whose hidden plot is the seduction and subjugation of Athens. In the absence of empirical grounds for his assertion that Philip is Athens' enemy, Demosthenes must rely on calculations, λογισμοί (VI 6). He invites the Athenians to engage in calculation with him of Philip's motives and intents and to draw their own inferences (VI 17, λογίζεσθε γάρ). Philip, according to Demosthenes, is himself both observing the course of present events and drawing inferences from the past (VI 10): οὐ μόνον εἰς τὰ παρόνθ' ὁρῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ πρὸ τούτων λογιζόμενος. These calculations Philip measures against the standard of his ambition, that is, his desire for universal dominion (VI 7): πρὸς πλεονεξίαν, οἶμαι, καὶ τὸ πάνθ' ὑφ' αὑτῷ ποιήσασθαι τοὺς λογισμοὺς ἐξετάζων. For example, it is so that they might become "tools of his ambition" that Philip seeks ties with Thebes and Argos (VI 12): συνεργοὺς . . . πλεονεξίας. Those who would deny that Philip acted previously πλεονεξίας ἕνεκ' cannot continue to argue so

in the present situation (VI 13). Philip is seeking empire (VI 17): ἄρχειν βούλεται.

In Demosthenes' portrayal, Philip's ambition is understood as the natural corollary of his role as king (VI 25):

> βασιλεὺς γὰρ καὶ τύραννος ἅπας ἐχθρὸς ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ νόμοις ἐναντίος.
>
> Every king and tyrant is an enemy hostile to freedom and law.

Inasmuch as the free constitutions and free social intercourse of neighboring states stand as a threat to the security of kingly rule, a king or tyrant must fear democracies and ultimately seek to eliminate them. Hence, as Demosthenes quotes his warning to the Messenians and Argives (VI 21):

> οὐ γὰρ ἀσφαλεῖς ταῖς πολιτείαις αἱ πρὸς τοὺς τυράννους αὗται λίαν ὁμιλίαι.
>
> These excessive involvements with tyrants are dangerous for free societies.

Demosthenes suggests that democracies which negotiate in good faith with a king in order to avoid war soon discover that they have been deceived into laying the groundwork for a dictatorship (VI 25):

> οὐ φυλάξεσθ' ὅπως, ἔφην, μὴ πολέμου ζητοῦντες ἀπαλλαγῆναι δεσπότην εὕρητε;
>
> "Will you not take care," I said, "that, while seeking to escape from war, you don't discover a dictator?"

To the image of Philip as a person ambitiously craving ever larger dominion Demosthenes adds the associations Athenians would draw from his title, βασιλεύς (VI 25). His intent is to check every rationalization of Philip's threat: even if the Athenians were to imagine that Philip's ambitions were not directed at Athens and could be fulfilled through domination of other Greek states or of barbarian tribes to the north and

east, they must nevertheless reckon with the natural enmity Philip as βασιλεύς must feel toward Athens, the model of Hellenic democracy.

The third aspect of Demosthenes' image of Philip in the Second Philippic flows from the second and first. If Philip is, indeed, a king and tyrant by nature hostile to democracies and a person ambitious for expanded empire, he must destroy Athens. But since Demosthenes can produce no clear evidence, he argues that Philip is covertly plotting Athens' destruction, in fact, that all of his activities elsewhere are correctly to be understood as components of a master plan aimed at Athens. In the prologue (VI 2) Demosthenes speaks of Philip's plots against "all the Greeks" (πᾶσι τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐπιβουλεύοντα). Only a little later, however, he tells the Athenians that he is surprised at those who fail to recognize that "all Philip's preparations are directed at them." (VI 6, ἐφ' ὑμᾶς πάντα παρασκευάζεσθαι) It is this point rather than the first, more panhellenic, one that Demosthenes pursues throughout the speech. Philip tenders his favors to Thebes and Argos rather than to Athens, not in order to have them as the φίλοι committed to justice that Athens would expect to be, but in order to find additional accomplices for his ambitions (VI 12). More than that, however, he is cultivating them as part of his plot against Athens (VI 19, ἐπὶ τῇ πόλει θεραπεύει τινάς, θηβαίους καὶ Πελοποννησίων τοὺς ταὐτὰ βουλομένους τούτοις). Demosthenes recognizes and admits that his picture is inferential and that other interpretations of the facts are at least possible. It is only when the facts are observed "correctly" that the Athenians will recognize the meaning of Philip's activities, namely, that all the "business" to which

Philip has devoted himself in the period since ratification of the Peace has been integral to his plot against Athens (VI 16):

> ἐκ πάντων δ', ἂν τις ὀρθῶς θεωρῇ, πάνθ' ἃ πραγματεύεται κατὰ τῆς πόλεως συντάττων.[17]

Demosthenes continues with the line of reasoning which he believes will provide the key to the meaning and purpose of Philip's activities and permit one to observe them ὀρθῶς (VI 17-18):

> λογίζεσθε γάρ. ἄρχειν βούλεται, τούτου δ' ἀνταγωνιστὰς μόνους ὑπείληφεν ὑμᾶς. ἀδικεῖ πολὺν ἤδη χρόνον, καὶ τοῦτ' αὐτὸς ἄριστα σύνοιδεν αὐτῷ. . . . ἀμφότερ' οὖν οἶδε, καὶ αὐτὸν ὑμῖν ἐπιβουλεύοντα καὶ ὑμᾶς αἰσθανομένους· εὖ φρονεῖν δ' ὑμᾶς ὑπολαμβάνων. δικαίως αὐτὸν μισεῖν νομίζει.
>
> Figure it out for yourselves. Philip wants an empire, and for that he has determined that you are his only rivals. He has been doing you injury for a long time now, and of that his own conscience is best aware. . . . He knows these two things, then, that he is plotting against you and that you are aware of it. Supposing you are insightful people, he believes that you must hate him.

Here as in the First Philippic Demosthenes in the forensic manner places his own point of view into the mind of the antagonist.[18] He locates in Philip's imagination both the characterization of Philip and the Athenian response which he commends to his audience.[19] In fact, the long-time injury done to Athens by Philip was not a perception universally held by his fellows. It is Demosthenes who is accusing Philip of secret plots and trying to cause other Athenians to see them too. If Philip were correct in his "knowledge" that the Athenians were aware of his "plots," Demosthenes would have no need to deliver this speech. Finally, Philip becomes Demosthenes' instrument to confirm for the audience the legitimacy of the hatred toward Philip to which Demosthenes is trying to rouse his fellow citizens. None of this is empirical evidence; some of it is simply untrue. Yet it seductively creates and dramatically

portrays the image of the ambitious ruler calculating the necessary factors and plotting his course. At the same time Philip becomes an advocate for Demosthenes' position in the speech: Philip, power-hungry ruler, who has already injured Athens, now is planning more serious mischief; but an insightful Athenian populace will take notice and alone oppose Philip with a righteous hatred.

Demosthenes contrasts most clearly and potently the opposing images of Philip and Athens in VI 8-12, where he also as in VI 17-18 conveys the contrast by portraying it as the reflections of Philip himself. In these paragraphs Demosthenes introduces the single significant historical paradeigma used in the speech. Here also he concentrates his use of six epitaphic commonplaces. We shall now examine these five paragraphs in further detail.

The paradeigma which Demosthenes recalls in these paragraphs is drawn from the period of the Persian wars, and through it Demosthenes highlights the image of Athens as faithful panhellenic champion of common Hellenic rights against a scheming aggressor. This image he introduces first in paragraph eight as his explanation of why Philip chose to act in the interests of Thebes rather than of Athens (VI 8):

> εἶδε τοῦτ' ὀρθῶς, ὅτι τῇ μὲν ἡμετέρᾳ πόλει καὶ τοῖς ἤθεσι τοῖς ἡμετέροις οὐδὲν ἂν ἐνδείξαιτο τοσοῦτον οὐδὲ ποιήσειεν, ὑφ' οὗ πεισθέντες ὑμεῖς τῆς ἰδίας ἕνεκ' ὠφελείας τῶν ἄλλων τινὰς Ἑλλήνων ἐκείνῳ πρόοισθε, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ δικαίου λόγον ποιούμενοι, καὶ τὴν προσοῦσαν ἀδοξίαν τῷ πράγματι φεύγοντες, καὶ πάνθ' ἃ προσήκει προορώμενοι, ὁμοίως ἐναντιώσεσθε, ἄν τι τοιοῦτ' ἐπιχειρῇ πράττειν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ πολεμοῦντες τύχοιτε.
>
> This he [i.e., Philip] saw clearly, that to our city and our character he could offer or grant nothing so great that you would be persuaded by it to abandon to him any of the other Greeks. No. Because you value justice, flee the damage to your reputation that

> would attach to such a transaction, and foresee everything appropriate to the case, you would oppose him, if he should try to do anything of the sort, as much as if you were at war.

Here it is Philip who not only considers, supposes, or finds in his own conscience, but "sees accurately" (εἶδε τοῦτ' ὀρθῶς) the Athenian national character. The statement of the image is repeated only a few lines later, again as evidence of Philip's attitude toward Athens. His actions on behalf of the Messenians and Argives are an encomium of Athens and a judgment of the Athenian character (VI 9f.):

> ὃ καὶ μέγιστόν ἐστι καθ' ὑμῶν ἐγκώμιον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι· κέκρισθε γὰρ ἐκ τούτων τῶν ἔργων μόνοι τῶν πάντων μηδενὸς ἂν κέρδους τὰ κοινὰ δίκαια τῶν Ἑλλήνων προέσθαι, μηδ' ἀνταλλάξασθαι μηδεμιᾶς χάριτος μηδ' ὠφελείας τὴν εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας εὔνοιαν.

> This is, indeed, the greatest encomium he could bestow on you, men of Athens. For by these actions you are judged the only state among them all that will not abandon the common rights of the Greeks for any profit, nor exchange your devotion to the Greeks for any favor or benefit.

The two statements of the panhellenic image, in both cases attributed to Philip or inferred from his actions, are then grounded in an historical event, again conjured from the mind of Philip. His image of Athens and his very different image of the Thebans and Argives are reasonable (εἰκότως) because Philip not only "observes current events, but draws inferences from history" (VI 10f.):

> οὐ μόνον εἰς τὰ παρόνθ' ὁρῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ πρὸ τούτων λογιζόμενος. εὑρίσκει γάρ, οἶμαι, καὶ ἀκούει τοὺς μὲν ὑμετέρους προγόνους, ἑξὸν αὐτοῖς τῶν λοιπῶν ἄρχειν Ἑλλήνων ὥστ' αὐτοὺς ὑπακούειν βασιλεῖ, οὐ μόνον οὐκ ἀνασχομένους τὸν λόγον τοῦτον, ἡνίκ' ἦλθεν Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ τούτου πρόγονος περὶ τούτων κῆρυξ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν χώραν ἐκλιπεῖν προελομένους καὶ παθεῖν ὁτιοῦν ὑπομείναντας, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα πράξαντας ταῦθ' ἃ πάντες ἀεὶ γλίχονται λέγειν, ἀξίως δ' οὐδεὶς εἰπεῖν δεδύνηται, διόπερ κἀγὼ παραλείψω, δικαίως (ἔστι γὰρ μείζω τἀκείνων ἔργα ἢ ὡς τῷ λόγῳ τις ἂν εἴποι). . . .

> He [i.e., Philip] not only looks at what is going on now, but he also draws inferences from history. I think, for example, that historical study and common lore inform him that when your ancestors might have ruled the other Greeks on condition of their own submission to the Greek King, not only did they refuse to receive this proposal when Alexander, Philip's ancestor, came as hawker of these terms, but they chose instead to abandon their land and endure any suffering and after that accomplished those heroic feats that everyone always loves to tell but never has been able to tell adequately. So I too am justified in omitting any description of their exploits; they are, after all, too great for anyone to put into speech.

The paradeigma drawn from the period of the Persian wars serves, in Demosthenes' use of it, as the grounds for Philip's (i.e., Demosthenes') image of Athens. Neither Philip nor Demosthenes would be able to see ὀρθῶς a city committed to freedom for all Greeks merely by observation of the present policy and activity of Athens (εἰς τὰ παρόνθ' ὁρῶν). The theme of all the Philippic speeches is Athens' present failure to do anything of what the situation calls for (e.g., VI 1: γιγνόμενον δ' οὐδὲν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν τῶν δεόντων). Demosthenes suggests that Athens' principal foreign adversary and principal domestic critic share a common vision of Athens based not on its present policy and practice but on the heroic identity established and portrayed in its illustrious history. According to Demosthenes, Philip is treating Athens as though the city were continuing to act worthy of its past. He himself repeats here and throughout the Philippics that by acting in a manner worthy of its past Athens will be able in the present to meet Philip's challenge.

The second function of the paradeigma is to associate the image stated in VI 8 and 9f. with a specific event, not merely to provide evidence for the truth of the image but to endow the image with

the evocative power of the event. F. W. Schlatter has argued that the embassy of Alexander I to Athens "retained interest for the Athenians in the years following the Persian war" and that awareness of the event "was surely present when Attic conflicts with Philip II brought renewed attention to Macedon." He concludes that "it seems likely that so momentous an incident . . . would be a matter known well enough to guarantee some type of common tradition."[20] Demosthenes appears, therefore, to be using here an event familiar to his audience, perhaps a favorite among their recollections of the Persian wars. If it is not, like Marathon and Salamis, a normal subject of epideictic oratory recurrent in the epitaphioi, it is nonetheless particularly pertinent as an illustration of the contrast between Athenian and Macedonian. Not only are the Athenians portrayed refusing the Great King's proposal out of faithfulness to their Hellenic compatriots, but Philip's ancestor, Alexander, is seen to be the bearer of the King's terms.

Demosthenes probably chooses an illustration from the period of the Persian wars because of the increased reliance on panhellenic rhetoric which characterized the political discourse of the period since the ratification of the Peace. Demosthenes was not the first to turn the traditional anti-Persian rhetoric against Philip. In his speech On the False Embassy delivered during his prosecution of Aeschines in 343, Demosthenes accuses Aeschines of having been the first politician who single-handedly identified Philip as "the common enemy of all Greeks" (XIX 302):

> μόνος καὶ πρῶτος ἰδὼν ὅτι κοινὸς ἐχθρὸς ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν ἁπάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων.[21]

This identification, traditionally used of the Persian king, Aeschines apparently set into speeches replete with references to the Persian wars (XIX 303):

> τίς ὁ τοὺς μακροὺς καὶ καλοὺς λόγους ἐκείνους δημηγορῶν, καὶ τὸ Μιλτιάδου καὶ τὸ θεμιστοκλέους ψήφισμ' ἀναγιγνώσκων καὶ τὸν ἐν τῷ τῆς Ἀγλαύρου τῶν ἐφήβων ὅρκον;
>
> Who was it that delivered those long, noble deliberative speeches and read the decrees of Miltiades and Themistocles and the oath taken by ephebes in the temple of Aglaurus?

According to Demosthenes, Aeschines went so far as to call Philip a "barbarian," "many times" in fact, and in the context the implication is that Aeschines intended thereby to identify Philip with the traditional Persian enemy (XIX 305). Aeschines, for his part, does not deny Demosthenes' charges and grants that he had done what he could to unite Greeks against Philip (Aeschin. II 79): ἐγὼ δ' ἐν μὲν τῷ πολέμῳ συνίστην, καθ' ὅσον ἦν δύνατος, Ἀρκάδας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας ἐπὶ Φίλιππον. After a visit to Macedonia, Demosthenes says, Aeschines reversed himself, and the one "who had spoken so eloquently about Marathon and Salamis, about battles and victories, forbade you to remember the examples of your ancestors, or to recall old victories, or to send help to anyone or to take counsel in common with other Greeks" (XIX 311):

> ἐκεῖν' ἃ διεξῆλθον ἐν ἀρχῇ δεδημηγορηκώς, τὸν Μαραθῶνα, τὴν Σαλαμῖνα, τὰς μάχας, τὰ τρόπαια, ἐξαίφνης ὡς ἐπέβη Μακεδονίας, πάντα τἀναντία τούτοις, μὴ προγόνων μεμνῆσθαι, μὴ τρόπαια λέγειν, μὴ βοηθεῖν μηδενί. . . .[22]

Hence, it is clear enough that between 348 and the ratification of the Peace in 346 at least Aeschines and probably others eventually were using the traditional, panhellenic, anti-Persian rhetoric to

attack Philip and to seek common Greek resistance against him.

After ratification of the Peace panhellenic rhetoric continued to be prominent among certain Athenian intellectuals and their sympathizers. Now, however, that rhetoric was not directed against Philip. It was exploited in support of a new Greek expedition against Persia under Philip's leadership.[23] This turn of events called for an opposition rhetoric which would direct anti-Persian themes and examples once again against Philip. Moreover, the unification of the Greek states under a common peace intended at least ostensibly to link Greek interests and to suppress, under Philip's hegemony, the private hostilities among the Greek states invited political use of a panhellenic rhetoric responsive to common Greek concerns. Demosthenes himself appears to provide evidence in the prologue of this speech that the political discussions to which the Second Philippic was a contribution were being expressed in panhellenic language.[24] No one could argue against peace or the cessation of Greek inter-state aggressions; the argument had to center on Philip's relationships to the Peace, namely, on the question whether his leadership was providing an effective and beneficial guarantee of peace and freedom or whether he was using the terms of the Peace to quiet Greek opposition and to cloak his plans for the eventual subjugation of the Greek mainland. While it is likely that the speeches asserting Philip's violations of the Peace and aggressions against Athens (VI 1) were, in fact, voiced primarily by Demosthenes, Hegesippus, and other representatives of the minority point of view in the assembly, it is probably also likely that many speakers--both pro- and anti-Macedonian--were, by the time of the debate surrounding

the Second Philippic, delivering φιλανθρώπους λόγους argued of concern for the welfare of all Greeks. The argument that Demosthenes pursues in VI 8-12 and which culminates in the paradeigma of the Alexander embassy is grounded in the concept of φιλανθρωπία which he notes in his opening sentence. This is one of the Athenian virtues most characteristically represented in the epitaphioi and is the motif which links together the six epitaphic commonplaces contained in VI 8-12.

Commonplaces in VI 8-12

1. Athenians act out of commitment to τὸ δίκαιον.

   VI 8, τοῦ δικαίου λόγον ποιούμενοι

   VI 12, ἠγεῖτ' οὖν [ὁ Φίλιππος], εἰ μὲν ὑμᾶς ἔλοιτο, φίλους ἐπὶ τοῖς δικαίοις αἱρήσεσθαι, εἰ δ' ἐκείνοις προσθεῖτο, συνεργοὺς ἕξειν τῆς αὐτοῦ πλεονεξίας.

   cp. VI 10-- μηδενὸς ἂν κέρδους τὰ κοινὰ δίκαια τῶν Ἑλλήνων προέσθαι.

   VI 1-- ἀεὶ τοὺς ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν λόγους καὶ δικαίους καὶ φιλανθρώπους ὀρῶ φαινομένους.

   VI 3-- ὡς μὲν ἂν εἴποιτε δικαίους λόγους καὶ λέγοντος ἄλλου συνείητε, ἄμεινον Φιλίππου παρεσκευάσθε.

   VI 7-- τοὺς λογισμοὺς ἐξετάζων [ὁ Φίλιππος], καὶ οὐχὶ πρὸς εἰρήνην οὐδ' ἡσυχίαν οὐδὲ δίκαιον οὐδέν.

   VI 35-- [I wish to remind you who it was that] πεποίηχ' ὑμῖν μὴ περὶ τῶν δικαίων μηδ' ὑπὲρ τῶν ἔξω πραγμάτων εἶναι τὴν βούλην.

2. Athenians do not sacrifice freedom, justice, and glory to personal gain

   VI 8-- . . . τῆς ἰδίας ἕνεκ' ὠφελείας . . .

   10-- . . . μηδενὸς ἂν κέρδους . . .

10-- . . . μηδεμιᾶς χάριτος μηδ' ὠφελείας . . .

3. Athenians are the only ones to do certain things [μόνοι], among them, to defend all Greeks against the barbarian.

VI 10--κέκρισθε . . . μόνοι τῶν πάντων μηδενὸς ἂν κέρδους τὰ κοινὰ δίκαια τῶν Ἑλλήνων προέσθαι.

cp. 17-- τούτου δ' ἀνταγωνιστὰς μόνους ὑπείληφεν ὑμᾶς.

4. Athenians make a conscious choice [προαίρεσις] of τὸ καλον over τὸ σύμφερον.

VI 11-- τὴν χώραν ἐκλιπεῖν προελομένους καὶ παθεῖν ὁτιοῦν ὑπομείναντας

5. Athenians endure [ὑπομένειν] whatever dangers and toils come.

VI 11-- . . . παθεῖν ὁτιοῦν ὑπομείναντας . . .

cp. XVIII 204--τὴν χώραν καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐκλιπεῖν ὑπέμειναν.

6. Athenian exploits are beyond human speech.

VI 11-- ἀξίως δ' οὐδεὶς εἰπεῖν δεδύνηται, διόπερ κἀγὼ παραλείψω, δικαίως (ἔστι γὰρ μείζω τἀκείνων ἔργα ἢ ὡς τῷ λόγῳ τις ἂν εἴποι)

Of the six commonplaces identifiable in VI 8-12, two (1, 5) appeared already in the First Philippic. In their context there, together with the four additional commonplaces which express Athens' conscious, singular, self-sacrifice beyond all power of speech to convey, they evidence more certain epideictic intent than can be demonstrated in the earlier speech. In addition, the reference to the Athenian abandonment of Attica in VI 11 is widely attested in epideictic oratory, though it does not appear in the epitaphioi except in Lysias.[25] The characterization of Athens which Demosthenes presents through his paradeigma in the terms of these commonplaces he, moreover, calls explicitly an encomium (VI 9, ἐγκώμιον), a term he uses ironically since it is Philip's unfavorable treatment of Athens that prompts these words in praise for the City.

Here, in contrast to the First Philippic, the commonplaces bear a distinctly panhellenic flavor. This panhellenic tone is used here not only because it fit the mood of the times, as I have noted above. It also creates the sharpest contrast to the image Demosthenes gives to Philip, the scheming, self-serving tyrant whose aim is the subversion of Greek freedom. While Athens is said to reverence justice (τοῦ δικαίου λόγον ποιούμενοι), Philip is designated the adversary of law (ἐχθρὸς . . . νόμοις ἐναντίος). While the Athenians refuse to betray freedom for their own gain (μηδενὸς κέρδους), Philip plans and acts solely for the sake of his own ambition (πρὸς πλεονεξίαν). The Athenians chose to abandon their land for the sake of freedom for all Greeks (τὴν χώραν ἐκλιπεῖν προελομένους); Philip chose to act in the interests of Thebes (πράττειν προείλετο) in pursuit of his ambition. Unfortunately, if it was true that in the past the deeds of Athenians were beyond the power of words to express (VI 11), now it is Philip who excels in deeds, while the Athenians concentrate their skill on words (VI 4, ἐν οἷς ἑκάτεροι διατρίβετε καὶ περὶ ἃ σπουδάζετε, ταῦτ' ἄμεινον ἑκατέροις ἔχει, ἐκείνῳ μὲν αἱ πράξεις, ὑμῖν δ' οἱ λόγοι).

The commonplaces in VI 8-12, therefore, serve the purpose of dramatizing the incompatibility of Philip and Athens. They clarify how alien his values are to those of Athens. They drive home Demosthenes' claim that Philip's purposes are irreconcilably and dangerously hostile to Athens' purposes. They, finally, remind Athenians of their true identity as guardians of justice and freedom against just such an alien threat as Philip's. Philip is nowhere here called "the

common enemy of all Greeks," though he is clearly designated Athens' enemy (VI 6). He is not referred to as a barbarian, although his ancestor, Alexander I, is identified as the Barbarian's accomplice. He is condemned by association with the Persian rather than by equation with him. Philip remains, in the Second Philippic, an ambitious, scheming despot, against whom Demosthenes pleads for "democracy's best and safest defense against tyrants"--ἀπιστία (VI 24).[26] Against this dangerous trickster Demosthenes in VI 8-12 raises the image of Athens as faithful friend of Greek rights and relentless opponent of all threats to Greek freedom. In support of this image he adduces his paradeigma from the period of the Persian wars and couches it in the patriotic commonplaces of the epitaphioi.

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER III

[1]So. H. Weil, Les Harangues de Démosthène, 2d ed. (Paris: Hachette, 1881), p. 217.

[2]G. M. Calhoun, "Demosthenes' Second Philippic," TAPA 64 (1933): 1-17.

[3]Calhoun, p. 3.

[4]So Puech, Croiset, Bury, Beloch, and Drerup.

[5]G. L. Cawkwell, "Demosthenes' Policy after the Peace of Philocrates. I," CQ n.s. 13 (1963): 120-38.

[6]Cawkwell, p. 125. Cf. Fritz R. Wüst, Philipp II. von Makedonien und Griechenland, Münchener Historische Abhandlungen, 1. Reihe, 14. Heft (Munich: Beck, 1938), pp. 69f.

[7]Cawkwell, p. 126.

[8]Thucydides provides fifth century evidence for the denunciation of another state in the presence of its envoys and for the mistreatment of the envoys themselves. Cf. Cleon's denunciation of the Spartans, IV 22; Alcibiades' criticism before the Argives and their allies of their treaty with Sparta, V 61.2; and the Athenians' arrest of ambassadors from Corcyra, III 72.1. About this last, Gomme comments, "an action against the accepted standard of international morals?" A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956), p. 362.

In none of these cases, however, does a politician attack and denounce in the presence of its envoys a foreign state more powerful than his own. When Athenians in the fifth century insulted and abused foreign envoys, they did so because they believed that Athens had the power to withstand any retaliation. The same could not be said for Athens after the Peace of Philocrates. Demosthenes knew that Athens could not successfully repel Philip unless its fundamental attitude and policy changed. Even the alleged Athenian kidnapping of a Macedonian courier and the arrest and torture of a Macedonian ambassador, with which Philip charges Athens (XII 2-4) is of an altogether different order. It is one thing anonymously to kidnap a courier or seize and misuse an ambassador and quite another personally to provoke an adversary as formidable as Philip in the presence of his emissaries.

[9]Calhoun, pp. 16-17.

[10]"We do not know enough about the rules and customs of the Attic ecclesia to know how much could be said openly against foreign envoys in their presence; and accordingly we cannot decide whether the frankness with which Demosthenes expresses himself concerning the insidiousness of Philip and the stupidity of the Peloponnesians presupposes their absence. If so, we are left, of course, to form our own conclusions." Werner Jaeger, Demosthenes. The Origin and Growth of His Policy (Berkeley: U. California Press, 1938), p. 253, n. 29.

Demosthenes, however, was no fool. Prudence, if not the "rules and customs of the Attic ecclesia," would have provided a restraint to open denunciation of Macedonian power in the presence of its representatives. Cf. n. 8 above.

[11]Cawkwell, p. 131. His article lays out the argument for the historical sketch outlined in this paragraph.

[12]E. g. IV 10.

[13]V 14 17 19 25.

[14]VI 6.

[15]Isoc. V 16, προστῆναι τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὁμονοίας καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους στρατείας.

[16]M. M. Markle, III, "Support of Athenian Intellectuals for Philip: A Study of Isocrates' Philippus and Speusippus' Letter to Philip," JHS 96 (1976): 80-99.

[17]Cf. X 15 (=VIII 43), X 17 (=VIII 45). Since πραγματεύομαι may refer to commercial negotiations (Dem. XXXII 25) and to carrying on one's business (Arist. EN 1122a9, 1176b29), it would be fruitful to know whether other speakers in this debate had been reassuring the audience about Philip's motives by asserting that he was "tending to his own business" in the north. Demosthenes' response here would then be a pun that would sharpen his attack on those who naively missed the correct import of Philip's "business." The fact that Demosthenes uses the same term again in 342/1 does not speak against his first use of it as a specific response to a specific opponent's speech.

[18]See above, p. 45.

[19]The theme of Athens as the "sole" defender of justice (μόνους) is an epitaphic commonplace which appears also in VI 10. See below, p. 75.

[20]F. W. Schlatter, "Salamis and Plataea in the Tradition of the Attic Orators" (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1960), pp. 149-50. For a discussion of Schlatter's argument about the relationship between Herodotus and the popular tradition, cf. Appendix III.

[21]Cf. XIX 10, ἔστι τοίνυν οὗτος ὁ πρῶτος Ἀθηναίων αἰσθανόμενος Φίλιππον, ὡς τότε δημηγορῶν ἔφη, ἐπιβουλεύοντα τοῖς Ἕλλησι καὶ διαφθείροντά τινας τῶν ἐν Ἀρκαδίᾳ προεστηκότων. Demosthenes' references to the embassies commissioned by Eubulus (XIX 10 304) imply that he is referring these speeches of Aeschines to the convocation of Greek states summoned by Eubulus to deliberate about "the freedom of the Hellenes." This congress is normally dated to the period shortly after the fall of Olynthus in 348/7. G. L. Cawkwell has recently argued that there are "serious objections" to doing so and proposed that the embassies of Eubulus and Aeschines be dated to early 346. Philip of Macedon (London: Faber and Faber, 1978), p. 97. Since both the traditional date and Cawkwell's alternative fall between Demosthenes' Olynthiacs and the Second Philippic, either date will serve our purposes. Aeschines' rhetoric employed on these embassies provided the precedent for Demosthenes' own rhetorical shift between 348 and 344.

[22]Cf. XIX 16 307.

[23]See above, p. 79, n. 16.

[24]Perhaps in the first sentence of the speech, when Demosthenes says that he observes the speeches of others on behalf of Athens to be "inspired by justice and generosity" (VI 1, ἀεὶ τοὺς ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν λόγους καὶ δικαίους καὶ φιλανθρώπους ὁρῶ φαινομένους), we are to assume that the Scholiast is correct to find in φιλανθρώπους panhellenic import (Dindorf 65, 2): Δικαίους μὲν κατὰ γὰρ Φιλίππου λέγετε ἀδικούντος, φιλανθρώπους δέ· ὅτι ἐλεεῖτε τὸ γένος τὸ Ἑλληνικόν. Cf. K. J. Dover, Greek Popular Morality (Berkeley: U. California Press, 1974), p. 202, "The same word [φιλανθρωπία] was used of relations between states, denoting the sacrifice of self-interest: Dem. XVI 16, XIX 39, XXIII 13, 131."

[25]Paul Wendland, "Beiträge zu athenischer Politik und Publicistik des vierten Jahrhunderts," GöttNachr, 1910, p. 313, cites Isoc. IV 99, V 147, VI 43 83, and VIII 43, as well as Lys. II 33 40 and Lycurg., In Leoc. 68. He concludes that "der Zug gehört zum festen Inventar der Epideiktik."

[26]See above, p. 64.

CHAPTER IV

ON THE CHERSONESE

The speech On the Chersonese, the Third Philippic, and the Fourth Philippic were delivered at several week intervals in the spring of 341.[1] During the period following the delivery of the Second Philippic in 344 Philip attempted to negotiate the "amendment" to the Peace of Philocrates which his envoy Python had proposed without success in 344.[2] The speech On Halonnesus preserved among Demosthenes' speeches (VII) but attributed by Libanius to Demosthenes' colleague Hegesippus illustrates the hard line toward Philip adopted by the group with which Demosthenes allied himself.[3] Their terms for a Common Peace included the return of Amphipolis, a stipulation to which Philip could not agree.[4] However unrealistic their terms, the group attracted enough votes in the Assembly to block negotiations with Philip and to encourage a deteriorating relationship with Macedonia.

In 342 Athens sent a large contingent of colonists to its cleruchy in the Chersonese.[5] Diopeithes, an associate of Hegesippus, accompanied the colonists as leader of a band of mercenaries.[6] When he attempted to take lands belonging to Cardia for the new Athenian colonists, the Cardians appealed to Philip, who sent a letter of warning to Athens. He lodged a strong protest against the actions of Diopeithes and stated his intention to defend the Cardians, his allies.[7]

Demosthenes' speech On the Chersonese was delivered in response to Philip, probably in April 341.[8] Although Diopeithes' activities were a clear violation of the Peace, Demosthenes argues that Philip is already at war with Athens anyway and that Diopeithes should therefore be permitted to remain in the Chersonese with full Athenian support and cooperation (VIII 6 19).

The main problem in interpreting On the Chersonese and in determining its relationship to the Third and Fourth Philippics has been the presence of a large block of material in On the Chersonese (VIII 38-67) which is parallel to two blocks of material in the Fourth Philippic (X 11-27, 55-70). In the nineteenth century, scholarship focussed on the authenticity of the Fourth Philippic, and explanations of the parallels appear to have assumed the integrity of On the Chersonese in the form in which it has come down to us. In his introduction to On the Chersonese, for example, Weil fails even to make mention of the parallels with the Fourth Philippic.[9] He assumes that the parallel passages in the Fourth Philippic have been drawn from On the Chersonese.[10] Following Blass, Weil concludes that the Fourth Philippic was assembled from a number of Demosthenic scraps by an arranger.[11] In this century Drerup has written that both speeches were delivered by Demosthenes, but that only the Chersonese speech was intended for publication.[12] Jaeger and Picard-Cambridge ignore the problem.

In 1938, however, C. D. Adams proposed a theory for relating the two speeches which, with slight modification, has since received persuasive confirmation.[13] Adams' hypothesis was as follows:

1. In early spring 341 Demosthenes delivered a comparatively short speech on affairs in the Chersonese but did not at that time publish it. This speech contained none of the matter that is parallel with the Fourth Philippic.

2. Before June 341 Demosthenes delivered his Fourth Philippic in the form in which we have it. It was hastily composed and loosely constructed. This speech Demosthenes himself never published.

3. Some time later, Demosthenes, wishing to put into permanent form (in addition to his great Third Philippic) a record of the motives which led him to agitate for war with Philip, took his manuscript of the speech On the Chersonese, separated it into two parts, and inserted the strongest parts of his (unpublished) Fourth Philippic, revising these parts in many details. It is the speech On the Chersonese in the form in which it has come down to us.

4. After Demosthenes' death, the unpublished Fourth Philippic was found among his papers and, like the Midiana, was published by Demosthenes' literary executor.[14]

In his Harvard dissertation of 1953, Stephen G. Daitz confirmed Adams' hypothesis with some minor modifications and demonstrated the dependency of our speech On the Chersonese on the Fourth Philippic.[15] The effect of his conclusion is to remove paragraphs 38-67 of On the Chersonese from discussion of Demosthenes' strategy in April 341. If we are to assume also, with Daitz, that the peroration of this speech was also revised at the time of its publication to harmonize it with the segments appropriated from the Fourth Philippic, then we may delete his call in VIII 76 for embassies to be sent "in every direction," which appears to have been drawn from IX 71 and 73 and which is inconsistent with the scorn of embassies that Demosthenes expresses in VIII 34-37.[16] The speech with which we are left is concerned solely with Athens and with Athenian interests, without the panhellenic rhetoric to be voiced only a month later in the Third and Fourth Philippics.[17] Pearson notes that "references to past events are brief, and there is no attempt at

narrative. . . . Also notably lacking are the solemn paradeigmata in appeals to Athenian pride and tradition."[18]

Once the parallel passages have been removed, the speech On the Chersonese in its original form is a remarkably lean speech which appears to be a throwback to an earlier stage in Demosthenes' oratorical development. Although, as we shall see, this perception of the speech is not adequate, nonetheless the remarkable difference in tone between the speech as it was originally delivered and the speech as Demosthenes finally published it with its interpolations raises questions about the extent to which we may safely generalize about Demosthenes' standard oratorical practice on the basis of the speeches that have come down to us. Demosthenes obviously delivered many more speeches in the Assembly than those that have been preserved.[19] Probably Demosthenes published only a small selection of his speeches and intended to preserve for posterity only those which were notable for their rhetorical richness and which would portray as favorably as possible his policy in opposition to Philip. The Chersonese speech is directed narrowly toward the specific issue of Diopeithes' tenure in the north. It may well provide us with an example of how Demosthenes normally spoke to specific questions facing the Assembly and may therefore be more representative of his ordinary speeches than the more grand, elevated, and memorable speeches which he revised for the wider audience of his published works. Of course, other factors may also account for the spare character of the speech. A debate about the brigandage of an Athenian general on behalf of Athenian colonists may not have seemed the appropriate occasion for florid rhetoric or for reminiscences of anti-Persian glory. Moreover,

this speech, unlike the Second Philippic, was offered in a debate in which the other speakers do not appear themselves to have drawn on panhellenic rhetoric. Demosthenes says in the prologue that "most of the speeches have been addressed to what Diopeithes is doing or is about to do" (VIII 2):

> τῶν δὲ λόγων οἱ πλεῖστοι περὶ ὧν Διοπείθης πράττει καὶ μέλλει ποιεῖν εἴρηνται.

If all the speeches pro and con focussed narrowly on Diopeithes' provocative adventures, we may assume that Demosthenes constructed his own contribution to that discussion in a form appropriate to it.

Demosthenes' strategy in this speech is to shift attention away from Diopeithes' admitted aggressions to the larger conflict between Philip and Athens. Diopeithes' leadership, however vulnerable to criticism, is indispensible to Athens' defense against Philip. Demosthenes' advice, however disagreeable, comes from an ἀγαθὸς πολίτης whose policy always aims at the City's welfare. Beginning in the first paragraph, Demosthenes poses as the dispassionate, objective statesman who stands above petty disputation. He implies that those speakers responding to Philip's letter of protest by focussing debate on Diopeithes' behavior are neither acting in the interests of the City nor intending to do so (VIII 1):

> Ἔδει μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοὺς λέγοντας ἅπαντας μήτε πρὸς ἔχθραν ποιεῖσθαι λόγον μηδένα μήτε πρὸς χάριν, ἀλλ' ὃ βέλτιστον ἕκαστος ἡγεῖτο, τοῦτ' ἀποφαίνεσθαι, ἄλλως τε καὶ περὶ κοινῶν πραγμάτων καὶ μεγάλων ὑμῶν βουλευομένων· ἐπεὶ δ' ἔνιοι τὰ μὲν φιλονικίᾳ, τὰ δ' ἠντινιδήποτ' αἰτίᾳ προάγονται λέγειν, ὑμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοὺς πολλοὺς δεῖ πάντα τἄλλ' ἀφελόντας, ἃ τῇ πόλει νομίζετε συμφέρειν, ταῦτα καὶ ψηφίζεσθαι καὶ πράττειν.

> It should be the obligation of all speakers, men of Athens, not to make any speech either out of personal enmity or favor, but to declare what each thinks best, especially when you are debating matters of great public importance. However, since some are being induced to speak either out of love or controversy or from motives known only to them, it behooves you, men of Athens,--the majority--to lay aside everything else and to vote and carry out what you believe is in the interest of our city.

Although Demosthenes shows himself later in the speech prepared to grant the legitimacy of the charges leveled against Diopeithes (VIII 9 20 28), he denies that they are sufficient grounds for relieving the general of his command. In fact, the issue, as Demosthenes puts it in the second paragraph of his prologue, is not Diopeithes but Philip (VIII 2):

> ἡ μὲν οὖν σπουδὴ περὶ τῶν ἐν Χερρονήσῳ πραγμάτων ἐστὶ καὶ τῆς στρατείας, ἣν ἐνδέκατον μῆνα τουτονὶ Φίλιππος ἐν Θράκῃ ποιεῖται.
>
> The matter of urgency, you see, concerns our affairs in the Chersonese and Philip's campaign in Thrace, now in its eleventh month.

If Philip and the threat posed by his extended military operations are the real issue, then the extended discussion περὶ ὧν Διοπείθης πράττει καὶ μέλλει ποιεῖν is a smokescreen that obscures the real issue and diverts the Assembly away from its essential interests. Who is Athens' real enemy? Who is the cause of Athens' problems? Is the enemy one or another troublemaker within the Athenian body politic or is it Philip?

Demosthenes poses the contrast in the conclusion of the prologue. Diopeithes he characterizes as a fellow Athenian legally punishable under Athenian laws; whether sooner or later is of little importance. Dealing with such charges against a fellow citizen is not a matter for intense public debate (VIII 2):

> ἐγὼ δ' ὅσα μέν τις αἰτιᾶταί τινα τούτων, οὓς κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ἐφ' ὑμῖν ἐστιν, ὅταν βούλησθε, κολάζειν, κἂν ἤδη δοκῇ κἂν ἐπισχοῦσιν περὶ αὐτῶν σκοπεῖν ἐγχωρεῖν ἡγοῦμαι, καὶ οὐ πάνυ δεῖ περὶ τούτων οὔτ' ἔμ' οὔτ' ἄλλον οὐδέν' ἰσχυρίζεσθαι.

In the case of Philip, however, Demosthenes asserts, the Athenians are dealing with their city's real enemy (ἐχθρὸς ὑπάρχων τῇ πόλει) and with the possibility that he will make irreversible gains in the area of the Hellespont. When the city is facing a critical showdown with its substantial enemy, discussion of possible legal action against a fellow citizen is irrelevant (VIII 3):

> ὅσα δ' ἐχθρὸς ὑπάρχων τῇ πόλει καὶ δυνάμει πολλῇ περὶ Ἑλλήσποντον ὧν πειρᾶται προλαβεῖν, κἂν ἅπαξ ὑστερήσωμεν, οὐκέθ' ἕξομεν σῶσαι, περὶ τούτων δ' οἶομαι τὴν ταχίστην συμφέρειν καὶ βεβουλεῦσθαι καὶ παρεσκευάσθαι, καὶ μὴ τοῖς περὶ τῶν ἄλλων θορύβοις καὶ ταῖς κατηγορίαις ἀπὸ τούτων ἀποδρᾶναι.
>
> But when the real enemy of our city is in the area of the Hellespont with a large force and is trying to seize our property before we can stop him, [we are confronting an urgent matter.] We have only this one chance to stop him; if we are too late, we will never again have it in our power to recover our interests there. This is the question on which I think it is in our interest to complete our debate and planning with all haste and not to be sidetracked from it by the outcries and charges about irrelevancies.

Demosthenes pursues the contrast between Diopeithes and Philip throughout the speech. While Diopeithes is merely trying "to help the Thracians" (VIII 8: βοηθεῖν τοῖς Θραξίν), Philip is already at war with Athens, seizing Athenian property and equipping himself thereby for a final assault on the city. (VIII 4-7) The Athenians have no choice but to defend themselves against one who is already waging war against them (VIII 7: ἀμύνεσθαι τὸν πρότερον πολεμοῦνθ' ἡμῖν). Diopeithes, by contrast, "if he is indeed acting outrageously in detaining merchant vessels," can simply be sent a "brief memo, just a

little memo, and all the activity in question would be stopped" (VIII 28):

> εἰ γὰρ δεινὰ ποιεῖ Διοπείθης καὶ κατάγει τὰ πλοῖα, μικρόν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μικρὸν πινάκιον ταῦτα πάντα κωλῦσαι δύναιτ' ἄν.

To send out a second general to the Hellespont as a restraint upon Diopeithes would be to place a guard "against ourselves," and that would be "the height of insanity" (VIII 28: ὑπερβολὴ μανίας). "Enemies" are those who are not, unlike Diopeithes, accountable to our laws, and it is against "enemies" that a city should and must "maintain troops, dispatch fleets, and raise taxes." (VIII 29) Philip is responsible for all of Athens' woes and problems: if he had kept quiet, Athens would not have had any problem (VIII 31):

> πάντων τῶν κακῶν καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τούτων Φίλιππός ἐστ' αἴτιος· εἰ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος ἦγεν ἡσυχίαν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν πρᾶγμα τῇ πόλει.

But Philip has not kept quiet. He has won military successes largely because he is consistently first to deal with the issues. He knows in advance what moves he wants to make. He is ready and on hand in an instant to attack whomever he wishes. "With great ease" he holds on to whatever he has seized (VIII 11-12):

> ἴστε γὰρ δήπου τοῦθ' ὅτι οὐδενὶ τῶν πάντων πλέον κεκράτηκε Φίλιππος, ἢ τῷ πρότερος πρὸς τοῖς πράγμασι γίγνεσθαι. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔχων δύναμιν συνεστηκυῖαν ἀεὶ περὶ αὐτὸν καὶ προειδὼς ἃ βούλεται πρᾶξαι, ἐξαίφνης ἐφ' οὓς ἂν αὐτῷ δόξῃ πάρεστιν. . . . εἶτ', οἶμαι, συμβαίνει τῷ μὲν ἐφ' ἂν ἔλθῃ, ταῦτ' ἔχειν κατὰ πολλὴν ἡσυχίαν.

In fact, "continuously all the time" Philip is "seizing the property of Greeks and barbarians and stowing it for an attack on us" (VIII 6):

> πάντα δὲ τὸν χρόνον συνεχῶς τὰ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων λαμβάνων καὶ ἐφ' ἡμᾶς συσκευαζόμενος.

In these and other passages throughout the original portions of the speech Demosthenes illustrates his contention that Philip is Athens' real enemy and the cause of Athens' problems, who is acting and plotting everywhere for an eventual attack on Athens. His conclusion is that Diopeithes, Athens' general and guardian of Athenian interests, deserves the city's full support and cooperation (VIII 19):

> ταῦτα τοίνυν ἅπαντας εἰδότας καὶ λογιζομένους χρή, οὐ μὰ Δί' οὐχ ἣν Διοπείθης πειρᾶται τῇ πόλει δύναμιν παρασκευάζειν, ταύτην βασκαίνειν καὶ διαλῦσαι πειρᾶσθαι, ἀλλ' ἑτέραν αὐτοὺς προσπαρασκευάζειν καὶ συνευποροῦντας ἐκείνῳ χρημάτων καὶ τἆλλ' οἰκείως συναγωνιζομένους.

> Well then, all who know these facts and are drawing conclusions from them should surely not be trying to smear and break up the force that Diopeithes is trying to prepare for the City. My God, no! They ought themselves to provide an additional force, to keep up a supply of money to him, and in other respects to share the struggle with him as one of their own.

Anything that Diopeithes is doing μὴ καλῶς may be adjusted without dissolving his whole operation because of somebody's accusations (VIII 76):

> χρήματ' εἰσφέρειν φημὶ δεῖν· τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν δύναμιν συνέχειν, ἐπανορθοῦντας εἴ τι δοκεῖ μὴ καλῶς ἔχειν, μὴ ὅσοις ἄν τις αἰτιάσηται τὸ ὅλον καταλύοντας.[20]

> I say that we must pay our taxes. We must hold together the force we already have, making amends if anything improper seems to be going on, but not disbanding the whole force because of all the trifles one might criticize.

The issue is not Diopeithes but Philip, and he must be opposed.

As in his other speeches, Demosthenes attacks not only Philip but those Athenian politicians whom he alleges to be influencing the Assembly on behalf of Philip. Immediately in the prologue he questions the motives of speakers who "are being induced to speak either out of love of controversy or from motives known only to them (lit. "for

whatever cause")." (See p. 85 above.) He implies that the subject of their disputations is the "everything else" (τἆλλ') which the majority should "lay aside," instead focussing their deliberations and actions on the interests of the city. The protracted discussion περὶ ὧν Διοπείθης πράττει καὶ μέλλει ποιεῖν he portrays as a diversion from Athens' real interests. Later in the speech he explicitly identifies the speeches of those carrying on extended debate about the charges against Diopeithes as a filibuster consciously designed to prevent Athens from taking action in its interests (VIII 13):

> μὴ τοίνυν ἀγνοεῖτ', ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅτι καὶ τὰ νῦν τἆλλα μέν ἐστι λόγοι ταῦτα καὶ προφάσεις, πράττεται δὲ καὶ κατασκευάζεται τοῦτο, ὅπως ὑμῶν μὲν οἶκοι μενόντων, ἔξω δὲ μηδεμιᾶς οὔσης τῇ πόλει δυνάμεως, μετὰ πλείστης ἡσυχίας ἅπανθ' ὅσα βούλεται Φίλιππος διοικήσεται.
>
> And so, don't be ignorant of the fact, men of Athens, that these other irrelevancies now are just talk and pretexts and that all this business has been trumped up to keep you at home without any of our city's forces abroad, while Philip with the greatest of ease will settle everything he wishes.

He asserts that Diopeithes has been subjected to accusations (VIII 2: ὅσα μέν τις αἰτιᾶταί τινα) "even about what they say he is going to do" because the citizens have given too much authority to speakers who specialize in accusations and slanders (VIII 23):

> οἱ γὰρ ἤδη τοσαύτην ἐξουσίαν τοῖς αἰτιᾶσθαι καὶ διαβάλλειν βουλομένοις διδόντες, ὥστε καὶ περὶ ὧν φασὶ μέλλειν αὐτὸν ποιεῖν, καὶ περὶ τούτων προκατηγορούντων ἀκροᾶσθαι.

Diopeithes' accusers claim, "He is betraying the Greeks." Demosthenes mocks their feigned concern for the Greeks in Asia, but he adds (VIII 27):

> ἀμείνους μέντἂν εἶεν τῶν ἄλλων ἢ τῆς πατρίδος κήδεσθαι.

> But they would no doubt be better at weeping for the woes of other countries than of their own.

If Philip is the ultimate cause of Athens' problems, the penultimate cause is "some" (ἔνιοι) of Athens' own politicians (VIII 32):

> παρεσκευάκασιν ὑμᾶς τῶν πολιτευομένων ἔνιοι ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις φοβεροὺς καὶ χαλεπούς, ἐν δὲ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς ταῖς τοῦ πολέμου ῥαθύμους καὶ εὐκαταφρονήτους.[21]

> Some of our politicians have prepared you to be formidable and harsh in the Assembly, but in your provisions for war slack and contemptible.

Demosthenes suggests that Athens' active preparation against Philip must be joined to active rejection of politicians whose attacks on fellow citizens absorb the energies of the Assembly and prevent decisive response to the threat from Philip. While posing as the courageous defenders of the City, in fact, they fleece their fellow citizens even as they find security in popularity-mongering (VIII 69):

> ὅστις μὲν γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, παριδὼν ἃ συνοίσει τῇ πόλει, κρίνει, δημεύει, δίδωσι, κατηγορεῖ, οὐδεμιᾷ ταῦτ' ἀνδρείᾳ ποιεῖ, ἀλλ' ἔχων ἐνέχυρον τῆς αὐτοῦ σωτηρίας τὸ πρὸς χάριν ὑμῖν λέγειν καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι, ἀσφαλῶς θρασύς ἐστιν.

> For whoever disregards what is good for the City and brings lawsuits, confiscates private property, gives bribes, and brings indictments is not doing so because of any bravery. Holding as security for his safety his speeches and deliberations aimed at gaining your favor he is rash without risk.

In summary, Demosthenes says in his peroration that Athens must continue to support Diopeithes' forces in the Chersonese. But rather than punishing Diopeithes, he adds that Athens ought to punish politicians who take bribes and support their sound, moderate leaders (VIII 76):

> παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα τοὺς ἐπὶ τοῖς πράγμασι δωροδοκοῦντας κολάζειν καὶ μισεῖν πανταχοῦ, ἵν' οἱ μέτριοι καὶ δικαίους αὐτοὺς παρέχοντες εὖ βεβουλεῦσθαι δοκῶσι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ ἑαυτοῖς.

> Besides all this we must punish and everywhere detest those who take bribes for their political activities so that decent men, men who prove they are law-abiding, may be seen as ones whose counsel benefitted everyone else as well as themselves.[22]

In his speech On the Chersonese Demosthenes is clearly concerned to project an image both of Philip and of those politicians whose contributions to public debate serve Philip, whether intentionally or not. He portrays Philip as Athens' enemy and the source of all of Athens' problems. Politicians who ignore Philip while absorbing public debate in accusations directed at fellow citizens Demosthenes portrays as self-serving opportunists who use the political and legal processes for their own ends, while disregarding the interests of the city. Some of them he accuses of deliberately obfuscating public debate in order to prevent any action from being taken against Philip. It is these partisans of Philip to whom Demosthenes particularly refers as ὠροδοκοῦντες in his peroration. Despite Diopeithes' violations of the Peace legitimately protested by Philip in his letter to the Athenian Assembly, Demosthenes throughout his speech portrays Diopeithes (whose close association with Hegesippus makes him a colleague of Demosthenes as well) as a victim of politicians who are, in fact if not always in intent, representing Philip's interests in the Assembly.[23] Even Diopeithes' detention of ships and extortion from them of payments in order to provide for his troops would not have been necessary if the Assembly had voted him the necessary subsidy (VIII 26). He is the scapegoat of "malignant persons seeking to destroy the City" (VIII 29): ἐπηρεαζόντων δὲ καὶ διαφθειρόντων τὰ πράγμαθ' ἃ νῦν οὗτοι ποιοῦσιν.

To such persons Demosthenes opposes the image of Diopeithes and of himself. Diopeithes is the hapless general attempting to serve Athens (VIII 8) and to bring help to the Thracians (VIII 9) without proper support from the fellow citizens whose interests he was sent to protect. His fullest characterization, however, Demosthenes reserves for himself. In paragraphs 68-72 he defends himself against the charge that he is cowardly and spineless (68, ἄτολμος καὶ μαλακός) for refusing to take the risk of making a solid motion (68, οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλεις γράφειν, οὐδὲ κι[illegible]ύειν), probably for a declaration of war against Philip.[24] He responds that he is neither cowardly and weak nor rash, impudent, and shameless (68, θρασὺς καὶ βδελυρὸς καὶ ἀναιδής). He is the brave and useful citizen (VIII 69):

> ὅστις δ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ βελτίστου πολλὰ τοῖς ὑμετέροις ἐναντιοῦται βουλήμασι, καὶ μηδὲν λέγει πρὸς χάριν ἀλλὰ τὸ βέλτιστον ἀεί, καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν προαιρεῖται ἐν ᾗ πλειόνων ἡ τύχη κυρία γίγνεται ἢ οἱ λογισμοί, τούτων δ' ἀμφοτέρων ἑαυτὸν ὑπεύθυνον ὑμῖν παρέχει, οὗτός ἐστ' ἀνδρεῖος, καὶ χρήσιμός γε πολίτης ὁ τοιοῦτός ἐστιν.
>
> Whoever for the sake of what is best opposes himself to your wishes on many issues, says nothing aimed merely at gaining your favor but always what is best, and chooses the kind of policy in which Fortune controls the outcome more than calculation while holding himself accountable to you for both--he is brave, the kind of person who is a valuable citizen.[25]

In contrast to his opponents he says he is not motivated by greed or ambition (VIII 71, οὐδὲ προήχθην οὔθ' ὑπὸ κέρδους οὔθ' ὑπὸ φιλοτιμίας). He does not contrive to become "first" while the City becomes least among the nations (VIII 72):

> οὐδ' ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ δικαίου τοῦτ' εἶναι πολίτου, τοιαῦτα πολιτεύμαθ' εὑρίσκειν ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ μὲν πρῶτος ὑμῶν ἔσομαι εὐθέως, ὑμεῖς δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ὕστατοι.

> To me, at any rate, it does not seem characteristic of an honest citizen to seek out the sort of political proposals by which I shall instantly become first among you, but you take last place among all nations.

He concludes his apology by reiterating his definition of the ἀγαθὸς πολίτης as the counselor of τὸ βέλτιστον, as a politician whose personal welfare is so linked to the public welfare that they will rise or fall together (VIII 72):

> ἀλλὰ συναυξάνεσθαι δεῖ τὴν πόλιν τοῖς τῶν ἀγαθῶν πολιτῶν πολιτεύμασι, καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον ἀεί, μὴ τὸ ῥᾷστον ἅπαντας λέγειν· ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο μὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσις αὐτὴ βαδιεῖται, ἐπὶ τοῦτο δὲ τῷ λόγῳ δεῖ προάγεσθαι διδάσκοντα τὸν ἀγαθὸν πολίτην.

> No, the city ought to grow along with the policies proposed by its good citizens, and they must always speak what is best and not what is most agreeable. To incline to what is agreeable is natural; to use public discourse to teach and induce you to what is best is the role of the good citizen.

Curiously, it is in this "sober and dignified description of the characteristics of the 'honest citizen'"[26] that we find converging a number of terms reminiscent of the epideictic commonplaces which are the interest of this paper. The good citizen "chooses" (προαιρεῖται) what is best rather than what is in his own interest (Cp. commonplace 7, p. 234.). He evidences φιλανθρωπία (see above pp. 73-74.) He does not act for personal gain (κέρδος, cp. commonplace 5, p. 233.). He is concerned for τὸ δίκαιον (VIII 72, δικαίου . . . πολίτου, cp. commonplace 3, p. 230.). He contrasts himself to citizens who have not shown themselves "worthy of the City" (VIII 70, ἀξίους πολίτας τῆς πόλεως, cp. commonplace 1, p. 229.). Furthermore, the emphasis on his ἀνδρεία recalls the commonplace which stresses the courage of the fallen and their ancestors.[27]

Merely because of the verbal similarities between these terms

and the language of the commonplaces we cannot safely conclude that Demosthenes is here applying those commonplaces to himself. No doubt to do so would have been a shockingly presumptuous act for any individual. It is more likely that here we see evidence that praise of self and praise of city draw upon a common value system so that there is a congruence between the image of the ideal Athens and the image of the ideal Athenian. If Demosthenes had here cited the example of Athenian statesmen of the past, as he does in some other speeches (e.g., XIII 21-29, XXIII 196-206), and sought to inspire his audience to emulate them through use of the terms and themes we have identified in paragraphs 68-72, we could justifiably claim that Demosthenes is here drawing on the epideictic commonplaces. He does not, in fact, point to the heroes of the past but to himself and Diopeithes. In all probability, his use of the terms and themes noted here would not have suggested to the orator's audience that he was placing himself alongside the notable Athenians of Athens' patriotic lore. When he describes the "brave," "worthy," and "good" citizen, however, the language is consistent with that of the commonplaces and demonstrates how deeply the ideals of epideictic are embedded in Athenian popular values.

We conclude that even in this speech, without the paradeigmata and clear epitaphic references of some other speeches, Demosthenes has not lost sight of the need to provide positive images as motivation for Athenian action. For an argument over treatment of a single Athenian general Demosthenes probably recognized that a full epideictic style would have seemed inappropriately excessive. To the negative images of Philip and self-serving Athenian politicians Demosthenes does, however,

oppose the positive images of himself and Diopeithes. Even as he attacks Philip and Philip's partisans among Athenian politicians and defends himself and Diopeithes, he commends himself and the accused general as models for the emulation of fellow Athenians. Each is acting in his own sphere of activity without regard for personal safety or advantage, Diopeithes in the field of combat, Demosthenes in the deliberations of the Assembly. Diopeithes is the faithful general, Demosthenes the brave and beneficial citizen. By emphasizing his own and Diopeithes' commitment to the City and by discrediting the intentions of their opponents, Demosthenes manages to turn the arguments against Diopeithes back on themselves. Far from being a criminal to be deprived of his position and punished Diopeithes is a true patriot, and the accusations leveled against him by Philip and reinforced by Philip's unwitting or willful partisans among Athenian politicians are the badge of his patriotic heroism. He and Demosthenes, exactly because their opponents accuse them, are revealed as δίκαιοι καὶ ἀγαθοὶ πολῖται and models for the emulation of all true Athenians.

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER IV

[1]For the dates of these three speeches, cf. R. Sealey, "Dionysius of Halicarnassus and some Demosthenic Dates," REG 68 (1955): 101-10.

[2]On the period from 344 to 341, cf. G. L. Cawkwell, "Demosthenes' Policy after the Peace of Philocrates," CQ n.s. 13 (1963): 120-38 and 200-13.

[3]Although Dionysius (ad Amm. I 10) attributes the speech to Demosthenes, Libanius reports in his hypothesis that the ancient critics doubted that the speech was by Demosthenes and that some, on grounds of both style and content, attributed it to Hegesippus. Libanius supports the attribution to Hegesippus with his own argument, and he is followed by virtually all scholars to this day.

[4]VII 19-29. For the importance of Amphipolis as the principal asset of Athens' fifth century empire, cf. Isoc. V 2 and G. L. Cawkwell, "Eubulus," JHS 83 (1963): 53.

[5]Hypothesis 1. Philochorus, Jacoby, FGrH 328 F 158.

[6]Aeschin. I 63-64. G. L. Cawkwell, CQ n.s. 13 (1963): 205. Cawkwell, Philip of Macedon (London: Faber and Faber, 1978), p. 131.

[7]Hypothesis 3. [Dem.] XII 11.

[8]Sealey, p. 109: "winter or early spring of 342/1." Stephen G. Daitz, "The Relationship of the De Chersoneso and the Philippica Quarta of Demosthenes," (CP 52 (1957): 155: "March/April 341)" Cawkwell, Philip, p. 131: "April 341."

[9]Henri Weil, Les Harangues de Démosthène, 2d ed. (Paris: Hachette, 1881), pp. 267-71.

[10]Weil, p. 358.

[11]Weil, 366. Blass believed that the parallel passages originally existed as we have them in the Fourth Philippic, but that they were independent pieces adapted for use in the speech On the Chersonese and later incorporated into the Fourth Philippic by a redactor. F. Blass, Die attische Beredsamkeit, 2d. ed., 3 vols. (Leipzig: Teubner, 1887-1898) 3:391.

[12]E. Drerup, Aus einer alten Advokatenrepublik, Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Altertums, Band 8, Heft 3-4 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1916), p. 118.

[13]C. D. Adams, "Speeches viii and x of the Demosthenic Corpus," CP 33 (1938): 129-44.

[14]Adams' position as summarized by Daitz, CP 52 (1957): 148.

[15]Stephen G. Daitz, "The De Chersoneso and the Philippica Quarta of Demosthenes: The Texts and their Relationship" (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1953). Abstract in HSCP 61 (1953): 164-66. See also the "considerably revised" extract from Daitz's dissertation published in CP (see above, p. 97 , n. 8.).

George Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton: Princeton U. Press, 1963), p. 206, appears to endorse Daitz's conclusions. For the assertion that "the relation between a delivered speech and its published version has been demonstrated only in the case of On the Chersonese and the Fourth Philippic," he cites Daitz's CP article. Sealey, p. 108, without citing Adams or Daitz, proposes a solution similar to theirs.

[16]VIII 76: φημὶ δεῖν . . . πρέσβεις ἐκπέμπειν πανταχοῖ τοὺς διδάξοντας, νουθετήσοντας, πράξοντας. Cp. IX 71: καὶ τοὺς ταῦτα διδάξοντας ἐκπέμπωμεν πρέσβεις [πανταχοῖ . . .]. IX 73: τοὺς δ' ἄλλους Ἕλληνας συγκαλεῖν, συνάγειν, διδάσκειν, νουθετεῖν.

VIII 34-37: φέρε γὰρ πρὸς Διός, εἰ λόγον ὑμᾶς ἀπαιτήσειαν οἱ Ἕλληνες ὧν νυνὶ παρείκατε καιρῶν διὰ ῥᾳθυμίαν. καὶ ἔροιντ' ὑμᾶς· ' ἄνδρες Ἀθυναῖοι, πέμπεθ' ὡς ἡμᾶς ἑκάστοτε πρέσβεις, καὶ λέγεθ' ὡς ἐπιβουλεύει Φίλιππος ἡμῖν καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς Ἕλλησι, καὶ ὡς φυλάττεσθαι δεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαυτί; ἀνάγκη φάσκειν καὶ ὁμολογεῖν· ποιοῦμεν γὰρ ταῦτα. . . . τί οὖν πρεσβεύετε καὶ κατηγορεῖτε καὶ πράγμαθ' ἡμῖν παρέχετε;' ἂν ταῦτα λέγωσι, τί ἐροῦμεν ἢ τί φήσομεν, Ἀθηναῖοι; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ὁρῶ.

[17]W. Jaeger, Demosthenes. The Origin and Growth of His Policy (Berkeley: U. California Press, 1938), p. 265, n. 43, asserts that "the strain of Panhellenism can be traced with increasing clearness through all Demosthenes' speeches after the Peace of Philocrates." He concedes that "the speech On the Chersonese was, to be sure, delivered in a specifically Athenian emergency." But in support of his claim that "the interest of the Greeks as a whole is never left out of sight," he cites only paragraphs 46, 49, 55, all of them inserted into the speech from the Fourth Philippic at a later date.

[18]Lionel Pearson, The Art of Demosthenes, Beiträge zur klassischen Philologie, Heft 68 (Meisenheim am Glan: Hain, 1976), 148. Curiously, although Pearson refers to the theory of Adams and Daitz (p. 156 n. 23), he ignores it in his discussion of the two speeches. He also cites in the same note an article by Treves, "La composition de la 3me Philippique," REA 42 (1940): 354-64, as a "variation" on Adams' and Daitz's theory. Although Treves does argue for the priority of the Fourth Philippic and the Chersonese speech's dependence on it, he concludes that the Fourth Philippic was written before April 341, but never delivered. This conclusion would require a quite different description of Demosthenes' development between VIII, IX and X from the one that I will propose.

Pearson himself apparently disregards Daitz's work because he is convinced that "the lack of design and unity in the [Fourth Philippic] makes it very difficult to believe that [Demosthenes] could have delivered it or wanted anyone to read it in the form in which it has been preserved. . . . The real trouble is that it cannot be regarded as a finished composition; the various parts of the speech are not combined, and there is no clear line of argument such as we expect to find in a Demosthenic oration." (p. 155.) Hence, the parallels between the Chersonese speech and the Fourth Philippic are, in Pearson's view, "apparent 'borrowings'" from the Chersonese speech. (p. 155. Cp. 151: The Fourth Philippic "appears to 'borrow' passages from On the Chersonese.")

[19]Minor M. Markle, III, "The Peace of Philocrates: A Study of Athenian Foreign Relations 348-346 B.C." (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1967), p. 339.

[20]Demosthenes' choice of ἐπανορθοῦντας may be a sarcastic reference to the "adjustment" (ἐπανόρθωσις) of the Peace which Philip had proposed in response to Athenian criticisms. His designation of Diopeithes' aggressions in the Chersonese with the term, μὴ καλῶς ἔχειν, either anticipates or is drawn from his metaphor, in the Third Philippic, of the "true-born" son who manages his affairs μὴ καλῶς μηδ' ὀρθῶς (IX 30). Diopeithes is also a γνήσιος whose activity merits blame and reproach (IX 30, ἄξιον μέμψεως εἶναι καὶ κατηγορίας). But his wrongs are mere peccadillos compared with the aggressions of a foreign enemy.

[21]Cf. K. J. Dover, Greek Popular Morality (Berkeley: U. of California Press, 1974), p. 200: "Dem. xiii 17 unusually (the speech is deliberative, not forensic) tells the Athenians that they should be frightening under arms but kindly (philanthrōpos: cf. section 2) in the courts."

[22]Cf. Dover, p. 56 n. 18: "Metrios is applied to the man who behaves as law and honour require, even to the sacrifice of his own life (e.g. Dem. xviii 321)."

[23]On Diopeithes' relationship to Hegesippus, cf. p. 97 n. 6 above. Philip's letter of protest is not the later one included as XII in the Demosthenic corpus. The later speech, now commonly recognized to be authentically Philip's, is to be dated to the summer of 340. (On its genuineness, cf. F. Wüst, Philipp II. von Makedonien und Griechenland in den Jahren von 346 bis 338, Münchener Historische Abhandlungen, 1. Reihe, 14. Heft [Munich: C. H. Beck, 1938], pp. 133-40. He cites Weil [Harangues, 1873, p. 402] and Blass [3: 394] as well as Böhnecke, Wilamowitz, and Reichenbacher in favor of authenticity; Schäfer (2^2: 505, 3 Beilagen 105] against. Wüst was himself convinced by M. Pohlenz, "Der Ausbruch des zweiten Kreiges zwischen Philipp und Athen," NGG 1924: 38-42, and "Philipps Schreiben an Athen," Hermes 64 [1929]: 41-62. He dismisses the objections of A. Momigliano, "Due problemi storiographici. I. Anassimene e la lettera di Filippo," RIL 65 [1932]: 565ff.) Although [Dem] XII is intended as his later attempt to stall Athenian intervention in the Hellespont by sparking debate in the Assembly (So J. R. Ellis, Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism [London: Thames and Hudson, 1976], p. 177. Cawkwell, Philip, p. 137, calls the letter Philip's declaration of war; Ellis responds that "it would have been most uncharacteristic [and not a little naive] of Philip to broadcast his intention in such a way."), the letter is useful as evidence of the kind of complaints that Philip was directing at Athens and of the form in which those complaints were addressed to the Athenians.

[24]So John Edwin Sandys, Demosthenes. On the Peace, Second Philippic, On the Chersonesus, and Third Philippic (London: MacMillan, 1900), p. 182.

[25]Demosthenes' characterization of the χρήσιμος πολίτης as one who always speaks τὸ βέλτιστον and not πρὸς χάριν reintroduces the theme of the first sentence of his speech (see above, pp. 85-86). It is a commonplace of Demosthenes' polemic against his political opponents. (Cf. III 3, IV 51, V 7, IX 63. πρὸς ἡδονήν, VIII 34, IX 4, I 15, IV 38.)

[26]Sandys, p. 185.

[27]"The courage, bravery, daring, and boldness of the men are also praised in all the [epitaphic] speeches." J. Ziolkowski, "Thucydides and the Tradition of Funeral Speeches at Athens" (Ph.D. dissertation, North Carolina, 1963), p. 83. The fallen are also described frequently in the epitaphioi as ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί (Ziolkowski, p. 85). The specifically heroic connotations of that designation are not present in the term ἀγαθὸς πολίτης, on which cf. A. W. H. Adkins, Moral Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece From Homer to the End of the Fifth Century (New York: Norton, 1972), pp. 126ff. Cf. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility, A Study of Greek Values (Oxford: Clarendon, 1960), pp. 198ff. Dover (see above, p. 99 n. 21), pp. 164-67.

CHAPTER V

THE THIRD PHILIPPIC

Delivered in May 341, only a few weeks after the speech on the Chersonese, the Third Philippic addresses a situation that is little changed. If Demosthenes' report is truthful, Philip's troops have arrived and are in control of Cardia while others are advancing on Byzantium (IX 17 19 35). Diopeithes, however, has clearly not been recalled and remains in leadership of Athenian mercenaries in the Chersonese, possible evidence that Demosthenes' own political influence was increasing at this time. Diopeithes evidently has sent a request to Athens for money and supplies (IX 73), and this, together with the report of Macedonian troop movements toward Byzantium, has become the subject of extended debate. Demosthenes' response, as in his speech On the Chersonese (see above pp. ff.), is to assert that the Assembly is addressing the wrong issue (IX 19):

> καὶ τοσοῦτόν γ' ἀφέστηκα τῶν ἄλλων, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῶν συμβουλευόντων, ὥστ' οὐδὲ δοκεῖ μοι περὶ Χερρονήσου νῦν σκοπεῖν οὐδὲ Βυζαντίου, ἀλλ' ἐπαμῦναι μὲν τούτοις, καὶ διατηρῆσαι μή τι πάθωσι, [καὶ τοῖς οὖσιν ἐκεῖ νῦν στρατιώταις πάνθ' ὅσων ἂν δέωνται ἀποστεῖλαι,] βουλεύεσθαι μέντοι περὶ πάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὡς ἐν κινδύνῳ μεγάλῳ καθεστώτων.
>
> Indeed, so far do I dissent from the other speakers in this debate, my fellow Athenians, that I do not consider it appropriate for us to be looking into the question of either the Chersonese or Byzantium at this time. Of course we should help them, be alert to any possible attack on them, [and supply the troops that are now there with everything they need.][1] But our debate should be concerned

> with all the Greeks, for they are facing a very dangerous situation.

In his speech On the Chersonese Demosthenes had suggested that the extended argument about Diopeithes' misdeeds in the Chersonese was a ploy to obstruct decisive Assembly action against Philip (VIII 13). The issue for debate was not an Athenian citizen's peccadillos but the real threat to Athens posed by a foreign enemy (VIII 3). In the present speech Demosthenes follows a similar line: the issue for debate is not Athens' particular engagements with Macedon in the Chersonese, but the dangerous threat that Macedon poses for all of Greece.

Although the political situation is little changed since Demosthenes' delivery of the speech On the Chersonese, his response to it in the Third Philippic is a radical departure from his earlier political oratory. It is only in the Third Philippic that we find Demosthenes making extended use of the tradition of anti-Persian rhetoric in political debate. For the first time in this speech Athens and Macedon appear as antagonists explicitly playing in the fourth century the traditional fifth-century roles of Athens and Persia. In this speech Demosthenes' adoption of the anti-barbarian rhetoric and his organization of the speech around the theme of Athens in leadership of Greeks against the foreign usurper provide the matrix for major incorporation of the epideictic commonplaces. If, in the speech On the Chersonese, Demosthenes' rhetoric was modest and retained a narrow focus on the need to sustain continued support of Diopeithes' leadership in the north, in the Third Philippic, as this chapter will show, Demosthenes elevates and broadens the dimensions of the conflict with Philip so that the issue of the speech becomes the survival of the traditional relationships within

the Greek community of cities and of Athens' traditional claim to leadership. Because the Third Philippic makes the theme of Athenian identity central, develops it through resort to the symbols of the great formative moment in Athenian history, the Persian wars, and articulates it through repeated use of epideictic commonplaces, this speech for the first time conveys an authentically epideictic tone unique among Demosthenes' speeches with the exception of his speech On the Crown (and, of course, his Epitaphios).

Scholars have not failed to recognize the unique character of the Third Philippic. In fact, they have universally recognized it to be Demosthenes' most brilliant political speech.[2] Even Drerup, who judges it to be despicable in its intent, calls it Demosthenes' "most powerful artistic achievement."[3] Yet, despite the admiration for the rhetorical genius of the speech expressed by Demosthenes' champions and detractors alike, more scholarly comment has been devoted to the controversy surrounding its double rescension than to the question of its style and method of argumentation. In their recent major survey of literature on Demosthenes during the period 1915-1965, Jackson and Rowe show no work on the argumentation of the Third Philippic and with regard to style they conclude:

> While many scholars have praised the Third Philippic for its lofty, Panhellenic expression, very little has been said that is specifically helpful for an understanding of Demosthenes' style.[4]

Those scholars who, in larger works, have attempted to account for the oratorical power of the Third Philippic generally speak of its capacity to arouse the emotions of the hearer (or reader). Jaeger, for example, refers this capacity to the "mighty alliance" of ethos and

pathos in Demosthenes' soul, "marking the onset of a new era of spiritual and artistic expression in the history of the Greek spirit."[5] In Schaefer's view the strength of the speech lies in its singleness of purpose and its appeal to feeling:

> Da ist kein Wort müssig oder einschmeichelnd, keines das nicht zum Zwecke entspräche die Hörer zu erschüttern, sie zu klarer Erkenntnis zu leiten und sie fest zu machen in dem Willen des rechte und pflichtgemässe zu thun. In gesunder Kraft, markig und gedrungen, ergreift die Rede das Gemüt und lenkt zu thatkräftigen Entschliessungen.[6]

Blass links the pathetic power of the speech to its panhellenic character, the fulness of its exposition, the moving use of narrative, and the insight provided by Demosthenes' use of history:

> Vollends hat in den späteren Theilen die Rede den Charakter des Pathetischen, machtvoll Andringenden und Einstürmenden; die ganze Lage von Hellas wird überschaut und die Thatsachen, auch dieselben wieder, gesammelt vorgeführt; einen breiten Raum nehmen auch die Vergleichungen mit der Vergangenheit ein, wobei der Redner tiefen Einblick in die Unterschiede von sonst und jetzt offenbart.[7]

Croiset speaks of intensity of feeling joined to vigor of thought:

> L'amour enflammé de la liberté, le sens le plus élevé de l'honneur, l'appel aux plus nobles traditions s'y mêlent à l'ironie mordante et à l'indignation, et aussi à la tristesse que le spectacle de certaines injustices criantes fait naître dans une nature généreuse.[8]

George Kennedy finds in "the orator's vision of the national character . . . the point on which the whole speech focuses and under which all arguments are subsumed."[9] Jaeger gives poetic summation to the relationship between oratorical forces and the orator's vision of national character:

> In the symphony of the Third Philippic the motifs of the other Philippic orations are organically interwoven and subordinated to the new leading theme. The new and amazing power of its eloquence is fed by two springs that here converge: the passionate natural feeling of consanguinity, the very existence of which was imperiled; and the ethos of a moral right so unshakable that no other political

> demand had ever been more firmly backed up. It was these two ideas that made Demosthenes' position so strong. . . . Like his earlier speeches against Philip, the oration is primarily a spiritual and moral achievement. . . . In the Third Philippic the soul of the Greek nation, which is at last beginning to find itself in the common will, though it has never heretofore taken on any form politically, is here mirrored in language--not in the phrases of a patriotic holiday speaker, glamorous with the glory of a great past, but in the imperious call of destiny, leading the people once again out of the aimless clash of interests into a fellowship of action and suffering.[10]

The fact that scholars reading this speech many centuries after its publication show themselves to have been deeply moved by its rhetorical power witnesses to the skill of its author.[11] In fact, his skill, in my judgment, was to take a highly ambiguous military and political situation, to portray it as an unambiguous crisis of freedom for all Greece, and to make it a panhellenic cause célèbre for the preservation of all Greece from barbarian enslavement. He induces the pathetic involvement of his audience in his appeal not only through judicious selection of events illustrating Philip's activities and a tendentious interpretation of them, but through orchestration of a series of paradeigmata and accumulation of words and phrases drawn from common patriotic rhetoric.

The reassessment of Philip and Demosthenes which has followed upon the pro-Macedonian work of such nineteenth-century historians as Droysen and Beloch continues to exercise the scholarly skills and personal prejudices of modern scholars.[12] Drerup's virulent attack on Demosthenes in his Advokatenrepublik has been softened in the work of such historians as J. R. Ellis and G. L. Cawkwell, who represent a viewpoint moderately favorable toward Philip and skeptical of Demosthenes.[13] Nonetheless, in Cawkwell's view, Philip was "a great man and so a great

menace to the liberty of Greece."[14] As for Demosthenes, although he is no longer Drerup's amoral and self-serving opportunist, but "a defender of liberty" whose policy for the salvation of Greece was nonetheless "hopeless" and "a hero of a tragedy of his own making," yet, Cawkwell argues, when Demosthenes protested constantly following the Peace of Philocrates that Philip was breaking the Peace, "Demosthenes lied. Perhaps in a good cause, but he lied."[15] "The truth," Cawkwell asserts, "is that between 344 and 342 Philip did not intervene in Greece or infringe the Peace":[16]

> The sum total of Philip's actual interventions in the affairs of Greek cities in 344 to 342 was very slight. . . . For whatever reason, Philip did not seek a conflict with Athens. The opinion so constantly asserted by Demosthenes in 341 that Philip was virtually at war with Athens was nothing else than an estimate of Philip's intentions. <u>As yet, Philip had done nothing hostile</u>.[17] [Italics mine.]

Cawkwell's interpretation of the events surrounding Demosthenes' career may well be vulnerable to the charge that it is inordinately biased in favor of Philip's good intentions.[18] Nonetheless, a number of passages in the Third Philippic do lend some credence to Cawkwell's position. First, one notices that whenever Demosthenes speaks of how wretched the affairs of Athens and all Greece have become, he resorts to the most general language:

> IX 1: εἰς τοῦθ' ὑπηγμένα πάντα τὰ πράγματα καὶ προειμέν' ὁρῶ, ὥστε . . . εἰ καὶ λέγειν ἅπαντες ἐβούλονθ' οἱ παριόντες καὶ χειροτονεῖν ὑμεῖς ἐξ ὧν ὡς φαυλότατ' ἔμελλε τὰ πράγματθ' ἕξειν, οὐκ ἂν ἡγοῦμαι δύνασθαι χεῖρον ἢ νῦν διατεθῆναι.
>
> IX 3: ἐκ δὲ τοῦ συμβουλεύειν παντάπασιν [τὴν παρρησίαν] ἐξεληλάκατε. (Demosthenes, however, speaks with candor, a seeming contradiction of this statement.)
>
> IX 4: ἐν δὲ τοῖς πράγμασι καὶ τοῖς γιγνομένοις περὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων ἤδη κινδυνεύειν.

IX 36: νῦν δ' ἁπολωλὸς ἅπαντα λελύμανται καὶ ἄνω καὶ κάτω πεποίηκε πάντα τὰ πράγματα.

IX 40: ἀλλὰ ταῦτ' ἄχρηστα, ἄπρακτα, ἀνόνητα ὑπὸ τῶν πωλούντων γίγνεται.

Even if the generality of these statements is to be understood as a rhetorical convention, they do not in any case stand as evidence that Athens was suffering under the Peace. On the contrary, in the Third, and even more explicitly in the Fourth Philippic Demosthenes suggests that Athens was, in fact, prospering:

IX 40: τριήρεις γε καὶ σωμάτων πλῆθος καὶ χρημάτων καὶ τῆς ἄλλης κατασκευῆς ἀφθονία, καὶ τἆλλ' οἷς ἄν τις ἰσχύειν τὰς πόλεις κρίνοι, νῦν ἅπασι καὶ πλείω καὶ μείζω ἐστὶ τῶν τότε πολλῷ.

IX 70: καὶ ἡμεῖς τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἕως ἐσμὲν σῷοι, πόλιν μεγίστην ἔχοντες, ἀφορμὰς πλείστας, ἀξίωμα κάλλιστον, τί ποιῶμεν;

X 16: . . . τῶν δ' Ἀθηναίων λιμένων καὶ νεωρίων καὶ τριήρων καὶ τόπου καὶ δόξης . . .

X 38: ἡ τύχη, καλῶς ποιοῦσα, πολλὰ πεποίηκε τὰ κοινά, καὶ τετρακόσι' ἀντὶ τῶν ἑκατὸν ταλάντων προσέρχεται.

In the Fourth Philippic, delivered only a few weeks after this speech, Demosthenes clarifies in what sense he believes that the city's affairs have been "betrayed" (IX 1, ὑπηγμένα), "abandoned" (IX 1, προειμένα), "rendered useless" (IX 40, ἄχρηστα . . . γίγνεται), and "reduced to chaos" (IX 36, ἄνω καὶ κάτω πεποίηκε). Athenians are experiencing unprecedented economic prosperity, but they have lost the sure support of their former allies and their military is defective:

X 49-50: εἰ τοίνυν τὸ τῶν ὠνίων πλῆθος ὁρῶντες καὶ τὴν εὐετηρίαν τὴν κατὰ τὴν ἀγοράν, τούτοις κεκήλησθ' ὡς ἐν οὐδενὶ δεινῷ τῆς πόλεως οὔσης, οὔτε προσηκόντως οὔτ' ὀρθῶς τὸ πρᾶγμα κρίνετε· ἀγορὰν μὲν γὰρ ἄν τις καὶ πανήγυριν ἐκ τούτων ἢ φαύλως ἢ καλῶς παρεσκευάσθαι κρίνοι· πόλιν δ' ἣν ὑπείληφεν, ὃς ἂν τῶν Ἑλλήνων

ἄρχειν ἀεὶ βούληται, μόνην ἂν ἐναντιωθῆναι καὶ τῆς πάντων ἐλευθερίας προστῆναι, οὐ μὰ Δί' ἐκ τῶν ὠνίων, εἰ καλῶς ἔχει, δοκιμάζειν δεῖ, ἀλλ' εἰ συμμάχων εὐνοίᾳ πιστεύει, εἰ τοῖς ὅπλοις ἰσχύει, ταῦθ' ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως δεῖ σκοπεῖν· ἃ σφαλερῶς ὑμῖν καὶ οὐδαμῶς ἅπαντα καλῶς ἔχει.

Hence, if you see the abundance of goods for sale in the market and their low prices and you are beguiled by that into the fantasy that our city is in no danger, your judgment of the matter is flawed and unworthy of you. A market or a fair--you could judge whether they are well or poorly stocked on such grounds. But a city which anyone who has ever wanted to rule Greece has regarded as the only one that would oppose him and defend the freedom of all--My God! You shouldn't test the prosperity of a city like that on the basis of consumer interests! No. Can it depend on the good will of its allies? Is it strong militarily? These are the questions you should ask about Athens. And in these areas you are shaky, in fact, a total and absolute disaster.[19]

Whatever adventures Philip may have been attempting to the north, Demosthenes himself appears to attest that at home the Pax Philippica could be tasted and savored. Athens, so it seems, continued to be known as the leading market-place in the eastern Mediterranean, and the Athenian economy appears to have been thriving. It is no wonder, then, that Demosthenes accused politicians who defended the Peace of speaking πρὸς ἡδονήν. We can also grasp the enormity of the rhetorical problem facing any politician who hoped to persuade fourth-century Athenians to resume war with Philip. When Demosthenes argues for war, he must continually speculate about what Philip is "plotting," because the actual conditions of life under the Peace of Philocrates probably improved in Athens and perhaps throughout all Greece.

No doubt Demosthenes was correct, however, in his charge that Athens could no longer count on the support of its traditional allies. Demosthenes himself provides evidence that, as Cawkwell has claimed, "there are no good grounds for asserting that Greece in general felt

itself menaced by Philip in early 342 and that Demosthenes' analysis of the situation was widely shared."[20] In his speech On the False Embassy two years earlier Demosthenes had spoken of a "dread disease" that had invaded Greece, an epidemic of admiration for Philip and zeal to share friendly relations, social and cultural exchange, and fraternal bonds with him.[21] In the Third Philippic, despite including the fall of Olynthus (IX 11 26 56), Eretria (IX 33 57-58), and Oreus (IX 12 33 59-62) in his catalogue of Philip's violations of the Peace and assaults on the Greek cities, he admits nonetheless that in each of these cities politicians speaking on behalf of Philip received a more favorable reception than those speaking "for their own people" (i.e., against Philip). (IX 63) He laments that none of the Greek states, even though they observe and receive reports of Philip's activities, send embassies to one another complaining about his behavior (IX 28). As Philip's power increases, the various Greek cities pay no attention (IX 29). Even as he portrays with considerable feeling and sympathy the rejection, imprisonment, and eventual suicide of Euphraeus (opponent of Philip), he acknowledges that it was the δῆμος of Oreus that abandoned him. He attempts to explain the lack of opposition among the common people to Philip's supporters by attributing it to fear of reprisals, but for that claim he offers no evidence (IX 59-62). Demosthenes describes the Greek reaction to Philip by comparing it to people facing an attack of fever (IX 29) or the approach of a hailstorm: they do nothing (IX 33, κωλύειν δ' οὐδεὶς ἐπιχειρῶν). Seeing Philip's activities, they "put up with it" (IX 33, ἀνέχονται). The evidence is rather that they welcomed it.[22]

Nor did Demosthenes' fellow Athenians, at least those present in the Assembly, share Demosthenes' understanding of the Macedonian threat. Even if they found Philip's imperial adventures distasteful they may have decided that his military machine was unbeatable and prudently opted for peace over disaster. Moreover, if A. H. M. Jones is correct in his assessment that the average assembly was attended mainly by the well-to-do citizens, i.e., those who had the greatest opportunity to profit from the Pax Philippica and the strongest motives therefore to preserve the Peace, we can grasp the reason for the gap between Demosthenes' perception of the growing Macedonian power to the north and that of these fellow Athenians.[23] The financial gains to be won from a continuation of peace on almost any terms appeared to the majority to compensate by far for the decline of international political power Athens was experiencing in the face of ascendant Macedonian imperialism. The cost of what, in any case, must have appeared to be an unbeatable war was too high for the majority to contemplate an intentional rupture of the Peace. Demosthenes, by contrast, repudiates calculations based on economics or the pursuit of short-term well-being. He is convinced that Athens will not finally survive if the City fails to check Macedonian growth while Athens and the majority of Greek cities remain independent enough to launch a united resistance. In the Fourth Philippic he will accuse his audience of appearing to be high on drugs (X 6): their very economic prosperity has become their opiate which dulls them to the future consequences of their inaction. Why Demosthenes apparently adopted a long view of Athens' future while most Athenians of his own economic class inclined to preserve at least polite if not

cordial relations with Philip for the sake of present advantage, we cannot know.[24]

Whatever the reasons for the difference in their perspectives and policies, the fact of that difference between Demosthenes and the Athenian majority is evidenced in the Third Philippic. The prologue begins with reference to the many speeches delivered "at almost every meeting of the Assembly" περὶ ὧν Φίλιππος, ἀφ' οὗ τὴν εἰρήνην ἐποιήσατο, οὐ μόνον ὑμᾶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀδικεῖ (IX 1). To the extent that Demosthenes, Hegesippus, and their colleagues raised the subject of Philip's activities it would, of course, necessarily have been the subject of debate. The attitude of the Athenian majority, however, does not appear to be hostile to Philip, as Demosthenes' next comment implies (IX 1):

> καὶ πάντων οἶδ' ὅτι φησάντων γ' ἄν, εἰ καὶ μὴ ποιοῦσι τοῦτο, καὶ λέγειν δεῖν καὶ πράττειν ὅπως ἐκεῖνος παύσεται τῆς ὕβρεως καὶ δίκην δώσει.
>
> and all, I am certain, would say--even if they don't do so--that we ought to speak and take action to end his outrages and make him pay for them.

His parenthetical "I am certain" and his qualifying "even if they don't do so" indicate that he is projecting his own viewpoint on others who have given no indication of agreeing with it, who may actually have spoken in direct opposition to it. Weil interprets the qualifying clause to mean, "bien que leur conduite ne s'accorde pas avec cette déclaration."[25] In paragraph six he indicates that not all politicians are prepared to agree that Philip is at war with Athens and violating the Peace. "Some" (ἔνιοι, cp. VIII 1) "continually assert that some of <u>us</u> are the ones making war" (λεγόντων πολλάκις ὡς ἡμῶν τινές

εἰσιν οἱ ποιοῦντες τὸν πόλεμον). Their opposition to proposals for the renewal of the war with Philip is so strong that anyone inclined to offer such a resolution is afraid he will be formally charged with having provoked the war (IX 7):

> ἔστι γὰρ δέος μήποθ' ὡς ἀμυνούμεθα γράψας τις καὶ συμβουλεύσας εἰς τὴν αἰτίαν ἐμπέσῃ τοῦ πεποιηκέναι τὸν πόλεμον.[26]
>
> For there is a fear that anyone who moves or recommends that we defend ourselves may be faced with the charge that he was the instigator of the war.

In paragraph 14 Demosthenes refers again to a political opposition which continues to maintain "it is not Philip, at any rate, who is making war with Athens," a contention which, following oratorical convention, he attributes to bribery (IX 14):

> καὶ τῶν παρ' ἑαυτοῦ μισθοφοροῦντων τοὺς λόγους ἀφέλοιτο, οἷς ἀναβάλλουσιν ὑμᾶς, λέγοντες ὡς ἐκεῖνός γ' οὐ πολεμεῖ τῇ πόλει.[27]
>
> [Only if Philip were a fool would he] deprive his paid employees of the speech with which they protract your deliberations, saying that Philip is not, at any rate, making war on Athens.

While the imputation of bribery may probably be dismissed, we may safely infer from Demosthenes' remarks here and elsewhere in the Third Philippic that he faced an opposition whose strategy was to label Demosthenes and his associates belligerent warmongers. The size of that opposition cannot be certainly measured on the basis of his remarks in the speech. The fact that Demosthenes' exertions failed to persuade the Athenians to open war until 340, when they no longer had a choice, implies the majority status of that opposition.

My conclusion is that Demosthenes faced a formidable strategic problem when he set out to write his Third Philippic: Athens was prospering, Philip's adventures were remote and not necessarily crucial

or contradictory to Athenian interests, and a good many Athenians and Athenian allies were content with the Peace or at least did not share Demosthenes' strong opposition to it. Perhaps the most serious obstacle, however, for Demosthenes or for any politician who hoped to kindle armed resistance to Macedon was the obvious military and diplomatic superiority which had permitted Philip's power to increase so dramatically in the previous fifteen years. In the speech On the Chersonese (VIII 69) Demosthenes had already provided a clue that he understood well enough the strength of Macedon and the likelihood of the failure of opposition to Philip. There Demosthenes described the ideal politician (himself) as one who always speaks what is best and chooses a policy "in which Fortune controls more than does calculation" (ἐν ᾗ πλειόνων ἡ τύχη κυρία γίγνεται ἢ οἱ λογισμοί), a statement lacking the bluster of one possessing certainty that his policy would achieve success. Similarly, in that speech it is only with extreme caution that he expresses his conviction that a change in Athenian attitude and behavior "might, might, even still, improve matters" (VIII 77, ἴσως ἄν, ἴσως καὶ νῦν ἔτι βελτίω γένοιτο). In the Third Philippic Demosthenes attempts to belittle Philip's military achievement, attributing it as in earlier speeches to Athenian failure to "move" (IX 5), to lack of serious response from any Greek city, and to treachery at home. But he devotes a lengthy section of his speech to a description of the revolution in military strategy which he says has occurred since the days of the old disputes between Athens and Sparta (IX 47-52). We shall return to this section later. For a moment, however, it is sufficient to recognize

that the inclusion of such a prominent discussion of Philip's persistence, versatility, experience, and diplomatic skill is evidence that Demosthenes saw clearly how dangerous a military adversary Philip would prove to be. He concludes the section of Philip's military art with the admission that "for actual combat Philip is better trained than we" (IX 52, εἰς δ' ἀγῶνα ἄμεινον ἡμῖν ἐκεῖνος ἤσκηται). Although he spends time arguing the point, more than likely his audience was well enough aware of it. Athens would clearly have been loathe to jeopardize its peace and domestic prosperity for the sake of a renewed war with an adversary whose military prowess and diplomatic agility had already been tested and proved during the events surrounding the ratification of the Peace.

Demosthenes clearly believed, however, that Philip's activities in the Chersonese and eastern Thrace provided the seeds for the full bloom of war. Diopeithes, after all, had not been recalled, even though his actions were a clear provocation and had brought both a diplomatic and military response from Macedon. We do not know whether Diopeithes was censured or ordered to suspend his operations against the territory around Cardia. On the other hand, we do not know whether he was encouraged to enlarge his sortees into Thrace and his harassment of Philip's territory, as he had proposed (VIII 17). We do know that Diopeithes remained in the Chersonese, which is evidence enough that Athens was not willing to give Philip the free hand Demosthenes accuses Athens of handing over to him. If Athens was prepared to enjoy and capitalize on the Pax Philippica, we are not to assume that its appreciation of the benefits gained was not tempered by anxiety about the

possible future cost. Athens had always shown itself ready to protect its flanks, even when it prudently avoided a full frontal assault. Nonetheless, Demosthenes saw in this particular development of events to the north a possibility to be exploited for the severing of relations with Philip. The Third Philippic, his masterpiece, was his energetic response to that possibility.

Demosthenes' strategy contains three elements. The first is to hammer home his claim that Philip is already at war with Athens by repeated listing of Philip's alleged aggressions against the various Greek cities near and far from Athens. His list includes: Olynthus, Phocis, Thessaly, and Oreus (IX 11-12); Serrium, Doriscus, Fort Serreum, and the Sacred Mountain (IX 15); Megara, Euboea, Thrace, the Peloponnese (IX 17); the Hellespont, Megara, Euboea, the Peloponnese (IX 18); Phocis (IX 19); the Chersonese, Byzantium (IX 20); Olynthus, Methone, Apollonia, the thirty cities in and about Thrace, Phocis, Thessaly, Euboea ("not far from Thebes and Athens!"), Ambracia, Elis, Megara (IX 26-27); following which Demosthenes summarizes, οὐθ' ἡ Ἑλλὰς οὐθ' ἡ βάρβαρος τὴν πλεονεξίαν χωρεῖ τἀνθρώπου (IX 27). His list of injuries continues: Pythian games, Thermopylae and the passes into Greece, precedence at the oracle, Thessaly, Porthmus, Oreus (IX 32-33); Ambracia, Leucas, Naupactus, Echinus, Byzantium, Cardia (IX 34-35); Olynthus, Eretria, Porthmus, Oreus (at length) (IX 56-62); Oreus, Eretria, Olynthus, Phocis (IX 65-68). In the speech On the Chersonese Demosthenes had argued that Athens had no choice between war and peace, but he grounded his argument almost exclusively in Philip's Thracian campaign, completed and possible. Here Demosthenes begins

with precisely the same theme (IX 6ff., cp. VIII 4ff.), but he amplifies it to include all of Greece and reinforces it by incessant repetition of illustrations throughout the speech. Cawkwell presents evidence which suggests that some of Demosthenes' examples are clear falsifications of the facts, that others may be interpreted in a manner much more favorable to Philip, and that the remainder are at least ambiguous.[28] But Demosthenes' audience will not have had evidence before it, and the repeated recollection of events which, at the very least, portrayed the growing influence of Philip on the Greek mainland, penetrates the rational defenses of the hearer (and reader), excites one's apprehensions about this fearful Macedonian power, and arouses the conviction that Philip must surely be Athens' enemy and the enemy of all Greece. Such is the aim of the first element in Demosthenes' strategy.

The second element in Demosthenes' strategy is his attack on Philip's defenders. Pearson says of Demosthenes' use of narrative in this speech prior to his presentation of his formal proposals that "he wants it to appear that only a traitor could propose anything different."[29] Bribery is a major theme of this speech, and Demosthenes is explicit in identifying politicians opposed to his viewpoint as Philip's "employees" (IX 14).[30] In the prologue he lays the ground for his subsequent attack by repeating the claim, familiar from earlier speeches, that Athens' ill condition is due to politicians who choose to ingratiate themselves with their audience rather than to propose what is best for them (IX 2, εὑρήσετε διὰ τοὺς χαρίζεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ βέλτιστα λέγειν προαιρουμένους).[31] Of these, he says, some are concerned primarily to preserve the perquisites of their popularity

and have no foresight for the future. Others, the ones about whom Demosthenes will evidence most concern, spend their time laying charges against, and spreading lies about, those in public life, with no other aim in mind than that "this city should exact punishment from its own and be absorbed in this, while Philip is free to say and do whatever he pleases" (IX 2):

> ὧν τινες μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐν οἷς εὐδοκιμοῦσιν αὐτοὶ καὶ δύνανται, ταῦτα φυλάττοντες οὐδεμίαν περὶ τῶν μελλόντων πρόνοιαν ἔχουσιν, [οὐκοῦν οὐδ' ὑμᾶς οἴονται δεῖν ἔχειν,] ἕτεροι δὲ τοὺς ἐπὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν ὄντας αἰτιώμενοι καὶ διαβάλλοντες οὐδὲν ἄλλο ποιοῦσιν ἢ ὅπως ἡ μὲν πόλις αὐτὴ παρ' αὐτῆς δίκην λήψεται καὶ περὶ τοῦτ' ἔσται, Φιλίππῳ δ' ἐξέσται καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν ὅ τι βούλεται.

Philip's freedom to engage in war against Athens without having Athens at war with him Demosthenes says he has purchased by spending money, presumably on those politicians who support peace. (IX 9: τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὃ τῶν ἀναλισκομένων χρημάτων πάντων Φίλιππος ὠνεῖται, αὐτὸς μὲν πολεμεῖν ὑμῖν, ὑφ' ὑμῶν δὲ μὴ πολεμεῖσθαι.)
In the past, war was "open and above board," but now most disastrous defeats are due to the work of traitors whose services have been purchased with money (IX 48-49):

> οὕτω δ' ἀρχαίως εἶχον, μᾶλλον δὲ πολιτικῶς, ὥστ' οὐδὲ χρημάτων ὠνεῖσθαι παρ' οὐδενὸς οὐδέν, ἀλλ' εἶναι νόμιμόν τινα καὶ προφανῆ τὸν πόλεμον. νυνὶ δ' ὁρᾶτε μὲν δήπου τὰ πλεῖστα τοὺς προδότας ἀπολωλεκότας.[32]

Any citizens who speak on behalf of Philip are to be hated, for they are his servants (ὑπηρετοῦντες), his "employees" (ἄνθρωποι μισθωτοί) (IX 53-54). The examples of Olynthus, Eretria, Porthmus, and Oreus are adduced to portray the consequences when a city follows οἱ τὰ Φιλίππου φρονοῦντες (IX 56). In each case the city was

brought to ruin: its loyal citizens and real champions (e.g., Euphraeus) were banished and the cities have been placed into the hands of tyrants (IX 56-62). Their citizens have become slaves, under threat of whip and guillotine (IX 66: δουλεύουσί γε μαστιγούμενοι καὶ σφαττόμενοι). In Demosthenes' depiction of the situation, no one speaking favorably of Philip can be supporting the interests of Athens. Debate is drawn sharply between Philip's "friends," "servants," and "employees" and leaders who "speak the best" or who "speak on your behalf."[33]

Demosthenes' attack on Philip's defenders reaches its climax when he compares them to the traitorous Medizers whom the Athenian πρόγονοι in olden times severely punished (IX 41-45). Their defense of all Greece is a panhellenic theme central to the third element in Demosthenes' strategy. In previous speeches he had drawn modestly on the commonplaces of Athenian patriotism as they are evidenced in the epitaphioi; in this speech the commonplaces are pervasive. In the Second Philippic the orator had begun to make use of panhellenic rhetoric and drew his major paradeigma from the Persian wars; in this speech panhellenic rhetoric dominates and the conflict between Greek and barbarian epitomized in Greek defeat of Persia in the early fifth century becomes the organizing theme of the speech. Athens' task, bequeathed to it by its ancestors, is the salvation of Greece (IX 74). Athens' enemy is the enemy of all Greeks (IX 1 35) and a barbarian (IX 31, more despicable than the Persian had been) whose insatiable ambition (IX 27) threatens the freedom of all Greece. While the speech On the Chersonese was modest, almost understated, in its narrow focus

on Athenian interests in the Chersonese and the need to retain an Athenian military force there, this speech uses the conflict at Cardia and the Macedonian threat to Byzantium as the occasion to press for a unanimous uprising of all Greeks against Macedon, what Jaeger has typified as Demosthenes' "brand of Panhellenism"--"the outgrowth of a resolute will for national self-assertiveness, deliberately opposed to the national self-surrender called for by Isocrates."[34]

Without question Demosthenes intended his audience to respond to the panhellenic themes of this speech as an act of self-assertion. There is here, however, no notion of the subordination of Athenian interests to the larger interests of a panhellenic unity. If the theme is panhellenic unity, the issue in the Third Philippic is hegemony--Athens' hegemony "deliberately opposed" (Jaeger) to Philip's hegemony espoused by Isocrates and promoted by the policies of Demosthenes' political opponents. The point is important for understanding both Demosthenes' political aims and his rhetorical strategy, for it will be seen that Demosthenes' aim and the end of his policy is not to create panhellenic unity nor does the panhellenic idealism conveyed in the Third Philippic represent Demosthenes' basic values or driving motives. The panhellenism is not an end but a means--in the first case, to the defeat and final demolition of Macedonian power; in the second, to the persuasion of his audience. Demosthenes here adopts a panhellenic strategy because the political and rhetorical demands of the occasion call for it. For Demosthenes, however, the Athenian identity which he invokes in this speech, cannot be separated from its historic leadership--its rightful hegemony--and it is to that identity, to that assertion of primacy

among the Greeks, that Demosthenes is finally driving his audience in the Third Philippic.

In the first of four major illustrations (IX 23-25, 30-31, 36-45, 47-52) from Athenian history which Demosthenes uses in this speech, the contrast is drawn between the common response of the Greek states to previous Athenian and Spartan hegemonies and to Philip. He adduces the 73-year hegemony of Athens and the 29-year hegemony of Sparta to illustrate the limits to power placed on the leading cities of Greece by the other Greeks. Even when Athens or Sparta were προστάται in Greece for long periods of time and even when Thebes--never in genuine competition with Athens or Sparta--held a measure of power (ἴσχυσαν δέ τι) for a time, the other Greek cities never conceded to them what all of them, Demosthenes argues, have conceded to Philip--τὸ ποιεῖν ὅ τι βούλεται (IX 22-23, cp. 2). In turn, first Athens, then Sparta, held the power to dominate Greece (IX 24, δυναστεία). But when the Athenians failed to conduct themselves with moderation in their dealing with any of the other states (IX, 24, ἐπειδή τισιν οὐ μετρίως ἐδόκουν προσφέρεσθαι) and when the Spartans tried to expand and to modify the existing order beyond acceptable limits (IX 24, ἐπειδὴ πλεονάζειν ἐπεχείρουν καὶ πέρα τοῦ μετρίου τὰ καθεστηκότ' ἐκίνουν), all Greek states together resisted, even those not directly affected. Hence, whatever "errors" Spartans and Athenians had committed in the 100 years one or the other of them held the Greek hegemony were fewer than, not even a fraction of, the "aggressions" committed by Philip in the not quite thirteen years he had "been on top."[35] Two panhellenic themes are present in Demosthenes' use of this illustration: the contrast

between the moderation and mutual accountability exercised within the Greek community and the passive-aggressive relationship between the Greeks as a group and a foreign overlord; and the readiness of Greeks to go to war alongside and in behalf of other Greeks who had been the victims of aggression, even when those bringing aid had not themselves been injured.[36] A clear subtheme, however, is the exercise of legitimate hegemony by a Greek city and the malignant rule of a foreign rival.

The theme is accentuated in Demosthenes' second major illustration (IX 30-31). Here again the contrast is between the legitimate hegemonies of Athens and Sparta and the usurpation of rightful leadership by Philip. Greeks are compared in this illustration to members of a family. The Athenians and Spartans are legitimate offspring of that family (γνήσιοι τῆς Ἑλλάδος) and may be compared to a legitimate son born to a large estate (ὥσπερ ἂν . . . υἱὸς ἐν οὐσίᾳ πολλῇ γεγονὼς γνήσιος). The implication of the image is that Athenians and Spartans are rightful heirs to leadership in Greece. While they battle between themselves to determine who shall exercise it, the assumption is that either Athenians or Spartans assume Greek hegemony as their rightful estate. Philip, by contrast, is compared not merely to an outsider who can claim neither kinship nor rights of inheritance (οὐ προσήκων . . . οὐ κληρονόμος τούτων ὤν), but to one of unworthy and unequal status, a slave or a spurious imposter (δοῦλος ἢ ὑποβολιμαῖος). Because Athenians and Spartans are members of the family, so to speak, their acts of aggression against fellow family members may be counted merely as "a shameful mismanagement of the estate, for which they deserve censure and criticism" (διῴκει τι μὴ

καλῶς καὶ ὀρθῶς, κατ' αὐτὸ μὲν τοῦτ' ἄξιον μέμψεως εἶναι καὶ κατηγορίας).[37] Philip's actions, however, may be described as "the wasting and squandering of what is not properly his," and "everyone would say that it is terrible and merits indignant rage" (τὰ μὴ προσήκοντ' ἀπώλλυε καὶ ἐλυμαίνετο, 'Ηράκλεις ὅσῳ μᾶλλον δεινὸν καὶ ὀργῆς ἄξιον πάντες ἂν ἔφησαν εἶναι). But the Greeks, says Demosthenes, do not in fact respond to Philip's illegitimate and aggressive exercise of leadership with appropriate rage (IX 31):

> ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑπὲρ Φιλίππου καὶ ὧν ἐκεῖνος πράττει νῦν, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχουσιν, οὐ μόνον οὐχ Ἕλληνος ὄντος οὐδὲ προσήκοντος οὐδὲν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ βαρβάρου ἐντεῦθεν ὅθεν καλὸν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ' ὀλέθρου Μακεδόνος, ὅθεν οὐδ' ἀνδράποδον σπουδαῖον οὐδὲν ἦν πρότερον πρίασθαι.
>
> But that is not how they act toward Philip in response to his present activity, even though he is not only no Greek nor any relation of Greeks, but not even a barbarian from any place that can be mentioned in polite conversation. No, he's a damned Macedonian, from a place where in the past you couldn't even buy a decent slave.

This celebrated piece of invective is surely intended to widen the gap as far as possible between Philip and all Greeks. If Aeschines had been able to call Philip ἑλληνικώτατος ἀνθρώπων (XIX 308), Demosthenes here calls him, in effect, βαρβαρώτατος βαρβάρων. He is no Greek, in no way related to Greeks, and the worst of all possible barbarians. This obvious exaggeration is probably intended to be humorous. But it is venomous humor fueled by more than the antipathy to the barbarian and the dream of a panhellenic uprising against him reminiscent of the great anti-Persian campaign of 150 years earlier. It is sarcasm fueled by Demosthenes' resentment of a foreign novus homo successfully assuming Athens' traditional role of Hellenic leadership.

Demosthenes reveals his motive in the following paragraph (32). If Philip's attempts to establish his hegemony in Greece may be viewed as acts of hybris, quite literally as attempts to grasp honor and position above one's station, Demosthenes can point to "the most extreme forms of his insolence." (τί τῆς ἐσχάτης ὕβρεως ἀπολείπει;) As if destroying cities is not enough for him, he organizes the Pythian games, τὸν κοινὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀγῶνα, and when himself cannot be present for this Greek family celebration, τοὺς δούλους ἀγωνοθετήσοντας πέμπει.[38] He further assumes precedence at the Oracle (ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὴν προμαντείαν τοῦ θεοῦ), displacing Athens and other legitimate Greek cities from a privilege, "to which not even all Greek cities have access" (ἧς οὐδὲ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἅπασι μέτεστι). Demosthenes' theme is that Philip is not a Greek and is showing himself the common enemy of all Greeks both by seizing and destroying their cities and by assuming their legitimate prerogatives. More than that, though a fraud of sub-slavish birth, he has seized from Athens and Sparta, true-born Greeks, their rights to precedence and imperium.

Demosthenes' third major illustration, the longest and most fully developed (IX 36-45), is designed to support Demosthenes' attack on Philip's defenders among Greeks. It is also the most thoroughly panhellenic illustration in the speech, with a paradeigma--ostensibly--from the Persian Wars. In paragraph 35 Demosthenes laments the fact, as he sees it, that despite the many injuries the Greeks had suffered at Philip's hands ἅπαντες μέλλομεν καὶ μαλκίομεν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς πλήσιον βλέπομεν, ἀπιστοῦντες ἀλλήλοις, οὐ τῷ πάντας ἡμᾶς ἀδικοῦντι. "What is the cause of this?" he asks (36). He

withholds his answer long enough both to build suspense and, while doing so, to insert several patriotic commonplaces:

> οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ λόγου καὶ δικαίας αἰτίας οὕτε τόθ' οὕτως εἶχον ἑτοίμως πρὸς ἐλευθερίαν οἱ Ἕλληνες οὕτε νῦν πρὸς τὸ δουλεύειν. ἦν τι τότ', ἦν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐν ταῖς τῶν πολλῶν διανοίαις, ὃ νῦν οὐκ ἔστιν, ὃ καὶ τοῦ Περσῶν ἐκράτησε πλούτου καὶ ἐλευθέραν ἦγε τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ οὔτε ναυμαχίας οὔτε πεζῆς μάχης οὐδεμιᾶς ἡττᾶτο. . . . τί οὖν ἦν τοῦτο; [οὐδὲν ποικίλον οὐδὲ σοφόν, ἀλλ' ὅτι] τοὺς παρὰ τῶν ἄρχειν βουλομένων ἢ διαφθείρειν τὴν Ἑλλάδα χρήματα λαμβάνοντας ἅπαντες ἐμίσουν.
>
> For it was not without rationale or just cause that the Greeks in the past were so zealous for freedom, while those today are zealous for slavery. There was something in those days, men of Athens, something in the spirit of the masses which is not there now, something that defeated the wealth of Persia, that kept Greece free, that never lost a single battle at land or sea . . . What was that? [Nothing complicated or clever; merely that] any who took money from those whose purpose was to rule Greece or buy control of it were hated by all.

Triumph over wealth, pursuit of freedom, victory on both land and sea are each commonplaces evidenced in the epitaphioi.[39] They elevate the tone of this explanation and explicitly connect it to the panhellenic sentiments of the Persian Wars. He continues that in that earlier period one could not buy from either a politician or general any καιρὸν . . . οὐδὲ τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὁμόνοιαν, οὐδὲ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς τυράννους καὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους ἀπιστίαν, οὐδ' ὅλως τοιοῦτον οὐδέν (38).[40] In the Second Philippic (VI 24) Demosthenes had commended ἀπιστία as a κοινὸν φυλακτήριον, ἀγαθόν and σωτήριον for all, but especially useful for the defense of democracies against tyrants (μάλιστα δὲ τοῖς πλήθεσι πρὸς τοὺς τυράννους). Here the theme is repeated, but given explicit anti-Persian coloring by the additional reference to "barbarians" and incorporated into panhellenic symbolism by its linkage to ὁμόνοια, a key term in the panhellenic

rhetoric of Isocrates.[41]

That the incorruptible distrust of Greeks for tyrants and barbarians did exist in an earlier age (IX 41, ἐν τοῖς ἄνωθεν χρόνοις) Demosthenes illustrates with a startlingly new kind of evidence hitherto unexampled in his political speeches. With considerable ceremony he introduces what he alleges to be the very words of a decree passed by the Athenian ancestors and recorded for the edification of posterity (IX 41):

> Ὅτι δ' οὕτω ταῦτ' ἔχει τὰ μὲν νῦν ὁρᾶτε δήπου καὶ οὐδὲν ἐμοῦ προσδεῖσθε μάρτυρος· τὰ δ' ἐν τοῖς ἄνωθεν χρόνοις ὅτι τἀναντί' εἶχεν ἐγὼ δηλώσω, οὐ λόγους ἐμαυτοῦ λέγων, ἀλλὰ γράμματα τῶν προγόνων τῶν ὑμετέρων ἀνεῖνοι κατέθεντ' εἰς στήλην χαλκῆν γράψαντες εἰς ἀκρόπολιν, [οὐχ ἵν' αὐτοῖς ᾖ χρήσιμα (καὶ γὰρ ἄνευ τούτων τῶν γραμμάτων τὰ δέοντ' ἐφρόνουν), ἀλλ' ἵν' ὑμεῖς ἔχηθ' ὑπομνήματα καὶ παραδείγματα, ὡς ὑπὲρ τῶν τοιούτων σπουδάζειν προσήκει.
>
> That such is the way things are today you surely see for yourselves and need no further account of it from me. That in the olden days things were just the opposite, however, I intend to prove, not by reciting words of mine, but a document of your ancestors which they engraved on a bronze pillar and deposited in the Acropolis. This they did, not so that it would be of use to them (for even without these documents their minds were inclined to what was needed), but so that you might have reminiscences and examples of how earnestly you ought to pursue such issues.

This lengthy introduction to his paradeigma attracts his audience's attention to it, heightens their anticipation of it, and emphasizes its importance. It also shapes his audience's attitude toward the document and the understanding he intends for them to have of it, for Demosthenes here introduces his "document" with a clear statement of its rationale and purpose. For his characterization of contemporary Athens Demosthenes implies that he needs no proof; he points out to his audience what he sees and invites the members of his audience to verify his perceptions

from their own experience (οὐδὲν ἐμοῦ προσδεῖσθε μάρτυρος). In support of characterizations of the past, however, evidence is required. The orator may appeal to Athenian popular history, and usually he does so (as in VI 11 and elsewhere in this speech). Here, however, he will set aside these mere "stories" (λόγοι) in favor of hard data, documentary evidence (γράμματα). The orator implies that he himself will step aside and permit the Athenian ancestors to speak for themselves. Their words he invests with authority. They have been engraved in metal for deposit in the national archives (no ordinary words). They are the words of a generation whose advice ought to be heeded, for "they were of a mind attuned to what the situation required" (τὰ δέοντ' ἐφρόνουν). And they were recorded by the Athenians' ancestors, not for themselves but for their descendents, for the very audience that Demosthenes is addressing. The ancestors intended their document to be a memento and a model for their descendents, for Demosthenes' audience (ἵν' ὑμεῖς ἔχητε ὑπομνήματα καὶ παραδείγματα). Finally, leaving no chance of misunderstanding, Demosthenes spells out for his audience the message their ancestors wish to convey through their document: Athenians ought to protect Greece zealously from traitors (ὑπὲρ τῶν τοιούτων σπουδάζειν προσήκει).

With such an extended and carefully crafted introduction Demosthenes clearly intends to arouse in his audience σπουδή for the "document" he then recites for them. It is a decree declaring Arthmius of Zelea ἄτιμος καὶ πολέμιος τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων αὐτὸς καὶ γένος. (IX 42) He is declared "an outlaw and an enemy of the dêmos of the Athenians and of their allies, himself and

his descendents" because " he transported gold from the Medes into the Peloponnese" (ὅτι τὸν χρυσὸν τὸν ἐκ Μήδων εἰς Πελοπόννησον ἤγαγεν). Demosthenes had invoked this same decree two years earlier in his speech On the False Embassy (XIX 271). There as here his intent was to urge state action against his political opponents. Even as Arthmios is a paradeigma of a time when "justice was holy and punishment of those who commit such crimes was considered honorable" (XIX 272), so Demosthenes concludes the earlier speech with a call to make Aeschines' punishment a paradeigma as well: τιμωρησαμένους παράδειγμα ποιῆσαι πᾶσι, καὶ τοῖς πολίταις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἕλλησιν (XIX 343). But also there as here he associates the decree with the Persian Wars. He emphasizes the special location in the acropolis of the bronze stele containing the inscription; it is alongside a great Persian War memorial (XIX 272):

> νὴ Δί', ἀλλ' ὅπως ἔτυχεν ταῦτα τὰ γράμματ' ἔστηκεν. ἀλλ' ὅλης οὔσης ἱερᾶς τῶς ἀκροπόλεως ταυτησὶ καὶ πολλὴν εὐρυχωρίαν ἐχούσης, παρὰ τὴν χαλκῆν τὴν μεγάλην Ἀθηνᾶν ἐκ δεξιᾶς ἕστηκεν, ἣν ἀριστεῖον ἡ πόλις τοῦ πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους πολέμου, δόντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὰ χρήματα ταῦτα, ἀνέθηκεν.
>
> Does someone object that this inscription was set up just anywhere? They are wrong! Even though this whole acropolis of ours is a holy place and has a good amount of free space, [the inscription] was set up to the right alongside the large bronze Athena which the City dedicated as a memorial of the war with the barbarians, a memorial for which the Greeks contributed the funding.

Demosthenes here wishes to cloak his decree with the associations and authority of Phidias's great bronze statue of Athena Promachos, "the first great public monument to be set up after the Persian wars" and "the most conspicuous landmark in Athens for those who approached the city by sea."[42] Both here and in the Third Philippic he clearly

understands this decree to refer to the first half of the fifth century --to the Persian Wars themselves or to the period immediately following and closely associated with those wars. In this understanding we may assume he was essentially correct.[43]

From the Arthmius affair and the decree which "outlawed" Arthmius and his family for it Demosthenes draws his evidence not only that the Athenians' ancestors "detested" (IX 37, ἐμίσουν) anyone who took bribes from aspirants to the rule of Greece; he also draws the panhellenic conclusion that the decree is evidence of Athenian care for the welfare of all Greeks (45, οὐκοῦν ἐνόμιζον ἐκεῖνοι τῆς πάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων σωτηρίας αὐτοῖς ἐπιμελητέον εἶναι). Otherwise, why would bribery in the Peloponnese be of concern to the Athenians?[44] He concludes his comments on the example, therefore, with a panhellenic moral (IX 45):

> ἐκ δὲ τούτων εἰκότως τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἦν τῷ βαρβάρῳ φοβερά, οὐχ ὁ βάρβαρος τοῖς Ἕλλησιν.[45]
>
> The logical result of this was that the Barbarian dreaded the actions of Greeks, not that Greeks dreaded the Barbarians.

The παράδειγμα of Arthmius serves several purposes. It illustrates Demosthenes' contention that the Greeks of olden times viewed much more seriously the acceptance of bribes from non-Greek powers than did Greeks in his own day. Secondly, it provides the occasion for a memorable reference to the Persian wars and further emphasis on the antipathy between Greek and barbarian and the panhellenic concern and cooperation which those wars symbolized. If the decree stood in a prominent place on the Acropolis, it is also reasonable to ask whether the Athenians of Demosthenes' day may have known this decree and

recognized it to have come from the period of the Confederacy, when a decree of the Athenian Assembly could be binding on the other members of the Confederacy as well.[46] If so, the incident is a reminder not only of common Greek opposition to the barbarian but also a further reference to the historic Athenian right to leadership in Greek affairs, a recollection of the days when the Athenian Assembly could legislate for the rest of Greece.[47]

Demosthenes' fourth paradeigma is introduced as the "silly talk of those who want to reassure the City" (IX 47, Ἐστι τοίνυν τις εὐήθης λόγος παρὰ τῶν παραμυθεῖσθαι βουλομένων τὴν πόλιν). They say that Philip is not yet the equal of the Spartans in the days when they were in control of land and sea, had the Great King as their ally, and nothing could resist them. Yet Athens defended itself against the Spartans and was not taken. Demosthenes had used this illustration himself ten years earlier in his First Philippic (IV 3) and again in the Second Olynthiac (II 24), when he was the one reassuring the city. Here he uses it as a counter-paradeigma to illustrate the changes that have occurred in the practice of war since the days of the conflict between Athens and Sparta. He seeks through this illustration to emphasize how formidable an adversary Athens can expect Philip to be (see above, pp. 113-114). Although he does not say so, he is probably implying that Athens' conflict with Philip lies outside the normal parameters of intra-Greek rivalry. When Greeks fought with Greeks, war was "open and above board" (IX 48, νόμιμόν τινα καὶ προφανῆ τὸν πόλεμον). Now, to return to the theme of bribery, treachery substitutes for open warfare (IX 49, τὰ πλεῖστα τοὺς προδότας ἀπολωλεκότας). Hence,

Demosthenes uses this illustration to support the view that effective opposition to an adversary as wily and un-Greek as Philip must begin with the purge of "his servants" within the Greek cities (IX 53) and culminate in a common panhellenic revolt against his power (IX 71). The implication of Demosthenes' use of the paradeigma is that a threat as insidious and innovative as Philip's can only be met through a united front.

If Athens cannot stand alone in opposition to Philip, Demosthenes does not conclude that Athens is thereby robbed of its precedence of place and initiative. In a rhetorical flourish drawn from the epitaphic tradition, Demosthenes asserts that "even if all the others consent to become slaves, we at any rate must continue the battle for freedom" (IX 70):

> καὶ γὰρ ἂν ἅπαντες δήπου δουλεύειν συγχωρήσωσιν οἱ ἄλλοι, ἡμῖν γ' ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἀγωνιστέον.

But, given his strong warnings about the formidability of the Macedonian in his fourth illustration, he may here be calling for heroic death rather than cowardly submission, as in IX 65, τεθνάναι δὲ μυριάκις κρεῖττον ἢ κολακείᾳ τι ποιῆσαι Φιλίππου. (This sentiment is itself an epideictic commonplace.) Athens' role of leadership, however, is not, first of all, to persevere to the death when all others have submitted. It is to function once again literally as προστάτης τῶν Ἑλλήνων by calling them to action, by becoming their convenor, teacher, and coach (IX 73): φημὶ δεῖν . . . τοὺς δ' ἄλλους Ἕλληνας συγκαλεῖν, συνάγειν, διδάσκειν, νουθετεῖν. This is the task that belongs to a city with the rank of honor that accrues to Athens (ταῦτ' ἔστιν πόλεως ἀξίωμ' ἐχούσης ἠλίκον

ὑμῖν ὑπάρχει). Clearly, if the battle against Philip has to be a panhellenic enterprise, Demosthenes' intent is that Athens will be at its head. It is not the historic and rightful task of Chalcidians or Megarians to "save Greece" (IX 74, τὴν Ἑλλάδα σώσειν), nor would they be able to do so if Athens were to withdraw. Drawing from the epideictic tradition, Demosthenes concludes that the salvation of Greece is a task bequeathed to Athens, a "prize" won for the Athenians by their ancestors and handed down "with many and great risks" (IX 74):

> ἀλλ' ὑμῖν τοῦτο [i.e. τὸ τὴν Ἑλλάδα σῴζειν] πρακτέον· ὑμῖν οἱ πρόγονοι τοῦτο τὸ γέρας ἐκτήσαντο καὶ κατέλιπον μετὰ πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων κινδύνων.

After this strong assertion of Athenian identity, capturing the heroic image of its leadership of other Greeks at their moments of most serious distress, Demosthenes adds one last, brief caution to any who still might imagine they can sit still and hope for others to fulfill the duty which is theirs alone. He then concludes the Third Philippic with a far more confident statement than he had managed in the speech On the Chersonese only a few weeks earlier. The conditional construction remains, but the fearful and somewhat carping repetition of ἴσως . . . ἴσως is replaced with a straightforward, though modest, assertion of trust in the validity of the policy he proposes (IX 76):

> Ἐγὼ μὲν δὴ ταῦτα λέγω, ταῦτα γράφω· καὶ οἶομαι καὶ νῦν ἔτ' ἐπανορθωθῆναι ἂν τὰ πράγματα τούτων γιγνομένων.

> These, then, are my proposals, and I move their adoption. Even now I believe that our fortunes may still be 'amended,' if only my proposals are put into effect.

Perhaps it is characteristic of the boldness of this speech that it should end with an allusion to the "amendment" of the Peace proposed by

Philip and finally rejected by the Athenians, largely through the influence of Hegesippus, a year earlier. If Demosthenes has his way, Athens, the γνήσιος υἱός, and not the ὑποβολιμαῖος βάρβαρος Philip, will settle the affairs of Greece.[48]

Both the assertion of Athenian superiority and the panhellenic concern of this speech are echoed throughout this speech in commonplaces drawn from the epitaphioi. That is not ἄνευ λόγου καὶ δικαίας αἰτίας since in this speech for the first time the image of Athens as defender of Greek freedom is opposed explicitly to the image of Philip as the common barbarian enemy of all Greeks. In the Second Philippic, as we have seen, Demosthenes used the traditional panhellenic, anti-Persian rhetoric to evoke a powerful patriotic image of Athens, but he applied the tradition to Philip only indirectly by implication. In Demosthenes' confrontation with Aeschines a year later, the role of the traditional rhetoric in Aeschines' oratory becomes, somewhat surprisingly, a focus for Demosthenes' attacks upon his political adversary (XIX 303-08, 311, 16). It becomes apparent from a reading of the speech On the False Embassy that the cooptation of anti-Persian rhetoric for attack on Philip did not originate with Demosthenes but had been used by Aeschines before ratification of the Peace.[49] Here for the first time in his own political speeches Demosthenes places Athens and Macedon--as Aeschines had done seven years earlier--into the traditional fifth century roles of Greek and barbarian. It is for the articulation of the historic anti-barbarian idealism and the theme of Athens in leadership of Greeks against a foreign usurper that Demosthenes enlists the epideictic commonplaces which appear plentifully in the Third Philippic.

They are listed here in the order in which they first appear in the speech.[50]

Commonplaces in the Third Philippic

1. Athenians are victorious over their enemies.

IX 5--νῦν δὲ τῆς ῥᾳθυμίας τῆς ὑμετέρας καὶ τῆς ἀμελείας κεκράτηκε Φίλιππος, τῆς πόλεως δ' οὐ κεκράτηκεν· οὐδ' ἥττησθ' ὑμεῖς, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ κεκίνησθε.

[IX 36--ἦν τι τότ' . . . ὃ καὶ τοῦ Περσῶν ἐκράτησε πλούτου . . . καὶ οὔτε ναυμαχίας οὔτε πεζῆς μάχης οὐδεμιᾶς ἡττᾶτο.]

2. Athenians are the leaders of Greece.

IX 23--καίτοι προστάται μὲν ὑμεῖς ἑβδομήκοντ' ἔτη καὶ τρία τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐγένεσθε, [προστάται δὲ τριάκονθ' ἑνὸς δέοντα Λακεδαιμόνιοι.]

3. Athenians help the victims of aggression.

[IX 24--πάντες ᾤοντο δεῖν, καὶ οἱ μηδὲν ἐγκαλεῖν ἔχοντες αὐτοῖς, μετὰ τῶν ἠδικημένων πολεμεῖν . . . πάντες εἰς πόλεμον κατέστησαν, καὶ οἱ μηδὲν ἐγκαλοῦντες αὐτοῖς.]

[IX 25--ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς αὐτοὶ καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, οὐδὲν ἂν εἰπεῖν ἔχοντες ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὅ τι ἠδικούμεθ' ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, ὅμως ὑπὲρ ὧν τοὺς ἄλλους ἀδικουμένους ἐωρῶμεν, πολεμεῖν ᾠόμεθα δεῖν.]

4. Athenians are nobly born and autochthonous.

[IX 30--ὅσα μὲν ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων ἢ ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἔπασχον οἱ Ἕλληνες, ἀλλ' οὖν ὑπὸ γνησίων γ' ὄντων τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἠδικοῦντο . . . ὥσπερ . . . υἱὸς ἐν οὐσίᾳ πολλῇ γεγονὼς γνήσιος. . . .]

Philip, by contrast, cp. IX 31--δοῦλος . . . ὑποβολιμαῖος . . . οὐχ Ἕλληνος ὄντος οὐδὲ προσήκοντος οὐδὲν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ βαρβάρου ἐντεῦθεν ὅθεν καλὸν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ' ὀλέθρου Μακεδόνος . . .

5. Athenians do not sacrifice freedom, justice, and glory to personal gain.

[IX 36--ὃ καὶ τοῦ Περσῶν ἐκράτησε πλούτου]

6. Athenians fight for freedom, for all Greeks.

[IX 36-- τόθ' οὕτως εἶχον ἑτοίμως πρὸς ἐλευθερίαν οἱ Ἕλληνες . . . νῦν πρὸς τὸ δουλεύειν]

[IX 36-- ἐλευθέραν ἦγε τὴν Ἑλλάδα]

[IX 59--(Euphraeus) τις ἄνθρωπος καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν ποτ' ἐνθάδ' οἰκήσας, ὅπως ἐλεύθεροι καὶ μηδενὸς δοῦλοι ἔσονται]

[IX 70-- καὶ γὰρ ἂν ἅπαντες δήπου δουλεύειν συγχωρήσωσιν οἱ ἄλλοι, ἡμῖν γ' ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἀγωνιστέον.]

7. Athenians are superior in battle on both land and sea.

[IX 36-- καὶ οὔτε ναυμαχίας οὔτε πεζῆς μάχης οὐδεμιᾶς ἡττᾶτο]

8. Athenians are the salvation of all Greece.

IX 45-- οὐκοῦν ἐνόμιζον ἐκεῖνοι τῆς πάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων σωτηρίας αὐτοῖς ἐπιμελητέον εἶναι

IX 74-- εἰ δ' οἴεσθε Χαλκιδέας τὴν Ἑλλάδα σώσειν ἢ Μεγαρέας, ὑμεῖς δ' ἀποδράσεσθαι τὰ πράγματα, οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἴεσθε· ἀγαπητὸν γὰρ ἐὰν αὑτοὶ σῴζωνται τούτων ἑκάστοις. ἀλλ' ὑμῖν τοῦτο πρακτέον· ὑμῖν οἱ πρόγονοι τοῦτο τὸ γέρας ἐκτήσαντο καὶ κατέλιπον μετὰ πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων κινδύνων.

9. Athenians die nobly rather than live disgracefully.

IX 65-- τεθνάναι δὲ μυριάκις κρεῖττον ἢ κολακείᾳ τι ποιῆσαι Φιλίππου καὶ προέσθαι τῶν ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν λεγόντων τινάς.

10. Athenians possess an honored reputation.

IX 70-- . . . ἄξίωμα κάλλιστον . . .

73-- ταῦτ' ἐστὶν πόλεως ἀξίωμ' ἐχούσης ἡλίκον ὑμῖν ὑπαρχει

11. The ancestors of the Athenians have handed down (κατέλιπον, παρέδωκαν) a legacy of honor and responsibility.

IX 74-- ὑμῖν οἱ πρόγονοι τοῦτο τὸ γέρας ἐκτήσαντο καὶ <u>κατέλιπον</u> μετὰ πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων κινδύνων.

12. Athenians submit to many dangers.

IX 74--ὑμῖν οἱ πρόγονοι τοῦτο τὸ γέρας ἐκτήσαντο καὶ κατέλιπον μετὰ πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων κινδύνων.

Even such a merely quantitative measure as this listing of epideictic commonplaces clearly identifiable in the Third Philippic will provide a first explanation of the emotive power of the Third Philippic. It illustrates concretely, first of all, the increase in numbers of such commonplaces used by Demosthenes in a single speech. The twelve identified in this speech are three times the number in the First Philippic of a decade earlier and twice as many as we have identified in the Second Philippic. Unquestionably the verbalization of the most hallowed phrases and memories of the Athenian patriotic tradition will have their emotional impact on the audience. The mere fact that they appear in such large numbers suggests that they provide one clue to the both ancient and modern judgment that this speech is the most "pathetic" of Demosthenes' public speeches.

A second discovery to be found in the listing of the commonplaces is their dispersion throughout the speech. In the First Philippic we were able to identify four distinctive commonplaces. All of them, however, fall within a single paragraph early in the speech. Indeed, two of them are phrases within a single sentence. In the Second Philippic the six identified commonplaces again are clustered in a single section of the speech (VI 8-12). They and the example of Alexander's embassy which they illuminate also appear early in the speech as a part of what traditionally might have been called the "narrative." In this speech, however, we find the commonplaces distributed in clusters throughout the speech. The first appears in the final

sentence of the prologue; the last appear in the final statement of Demosthenes' proposals immediately before the epilogue. Several are associated with the reference to Athenian and Spartan hegemonies (IX 23-25); the illustration of the legitimate heir and the illegal imposter (30-31) may be understood as an extended amplification of a single commonplace; several commonplaces appear in a single sentence introducing the lengthy example of Arthmius and another appears in the conclusion of the section (36, 45); the story of Euphraeus is introduced (59) with a characterization that correlates with a commonplace; a brief allusion in 70 is followed by a cluster of commonplaces in 73-74 drawing the argument of the speech to a close. We can conclude, therefore, that Demosthenes has departed from the practice of his earlier public speeches in the distribution of epideictic commonplaces. In the earlier speeches, both the paradeigmata and the commonplaces used to articulate their meaning appeared very early. It is as though Demosthenes viewed these early attempts to pose a positive image of Athens as a kind of insinuatio, to create a sense of good will between himself and his audience and a positive attitude toward the subject early in the speech. He depended on that early establishment of a positive image to carry persuasive force throughout the remainder of the speech. By 341, however, he seems to have learned that he could not depend on a single statement of faith in the character of his people to sustain their confidence and raise their spirits for the remainder of a speech which was an assault on their present behavior. That image needed continual reinforcement throughout the speech. Continual reference to the patriotic ideals of the city's most heroic and lovingly remembered past was needed if an

audience was to be able to receive the speaker's chastisement and challenge positively and hopefully. In the Third Philippic Demosthenes disperses both his narrative of Philip's abuses (see above, pp. 115f.) and his illustrations of true Athenian identity throughout his speech.[51]

A third discovery made possible by a listing of identified commonplaces has to do with their order within the speech. Demosthenes applies a number of the traditional Athenian commonplaces to the Greeks in general. Characteristics attributed in the epitaphioi to the Athenians alone are here said to be true of Greeks as a group. But this application of Athenian commonplaces to all Greeks occurs only in the case of commonplaces in the central sections of the speech (23-25, 30, 36, 59). Commonplaces used at the beginning of the speech (5) and especially in the later sections (45, 65, 70, 73-74) refer to the Athenians alone. Demosthenes recognizes that, even though he is making an appeal for a common Greek rebellion against Macedonian rule and must arouse among his Athenian listeners a sense of solidarity with other Greeks in opposition to Philip, his appeal nonetheless is to Athenians. He begins his speech, therefore, and concludes it with patriotic allusions that will reinforce the distinctive Athenian identity within the common Greek landscape. Also significant is the subject matter of the commonplaces with which he begins and closes his speech. The first, with which he closes his prologue, is a reference to Athenian invincibility. Demosthenes, in a clear instance of paramythia, reassures his audience that Philip has not defeated the Athenians; he has defeated only their lassitude and apathy. With some humor he repeats his point in the concluding words of the prologue: "You haven't been bested. How

could you have been? You haven't even moved!" At the conclusion of the speech the several commonplaces are more serious, but they are filled with inspiring associations. It is the unique prerogative of Athens, earned for the city and handed down to the present generation through the blood, sweat, and tears of its ancestors, to be the savior of Greece.[52] If the Athenians have not been defeated by their adversary, Demosthenes cannot imply that the defeat of Philip will come easily. His speech stresses, on the contrary, the magnitude of the threat that Philip poses, and Demosthenes' final illustration on the revolution in warfare emphasizes the military superiority Philip brings to the conflict with Greece. Demosthenes, therefore portrays the conflict as noble, worthy of Athens' unique status among the Greeks, who look to Athens for leadership, and as an obligation laid on the present generation by its ancestors. The orator had prepared for this final urging with the exclamation a little while earlier (IX 65) that it was far better to "die a thousand deaths than to pander to Philip!" If the salvation of Athens and all Greece can come only μετὰ πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων κινδύνων, that is nonetheless a γέρας which Athenians cannot refuse. For to do so would be to disgrace themselves, their city, and the forebears who left to their descendents the role of leadership. Athenian identity cannot be separated from its historic leadership, its rightful hegemony, and it is to that identity, to that assertion of primacy among Greeks that Demosthenes is urging his audience in this speech.

Neither a quantitative analysis of the number and dispersion of commonplaces in the Third Philippic nor even a description of their subject matter will altogether explain, however, the far more authentically

epideictic tone conveyed by Demosthenes' use of the commonplaces in this speech. That tone derives from Demosthenes' employment of more of the characteristics of epideictic style in this speech than in his earlier ones. That this is to be a speech in the grand style Demosthenes establishes immediately with the first sentence of his prologue, a wondrously long, balanced, finely wrought periodic masterpiece of epideictic proportions. Blass examines its structure minutely as an example of Demosthenes' mature style. In fact, he uses this sentence as an example of "die Mischung von rednerisch gerundeten und epideiktisch vollen Perioden."[53] Indeed, this one sentence contains four parts, each of which is itself a period, according to Blass. The first two parts are parallel genitive absolutes: πολλῶν . . . λόγων γιγνομένων, κτλ. and πάντων . . . φησάντων γ' ἄν, κτλ., each part ending with parallel terms, τοὺς ἄλλους ἀδικεῖ and δίκην δώσει. The third part, a complex clause dependent on the verb ὁρῶ, specifies Demosthenes' observation that ὑπηγμένα πάντα τὰ πράγματα καὶ προειμέν', as the clause begins and φαυλότατ' ἔμελλε τὰ πράγματ' ἔξειν, as the clause ends. The fourth part records Demosthenes' interpretation, ἡγοῦμαι, which is that matters could not be worse (οὐκ ἂν ἡγοῦμαι δύνασθαι χεῖρον ἢ νῦν διατεθῆναι). The entire sentence is dependent on the ὁρῶ at its center, the two genitive absolutes providing the deliberative context (setting the stage) and the final clause succinctly stating Demosthenes' evaluation of what he sees. Curiously, as Blass notes, the third part of the sentence is not necessary for its meaning but serves to accent the final clause, which contains the orator's point.

This sentence is a truly epideictic beginning to a deliberative speech, and Demosthenes uses many such pieces of amplification in this speech. If we examine the section of the speech which centers in the Arthmius decree, we find that it is introduced with similar sentences. In paragraph 36 the section is introduced with a sentence which alone contains three commonplaces (IX 36):

> ἦν τι τότ', ἦν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐν ταῖς τῶν πολλῶν διανοίαις, ὃ νῦν οὐκ ἔστιν, ὃ καὶ τοῦ Περσῶν ἐκράτησε πλούτου καὶ ἐλευθέραν ἦγε τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ οὔτε ναυμαχίας οὔτε πεζῆς μάχης οὐδεμιᾶς ἡττᾶτο, νῦν δ' ἀπολωλὸς ἅπαντα λελύμανται καὶ ἄνω καὶ κάτω πεποίηκε πάντα τὰ πράγματα.
>
> There was something in those days, men of Athens, something in the spirit of the masses which is not there now, something that defeated the wealth of Persia, that kept Greece free, that never lost a single battle on land or sea, but now extinct it has ruined everything and reduced all our affairs to chaos.

The sentence begins with the pathetic repetition, ἦν . . . ἦν, the subject of which is τι. Dependent on this main clause are two clauses beginning with the relative ὅ, the first of which informs the audience that τι "is no more," the second of which describes its benefits in the past: (1) καὶ . . . πλούτου; (2) καὶ . . . Ἑλλάδα; (3) καὶ . . . ἡττᾶτο. The first and third of the three benefits, in parallel clauses, refer to Greek victories; in the center, the second benefit names the freedom which those victories preserved. A second main clause, νῦν δ' κτλ., parallels the first. It begins with a condensed version of the information that τι "is no more," ἀπολωλός, and then in chiastic structure describes the damage its absence does in the present: (1) ἅπαντα λελύμανται, (2) ἄνω καὶ κάτω πεποίηκε πάντα. . . . Demosthenes uses this finely crafted sentence to increase interest in the characteristic of past generations which he

will only name two sentences later. He heightens the value of that unnamed characteristic by naming it as the cause of Athens' heroic past achievements. Here the epideictic commonplaces and the elevated style reinforce each other to produce a truly epideictic tone.

Other examples of symmetry, parallelism, assonance, homoioteleuton, and other epideictic figures can be found throughout the Third Philippic, many of them in the company of the commonplaces. Note, for example, the homoioteleuta and alliteration in this commonplace (IX 5):

> τῆς ῥᾳθυμίας
> νῦν δὲ τῆς ὑμετέρας καὶ τῆς ἀμελείας κεκράτηκε Φίλιππος, τῆς πόλεως δ' οὐ κεκράτηκεν· οὐδ' ἤττησθ' ὑμεῖς, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ κεκίνησθε.

A study of each of the commonplaces will reveal similar attention to style and sentence structure which evoke the poetic and elevated tone of epideictic oratory and give to the speech its emotive power. Although a thorough analysis of the stylistic aspects of Demosthenes' epideictic manner in the Philippic speeches lies outside the scope of this paper, these few illustrations indicate the value that such an analysis will have for further understanding of the epideictic elements in Demosthenes' deliberative oratory.

For us it is left to ask whether the arguments and themes of the speech meet the demands of the situation outlined in the early part of this chapter. It appears that the panhellenic thrust which Demosthenes gives to the Third Philippic is his response both to the remoteness of Philip's adventures and to the admitted strength of his military might. Demosthenes implies his own awareness of the problem of remoteness when he refers to Philip's alleged establishment of tyrannies in the cities of Euboea and adds parenthetically (IX 27), καὶ ταῦτ' ἐν νήσῳ

πλησίον Θηβῶν καὶ Ἀθηνῶν (and this in an island adjacent to Thebes and Athens), as if to answer the objections of critics that he is citing Macedonian actions far from Athens and of little threat to the city's security. By emphasizing panhellenic unity, Demosthenes is able to respond that no Macedonian aggression against any Greek city is irrelevant to Athens. The Greeks are a common family of cities whose continued survival depends on their mutual support and protection. Of course, the panhellenic thrust also provides the most realistic response to Philip's military superiority, since a united Hellenic effort against the Macedonian was probably the only hope for eliminating his influence in the region.

Nonetheless, Demosthenes was left with what appears to be the immutable fact of Athenian prosperity precisely at a time that the orator was attempting to motivate his fellow citizens to war mobilization. Indeed, his repetitious recital of Philip's crimes against Greeks is his attempt to demonstrate, probably at an emotional more than at a rational level, that Philip was already at war with Athens and all Greeks. It is curious, however, that he does not exploit more fully the serious consequences possible for Athens in Philip's movement toward Byzantium. In fact, he appears to deemphasize the crisis in the Chersonese and Byzantium (19), instead of highlighting and dramatizing the genuine threat to the Athenian grain supply that capture of Byzantium implied. Even without capture of Byzantium Philip managed several months later to seize a fleet of 230 Athenian ships pinned down by inclement weather near the mouth of the Bosporus and to collect 700 talents, more than a year's revenue for the Athenians.[54] καὶ νῦν ἐπὶ Βυζαντίους

πορεύεται συμμάχους ὄντας; he asks (34), but makes no allusion to the implications of that act. Similarly, he refers once to the danger for Athens in "the alienation of the Hellespont" 18, τῷ τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ἀλλοτριωθῆναι, but he places it alongside of references to Megara, Euboea, and the Peloponnese which would seem to rob the immediate and serious threat to the Hellespont of its primary importance.

Perhaps Demosthenes' failure to concentrate on the strategic significance of Philip's threat to Byzantium and the Hellespont illustrates how obvious that threat would be to an Athenian audience; there would be no need to spell out what any Athenian would already grasp without explanation. Possibly the strategic implications had already been discussed by other speakers during the course of the debate. We do not know, and our lack of access to the other speeches delivered alongside the extant speeches of Demosthenes remains one of the most serious obstacles to valid interpretation of his rhetorical strategy. Nonetheless, for whatever reason, Demosthenes does not concentrate on the problem for Athenian security (or prosperity!) posed by any one of Philip's alleged aggressions. Instead, to his litany of Macedonian offenses he responds with an appeal for the restoration of traditional Athenian leadership in Greek affairs. His appeal in this speech is not directed so much toward the salvation of Athens as to the salvation of all Greece. But the salvation of Greece is inextricably linked to the restoration of Athens' historic hegemony. As I have said earlier (see above, pp. 118-119) the unified opposition of Greeks to barbarian is the theme of the Third Philippic, but the restoration of Athenian

hegemony over Greeks is its underlying issue. That is why the conflict and continuing tension between Athens and Sparta recurs as a theme in all four of the major paradeigmata in this speech. Athens and Sparta have united against the barbarian in the past, but they have spent most of their histories vying with one another for the position of supremacy in Greece. When Arthmius carried barbarian bribes into the Peloponnese it was an Athenian concern and called for an Athenian response, not merely because of Athenian care for others but because it was a direct threat to Athenian security. But these traditional conflicts between Athens and Sparta may not be employed as a paradeigm for the Greek conflict with Macedon; Macedon, in Demosthenes' eyes, is not a legitimate rival for Greek supremacy, nor do his tactics befit a Greek competing for leadership with other Greeks. Demosthenes must seek the paradeigm for understanding the conflict with Macedon, as Aeschines had done before the ratification of the Peace had altered internal Athenian politics, in the Persian wars, when all Greeks united to exclude the barbarian from intrusion into Greek affairs.

Demosthenes' paradeigmata betray his obsession with Athens' hegemony; he does not, as Aeschines had done, cite Marathon and Salamis or any of the other conventional events of Athenian epideictic. His interests remain lodged in the period of the confederacy and empire, as his paradeigmata reveal. Even the Arthmius affair probably reached its conclusion during the confederacy. But Demosthenes endows these paradeigmata with panhellenic meaning and epideictic power through his use of the commonplaces. Through them Demosthenes is able to convert the conflict with Philip from the specifics of his "aggressions" against

Cardia or his threat to Byzantium and the Athenian shipping through the Hellespont. In the Third Philippic, paradeigmata and epideictic commonplaces unite with epideictic style to elevate, to transfigure the conflict with Philip and to make of it something as grand and heroic and portentous as the wars with Persia. Now as then, Demosthenes wishes to suggest, the outcome will decide the future of the relationships within the Greek community of cities and of Athens' claim to leadership of that community. Only in grasping the leadership of Greece at whatever cost, only by assuming the privilege (γέρας) bequeathed to it by its ancestors, will the City, however prosperous, survive as the "Athens" whose ἀξίωμα κάλλιστον it is the obligation of the present generation to preserve for its posterity.[55]

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER V

[1]Argument about the relationship between the two versions of the Third Philippic has animated scholarship at least since Spengel gave the issue its first scientific treatment in 1839 (AbhBay, phil.-phil. Kl., III, 1, pp. 157ff. and IX, 1, pp. 112ff.). A schematic list of possible solutions to the problem and a brief review of scholarly discussion may be found in E. Drerup, Aus einer alten Advokatenrepublik, Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Altertums, Band 8, Heft 3-4 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1916), p. 113, n. 115.

P. Treves, "La composition de la 3me Philippique," REA 42 (1940): 354-64, argues that, of the two versions, the shorter version found in S and L and the longer version preserved in the vulgate, the longer version corresponds to the speech as it was actually delivered, while the shorter version represents the form edited by Demosthenes for publication. This paper will assume the validity of Treves' (and Drerup's) position.

L. Pearson, The Art of Demosthenes, Beiträge zur klassischen Philologie, Heft 68 (Meisenheim am Glan: Hain, 1976), does not acknowledge recent discussion of the problem. He cites only the introduction to Sandys, Demosthenes. On the Peace, Second Philippic, On the Chersonese, and Third Philippic (London: 1900), pp. lix, lxvii, and to Croiset's Budé edition of the speech, Harangues (Paris: Société d'édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1967) 2:90f. Of the question whether Demosthenes delivered the longer or shorter version of the speech in the Assembly Pearson writes (p. 151), "The question is unanswerable."

[2]D. H., Th. 54, μεγίστη τῶν κατὰ Φιλίππου δημηγοριῶν. A. Schaefer, Demosthenes und seine Zeit, 3 vols., rev. 2d ed. (Leipzig: Teubner, 1885-87), 2:479, "Die Rede ist mit vorzüglicher Sorgfalt entworfen und durchgearbeitet und gilt nach dem übereinstimmenden Urteile alter und neuer Kritiker als die grösste Staatsrede des Demosthenes." F. Blass, Die attische Beredsamkeit, 3 vols., 2d ed. (Leipzig: Teubner, 1887-1898) 3, 1: 381, "So ist diese Rede die pathetischste und gewaltigste von allen, und, wie Rehdantz sagt, nicht den Demosthenischen allein, sondern vielleicht von allen, die jemals auf Erden gesprochen sind." Henry Lord Brougham, Works, vol. 7 (Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Black, 1872), p. 200, "In fire and variety, indeed, it is surpassed by none of the lesser orations; and by some it is preferred to all the rest." H. Weil, Les Harangues de Démosthène, 2d ed. (Paris: Hachette, 1881), p. 309, "La troisième Philippique est la plus puissante des harangues de Démosthène. Denys d'Halicarnasse en a déjà jugé ainsi, et le lecteur moderne reçoit la même impression." W. Jaeger, Demosthenes. The Origin and Growth of his Policy (Berkeley: U. of California Press, 1938), p. 170, "His Third Philippic [is] the most powerful of these speeches, a work much wider in its import than the occasion that calls it forth, bringing the whole significance of this moment of history before us in one vast spectacle." George Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton: Princeton

U. Press, 1963), p. 225, "The third Philippic [is] Demosthenes' most forceful speech.

[3]See above, p. 20 , n. 2.

[4]Donald F. Jackson and Galen O. Rowe, "Demosthenes 1915-1965," Lustrum 14 (1969): 71.

[5]Jaeger, p. 174.

[6]Schaefer, 2:480.

[7]Blass, III, 1:380f.

[8]M. Croiset, Démosthène. Harangues, 2 vols. (Paris: "Belles Lettres," 1967-68), 2:89-90.

[9]Kennedy, p. 225.

[10]Jaeger, pp. 173-75.

[11]Cf. Jaeger, p. 176.

[12]J. G. Droysen, Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen (Hamburg, 1833). J. Beloch, Die attische Politik seit Perikles (Leipzig: Teubner, 1884). For a study of the political, social, and intellectual influences on attitudes toward Philip and Demosthenes, cf. John R. Knipfing, "German Historians and Macedonian Imperialism," AHR 26 (1920/1): 657-71.

[13]J. R. Ellis, Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism (London: Thames and Hudson, 1976). G. L. Cawkwell, Philip of Macedon (London: Faber and Faber, 1978). See p. 20 , n. 3.

[14]Cawkwell, p. 10.

[15]Cawkwell, pp. 10, 131, 130, 127.

[16]Cawkwell, p. 127.

[17]G. L. Cawkwell, "Demosthenes' Policy after the Peace of Philocrates. II," CQ n.s. 13 (1963): 205.

[18]So P. E. Harding, review of Philip of Macedon by G. L. Cawkwell, in Phoenix 33 (1979): 173-78.

[19]Cp. X 68-69: ὑμεῖς δὲ τούναντίον ἐκ μὲν ἐνδόξων ἄδοξοι, ἐκ δ' εὐπόρων ἄποροι· πόλεως γὰρ ἔγωγε πλοῦτον ἡγοῦμαι συμμάχους, πίστιν, εὔνοιαν, ὧν πάντων ὑμεῖς ἔστ' ἄποροι. . . . ὑμεῖς δ' ἐρημοι καὶ ταπεινοί, τῇ μὲν κατὰ ἀγορὰν εὐετηρίᾳ λαμπροί, τῇ δ' ὧν προσῆκε παρασκευῇ καταγέλαστοι. One observes the purely rhetorical, i.e., non-factual, intent of Demosthenes' assertions by comparing ἄδοξοι in this passage to δόξης in X 16 and ἀξίωμα κάλλιστον in IX 70 above.

[20]Cawkwell, Philip, p. 206, n. 9.

[21]XIX 259, νόσημα γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δεινὸν ἐμπέπτωκεν εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα. Φιλίππῳ ξενίαν καὶ ἑταιρείαν [καὶ φιλίαν].

[22]Cf. IX 18, where the danger facing Athens is the "alienation of the Hellespont" and "defection" of the Peloponnese (ἀλλοτριωθῆναι---τἀκείνου φρονῆσαι). Cf. also IX 35, ἀπιστοῦντες ἀλλήλοις, οὐ τῷ πάντας ἡμᾶς ἀδικοῦντι. Cawkwell, Philip, p. 132, "Philip was not breaking the Peace. He did not need to. His interests were being advanced by those in the cities of Greece who could profit from his alliance."

[23]A. H. M. Jones, "The Athens of Demosthenes," Athenian Democracy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969), p. 36.

[24]The conflict between Demosthenes and the Athenian majority over the appropriate response to ascendant Macedonian imperialism may be compared to the twentieth-century conflict between ecologists and the Euro-American majority over the appropriate response to technology. The rhetorical problem faced by both Demosthenes and the ecologists is analogous. For the Athenian majority Philip's power, for the Euro-American majority the power of technology, creates conditions productive of economic growth and increase of general prosperity. Demosthenes and the modern ecologists can point to evidence that those same powers promise future disaster beyond "the good life" of the present, but their evidence is ambiguous and inconclusive. Neither Demosthenes nor the ecologists will be able to prove their case indisputably until the doom they now predict has arrived. In response to their rhetorical dilemma both accuse their opponents of appealing to the base self-interest of the majority (speaking πρὸς ἡδονήν or πρὸς χάριν), while they themselves appeal to the higher values inherent in the identity of their audience in order to persuade their audience to the self-sacrifice which effective opposition to Philip or unbridled technology will entail. Attempts to discern the factors which influenced Demosthenes or the twentieth-century ecologists to a perspective so uncharacteristic of their own economic class must finally become futile psychohistorical speculation.

[25]Weil, Harangues, p. 317.

[26]Cf. VIII 68 and p. 93 above.

[27]For the claim that Demosthenes' opponents were intentionally confusing discussion and delaying Athenian action by their contributions to public debate, cf. VIII 13 and above, pp. 85-87.

[28]Cf. esp. G. L. Cawkwell, "Demosthenes' Policy after the Peace of Philocrates," CQ n.s. 13 (1963): 120-38, 200-13.

[29]Pearson, p. 155.

[30]See above, p. 112 . Cf. Isoc., Phil. 15-16.

[31]See above, p.100, n. 25.

[32]Cf. Diod. Sic. XVI 53.3.

[33]IX 55: ἀλλὰ καὶ μετὰ πλείονος ἀσφαλείας πολιτεύεσθαι δεδώκατε τούτοις [Philip's "employees"] ἢ τοῖς ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν λέγουσιν. 56: Ἦσαν ἐν Ὀλύνθῳ τῶν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι τινὲς μὲν Φιλίππου καὶ πάνθ' ὑπηρετοῦντες ἐκείνῳ, τινὲς δὲ τοῦ βελτίστου καὶ ὅπως μὴ δουλεύουσιν οἱ πολῖται πράττοντες. . . . οἱ τὰ Φιλίππου φρονοῦντες . . . τοὺς τὰ βέλτιστα λέγοντας. . . . 57: Those members of the δῆμος at Eretria who wished to hand the city's affairs over to Philip rather than to Athens are contrasted with τοὺς ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν λέγοντας. 63: The people of Olynthus, Eretria, and Oreus were more favorably inclined πρὸς τοὺς ὑπὲρ Φιλίππου λέγοντας . . . ἢ τοὺς ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν. According to Demosthenes, the same situation prevails in Athens (ὅπερ καὶ παρ' ὑμῖν): The conflict within Athens is between οἱ ὑπὲρ τοῦ βελτίστου λέγοντες (IX 63), οἱ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν λέγοντες (IX 65), on the one hand, and οἱ Φιλίππῳ συμπράττοντες (IX 63), οἱ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐχθρῶν λέγοντες (IX 67).

[34]Jaeger, Demosthenes (see above, p.146 , n. 2), pp. 172-73. Jaeger continues, "The strongest antagonist arrayed against Demosthenes in his fight for the loyalty of Greece was defeatism clothed in the emotional garb of a higher patriotism." In Chapter Seven of his book (pp. 150-75) Jaeger emphasizes Isocrates' obsession with "Panhellenic cultural unity" (p. 152) and his determination to enlist Philip as the agent for that unity once he had decided that Philip "could not be eluded" (p. 152). That is to say, in Jaeger's view Isocrates could be counted among those opponents of Demosthenes whose defense of Philip was based on surrender to his apparent invincibility (p. 168): "It is

clear that a feeling of complete hopelessness was the basic reason for their acquiescing in the dependence to which the peace had doomed them, apparently forever. Such dependence, it seemed to them, was more endurable in the form of an alliance between equals than in that of coercive subjection." Demosthenes, however, had succumbed to no such hopelessness: "For a state to hold its own is, in his opinion, primarily a matter of will" (p. 168). Hence, as Jaeger states the case, Isocrates pursued a Panhellenic scheme under leadership of Philip out of "a more or less voluntary submission to the will of the conqueror" (p. 172). Demosthenes, by contrast, embarked on "an unparalleled fight for national unification" precisely in order to foster "a unanimous uprising of all the Greeks against the Macedonian foe" (p. 172).

A far more positive view of Isocrates' political views and intents has been taken by a number of modern scholars, among them Paul Wendland, "Beiträge zur athenischen Politik und Publicistik des vierten Jahrhunderts," GöttNachr, 1910, "I. König Philippos und Isokrates," pp. 123-82; "II. Isokrates und Demosthenes," pp. 289-323. Cf. C. D. Adams, "Recent Views of the Political Influence of Isocrates," CP 7 (1912): 343-50. J. Kessler, Isokrates und die panhellenische Idee (Paderborn, 1910). G. Mathieu, Les idées politiques d'Isocrate (Paris, 1925). S. Perlman has argued that "Isocrates was not a tool in the hands of Philip and was not a member of the pro-Macedonian party. . . . He put forward a plan which would preserve the existing limit of Macedonian influence. . . ." "Isocrates' 'Philippus'--A Reinterpretation," Historia 6 (1957): 306-17 (p. 317).

Attempts to portray Isocrates as a superior political genius and Athenian patriot still fail to be persuasive, however, as a recent article by Markle demonstrates: M. M. Markle III, "Support of Athenian Intellectuals for Philip: A Study of Isocrates' Philippus and Speusippus' Letter to Philip," JHS 96 (1976): 80-99. Markle argues that Isocrates attempted to persuade "the Athenians and other Greeks to be content with their present circumstances and to accept Philip as their legitimate leader in a campaign against Persia' (p. 80). Moreover, he argues that Isocrates' motive in promoting Greek acquiescence in Macedonian leadership was "to win royal patronage for himself and his school" (p. 80). Here Jaeger's "national self-surrender" is in the service neither of a panhellenic ideal nor of a sophisticated Athenian patriotism but of personal prestige and power.

[35]Spartans and Athenians (IX 25): πάνθ' ὅσ' ἐξημάρτηται. Philip: ὧν Φίλιππος ἐν τρισὶ καὶ δέκ' οὐχ ὅλοις ἔτεσιν, οἷς ἐπιπολάζει, ἠδίκηκε τοὺς Ἕλληνας.

[36]IX 24-25: πάντες ᾤοντο δεῖν, καὶ οἱ μηδὲν ἐγκαλεῖν ἔχοντες αὑτοῖς, μετὰ τῶν ἠδικημένων πολεμεῖν. . . . πάντες εἰς πόλεμον κατέστησαν, καὶ οἱ μηδὲν ἐγκαλοῦντες αὑτοῖς. . . . ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς αὐτοὶ καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, οὐδὲν ἂν εἰπεῖν ἔχοντες ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὅ τι ἠδικούμεθ' ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, ὅμως ὑπὲρ ὧν τοὺς ἄλλους ἀδικουμένους ἐωρῶμεν, πολεμεῖν ᾠόμεθα δεῖν. The theme of bringing help to the victims of aggression is itself a commonplace of the epitaphioi. See below, p. 133.

[37]Indeed, the whole section may be viewed as a use of the topos genos and the commonplace of noble and legitimate birth. See below, p. 133.

[38]On this reference, see Weil, Harangues, p. 333, and Schaefer, Demosthenes 2:415. When Demosthenes refers to Philip's δοῦλοι, he may simply be expressing the common Greek notion that in an absolute state, only the king is free (Weil). Cf. Eur., Hel. 276: τὰ βαρβάρων γὰρ δοῦλα πάντα πλὴν ἑνός. This background does not vitiate the strong emotional impact Demosthenes intends by his statement.

[39]See below, pp. 133-4.

[40]Cp. IX 35, above, ἀπιστοῦντες ἀλλήλοις, κτλ. . . . ὁμόνοια is rare in the Demosthenic corpus and is found only here among the speeches against Philip.

[41]See Isoc., Phil. 16 141. Panath. 3 173 174. For the earlier oligarchic and Pythagorean associations of the term, see G. Grossmann, Politische Schlagwörter aus der Zeit des Peloponnesischen Krieges (Zürich, 1950), pp. 43-70.

[42]Russell Meiggs, The Athenian Empire (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972), p. 94. Meiggs argues that the inspiration for the statue came not from Cimon but from "the radical democrats" (p. 94) and that the work on it began "very soon" after Cimon's ostracism in 461 and was completed in the late fifties (p. 95). He is sympathetic to Pausanias' statement (I.28.2) that the statue commemorated Marathon and suggests that "Athens was reminding herself and other Greeks that she had defeated Persia, alone with the Plataeans, before the Spartan-led alliance, which she had now left, drove back Xerxes' invasion" (p. 95).

[43]For discussion of the genuineness and chronology of the decree and of the Arthmius affair to which it refers, cf. Appendix IV, pp. 250-266.

[44]It is difficult to imagine that either Demosthenes or his audience could have been so naive as not to suspect that such Persian influence-peddling in the Peloponnese in fact was directed against Athens, hence, a highly pertinent Athenian concern.

[45]The use of τὰ τῶν Ἑλλ. in the first phrase may imply the commonality of Greek response to the Barbarian King in the fifth century, in contrast to the fear prompted by the contemporary "Barbarian" among the divided Greeks, τοῖς Ἕλλ.

[46]To have cited a decree that was well-known to his audience would have been consistent with Demosthenes' and, indeed, all fourth-century orators' preference for illustrations known to their audience. Cf. Lionel Pearson, "Historical Allusions in the Attic Orators," CP 36 (1941): 209-29. Even when Demosthenes (XIX 272) poses and responds to the rhetorical question, "Does someone object that this inscription was set up just anywhere?" he may be posing a question to which the audience already knew the answer, and in providing it himself he may be confirming their own knowledge in solidarity with them rather than instructing them as their superior. Pearson, p. 213: "An orator . . . dares not pose as a scholar or a historian who can instruct his audience in the history of their own times or that of their ancestors."

[47]A further inference can be drawn from the suggestion of P. Treves, "La composition de la 3me Philippique," REA 42 (1940): 359, that the συγγνώμη τοῖς ἐλεγχομένοις mentioned in the vulgate version of IX 37-38 refers to the acquittal of Aeschines. If Treves is correct, Demosthenes' use of the Arthmius decree here may recall intentionally his earlier use of the same example in the speech On the False Embassy (XIX 271-72) and specifies Aeschines as a leader among corrupted traitors against whom he directs this section of the speech.

Because the critical situation in the Hellespont provides the occasion for this speech, one may speculate that an illustration drawn from Zeleia--which was located in the Hellespont--was intended to point the significance of the present conflict. Demosthenes, however, seems unclear about the location of Zeleia or at least does not draw any attention to its proximity to Athens' present area of conflict. (IX 43, ἡ γὰρ Ζέλειά ἐστι τῆς Ἀσίας.)

[48]Cp. ἐπανορθωθῆναι. The term is especially rich with meaning within this context if Cawkwell is correct in his suggestion (CQ n.s. 13 [1963]: 132) that the ἐπανόρθωσις Philip was proposing for the Peace of Philocrates was its conversion "into a sort of Common Peace." Demosthenes clearly has in mind that any kind of Greek community will exist only under Athenian tutelage.

[49]Cf. Appendix IV, pp. 253-255.

[50]Of particular interest in the Third Philippic is Demosthenes' use of patriotic commonplaces, which in the epitaphioi are directed to the praise of Athens, to apply to the Greeks in general. Instances of such use will be cited in brackets [ ].

[51]So Aristotle writes that the appeal for the attention and good will of the hearer cannot be confined to the prologue but must be dispersed throughout the speech. Rh. 1415b 9-12: ἔτι τὸ προσεκτικοὺς ποιεῖν πάντων τῶν μερῶν κοινόν, ἐὰν δέῃ· πανταχοῦ γὰρ ἀνιᾶσι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀρχόμενοι· διὸ γελοῖον ἐν ἀρχῇ τάττειν, ὅτε μάλιστα πάντες προσέχοντες ἀκροῶνται.

[52]Implied in Demosthenes' statement, though not explicitly articulated is the commonplace that Athens alone (μόνοι) fulfills its responsibility.

[53]F. Blass, Die attische Beredsamkeit, 2d ed., 3 vols. (Leipzig: Teubner, 1887-1898) 3,1: 152.

[54]Didymus, in Demosth. 11.1 col. 10.34. Theop. FGrH 115 F 292. Philoch. FGrH 328 F 162. For a discussion of the import of the seizure, see Jacoby, FGrH IIIb 1 (Supplement) pp. 537-39, who concludes that the incident was not the cause of renewed war between Athens and Macedon, as Demosthenes asserts in XVIII 72 and the account in Didymus suggests, but "a warlike act" which probably occurred "at the very moment when the Demos listened to his letter of complaint and Demosthenes carried the formal declaration of war" (p. 539).

[55]For the significance of the notion that Athens' privileged status is an inheritance which it is the Athenians' obligation to hand on untarnished to future generations, cf. Plato, Menex. 247b (p. 242 below); K. J. Dover, Greek Popular Morality (Berkeley: U. California Press, 1974), pp. 170-75; and the ephebic oath preserved in Lycurg., Leoc. 77: ἀμυνῶ δὲ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἱερῶν καὶ ὁσίων καὶ οὐκ ἐλάττω παραδώσω τὴν πατρίδα, πλείω δὲ καὶ ἀρείω κατά τε ἐμαυτὸν καὶ μετὰ ἁπάντων. . . . (on which M. N. Tod, A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions [Oxford, Clarendon, 1948] 2:303-07. [Tod 204]).

CHAPTER VI

THE FOURTH PHILIPPIC

In the Third Philippic Demosthenes provided clues (IX 40 70, see above, p.107) that the Athens which he was attempting to drive into war with Philip was in fact prospering under the Peace with him. In that speech, however, he did not choose to attack the issue of prosperity head-on (see above, p.143). He chose instead to counter the desire for continued prosperity with a call to reassert Athens' traditional hegemony, a call couched in panhellenic language and conveyed with a markedly epideictic spirit and tone. In the Fourth Philippic, delivered only a few days or weeks after the Third, Demosthenes' interest in the recovery of Athens' hegemony is not less marked and his appeal to the conventional commonplaces is equally pervasive. In this speech, however, Demosthenes appears to have discovered a tactic for neutralizing the economic issue. In the Fourth Philippic, therefore, wealth, prosperity, economic security--the fruits of Eubulus' economic recovery program--move to the center and money becomes the unifying theme of the speech. Without discarding the power of the epideictic commonplaces to inspire the vision of Athens' traditional station in Greece, Demosthenes, for the first time in his career, attempts a response to Athenian concern for continued economic prosperity which he hopes will unite rich and poor behind the proposed war effort.

The Fourth Philippic has been neglected by scholars because of

questions about its authenticity. Already in the nineteenth century a distinguished line of Demosthenic scholars, beginning with Valckenaer and including F. A. Wolf, Dobree, Boeck, Westermann, and A. Schaefer, had argued that the Fourth Philippic was a forgery.[1] Others, like Weil and Blass, held it to be pastiche of genuine Demosthenic fragments by an unknown editor.[2] With the discovery in 1901 of papyrus fragments containing parts of Didymus' commentary on Demosthenes a reexamination of the issue of authenticity ensued.[3] Didymus himself has been recognized as a scholar "of immense learning and industry" and "a scrupulous transmitter of learning that might otherwise have been lost."[4] His commentary on Demosthenes, a substantive work full of citations from such historians as Philochoros and supplying useful historical material, deals at some length in the surviving fragments with the Fourth Philippic. Although Didymus discusses fully the authenticity of the Answer to Philip's Letter (XII) and informs us that it had been attributed to Anaximenes of Lampsacus, he raises no questions at all about the authenticity of the Fourth Philippic. He furthermore provides historical detail about the arrest of Hermeias and about Aristomedes which indicates their thoroughly contemporary character and relevance to the specific time when the speech was delivered. Körte and Foucart have subjected the fragments to thorough analysis, and on the basis of both the considerations mentioned here and of a detailed explication of the texts of both Didymus and the Fourth Philippic they have concluded in favor of the speech's authenticity.[5] Subsequent scholarship has shifted away from the issue of authenticity to the question of dating and of the parallels between the Fourth Philippic

and the speech On the Chersonese. The most exhaustive study of the problem is a 1953 dissertation by Stephen G. Daitz, which extended and modified theories first set forth by Spengel in 1860 and Adams in 1938.[6] Daitz provides detailed evidence that the parallel passages in the two speeches were originally part of the Fourth Philippic and not of the Chersonese speech, as has been generally proposed.[7] R. Sealey has arrived at the same conclusion, apparently independently, and it is the basis for the following treatment of the speech.[8]

Dionysius reports that the Fourth Philippic was delivered in the archonship of Nikomachos (341/0).[9] Didymus, citing Philochoros, assigns the speech to the same year.[10] Cawkwell has noted, however, that Didymus' discussion of the date of the speech "is very fragmentarily preserved and breaks off in tantalizing fashion at the end of column 2 with the remark that 'some' say that the speech was composed in 342/1."[11] The earlier date is almost certainly correct, for Didymus also conveniently preserves attestation by Philochoros, independently confirmed by the scholia on Aeschines, that Athenian "liberation" of Oreos from Macedonian control is to be dated to Scirophorion 341.[12] Within a month the Athenians were also beseiging Eretria.[13] Yet in the Fourth Philippic Demosthenes refers to Oreus (X 9 61) in a manner that implies that the city remains in Macedonian hands, and he says that Philip is making Euboea a "fortress against Athens," a claim that must appear preposterous if Athenian troops have already expelled Macedonian leadership from major Euboean cities. Hence, the Fourth Philippic must have been delivered before Scirophorion 341, before the Athenian campaign in Euboea.[14] There is, in fact, no evidence within the Fourth

Philippic that the situation has changed at all since the Third Philippic, and I will argue that it was delivered very shortly, perhaps within a few days, after the earlier speech.

Analysis of the Fourth Philippic has been hampered by scholarly concentration on the problem of the parallel passages and apparent borrowings from other speeches. The result of this focus has been to divert scholars from seeking a broader perspective on the speech, from seeing it as a whole rather than as a patchwork of fragments stitched together. Even scholars who argue for the authenticity of the speech do not move beyond transitions between its parts to an adequate theory which might satisfactorily link together the entire speech.[15] A reading of the speech itself, however, without continual reference to its relationship to other speeches, reveals that it does have a single unifying theme, and that theme is money.

A first indication that the speech is concerned with economic questions is the high frequency of words related to money and finance. The word χρήματα, for example, appears twelve times in this speech, more than in any other of the speeches against Philip. As the table on p. 158 will show, the Fourth Philippic contains twenty-five terms related to money, some of them found only in this speech. More of these terms are found in the Fourth Philippic, and most are used more times in this speech than in the other speeches against Philip. In paragraph 4-5 Demosthenes cites the victories of Philip's sympathizers "everywhere" and attributes their success to employment of "all the strategems by which politics are conducted (πᾶσιν ὅσοις πράγματα πράττεται), but "first and foremost, by having someone who will give money on their

MONEY-RELATED VOCABULARY

	I	II	III	IV	VI	VIII*	IX	X
χρήματα (money)	7		3	11	1	8	6	12
πρίαμαι (buy)							1	1
ἀναλίσκω (spend)	2	1	2	2		1	1	1
τροφή (provisions)	1			5				1
δαπανή (expense)					1	1		1
ἐγγυητής (guarantor)						1		1
οὐσία (property)							1	4
ἀνάλωμα (expense)							1	1
ὦνιοι (consumer goods)								2
εὐετηρία (plenty)								2
ἀγορά (market)	1		1				1	3
πανήγυρις (festival)								1
μισθαρνεῖν (work for pay)								2
μισθός (working for pay)		1	3	4				1
ἀργύριον (money)			1					1
καρποῦσθαι (derive profits)	3				2			2
πτωχός (poor)			1					1
πλούσιος (wealthy)			1					1
πλοῦτος (wealth)							1	1
εὔπορος ("well off")	1		1					7
ἄπορος (poor)								5
ἔνδεια (poverty)			2					2
ἐγχειρίζειν (entrust)								1
εὐδαίμων (prosperous)	1							2
εὐδαιμονία (prosperity)	1							1
Total occurrences	17	2	14	23	4	11	12	57

*For the speech On the Chersonese (VIII) only occurrences of words in the original sections are noted.

behalf to any who want to get it." (πρώτῳ μὲν πάντων καὶ πλείστῳ τῷ τοῖς βουλομένοις χρήματα λαμβάνειν ἔχειν τὸν δώσονθ' ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν) References to Philip's politics of largesse recur elsewhere in the speech (X 19 64 65 67 68), and Demosthenes recommends that the Athenians imitate him (19, ἀλλ' ὃν ἐκεῖνος πολεμεῖ τρόπον, τοῦτον μιμεῖσθε, τοῖς μὲν ἀμυνομένοις ἤδη χρήματα καὶ τἄλλ' ὅσων δέονται διδόντες). Bribery remains, as in earlier speeches, Athens' primary problem in making the necessary decisions against Philip. For "only in Athens is immunity granted to those who speak for one's enemies; politicians who have accepted bribes may safely address you personally, even when you have been robbed of your own" (X 66):

> ἐν μόνῃ τῶν πασῶν πόλεων τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ ἄδει' ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐχθρῶν λέγειν δέδοται, καὶ λαβόντα χρήματ' αὐτὸν ἀσφαλές ἐστι λέγειν παρ' ὑμῖν, κἂν ἀφῃρημένοι τὰ ὑμέτερ' αὐτῶν ἦτε.

Athenians, says Demosthenes, are well aware of what politicians are on Philip's payroll and are practicing as his agents; they are equally aware of which politicians are really acting in the best interests of Athens. But they bring their complaints against these latter and so let public business descend to ridicule and mockery that they are freed from ever having to perform any of their duties (X 75):

> οὐκ ἀγνοοῦντες αὐτούς (ἴστε γὰρ εὐθὺς ἰδόντες ἀκριβῶς, τίς μισθοῦ λέγει καὶ ὑπὲρ Φιλίππου πολιτεύεται, καὶ τίς ὡς ἀληθῶς ὑπὲρ τῶν βελτίστων), ἀλλ' ἵν' αἰτιασάμενοι τούτοις καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμ' εἰς γέλωτα καὶ λοιδορίαν ἐμβαλόντες μηδὲν αὐτοὶ τῶν δεόντων ποιῆτε.

In this speech the refusal to perform one's public functions is linked to money. Politicians speaking in opposition to resumption of open war with Philip are arguing from its cost, as Demosthenes himself reveals (X 55):

> ἐπειδάν τι τῶν πρὸς Φίλιππον ἐμπέσῃ, εὐθὺς ἀναστάς τις λέγει ὡς οὐ δεῖ ληρεῖν οὐδὲ γράφειν πόλεμον, παραθεὶς εὐθέως ἐξῆς τὸ τὴν εἰρήνην ἄγειν ὡς ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ τρέφειν μεγάλην δύναμιν ὡς χαλεπόν, καὶ "διαρπάζειν τινὲς τὰ χρήματα βούλονται."
>
> Whenever any of the issues having to do with Philip comes up, instantly someone stands up and says there must be no foolish talk, no declarations of war, and then adds right on without a stop how good it is to keep peace and how burdensome to maintain a large force, and that "some want to plunder your wealth."

That the accusation, διαρπάζειν τινὲς τὰ χρήματα βούλονται, has become a slogan of Demosthenes' opposition is clear from the following two paragraphs, in which Demosthenes continually throws the word, διαρπάζειν, back on the opposition. The "plunder of their wealth" they should stop by suggesting some policy to restrain Philip and not by abandoning Athenian interests. Demosthenes' indignation is aroused when he sees politicians concerned about the "plunder of their wealth," but not at Philip, who is "plundering" every Greek city in turn, and "plundering" them in order to attack Athens. Furthermore, he says, if it is χαλεπά to spend money on the preservation of Athens, what Athens will suffer if its citizens neglect their duty will be much more so (56-57).

It is apparent that since Demosthenes' delivery of his Third Philippic little action has been taken. Perhaps money and supplies have been sent to Diopeithes, but Demosthenes does not consider that isolated campaign to be the issue in any case, and he specifically criticizes Athens for funding βοηθείαι in an unsystematic, ad-hoc fashion instead of funding a standing force.[16] Perhaps some embassies have been sent to other Greek cities, although his mention of the resistance of other cities--probably, Thebes, Chalcis, and Byzantium--in

paragraph six does not require that the embassies called for in the Third Philippic have already been sent. The situation facing Demosthenes in this speech appears to be continued resistance to the broad mobilization which he had proposed in his earlier speech. His opponents appear not only to be accusing him and his associates of precipitating war, but in so doing, of bankrupting Athens at the time of its highest prosperity.[17] The speaker's strategic problem is to convince his audience that Athens can afford the cost of war and that the war effort is worth the cost.

Demosthenes admits that the cost of war with Philip will be high.[18] In fact, he asserts boldly that there is nothing Athens needs so much for the business to which it must now attend than money (X 31):

> οὐδενὸς τῶν πάντων οὕτως ὡς χρημάτων δεῖ τῇ πόλει πρὸς τὰ νῦν ἐπιόντα πράγματα.

He presents proposals, however, through which he intends to convince his fellow Athenians that the necessary funds are accessible. First, he proposes an end to wastefulness (cp. X 20, ὑστερίζετε, ἀναλίσκετε) through establishment of a well-rounded standing military machine and a fully functioning system of accountability (X 19-22). His second proposal, his boldest and most visionary, is his suggestion that Athens send ambassadors to seek an alliance with the Persian king. Demosthenes had already made the suggestion in the Third Philippic (IX 71), mentioning the King last in a list of places to which ambassadors should be sent:

> πανταχοῖ, εἰς Πελοπόννησον, εἰς Ῥόδον, εἰς Χίον, ὡς βασιλέα λέγω (οὐδὲ γὰρ τῶν ἐκείνῳ συμφερόντων ἀφέστηκε τὸ μὴ τοῦτον ἔᾶσαι πάντα καταστρέψασθαι.

> [we must disperse ambassadors] in all directions, to the Peloponnese, to Rhodes, to Chios, yes, I say to the King (for preventing Philip from subduing everything is not irrelevant even to the King's interests).

There the suggestion was made almost in passing, with the addition of a single clause to pose a rationale for what must have seemed an audacious notion. Perhaps he inserted his proposal in just such a casual way, without preparation and without either emphasis or elaboration, in order to test its impact and to lay the way for further development of the idea later if the response to his trial balloon was favorable.[19] Here he cloaks the idea with the suggestion of divine favor: a "spontaneous stroke of good fortune" has fallen upon the city (X 31, συμβέβηκε δ' εὐτυχήματ' ἀπὸ ταὐταμάτου), which can now use it to its advantage. Persons considered by the King to be his trusted "benefactors" are at war with Philip.[20] Furthermore, one of Philip's operatives, with personal knowledge of "all Philip's plots against the King," has been dragged off to the King and will shortly be forced to inform the King of Philip's hostile intentions.[21] All that remains for the Athenians is to send a message to the King "which he will be delighted to hear, namely, that the one injuring both should be punished by both in common" (X 33):

> ὡς τὸν ἀμφοτέρους ἀδικοῦντα κοινῇ τιμωρήσασθαι δεῖ.

The reception that such a proposal was likely to get from an Athenian audience is implied by Demosthenes' plea to his audience to "put aside the silly talk" about "the Barbarian" and "the common enemy of all," and the like (X 33):

> οἶμαι δεῖν ὑμᾶς . . . τὴν ἀβελτερίαν ἀποθέσθαι, δι' ἣν πολλάκις ἡλαττώθητε, "ὁ δὴ βάρβαρος καὶ ὁ κοινὸς ἅπασιν ἐχθρός," καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα.

Demosthenes had himself used those epithets of the King more than a decade earlier in his first known political speech (XIV 3 35 36). He had also used them to refer to Philip (XIX 302 307 308, IX 31, cp. III 16). Here he does not do so. While asserting that those traditional epithets are no longer appropriate to describe the King, he does not argue here that they should be referred instead to Philip. The King he calls one "who both formerly was the city's ally in straightening out its affairs and now was making proposals to us (X 34):

> ὃς καὶ πρότερον συνεπηνώρθωσε τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα καὶ νῦν ἐπηγγέλλετο.

He implies that, while Philip had talked deceitfully of ἐπανόρθωσις, the King had actually accomplished it.[22] And only recently had he sought Athenian assistance in his Egyptian campaign.[23] For Philip, on the other hand, Demosthenes does not use a title or epithet from the anti-Persian tradition; he speaks of one "expanding in the midst of Greece, a robber of Greeks" (X 34): ἐν μέσῃ τῇ Ἑλλάδι αὐξανομένου λῃστοῦ τῶν Ἑλλήνων. In order to ease establishment of friendly relations and a possible military alliance with the King he repudiates the old panhellenic rhetoric rather than seeking its transfer to Philip. To create a negative image of Philip as "robber" and "plunderer" of Greeks, on the other hand, is to reinforce the theme of money in this speech and to anticipate the discussion of plunder in paragraphs 55-57.

Demosthenes' third proposal for meeting the financial needs of a military campaign against Philip follows in paragraphs 35-45. At a time in Athenian history when financial considerations have become, in Demosthenes' view, a pretext for inaction he proposes to speak "for the

advantage of the city on behalf of the poor the case against the rich, and on behalf of property owners the case against the needy" (X 36):

> οἶμαι γὰρ ἔξειν καὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀπόρων τὰ δίκαι' ἐπὶ τῷ συμφέροντι τῆς πόλεως εἰπεῖν πρὸς τοὺς εὐπόρους, καὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν κεκτημένων τὰς οὐσίας πρὸς τοὺς ἐνδεεῖς.

The primary point of conflict between the two classes is, he says (X 35), the theorikon, and he proposes removing it from contentious discussion (X 36):

> εἰ ἀνέλοιμεν ἐκ μέσου καὶ τὰς βλασφημίας ἃς ἐπὶ τῷ θεωρικῷ ποιοῦνταί τινες οὐχὶ δικαίως, καὶ τὸν φόβον, ὡς οὐ στήσεται τοῦτ' ἄνευ μεγάλου τινὸς κακοῦ, οὐδὲν ἂν εἰς τὰ πράγματα μεῖζον εἰσενεγκαίμεθα, οὐδ' ὅ τι κοινῇ μᾶλλον ἂν ὅλην ἐπιρρώσειε τὴν πόλιν.
>
> If we could do away with the slanders that some are illegitimately speaking against the theorikon and the fear that it will not survive without very dangerous consequences, we would not introduce anything more favorable to the public good, nor would any action improve more the vitality of our whole city.

This reversal of the attacks on the theoric fund which had characterized Demosthenes' Olynthiac speeches (cf. III 10-13, 31) convinced many nineteenth-century critics that this speech could not be genuinely Demothenes'. As Drerup has correctly pointed out, however, politicians can change their minds.[24] He is undoubtedly correct as well in his speculation that Demosthenes here endorses the fund as a gesture designed to gain the support of the majority and so finally to wrest the financial administration of the city away from Eubulus.[25] He links his defense of the fund to his arguments for "those appearing to be in need" (X 37, τῶν ἐν χρείᾳ δοκούντων), with the claim that Good Fortune (N.B.! not Eubulus' sound policies) has so increased the financial base of the city that there is plenty enough profit for everyone. All citizens of Athens, rich and poor alike, benefit from the city's

prosperity, and all citizens accept their share of the benefits from the theoric fund. Hence, Demosthenes argues, the wealthy should not use the large surpluses dispensed through the theorikon as a pretext (X 35 39, πρόφασις) for withholding their liturgies or εἰσφοραί. In support of his claims upon the wealthy he cites the willingness of people of means οὐ πάλαι--probably just after the Social War--to perform their civic duties even though the total revenues of the city were no more than 130 talents at that time.[26] When Demosthenes speaks for the wealthy, however, he does not actually address the poor and needy, but the upwardly mobile politicians who take advantage of the Athenian political and legal system to drain off public funds to their own advantage and to win fines and confiscations from the wealthy in court. He does not criticize the poor anywhere in this section of the speech, but defends their right to share in the public wealth provided them through the theoric fund. At the same time, he defends the right of the wealthy to retain their property not by attacking the poor, but by attacking his political opponents, whom he generally criticizes for getting rich at public expense.

This third proposal for meeting the financial demands of war with Philip, a proposal which is based both on defense of the theorikon and on the assertion of a convergence of interests within the body politic, is a highly effective assault on the political strategy which had enabled Eubulus to hold together the interests of rich and poor for nearly fifteen years. As Beloch interpreted that strategy, Eubulus would have gained his natural support from the propertied classes who had the most to gain from his financial policies. In a democracy,

however, he could hardly hope to sustain his place of leadership if he depended for support only on the rich. He therefore had to incorporate into his financial system a means by which he could assure his popularity among the large, unpropertied majority, and that means was the theoric fund.[27] Demosthenes, for his part, gives evidence in this speech that he had learned something about strategy from Eubulus. By ignoring his earlier attacks on the theoric fund and endorsing its continued importance for all economic classes, by demonstrating that a Persian alliance might provide the needed funds for a war with Philip without compromising the prosperity enjoyed by rich and poor alike, and by asserting a commonality of interests between rich and poor, Demosthenes was attempting to take the financial issue away from Eubulus. In the Third Philippic he had concentrated on Philip's "aggressions" and Athens' historic call to leadership, but he did not attack directly the unassailable position of Eubulus that a war with Philip would cost Athens the post-Social War economic gains which had been realized under his peacetime financial policies. In this speech Demosthenes means to imply that Athenians can have their cake and eat it: the theorikon may be maintained intact and its critics denounced; funds for the war may be solicited from Persia, which has given signs of a desire for alliance with Athens; recognition of mutual interests and common responsibility among rich and poor will make it possible for the city to produce even out of its prosperity the revenues needed to support the war effort, as Demosthenes implies in paragraph 45:

> δεῖ γὰρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δικαίως ἀλλήλοις τῆς πολιτείας κοινωνεῖν, τοὺς μὲν εὐπόρους εἰς μὲν τὸν βίον τὸν ἑαυτῶν ἀσφαλῶς ἔχειν νομίζοντας καὶ ὑπὲρ

> τούτων μὴ δεδοικότας, εἰς δὲ τοὺς κινδύνους κοινὰ ὑπὲρ τῆς σωτηρίας τὰ ὄντα τῇ πατρίδι παρέχοντας, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς τὰ μὲν κοινὰ κοινὰ νομίζοντας καὶ μετέχοντας τὸ μέρος, τὰ δ' ἑκάστου ἴδια τοῦ κεκτημένου. οὕτω καὶ μικρὰ μεγάλη πόλις γίγνεται καὶ μεγάλη σώζεται.
>
> Men of Athens, we ought to share fairly the rights and privileges of our democracy: the wealthy should be able to count their fortunes secure without need to worry about them; but in times of danger they should furnish their wealth as a public resource to the city for its defense. Everyone else should count public resources public and accept their share of them, but recognize private wealth as the property of individuals. That is how small cities become great, and great cities are kept great.

Behind the phrases defending both the right to private property and the right to public welfare, however, Demosthenes discreetly conceals his ultimate strategy: "In times of danger," he says, "they should furnish their wealth as a public resource to the city for its defense." In order to gain public acceptance of his war policy he emphasizes mutual interests and mutual respect. His aim, however, is common responsibility. He is able to talk about the need to maintain the theorikon and to preserve the property of the wealthy because he is convinced that once Athens is totally mobilized it will face dangers which will motivate the wealthy to make their wealth κοινά. As for the theorikon, although he breathes not a word of it here, Demosthenes clearly also believes that, given those same dangers, the poor and needy will also gladly consent to make their theoric moneys στρατιωτικά.[28] As Philochoros informs us, that is precisely what finally happened, at Demosthenes' urging.[29]

Having argued that Athens can afford the cost of war, he must also persuade his audience that the war effort is worth the cost. This he attempts to do with two lines of argument. The first is that,

however high the costs of war, the cost of capitulation to Philip will be higher:

> ἐὰν λογίσηται τὰ τῇ πόλει μετὰ ταῦτα γενησόμενα, ἐὰν ταῦτα μὴ ἐθέλῃ ποιεῖν, εὑρήσει λυσιτελοῦν τὸ ἐκόντας ποιεῖν τὸ δέοντα. (24)
>
> νομίζειν δ' εἶναι χαλεπὰ οὐχ ὅσ' ἂν εἰς σωτηρίαν δαπανῶμεν, ἀλλ' ἃ πεισόμεθα, ἂν μὴ ταῦτ' ἐθέλωμεν ποιεῖν. (56)

Elaborating on a point made in earlier speeches, Demosthenes emphasizes that Athens is "the chief object of Philip's plots" (49, μάλισθ' ὑμῖν ἐπιβουλεύειν Φίλιππον). On the one hand, he is fortifying his hold over property to the north, "those wretched objects in Thrace" (15), in order to seize control in the future of the Athenians' "harbors, dockyards, triremes, location, and prestige" (16). On the other hand, it is because Philip is the "irreconcilable foe of constitutional government and democracy" that "all of his present activity and organization is preparing for an attack on Athens" (15):

> πρῶτον μὲν δὴ τοῦτο δεῖ, ἐχθρὸν ὑπειληφέναι τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τῆς δημοκρατίας ἀδιάλλακτον ἐκεῖνον, δεύτερον δ' εἰδέναι σαφῶς ὅτι πάνθ' ὅσα πραγματεύεται καὶ κατασκευάζεται νῦν, ἐπὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν πόλιν παρασκευάζεται.

Philip knows precisely (οἶδεν ἀκριβῶς) that his own hold on power will be precarious so long as Athens continues as a democracy (13, οὐδὲν ἔστ' αὐτῷ βεβαίως ἔχειν, ἕως ἂν ὑμεῖς δημοκρατῆσθε). Therefore, in a considerable escalation of rhetoric over his previous speeches, Demosthenes asserts as forcefully as possible Philip's hostility to Athens and his intent to destroy its free government, and he invokes the city's gods to destroy Philip (11):

πρῶτον μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο παρ' ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς βεβαίως γνῶναι, ὅτι τῇ πόλει Φίλιππος πολεμεῖ καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην λέλυκεν, καὶ κάκονους μέν ἐστι καὶ ἐχθρὸς ὅλῃ τῇ πόλει καὶ τῷ τῆς πόλεως ἑδάφει, προσθήσω δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει θεοῖς, οἵπερ αὐτὸν ἐξολέσειαν, οὐδενὶ μέντοι μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ πολιτείᾳ πολεμεῖ οὐδ' ἐπιβουλεύει, καὶ σκοπεῖ μᾶλλον οὐδὲν τῶν πάντων ἢ πῶς ταύτην καταλύσει.

First, men of Athens, you must fix this firmly in your minds, that Philip is at war with Athens and has broken the Peace, that he is the malevolent enemy of our whole city, and of the soil beneath our city, and, I will add, of the gods within our city (May they destroy him!), and that his military and diplomatic efforts are aimed at nothing so much as at our free constitution and he is investigating nothing more than how to abolish it.

Later in the speech Demosthenes returns to the theme, assuring this audience that, in Athens' case unlike that of other cities, capitulation to Philip will not mean slavery but extermination (X 62):

καὶ μὴν οὐχ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἴσων ὑμῖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔσθ' ὁ κίνδυνος· οὐ γὰρ ὑφ' αὑτῷ ποιήσασθαι τὴν πόλιν βούλεται Φίλιππος ὑμῶν, οὔ, ἀλλ' ὅλως ἀνελεῖν.

Moreover, it isn't for the same stakes that you and the others are in danger. Philip, you see, does not want simply to subjugate our city. No, he wants to wipe it off the map.

The war with Philip will be a "life-and-death struggle" (X 63, ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐσομένου τοῦ ἀγῶνος).

Demosthenes' first argument for Athens' investment in the war effort, however costly, is that the cost of capitulation will be infinitely higher--the abolishment of Athens' democratic constitution and, indeed, the City's utter annihilation. If the Athenians are skeptical that Philip's designs are as dire as Demosthenes represents them, it is because his arguments, as in earlier speeches, must continue to draw on Philip's alleged motives. Demosthenes' arguments, therefore, remain necessarily speculative, resting as they do on the argument from probability. Thus he says that it is "naive" (X 15, εὐήθης) to

believe that Philip would endure the effort, the harsh winters, and the extreme dangers of war in Thrace without having an eye to the ultimate conquest of Athens. As in earlier speeches, Demosthenes attributes Philip's antipathy to Athens' democratic order to his act of reasoning (X 14, οὐ καικῶς οὐδ' ἀργῶς ταῦτα λογιζόμενος) and it is, in fact, speculation in which Demosthenes invites his audience to engage with him (X 12, λογίζεσθε γάρ). If this reasoning from probability is not persuasive, however, Demosthenes offers a second argument for his assertion that the war effort against Philip is worth the cost. In this argument he patriotically draws on Athens' history and attempts to evoke the patriotic sentiments of the audience by resort to the epideictic commonplaces. They are listed here in the order in which they appear in the speech.

Commonplaces in the Fourth Philippic

1. Athenians are victorious over their enemies.

X 2 (ironic)--ἡμεῖς οὐδαμοῦ πώποτε, ὅπου περὶ τῶν δικαίων εἰπεῖν ἐδέησεν, ἠττήθημεν οὐδ' ἀδικεῖν ἐδόξαμεν, ἀλλὰ πάντων πανταχοῦ κρατοῦμεν καὶ περίεσμεν τῷ λόγῳ.

X 4 (of Philip's partisans)--οἱ τῆς ἐκείνου προαιρέσεως, οἱ τυραννίδων καὶ δυναστειῶν ἐπιθυμοῦντες, κεκρατήκασι πανταχοῦ.

X 5 (of Philip's partisans)--καὶ κεκρατήκασιν οἱ δι' ἐκείνου τὰς πολιτείας ποιούμενοι πᾶσιν ὅσοις πράγματα πράττεται.

X 59--ἡγοῦνται γάρ, ἂν μὲν ὑμεῖς ὁμοθυμαδὸν ἑκ μιᾶς γνώμης Φίλιππον ἀμύνησθε, κἀκείνου ξρατήσειν ὑμᾶς.

2. Athenians act out of commitment to το δίκαιον.

X 2-- . . . ἡμεῖς οὐδαμοῦ πώποτε, ὅπου περὶ τῶν δικαίων εἰπεῖν ἐδέησεν, ἠττήθημεν οὐδ' ἀδικεῖν ἐδόξαμεν, . . .

X 3 (ironic)--ἡμεῖς δὲ καθώμεθ' εἰρηκότες τὰ δίκαια, οἱ δ' ἀκηκοότες, εἰκότως, οἶμαι, τοὺς λόγους τἄργα παρέρχεται, καὶ προσέχουσιν ἅπαντες οὐχ οἷς εἴπομέν ποθ' ἡμεῖς δικαίοις ἢ νῦν ἂν εἴποιμεν, ἀλλ' οἷς ποιοῦμεν.

3. Athenians submit to many dangers.

X 3 (of Philip)-- πᾶσιν τοῖς οὖσιν ἑτοίμως κινδυνεύσων, ἡμεῖς δὲ καθώμεθ'

X 71--ὑπὲρ φιλοτιμίας καὶ δόξης . . . ἅπαντα ποιητέον εἶναι νομίζεις καὶ πονητέον καὶ κινδυνευτέον.

4. Athenians help the victims of aggression.

X 3-- ἔστι δὲ ταῦτ' οὐδένα τῶν ἀδικουμένων σῴζειν δυνάμενα

X 46--πᾶσι τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις βοηθεῖν περίεργον ἐπείσθητ' εἶναι καὶ μάταιον ἀνάλωμ'

5. Athenians are free.

X 4-- τοιγάρτοι διεστηκότων εἰς δύο ταῦτα τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, τῶν μὲν εἰς τὸ μήτ' ἄρχειν βίᾳ βούλεσθαι μηδενὸς μήτε δουλεύειν ἄλλῳ, ἀλλ' ἐν ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ νόμοις ἐξ ἴσου πολιτεύεσθαι

X 14--οὐκοῦν βούλεται τοῖς αὐτοῦ καιροῖς τὴν παρ' ὑμῶν ἐλευθερίαν ἐφεδρεύειν

6. Athens is a democracy, based on equality.

X 4-- . . . καὶ νόμοις ἐξ ἴσου πολιτεύεσθαι. . . . πόλις δημοκρατουμένη βεβαίως οὐκ οἶδ' εἴ τίς ἐστι τῶν πασῶν λοιπὴ πλὴν ἡ ἡμετέρα.

X 13--οὐδὲν ἔστ' αὐτῷ βεβαίως ἔχειν, ἕως ἂν ὑμεῖς δημοκρατῆσθε.

X 15--πρῶτον μὲν δὴ τοῦτο δεῖ, ἐχθρὸν ὑπειλῆφεναι τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τῆς δημοκρατίας ἀδιάλλακτον ἐκεῖνον

7. Athenians are the only ones to do certain things (μόνοι) among them, to defend all Greeks against the barbarian.

X 12--λογίζεσθε γάρ. ἄρχειν βούλεται, τούτου δ' ἀνταγωνιστὰς μόνους ὑπείληφεν ὑμᾶς.

X 30 (ironic)-- τοιγαροῦν ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων ἐθῶν μόνοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑμεῖς τοῖς ἄλλοις τούναντίον ποιεῖτε· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι πρὸ τῶν πραγμάτων εἰώθασι χρῆσθαι τῷ βουλεύεσθαι, ὑμεῖς δὲ μετὰ τὰ πράγματα.

X 50--πόλιν δ' ἣν ὑπείληφεν, ὃς ἂν τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἄρχειν ἀεὶ βούληται, μόνην ἂν ἐναντιωθῆναι καὶ τῆς πάντων ἐλευθερίας προστῆναι, οὐ μὰ Δί' ἐκ τῶν ὠνίων, εἰ καλῶς ἔχει, δοκιμάζειν δεῖ.

X 66 (ironic)-- ἐν μόνῃ τῶν πασῶν πόλεων τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ ἄδει' ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐχθρῶν λέγειν δέδοται, καὶ λαβόντα χρήματ' αὐτὸν ἀσφαλές ἐστι λέγειν παρ' ὑμῖν, ἂν ἀφῃρημένοι τὰ ὑμέτερ' αὐτῶν ἦτε.

8. Athenians fight for freedom, for all Greeks.

X 14--ἐστὲ γὰρ ὑμεῖς οὐκ αὐτοὶ πλεονεκτῆσαι καὶ κατασχεῖν ἀρχὴν εὖ πεφυκότες, ἀλλ' ἕτερον λαβεῖν κωλῦσαι καὶ ἔχοντ' ἀφελέσθαι καὶ ὅλως ἐνοχλῆσαι τοῖς ἄρχειν βουλομένοις καὶ πάντας ἀνθρώπους εἰς ἐλευθερίαν ἐξελέσθαι δεινοί.

X 25--αἰσχρὸν . . . καὶ ἀνάξιον ὑμῶν καὶ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων τῇ πόλει καὶ πεπραγμένων τοῖς προγόνοις, τῆς ἰδίας ῥᾳθυμίας ἕνεκα τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας Ἕλληνας εἰς δουλείαν προέσθαι

X 50--πόλιν δ' ἣν ὑπείληφεν, ὃς ἂν τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἄρχειν ἀεὶ βούληται, μόνην ἂν ἐναντιωθῆναι καὶ τῆς πάντων ἐλευθερίας προστῆναι

9. Athenians possess an honored reputation.

X 16-- . . . τῶν δ' Ἀθηναίων λιμένων καὶ νεωρίων καὶ τριήρων καὶ τόπου καὶ δόξης . . . οὐκ ἐπιθυμεῖν

X 71--ὑπὲρ φιλοτιμίας καὶ δόξης ταῦτα πάντα ποιεῖς

X 71--οὐ γὰρ ἐκεῖνό γ' ἂν εἴποις, ὡς σὲ μὲν ἐν τῇ πόλει δεῖ τινα φαίνεσθαι, τὴν πόλιν δ' ἐν τοῖς Ἕλλησι μηδενὸς ἀξίαν εἶναι.

X 73 (mockery of Aristomedes)--ἀλλα νὴ Δία παππῴα σοι καὶ πατρῴα δόξ' ὑπάρχει, ἣν αἰσχρόν ἐστιν ἐν σοὶ καταλῦσαι· τῇ πόλει δ' ὑπῆρξεν ἀνώνυμα καὶ φαῦλα τὰ τῶν προγόνων. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει.

10. Athenians live up to the ideals of their ancestors and city.

X 25--αἰσχρὸν . . . καὶ ἀνάξιον ὑμῶν καὶ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων τῇ πόλει καὶ πεπραγμένων τοῖς προγόνοις,

τῆς ἰδίας ῥᾳθυμίας ἕνεκα τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας Ἕλληνας εἰς δουλείαν προέσθαι.

X 73 (mockery of Aristomedes)--ἀλλα νὴ Δία παππφα σοι καὶ πατρφα δόξ' ὑπάρχει, ἦν αἰσχρόν ἐστιν ἐν σοὶ καταλῦσαι· τῇ πόλει δ' ὑπῆρξεν ἀνώνυμα καὶ φαῦλα τὰ τῶν προγόνων. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει.

11. Athenians die nobly rather than live disgracefully.

X 25--καὶ ἔγωγ' αὐτὸς τεθνάναι μᾶλλον ἂν ἢ ταῦτ' εἰρηκέναι βουλοίμην.

12. The ancestors of the Athenians have handed down (κατέλιπον, παρέδωκαν) a legacy of honor and responsibility.

X 46--ἐξέστητ', ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἐφ' ἧς ὑμᾶς οἱ πρόγονοι κατέλιπον

13. Athenians are the leaders of Greece.

X 46--τὸ μὲν προίστασθαι τῶν Ἑλλήνων . . . περίεργον ἐπείσθητ' εἶναι καὶ μάταιον ἀνάλωμ' ὑπὸ τῶν ταῦτα πολιτευομένων

X 50--πόλιν δ' ἣν ὑπείληφεν, ὃς ἂν τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἄρχειν ἀεὶ βούληται, μόνην ἂν ἐναντιωθῆναι καὶ τῆς πάντων ἐλευθερίας προστῆναι

X 51--τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλον ἅπαντ' εἰς δύο ταῦτα διῄρητο τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ ἡμᾶς, τῶν δ' ἄλλων [Ἑλλήνων] οἱ μὲν ἡμῖν, οἱ δ' ἐκείνοις ὑπήκουον.

X 62--ἄρχειν γὰρ εἰώθατε

X 74--τὴν πόλιν δ', ἣ προειστήκει τῶν Ἑλλήνων τέως καὶ τὸ πρωτεῖον εἶχε, νῦν ἐν ἀδοξίᾳ πάσῃ καὶ ταπεινότητι καθεστάναι

14. Athenians are the salvation of all Greece.

X 73--τῇ πόλει δ' ἡμῶν οὓς πάντες ἴσασιν οἱ Ἕλληνες ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων σεσωσμένοι

Demosthenes introduces his second--patriotic--argument most clearly in paragraphs 24-25:

> εἰ μὲν γάρ ἐστί τις ἐγγυητὴς ὑμῖν θεῶν (οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρώπων γ' οὐδεὶς ἂν γένοιτ' ἀξιόχρεως τηλικούτου πράγματος) ὡς, ἐὰν ἄγηθ' ἡσυχίαν καὶ ἅπαντα προῆσθε, οὐκ ἐπ' αὐτοὺς ὑμᾶς τελευτῶν ἐκεῖνος ἥξει, αἰσχρὸν μὲν νὴ τὸν Δία καὶ πάντας θεοὺς καὶ ἀνάξιον ὑμῶν καὶ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων τῇ πόλει καὶ πεπραγμένων τοῖς προγόνοις, τῆς ἰδίας ῥᾳθυμίας ἕνεκα τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας Ἕλληνας εἰς δουλείαν προέσθαι, καὶ ἔγωγ' αὐτὸς μὲν τεθνάναι μᾶλλον ἂν ἢ ταῦτ' εἰρηκέναι βουλοίμην.
>
> Even if there is some god who would be willing to underwrite the pledge (since no human being has means enough to back so large an affair) that if you remain at peace and abandon everything Philip will not in the end march against you yourselves, still, in God's name, in the name of all the gods, it would be shameful, it would be unworthy of yourselves, if the legacy granted to our city, and of the exploits of our ancestors for us to abandon, for the sake of our own comfort, all the other Greeks, and I for one would prefer to die rather than to suggest such a policy.

Here the use of the term ἐγγυητής and perhaps also of ἀξιόχρεως and πρᾶγμα reflects the financial interests of the speech.[30] Demosthenes, however, quickly moves the argument from sound investment (ἀξιόχρεως) to sound character (ἀνάξιον ὑμῶν κτλ.) invoking Athens' identity as the preeminent guardian and protector of all Greece. He punctuates this recollection of Athens' destiny with personal appeal to the commonplace of noble death in preference to shameful life. A little earlier in the speech he had claimed that ambition and pursuit of empire were not (!) innate Athenian gifts (X 14):

> ἐστὲ γὰρ ὑμεῖς οὐκ αὐτοὶ πλεονεκτῆσαι καὶ κατασχεῖν ἀρχὴν εὖ πεφυκότες, ἀλλ' ἕτερον λαβεῖν κωλῦσαι καὶ ἔχοντ' ἀφελέσθαι καὶ ὅλως ἐνοχλῆσαι τοῖς ἄρχειν βουλομένοις καὶ πάντας ἀνθρώπους εἰς ἐλευθερίαν ἐξελέσθαι δεινοί.
>
> You are not yourselves well endowed by nature to seek more than your due or to grasp for empire. But for stopping another's thievery and relieving him of his loot, for obstructing completely those seeking

> to rule and for liberating all humanity nature has made you marvelously adept.

Here again commercial imagery is linked to traditional patriotic commonplaces. Athens as the guardian of freedom is here expressed in the language of manumission--τινα εἰς ἐλευθερίαν ἐξελέσθαι (cp. Lys. XXIII 9). It is as true of Athens' nature as it has been characteristic of its traditional behavior or the legacy of its forebears that Athens should forego its own gain for the sake of the freedom of others. That is the claim of the commonplaces on which Demosthenes' rhetoric depends. But to forego gain is not to abandon one's station, and Athens' rightful station is to hold preeminence among Greeks; its help to the oppressed is linked inalienably to its supremacy over its peers. And, in Demosthenes' view, Athens has abandoned its due place and role among Greeks (46):

> ἐξέστητ', ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῆς ὑπόθέσεως ἐφ' ἧς ὑμᾶς οἱ πρόγονοι κατέλιπον, καὶ τὸ μὲν προίστασθαι τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ δύναμιν συνεστηκυῖαν ἔχοντας πᾶσι τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις βοηθεῖν περίεργον ἐπείσθητ' εἶναι καὶ μάταιον ἀνάλωμ' ὑπὸ τῶν ταῦτα πολιτευομένων.
>
> Men of Athens, you have abandoned the position to which your ancestors have left you, and you have been persuaded by politicians of this line that to stand first among the Greeks, to maintain a standing military force, and to help all the oppressed are excessive and useless expense.

Demosthenes' intent is to portray the loss of traditional Athenian identity as the substitution of commercial for patriotic values and further to lay the blame for that corruption of the Athenian character on the politicians resisting the war with Philip. They are promising that peace (τὸ δ' ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ διάγειν) will guarantee a "marvelous prosperity and full security" (θαυμαστὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ πολλὴν

ἀσφάλειαν). But in relinquishing its traditional role in Greece Athens has lost to Philip not only its status, but its prosperity as well (47):

> ἐκ δὲ τούτων παρελθὼν ἐπὶ τὴν τάξιν ἐφ' ἧς ὑμῖν τετάχθαι προσῆκεν ἕτερος, οὗτος εὐδαίμων καὶ μέγας καὶ πολλῶν κύριος γέγονεν.
>
> In consequence another has passed into the station to which you were rightly appointed, and it is he who has become prosperous, great, and in control of vast holdings.[31]

As in the Third Philippic, in the Fourth Philippic the concern for all Greece serves the more fundamental aim of the supremacy of Athens over all Greece. Though Athens does not seek more than its due or grasp for empire, it nonetheless is accustomed to imperial control (62, ἄρχειν εἰώθατε). Throughout its history Greeks have divided themselves into two spheres of influence, the one in subjection to Sparta, the other to Athens (51). Of the two cities Athens, the democracy, became known not merely as a "leader" but as a leader in the cause of freedom (50, τῆς πάντων ἐλευθερίας προστῆναι), freedom for all. At least such was Athens' self-understanding. And for the purposes of this speech, Demosthenes assures his audience, that such a city with such a history, such a status, such a responsibility for the welfare of the whole Greek community, cannot be measured by the wealth of its garden produce or quantity of its manufactured goods. It is measured by the good will of its allies and the strength of its armaments (50). That is, it must show power and influence at least as much as prosperity and security. Hence, Demosthenes attempts to argue, war with Philip is worth whatever cost; for the war aims not merely at the preservation of the Athenian market economy but at the restoration of

its status and the recovery of its true, historic identity.

The chief obstacle to that restoration and recovery Demosthenes finds, as in previous speeches, in the influence of Philip's partisans among the politically active in Athens. In the closing sections of the speech On the Chersonese (VIII 68-75, 76) and of the Third Philippic (IX 53-69) Demosthenes contrasted his own statesmanship with the self-serving treachery of his political opponents. In the Third Philippic (IX 59-62) he adduced the example of the politician from Oreus, Euphraeus, who in a manner consistent with the ideals of Athenian democracy οἰκήσας, ὅπως ἐλεύθεροι καὶ μηδενὸς δοῦλοι ἔσονται (59). In the final section of this speech Demosthenes again focusses his criticism on ἔνιοι τῶν λεγόντων (59). And again, as in the Third Philippic, he uses an emotional appeal to intensify the impact of his argument. He cites a politician by name, this time an Athenian politician. In the Third Philippic his portrayal of the fate of Euphraeus is tragic: the patriot's self-inflicted death becomes his final witness to his honest and pure dedication to his fellow citizens and opposition to Philip (IX 62). In the Fourth Philippic Demosthenes' apostrophe to Aristomedes is satirical, sarcastic; he subjects this representative of his opposition to comic ridicule. The crux of his attack is the constrast between the individual politicians and the body politic of Athens. He says he observes that the policy to which these politicians urge the city is the opposite of the policy they have adopted themselves: they urge the city to remain quiet even when being injured; they themselves are incapable of keeping quiet though no one is injuring them (70). He then addresses Aristomedes directly--why when

political life is so precarious does he not choose the quiet life instead of political life filled with peril? The response he places in Aristomedes' mouth provides evidence of his own motivation for political involvement and his own understanding of Athenian patriotism (X 71):

> εἰ γὰρ ὃ βέλτιστον εἰπεῖν ἂν ἔχοις, τοῦτό σοι δοίημεν ἀληθὲς λέγειν, ὡς ὑπὲρ φιλοτιμίας καὶ δόξης ταῦτα πάντα ποιεῖς. . . .
>
> For if we should be able to grant the truth of what you could say as your best answer, that you do all this out of a competitive urge to status and prestige. . . .

Demosthenes does not criticize Aristomedes for pursuing political goals for the sake of the prerogatives and acclaim that might ensue. Nor does he condemn him for, as he suggests (71), thinking that "it is your obligation to become a prominent figure in the city" (ὡς σὲ μὲν ἐν τῇ πόλει δεῖ τινὰ φαίνεσθαι). He criticizes the setting of goals for oneself which one appears to deny to the city, as though Athens were of no significance among the Greeks (τὴν πόλιν δ' ἐν τοῖς Ἕλλησι μηδενὸς ἀξίαν εἶναι). Demosthenes pursues the contrast between Aristomedes and Athens by suggesting that the politician may claim that he must participate in politics, however perilous, because he has the reputation of his father and grandfather to uphold. (By implication, if he suggests that Athens should avoid involvements that offer danger or effort, he is claiming that the city has no noble legacy from its forebears to preserve.):

> ἀλλὰ νὴ Δία παππῶα σοι καὶ πατρῶα δόξ' ὑπάρχει, ἣν αἰσχρόν ἐστιν ἐν σοὶ καταλῦσαι· τῇ πόλει δ' ὑπῆρξεν ἀνώνυμα καὶ φαῦλα τὰ τῶν προγόνων. (73)

On the contrary, says Demosthenes, reciting one of the traditional commonplaces, all the Greeks know that the Athenians' ancestors saved them

from the deadliest perils (73):

> τῇ πόλει δ' ἡμῶν οὓς πάντες ἴσασιν οἱ Ἕλληνες ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων σεσωσμένοι.

Aristomedes' father, by contrast, at least if he was anything like his son, was a thief:

> σοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἦν κλέπτης ὁ πατήρ, εἴπερ ἦν ὅμοιος σοί.

"To you there was a thief for a father, if, indeed, he was like you."

The climax of Demosthenes' satire, indeed, of his attack on his opposition, is to be found in this characterization. Critics in the past considered the inclusion of a personal attack on a named opponent to be evidence of the spuriousness of the speech, for Plutarch had written that Demosthenes' Philippic speeches were free of all personal invective.[32] Drerup, on the other hand, says that the inclusion of this piece of personal invective does not speak against Demosthenes' authorship of the speech because this "unmotiviert, plump, läppisch" invective is thoroughly consistent with Demosthenes' character.[33] Perhaps, however, Demosthenes felt the license here to engage in a little raillery against Aristomedes because he was already the common butt of ridicule in his day. Until the discovery of Didymus' commentary, the identity of Aristomedes remained unknown. Didymus, however, informs us that Aristomedes was a figure already notorious in contemporary comedy. In three passages from Greek comedy quoted by Didymus, one from the comedian Philemon and two from the comedies of Timocles, Aristomedes is referred to as a thief, a fact which may account for Demosthenes' own reference to Aristomedes as a thief in X 73.[34] Aristomedes may have been an obscure figure unknown to modern scholars, but in fourth century

Athens he apparently was proverbial.

We may speculate that Aristomedes had spoken, perhaps in this session of the Assembly, as a spokesman for the policy of Eubulus and an advocate of continued peace. In mocking Aristomedes Demosthenes is at once ridiculing the posture of fiscal concern posed by the proponents of peace and prosperity and suggesting that they are the real thieves (like the "thief" Aristomedes) of the city's wealth. For they seek their own fortunes at the city's expense, while urging upon the city policies which will lead to its moral bankruptcy and corporate destruction. Some of them (ἔνιοι) he says, manage neither their private nor their public affairs in a fair and democratic manner (X 74):

> ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐκ ἴσως οὐδὲ πολιτικῶς ἔνιοι τὰ καθ' αὑτοὺς καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν πολιτεύονται· πῶς γάρ ἐστιν ἴσον τούτων μέν τινας ἐκ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου ἥκοντας ἑαυτοὺς ἀγνοεῖν, τὴν πόλιν δ', ἣ προειστήκει τῶν Ἑλλήνων τέως καὶ τὸ πρωτεῖον εἶχε, νῦν ἐν ἀδοξίᾳ πάσῃ καὶ ταπεινότητι καθεστάναι;
>
> But indeed some govern neither their own nor the City's affairs in a democratic or statesmanlike manner. For how is it fair for some of these now coming out of jail to be ignorant of themselves, while the City, which once stood as leader of the Greeks and held first place should now have sunk to dishonor and humiliation?

Demosthenes had promised (X 70) to conduct his interrogation of Aristomedes λοιδορίας χωρίς. Drerup and others accuse Demosthenes of having abandoned that promise. In fact, however, this section is not invective against Aristomedes. It is a somewhat atypical appeal to a commonplace of popular comedy as a reminder to his audience of common consensus about the politicians whom Demosthenes opposes. He invokes the common belief that politicians are using their office for their own personal benefit to reinforce his own claim that politicians opposing war with Philip are doing so not because they are concerned for the

welfare of the city but because they fear the loss of their own pipeline to Philip's largesse. He concludes, on the one hand satirically, with a reference to politicians recently released from jail who fail to observe the Delphic injunction, Γνῶθι σεαυτόν, and who yet through their political machinations are able to bring their city to the depths of ignominy and disgrace. On the other hand, to the comic commonplace of Aristomedes "the thief" he opposes the patriotic commonplaces of Athens' historic role of leader and preeminent victor. Thereby, in the very last sentence of this section dealing with Aristomedes he turns from the comic to the tragic, implying that if the Athenians saw themselves for what they were and are ever destined to be they would recognize how dismal their status has become. Through the invocation of the epideictic commonplaces Demosthenes, in effect, challenges his audience to put the Delphic injunction to themselves and then decide if they can continue to acquiesce in the dishonor and humiliation to which they have sunk.

Upon that theme, the recollection of Athens' now lost hegemony in Greece, Demosthenes moves to his peroration (75-76). There he warns his audience again not to give heed to Philip's known agents nor to turn crucial public business into the object of ridicule and mockery. In his closing paragraph he contrasts his own contribution to that debate, spoken with candor and simple love for the best interests of Athens, and the deceptive flattery of his opponents aimed at filling their own bank accounts (76):

> ταῦτ' ἐστι τἀληθῆ, μετὰ πάσης παρρησίας, ἁπλῶς εὐνοίᾳ τὰ βέλτιστ' εἰρημένα, οὐ κολακείᾳ βλάβης καὶ ἀπάτης λόγος μεστός, ἀργύριον τῷ λέγοντι ποιήσων, τὰ δὲ

πράγματα τῆς πόλεως τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἐγχειριῶν. ἢ οὖν παυστέον τούτων τῶν ἐθῶν, ἢ μηδέν' ἄλλον αἰτιατέον τοῦ πάντα φαύλως ἔχειν ἢ ὑμᾶς αὐτούς.

This is the truth, spoken with all candor, simply, with good will, the best. This has not been a speech using flattery to damage and deceive, designed to make money for the speaker, but to place the affairs of Athens in trust with our enemies. Now either you must stop these habits of yours or for our completely contemptible condition blame no one but yourselves.

This conclusion rests its power on its simplicity and directness. He recognizes that the message he brings to his fellow citizens is not welcome. But, he asserts, it is truth--completely candid--simple--well meaning--best for Athens. The pleasantries of politicians speaking for continuation of the peace are flattery--mischief--deceit. Their aim is not the best for the city, but Philip's bribes for them and the city's wealth for Philip. The financial focus and imagery is prominent. The last word of this long sentence, ἐγχειριῶν, which appears only here in the political speeches, is itself a term commonly applied to business and banking transactions.[35] In a final twist, Demosthenes shifts his accusations to his fellow politicians to accusation of his audience. It is they who welcome these agents of Philip to the podium and applaud their ridicule and mockery of "patriots" like Demosthenes. If they continue to reject the truth in favor of the deceitful flatteries of Philip's partisans, then the city's decline and fall will be the fault of no one but themselves. And he points the accusing finger at them in the last words of his speech--ὑμᾶς αὐτούς.

In the Fourth Philippic as in the Third Demosthenes uses an abundance of epideictic commonplaces. In fact, the number of identified commonplaces in the Fourth Philippic exceeds even the number in the

Third. Here, as in the Third Philippic, the commonplaces are dispersed throughout the speech rather than clustered around a single paradeigma early in the speech. Yet the subject matter of this speech, its technique, style, and tone appear markedly different from the Third. Despite the generous use of epideictic commonplaces it fails to convey the epideictic "feel" we experience when reading the Third Philippic. This in a speech presumably delivered only a few days or, at most, weeks after the Third Philippic!

One possible solution to the differences between the two speeches would concentrate on the unfinished, "pre-publication" rawness of the Fourth Philippic which has led some scholars to conclude that it is a draft for a speech rather than the completed speech itself. If one were to adopt this solution, one would assume that this speech is simply inferior and inadequate because it needs further refinement. One would expect that later drafts of the speech would omit the address to Aristomedes, possibly insert some appropriate paradeigmata, and amplify the commonplaces for more moving epideictic effect. Such revision, however, would leave us with a quite different speech altogether. This chapter has attempted to make the case that the Fourth Philippic, even in its present form, is coherent in its parts and general thrust and displays its own power gained precisely from its directness, spontaneity, and pragmatic realism.

A second solution might attempt to account for the differences between the two speeches on the basis of the agenda to which it contributed. Aristotle's Ath. Pol. 43.4-6 indicates that the various four meetings of the Assembly scheduled during each prytany were assigned

specific agenda items. Special meetings were also held, and these too may have been organized around specific topics. Perhaps the Fourth Philippic was delivered at a meeting designated for discussion of πόροι one of the five major deliberative topics mentioned by Aristotle in his Rhetoric (1359a 21-3). If the assigned topic for the day were the issue of revenues, one could then expect to find a speech focussed on financial questions. Perhaps in such a session a speech filled with inspiring historical examples and the trappings of epideictic style would have appeared incongruous and inappropriate. The Fourth Philippic, however, is not a speech about revenues, nor does it provide any clue that such is the topic of the discussion to which it is a contribution. It does not reveal even the specificity apparent in the Chersonese speech. Like all the other Philippic speeches it deals generally with the threat posed by Philip and the fate likely to follow Athenian inaction. If some of its subjects, the endorsement of the theoric fund and the proposal of an embassy to the Great King, are novel, they are to be explained by the sequence of the speeches and their appropriateness to the strategic situation rather than by a supposed agenda for the day.

A third approach to a solution would seek to discern a logical movement in Demosthenes' strategy from the Third to the Fourth Philippic. This approach would assume that the Fourth Philippic, as we have it, is essentially the speech that Demosthenes intended to give and did deliver before the Assembly a short time after having delivered the Third Philippic. It would also assume that we can know no more about the agenda for the day that the Fourth Philippic was delivered than

for any other of Demosthenes' speeches. We are reliant on internal evidence, which is too ambiguous for any sound conclusions. This approach, however, would see a movement from the Chersonese speech, with its narrow focus on Diopeithes' misdeeds and possible recall, to the Third Philippic, with its highly epideictic tone and content, to the Fourth Philippic, with its brass tacks candor, its disarming bluntness, and radical proposals. It is apparent from our reading of the three speeches in succession that Demosthenes became convinced that the time was ripe for a radical assault on his political opponents. The Chersonese speech was at least partially successful; Diopeithes was not recalled and presumably continued his depradations in the north. The seriousness of the Macedonian threat in the Chersonese was perhaps clear enough to his audience that Demosthenes did not need to dwell on it; he had only to exploit it for his purposes. The Third and Fourth Philippics represent two contrasting, yet complementary, forms of exploitation. The Third Philippic elevates Philip's history of "aggressions" and his present troop movements in the Chersonese to panhellenic proportions and uses an elevated epideictic style, moving paradeigmata, and abundant epitaphic commonplaces to evoke an Athenian response equal to Philip's threat. The Fourth Philippic then attempts to move with the heightened spirit evoked by the Third and to mop up remaining opposition by a series of radical proposals and blunt attacks on the economic values of the opposition, both rich and poor. Those attacks aim, not at destroying the economic values, but at coopting them for the war against Philip, a war which Demosthenes in this speech continues to fuel with a barrage of commonplaces that reinforce and

even sharpen the concern for Athens' historic hegemony evoked in the Third Philippic. We do not find in this speech the application of Athenian commonplaces to Greeks in general as we did in the Third Phlippic. The focus of this speech is not Greece; it is not even Philip. It is Athens itself.

If both the Third and Fourth Philippics show use of commonplaces reflective of Athenian concern for other Greeks--help to the oppressed, champion of freedom for all, salvation for all--the stress in both speeches lies on the preeminence of Athens over other Greek cities even in the defense of the rights of all Greeks. In this speech, however, the expression of Greek hegemony is far more intense than in the Third Philippic. The conflict with Philip is portrayed as a battle, not so much for the liberation of Greece, as for its control. Although Demosthenes asserts that it is not in the Athenian character to stretch beyond its due place or to grasp for empire (X 14), he nonetheless admits that it has been Athens' custom to rule (X 62). He reveals his own resolution to the seeming conflict between "not seeking rule" and "being accustomed to rule" in the prologue, where he portrays the contrast between true Greek patriots and Philip's partisans. The true patriots are persons (X 4):

> εἰς τὸ μήτ' ἄρχειν βίᾳ βούλεσθαι μηδενὸς μήτε δούλευειν ἄλλῳ, ἀλλ' ἐν ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ νόμοις ἐξ ἴσου πολιτεύεσθαι.
>
> who have no wish to rule anyone by force [italics mine] nor to be slaves to anyone else, but to carry on their political life as equals in freedom under law.

The implication of his modification of ἄρχειν by βίᾳ is that Demosthenes saw the rule of other Greeks by Athenians as a birthright, as a natural and normal expression of Athenian identity, and not as a

tyrannical seizure of power over other sovereign states. Karl Jost has described Athenian hegemony as the center of Demosthenes' political stance and the point of departure for the evaluation of his personality.[36] In this speech more than any other that creative center of Demosthenes' thought is fully revealed.

The major statement of that point of view is made at the beginning of part five of the speech, X 46ff. The ὑπόθεσις for which the Athenians' ancestors had bequeathed them is the preeminence of Greece exemplified by the maintenance of a standing military and the offer of protection to all victims of aggression (X 46). While Athens has sat quietly by, however, its τάξις has been assumed by another, who in consequence has gained for himself the prosperity, greatness and influence that should be Athens' (X 47). In the past the leadership of Greece was a valued prize (X 47, πρᾶγμα γὰρ ἔντιμον καὶ μέγα καὶ λαμπρόν) for which the greatest of Greek cities were in competition. In fact, the Greeks divided themselves into two camps, the one answerable to Sparta, the other to Athens. The Great King was distrusted and hated by all (X 51). Athens has now permitted Philip to succeed to the prized position of leadership over all "without opposition" (X 47, ἔρημον ἀνείλετο). The result is that Philip is "prosperous, great, and feared by all Greeks and barbarians alike," while the Athenians are left in "isolated disgrace" (X 69):

> ὁ μὲν εὐδαίμων καὶ μέγας καὶ φοβερος πᾶσιν Ἕλλησι καὶ βαρβάροις, ὑμεῖς δ' ἔρημοι καὶ ταπεινοί.[37]

Demosthenes recapitulates and focusses the contrast most sharply at the conclusion of part six, his apostrophe to Aristomedes (X 74):

τὴν πόλιν δ', ἣ προειστήκει τῶν ἄλλων τέως καὶ τὸ πρωτεῖον εἶχε, νῦν ἐν ἀδοξίᾳ πάσῃ καὶ ταπεινότητι καθεστάναι.

It is because the recovery of Athenian hegemony is the clear issue of this speech that Demosthenes backs away from the anti-Persian panhellenic rhetoric of the Third Philippic. Here the King can be openly endorsed as a source of revenue and a potential ally. If the King once authorized Conon to restore Athens' status in Greece so that the City could claim again its right to hegemony (see above, n. 22), Persia can be as helpful an ally again. Rather than drawing primarily on the anti-Persian rhetoric, therefore, Demosthenes resorts instead to the rhetoric of Athenian preeminence. That is, it is Athens' traditional role to protect Greece and to marshal a common Greek alliance against common enemies. Hence, it is Athens' present task to summon Greeks and barbarians into a grand coalition which will break the power of Macedon and restore to Athens its traditional status among Greeks.

How does this line of argument respond to the concern about financial prosperity which provides the unifying theme of the speech? It is impressive and inspiring and, at the same time, revealing of the difficulty Demosthenes faced in making a persuasive case against Philip. He does <u>not</u> argue, as one might expect him to do in a speech responding to financial concerns, that the expansion of Philip's control in Thrace held out devastating prospects for the Athenian economy. With Philip firmly in control of the mines and forests of the region as well as the sole shipping route from the Black Sea, the Athenian economy could well have been significantly damaged.[38] At least it could have been held hostage to Macedonian interests. Instead of accentuating the potential

threat to Athens in Philip's Thracian campaigns, however, Demosthenes denigrates their importance, ridicules the notion that Philip would seek control of the Thracian territory for its own resources, and makes no connection between Thrace and Athens' important northern trade route (X 15-16).[39] Perhaps everyone in his audience understood precisely to what Demosthenes was referring when he said that it was to win Athens' harbors, dockyards, and triremes that Philip "carries on all that other business" in Thrace (X 16). We must assume that what appear to us to be only vague allusions or irrelevant generalizations may have been clear and specific to an Athenian Assembly in the midst of a debate. It is also possible, of course, that Demosthenes draws no explicit connections between Philip's Thracian campaign and the Athenian trade route because he believed that the argument would not be convincing. The Athenians did not have hard evidence that Philip would use control of Thrace and the Bosporus to damage the Athenian economy. In fact, the period of his increasing influence following the Peace had been simultaneously a time of increasing Athenian influence.

Whatever the Athenians' perception of the Macedonian threat in the north, Demosthenes saw their love of the new affluence as their major obstacle to a realistic response to Philip. He counters the Athenian concern for preservation of "the good life" with a speech which is an elaborate amplification of a single patriotic commonplace--the common epitaphic praise that Athenians do not sacrifice freedom, justice, and reputation for personal gain. Demosthenes cannot deny the fact of Athenian affluence under Macedonian hegemony. He can and does seek to persuade his audience that the pursuit of hegemony is a <u>sine qua non</u> of

Athenian identity and that the refusal to seize that legacy is to disgrace oneself, the historic achievement of Athens, and the brave exploits of the ancestors. These, he claims, and not the quantity and variety of consumer goods in its markets, constitute the true wealth of Athens.

In the Third Philippic Demosthenes made his strongest case that Philip was already at war with Athens and all Greece. His evidence for that claim fills many paragraphs of his earlier speech. Here, although his assertions of Philip's malignant intent are startlingly strong, the evidence from his earlier speech is largely absent. Demosthenes may feel no constraint to repeat illustrations from a speech delivered a short time before. He chooses, therefore, to argue from probability rather than from example (X 11-12 15 62). His interest here is not focussed on Philip's aggressions, but on Athens, in particular on the internal relationships within Athenian society, Athens' political and economic life, and Athens' sense of itself and its destiny. By concentrating on the character of Athens itself Demosthenes intends to engage his audience in contemplation of the fundamental values which have pervaded Athenian history and give meaning and purpose to the life of this people. He holds up before them the mirror of their present prosperity and their past heroism. The inference he intends his audience to draw is that their failure to grasp their historic hegemony and to lead the opposition to Philip may well permit the city to enjoy continued domestic leisure and affluence (if Philip does not choose to annihilate his potential rival). The choice of acquiescent non-resistance, however, will leave to the Athenians a city which is no longer "Athens," no

longer the city for which the forebears endured many dangers and offered their lives, no longer the city praised in the epitaphioi. The city bequeathed to them by their ancestors will exist no more. In abandoning freedom, justice, and reputation for personal gain they will have sold their birthright and destroyed their soul.

In earlier speeches Demosthenes had assured the Athenians that their future was in their hands. It was their choice. In this speech as well he concludes his appeal to history, which is at the same time an appeal to character, with a reminder that the choice of their future is theirs. If they choose self-service and the city is thereby reduced to ignominy (πάντα φαύλως ἔχειν), they will have no one to blame but themselves.[40]

FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER VI

[1]A. Schaefer, Demosthenes und seine Zeit, 3 vols., rev. 2d ed. (Leipzig: Teubner, 1885-87), 3b: 94ff., provides a compilation and elaboration of the arguments of his predecessors. For a detailed history of the arguments for and against authenticity to the early 1950's, see S. G. Daitz, "The De Chersoneso and the Philippica Quarta of Demosthenes: The Texts and their Relationship" (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard, 1953).

[2]Henri Weil, Les Harangues de Démosthène, 2d ed. (Paris: Hachette, 1881), pp. 357-66. Friedrich Blass, Die attische Beredsamkeit, 3 vols., 2d ed. (Leipzig: Teubner, 1887-98), 3.1: 390-92.

[3]H. Diels and W. Schubart, Didymos Kommentar zu Demosthenes, Berliner Klassikertexte, vol. 1 (Berlin: Weidmann, 1904).

[4]John Francis Lockwood, "Didymus (1)," in The Oxford Classical Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon, 1949), p. 279.

[5]A. Körte, "Zu Didymos' Demosthenes-Kommentar," RhM 60 (1905): 388-416. P. Foucart, "Etude sur Didyme," MémAcInscr 38 (1909): 27-118. Since the work of Körte and Foucart no scholars deny that the Fourth Philippic is from Demosthenes' pen. Some see it as an unfinished speech not ready either for delivery or publication. E. Drerup, Aus einer alten Advokatenrepublik, Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Altertums, Band 8, Heft 3-4 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1916), p. 118, "den Entwurf einer Volksrede . . . , die Demosthenes zwar gehalten hat, die aber, gleichwie die Meidiasrede, erst aus seinem Nachlasse als Literarwerk an die Öffentlichkeit gebracht worden ist." Lionel Pearson, The Art of Demosthenes, Beiträge zur klassischen Philologie, Heft 68 (Meisenheim am Glan: Hain, 1976), p. 155, "The lack of design and unity in the speech makes it very difficult to believe that he could have delivered it or wanted anyone to read it in the form in which it has been preserved." Pearson adds (p. 155, n. 20) that the view of Blass and Weil "has not been upset by the commentary of Didymus, which was not known to them." Both Jaeger and Sealey appear to accept X as a genuine speech, W. Jaeger, Demosthenes, The Origin and Growth of His Policy (Berkeley: U. of California Press, 1938), p. 258, n. 16. R. Sealey, "Dionysius of Halicarnassus and some Demosthenic Dates," REG 68 (1955): 104.

[6]See above n. 1.

[7]See above, pp. 82-85.

[8]Sealey, pp. 104-10, esp. 108.

[9]D. H., ad Amm. 10, μετὰ Σωσιγένην ἄρχων ἔστι Νικόμαχος, ἐφ' οὗ τὴν ἐνδεκάτην δημηγορίαν διελήλυθε περὶ τοῦ λελυκέναι τὴν εἰρήνην Φίλιππον καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους πείθει Βυζαντίοις ἀποστεῖλαι βοήθειαν, ἧς ἐστιν ἀρχή· 'Καὶ σπουδαῖα νομίζων, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι.'

[10]Didymus 1, 29 (= Philoch. F 161), [τοὺς κα]ιρ[οὺ]ς τοῦ λόγου τάχ' ἂν τ[ις συνίδοι ἐξ ὧν Φι/λόχορος προθεὶς ἄρ]χοντα Νικόμαχ[ον]* * *

[11]G. Cawkwell, "Demosthenes' Policy after the Peace of Philocrates. I," CQ n.s. 13 (1963): 136. Didymus 2,2, ἔνιοι δ[έ φασι τὸν λόγον ἐπὶ Σω-]σιγ[έ]νους συντετάχθαι [. . . .

[12]Didymus 1,13 (= Philochoros F. 159), περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῆς π[ρ]ὸς [Ὠρεὸν ἐξελθ]ούσης βοηθείας προθεὶς ἄρχοντα Σωσ[ι]γέ/[νη φησι τα]ῦτα· καὶ συμμαχίαν Ἀθηναῖοι πρὸς Χαλκιδεῖς ἐποι[ήσαντο, καὶ] ἠλευθέρωσαν Ὠρ[ί]τας μετὰ Χαλκιδέων μηνὸς [Σκιροφορ]ιῶνος, Κηφισοφῶντος στρατηγοῦντος, καὶ Φι/[λιστίδ]ης ὁ τύραννος ἐτελεύτησε.Cp. Schol. Aeschin. III 85.

[13]Didymus 1,18 (= Philochoros F. 160), περὶ δὲ τῆς εἰς Ἐρέτριαν (scil. βοηθείας) [πάλιν ὁ αὐ]τὸς προθεὶς ἄρχοντα Νικόμαχόν φησιν οὕτως· ἐπὶ τού/[του οἱ Ἀθ]ηναῖοι διέβησαν εἰς Ἐρέτρια Φωκίωνος στρατη[γοῦντος, καὶ] κατάξοντες τὸν δῆμον ἐπολιόρκουν Κλείταρχον, [ὃς πρό]τερον μὲν ἀντιστασιώτης ἦν Πλουτάρχου καὶ διε[πολι]τεύετο πρὸς αὐτόν, ἐκείνου δ' ἐκπεσόντος ἐτυράν[νησε· τ]ότε δὲ ἐκπολιορκήσαντες αὐτὸν Ἀθηναῖοι τῶι δή/[μωι] τὴν πόλιν ἀπέδωκαν. Jacoby, FGrH IIIb (Suppl.) 1:536, argues against the "general opinion" that the campaigns against Oreus and Eretria were separated by an interval of about a year. The βοήθεια sent to Oreus is dated explicitly to the last month of 342/1; the attack on Eretria begins 341/0, as the formula ἐπὶ τούτου in F. 160 indicates. The dating one month apart is confirmed by Diodorus, who opens his year 341/0 with the campaign against Eretria (D.S. XVI 74.1).

[14]Cawkwell, pp. 134-36, attempts to reopen the possibility of the Dionysian date for the Fourth Philippic. He says that the mention of Oreus in X 9 within a review of Philip's "progress in wrong-doing" is "no more inconsistent with Athens having actually intervened in Euboea than, for instance, is the remark about Athens' lack of allies (53) inconsistent with the alliances known to us from the scholiast on Aesch. 3.83 and elsewhere." Perhaps so. But the Fourth Philippic does not suggest a situation significantly changed from that of the Third Philippic, and the recent dispatch of Macedonian troops to Cardia mentioned in X 60 (καὶ νῦν εἰς Καρδίαν πέπομφε βοήθειαν) demands a date soon

after the Third Philippic (cp. IX 16). Furthermore, Demosthenes' warning about the fortification of Euboea is inconsistent with Cawkwell's own estimate of the results of the campaigns at Oreus and Eretria: "Euboea was safe." (Philip of Macedon [London: Faber and Faber, 1978], p. 135.)

[15]Cf., e.g., A. Puech, Les Philippiques de Démosthène, Etude et Analyse (Paris: Librairie Mellottée, 1939), pp. 202-27.

[16]X 22, οὐκ ἔνεστι βοηθείαις χρωμένους οὐδὲν τῶν δεόντων ποτὲ πρᾶξαι, ἀλλὰ κατασκευάσαντας δεῖ δύναμιν, καὶ τροφὴν ταύτῃ πορίσαντας καὶ ταμίας καὶ δημοσίους, καὶ ὅπως ἔνι τὴν τῶν χρημάτων φυλακὴν ἀκριβεστάτην γενέσθαι, οὕτω ποιήσαντας, τὸν μὲν τῶν χρημάτων λόγον παρὰ τούτων λαμβάνειν. . . .

[17]See above, pp. 107-108.

[18]X 24, εἰ δέ τῳ δοκεῖ ταῦτα καὶ δαπάνης πολλῆς καὶ πόνων καὶ πραγματείας εἶναι, καὶ μάλ' ὀρθῶς δοκεῖ.
X 55, ἀναστάς τις λέγει ὡς . . . τὸ τὴν εἰρήνην ἄγειν ὡς ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ τρέφειν μεγάλην δύναμιν ὡς χαλεπόν, καὶ "διαρπάζειν τινὲς τὰ χρήματα βούλονται," καὶ ἄλλους λόγους ὡς οἷον τ' ἀληθεστάτους λέγουσιν. Although this last is meant ironically, Demosthenes intends to affirm that the war will be costly, though worth the cost precisely because "there are some [i.e., Philip's lackeys] who wish to plunder Athenian wealth."

[19]The controversial character of the proposal is evidenced in Demosthenes' deletion of it from the published version of the Third Philippic. So Treves, REA 42 (1940): 360-62, "Or, cette politique d'entente avec la Perse n'était guère populaire à Athènes ni, très probablement, dans les autres cités grecques."

[20]He is probably referring to satrapies along the coast, as the scholiast suggests (Dindorf 134,5, p. 202), although it may be a bit premature to claim they are at war with Philip at this point.

[21]I.e., Hermias, tyrant of Atarneus, former student of the Academy in Athens, host to Aristotle (who married Hermias' niece), friend of Philip. In 342/1 he was deceived by Mentor, a Rhodian mercenary commander commissioned by the King to strengthen his hold over Asia Minor, arrested, and carried off to Susa. Although he was, indeed, tortured there in hopes of gaining information about Philip's intentions in Asia, he revealed nothing and, when finally executed, sent a message to his friends and associates assuring them that "he had done nothing unworthy of philosophy nor unseemly." (ἐπ]έσκη[ψε δ' αὐ]τῶι πρὸς

το[ὺς]φί[λους καὶ τοὺ]ς ἑταίρους [ἐπισ]τέλλειν, ὡς οὐδὲν ά[νάξιο]ν ε[ἶ]η φιλοσοφία[ς οὐδ' ά]σχημον διαπεπραγμένος Kallisthenes FGrH 124 F 2 (=Didymus 6,15-18.) Cf. D. S. XVI 52. D. L. V 3-0. Didymus 4, 59-6,62.

[22]The scholiast (134,5 Dind. p. 203) suggests that Demosthenes is here referring to Conon's defeat of the Spartans near Cnidus in 393 (τὴν διὰ Κόνωνος ναυμαχίαν λέγων). Didymus, in Demosth. 10,34 col. 7, consulted the fifth book of Philochoros' Atthis and considered several possible events to which Demosthenes might be here referring: the peace of Antalcidas of 391/2, which he discards because the Athenians had rejected it ('Αθηναῖοι οὐκ ἐδέξαντο); the peace of 375/4, (ἣν ἀσμένως προσήκαντο οἱ 'Αθηναῖοι); the peace of Callias (ἡ ὑπὸ Καλλίου τοῦ 'Ιππονίκου πρυτανευθεῖσα εἰρήνη) and several χρημάτων ἐπιδόσεις. Finally he decides that the best possibility (καὶ πάνυ πιθανόν) is the Persian assistance to Conon which made possible the naval victory at Cnidus and the rebuilding of Athens' Long Walls. Cf. Diod. XIV 85.2-3, and Xen., Hist. IV 8.9-10. The relevant section of Didymus is found in Philoch. 328 F 144-46, 149, 151. For a discussion, cf. F. Jacoby, FGrH 3b (Suppl.), p. 513.

In his speech Against Leptines (XX 68), Demosthenes reviews Conon's services to Athens: στρατηγῶν βασιλεῖ, παρ' ὑμῶν οὐδ' ἠντινοῦν ἀφορμὴν λαβών, κατεναυμάχησεν Λακεδαιμονίους, καὶ πρότερον τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπιτάττοντας εἴθισ' ἀκούειν ὑμῶν, καὶ τοὺς ἁρμοστὰς ἐξήλασεν ἐκ τῶν νήσων, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα δεῦρ' ἐλθων ἀνέστησε τὰ τείχη, καὶ πρῶτος πάλιν περὶ τῆς ἡγεμονίας ἐποίησε τῇ πόλει τὸν λόγον πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους εἶναι. In the following paragraph Demosthenes quotes Conon's inscription to the effect that he had "freed the allies of Athens" (XX 69, "ἐπειδὴ Κόνων" φησὶν "ἠλευθέρωσε τοὺς 'Αθηναίων συμμάχους."), and for that he gained φιλοτιμία and δόξα for both himself and for Athens. He was the first person honored with a bronze statue since Harmodius and Aristogeiton (XX 70). In XX 74 he is compared with Themistocles, and Conon's rebuilding of the Long Walls is declared a greater achievement than Themistocles' building of them in the first place. For other references to Conon, cf. XXII 72, XXIV 180.

In Demosthenes' understanding Conon's defeat of the Spartans and repair of the Long Walls was the major event that restored the balance of power in Greece and made possible Athens' renewed claim on its hegemony. The fact that this miraculous recovery was wrought by a general whose authority and resources came from the Great King must have influenced Demosthenes' views decisively in favor of a pro-Persian policy. Demosthenes' reference here is unquestionably to Conon, as Didymus surmised.

[23]In 344/3. Cf. G. L. Cawkwell (see above, n. 11), pp. 120-38.

[24]Drerup (see above, n. 5), pp. 116-17.

[25]G. L. Cawkwell, p. 135, suggests that Demosthenes' supporters have already gained control of the Theoric Commission by the time that this speech was delivered. His suggestion that the transfer of "administration" occurred between the speech On the Chersonese and this speech is based, however, on the false assumption that the doublets in the two speeches were original in the Chersonese speech. The "contrast" he cites between the point of view of the two speeches relies on VIII 52f. = X 55f. and VIII 66f. = X 68f. In fact, Demosthenes is able within a single speech (X) both to criticize Athens' "poverty" and to highlight its prosperity because he claims that the city's "true" prosperity lies, not in its markets and dockyards, but in its allies, trust, good will (X 69). Cawkwell's proposal requires a lengthening of the interval between VIII and X, and he is therefore persuaded to date the Fourth Philippic, with Dionysius, in 341/0. The arguments against that dating (see above, pp. 156-157) remain decisive, and in the absence of external evidence to the contrary we may retain Schaefer's judgment that "Demosthenes in der chersonesitischen und 3. philippischen Rede [therefore, also in X] noch das System des Eubulos in seiner vollen Wirksamkeit zu bekämpfen hat." (Schaefer 1: 212, n. 2.)

[26]G. L. Cawkwell, "Eubulus," JHS 83 (1963): 61, n. 85, defends the dating after the Social War about which he says "there has been general discord." I cannot grasp why he says that Demosthenes "normally used πάλαι to refer to fairly recent events" (cf. Appendix IV, p. 266 , n. 34); he is quite clear, however, that οὐ πάλαι refers to events in the speaker's and audience's own lifetime.

On the recovery of Athens' economy under Eubulus' administration, cf. Cawkwell, pp. 61-63, esp. p. 62, n. 88, "Probably in 346 [the city's] revenue was higher than it had been at any time since the prosperity of the fifth century," and p. 63, "After 346 things improved still more."

[27]Julius Beloch, Die attische Politik seit Pericles (Leipzig: Teubner, 1884), pp. 177-78.

[28]Cp. XIV 24-28 and Jaeger (see above, n. 5), p. 78, "We tend to look upon the tacticians of the Athenian Assembly as much too innocent, and we fail to realize that, as things then stood, they could not get along without such methods--least of all the leaders of the always unpopular propertied classes. . . . For they were forced to practice the art of diplomatic concealment (κλέπτειν) which the ancient rhetoricians demand of the political orator."

[29]Philochoros, FGrH 328 F 56a (= D. H. ad Amm. 1:11), Δυσιμαχίδης Ἀχαρνεύς· ἐπὶ τούτου τὰ μὲν ἔργα τὰ περὶ τοὺς νεωσοίκους καὶ τὴν σκευοθήκην ἀνεβάλοντο διὰ τὸν πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς Φίλιππον, τὰ δὲ χρήματα ἐψηφίσαντο πάντ' εἶναι στρατιωτικά, Δημοσθένους γράψαντος. For the argument that the theorikon is intended by τὰ χρήματα here, see Cawkwell, "Eubulus," JHS, p. 57.

[30]Cp. ἀξιόχρεως ἐγγυητής in Ar., Eccl. 1064-5, Pl. Ap. 38c.

[31]Cp. X 69: ἐκ δὲ τοῦ τούτων ὀλιγώρως ὑμᾶς ἔχειν καὶ ἐᾶν τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον φέρεσθαι, ὁ μὲν εὐδαίμων καὶ μέγας καὶ φοβερὸς πᾶσιν Ἕλλησι καὶ βαρβάροις, ὑμεῖς δ' ἔρημοι καὶ ταπεινοί, τῇ μὲν κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν εὐετηρίᾳ λαμπροί, τῇ δ' ὧν προσῆκε παρασκευῇ καταγέλαστοι. Cp. here τῇ δ' ὧν προσῆκε παρασκευῇ with τὴν τάξιν ἐφ' ἧς ὑμῖν τετάχθαι προσῆκεν above. Cp. τῇ μὲν κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν εὐετηρίᾳ λαμπροί with X 47: πρᾶγμα γὰρ ἔντιμον καὶ μέγα καὶ λαμπρόν, καὶ περὶ οὗ πάντα τὸν χρόνον αἱ μέγισται τῶν πόλεων πρὸς αὐτὰς διεφέροντο, . . . Because the connotations of the term admit both commercial and heroic associations, Demosthenes implies that Athens has lost sight of its true "business," which is not concentration on its internal prosperity and security but competition for the leadership of Greece.

[32]Plut., Mor. 810d, Δημοσθένης ἐν τῷ δικανικῷ τὸ λοίδορον ἔχει μόνῳ, οἱ δὲ Φιλιππικοὶ καθαρεύουσι καὶ σκώμματος καὶ βωμολοχίας ἁπάσης.

[33]Drerup, p 115.

[34]Didymus 9, 52-10,11. Philemon, Edmonds F. 40a. Timocles, Edmonds, FF. 13a, 16a. Cp. Plut. Dem. 11.

[35]Cp. Dem. XXVII 4 55, XXIX 47, XXX 20, LVI 1.

[36]Karl Jost, Das Beispiel und Vorbild der Vorfahren, Rhetorische Studien, Heft 19 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1936), p. 208.

[37]Cp. IX 45, ἐκ δὲ τούτων εἰκότως τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἦν τῷ βαρβάρῳ φοβερά, οὐχ ὁ βάρβαρος τοῖς Ἕλλησιν. Thuc. II 36.4, αὐτοὶ ἢ οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν βάρβαρον ἢ Ἕλληνα πόλεμον ἐπιόντα προθύμως ἠμυνάμεθα.

[38]Cp. Thuc. IV 108.1 and IG^2 105 = Tod 91. A. H. M. Jones, Athenian Democracy (Oxford: Blackwell's, 1969), pp. 95-96. According to Ath. Pol. 43.4, περὶ σίτου is a standard topic of the κυρία ἐκκλησία.

[39]As he does in XVIII 87 241 301.

[40]Cp. X 73, ἀλλα νὴ Δία παππφα σοι καὶ πατρφα δόξ' ὑπάρχει, ἣν αἰσχρόν ἐστιν ἐν σοὶ καταλῦσαι.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In the five speeches against Philip analyzed in the preceding chapters we have observed Demosthenes' increasing use of epideictic commonplaces. In the First Philippic of 351 these traditional phrases are confined to a single paragraph of the prologue. In the Third and Fourth Philippics a decade later they appear in much greater numbers and their presence is pervasive. Whether in the earlier or later speeches, however, the epideictic commonplaces serve the same function. They articulate the historic definition of Athenian identity recalled to Athenians annually in the epitaphioi logoi; they invoke the power of that identity both to establish bonds of unity between speaker and fellow Athenian audience and to impel the Athenians to present action consistent with their historic identity.

Demosthenes' rhetorical task in the speeches against Philip was complicated, as we have seen, by the ambiguity of Philip's actions and intents. Prior to the Peace of Philocrates the Athenians agreed that Macedonian insurgency threatened Athenian interests in the North. Demosthenes' concern at that time was to motivate the Athenians to take decisive military action against Philip by reassuring them that their efforts could be successful. Such was the thrust of his First Philippic and the three Olynthiac speeches. After 346 and the ratification of the Peace of Philocrates, however, Philip scrupulously avoided breaking

the letter of the Peace while he slowly built trust and expanded his influence on the Greek mainland and extended his control over the territories to the north and east of Macedon. Athens itself appears to have enjoyed its highest levels of state income since the fifth century, not least of all because of the sound fiscal policy of Eubulus, but no doubt also because of the concentration on domestic issues made possible by the "Pax Philippica." When Demosthenes and his associates made the claim, therefore, that Philip was violating the Peace and committing acts of aggression against Athens, they had to admit that their judgment was based on inference (VI 6, λογισμοί). They had to acknowledge that their observation of Philip's hostile activities was more foresight (προορᾶν) rather than sight (VI 6 8). Many years later, in his speech On the Crown (XVIII 43), Demosthenes recalled that after the signing of the Peace the Greeks were already at war "in a sense" (καὶ αὐτοὶ τρόπον τιν' ἐκ πολλοῦ πολεμούμενοι), as though to grant that--even from his own point of view--Philip had broken the Peace more in spirit than in fact. The recent studies of the evidence, primarily by Cawkwell, confirm that Philip in all probability had not violated the Peace even as late as 341. Whether or not Philip had literally violated the terms of the Peace, the evidence of Demosthenes' speeches is that the orator saw in Philip's activities clear signs of his ultimate designs. Philip was seeking the complete domination of the Greek mainland and the annihilation of Athens.

At the core of Demosthenes' persuasive response to this situation is the argument from character, on which the orator relies both to attack Philip and to challenge and encourage the Athenians. He

creates an image of Philip designed to rouse Athenian hatred and contempt; he evokes an image of Athenians intended to rouse their civic pride and mutual trust. Demosthenes creates the image of Philip for his audience in three ways. First, as Pearson has demonstrated, Demosthenes portrays Philip's character through the use of narrative adapted from forensic oratory. The method is particularly prominent in the Third Philippic, in which the recitation of Philip's "aggressions" consumes many paragraphs. The lists of injured cities serve as more than an indictment of Philip's crimes; they are narrative evidence of his character and clues, therefore, to his future intentions. Second, Demosthenes creates an image of Philip through another forensic device. Demosthenes projects impressions of Philip into the minds of his audience and engages in imaginative and totally speculative description of Philip's inner thoughts, feelings, and motives. In the Second Olynthiac, for example, Demosthenes portrays the weakness and moral decay of Philip and his court by characterization of his closest associates and ascription to them of uncomplimentary attitudes toward their king (II 14-21). In the Second Philippic he accounts for Philip's alleged favoritism toward the Thebans and Argives on the basis of reflections and attitudes he attributes to Philip (VI 7-12). Third, Demosthenes evokes an image of Philip by inference. In the Third Philippic, for example, he draws a contrast between the legitimate heirs to Greek hegemony (Athens or Sparta) and an illegitimate imposter (Philip). He then defines the contrast as Greek vs. barbarian (IX 30-31). By doing so he does not intend merely to call up from the Athenian unconscious the associations and prejudices which typified

the fourth century images of barbarians. As his later recollection in the same speech of Arthmius' punishment for carrying gold reveals, Demosthenes' intent is to identify Philip with Athens' major adversaries in the historic panhellenic struggle for Greek freedom. He draws from Arthmius' example the panhellenic moral that the Athenians' ancestors considered it their responsibility to preserve and protect all Greeks. Because of Athens' sovereign restraint of the enemies of Greece, τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἦν τῷ βαρβάρῳ φοβερά, οὐχ ὁ βάρβαρος τοῖς Ἕλλησι (IX 41-45). Demosthenes' audience is led to infer that Philip poses a threat to Greece comparable to that of the Persians in the fifth century; he is a threat worthy of panhellenic response under Athenian leadership. Through these three appeals to character Demosthenes contrives to establish Philip's guilt, to reveal his vicious intentions and moral vulnerability, and to dramatize the magnitude of his threat to Greece.

In the speeches we have studied Demosthenes also communicates two images of the Athenian character. The one is the image of the Athenians of Demosthenes' own day, of his contemporaries seated before him in the Pnyx. These Athenians Demosthenes accuses of apathy toward their civic duties and absorption in the selfish pleasure-seeking of their private lives. These are citizens who attend the assembly to enjoy and applaud the spectacle of politicians insulting one another, who are entertained by the day's agenda and forget its substance as soon as they return to their homes, who refuse to vote for any proposal which might require the slightest commitment of their personal affluence to the common welfare. This is a generation, as Demosthenes portrays

it, that is carelessly frittering away the prizes and possessions won for Athens by the hard work and bravery of their ancestors. Demosthenes can dare to criticize the behavior of his audience as portrayed in this first image only because he grounds Athenian identity in a second image, the image of the Athenians of the past, the ancestors, the Athenians praised in the epitaphioi. This alternative image of Athens, the ideal Athens represented in the epideictic commonplaces to which we have attended in this study portrays a generous and self-sacrificing community preeminent in both power and beneficence.

Demosthenes' evocation of this second, traditional, image of Athens through use of commonplaces in the speeches studied reveals both his response to the circumstances surrounding each speech and his development in his use of the epideictic genre. The minimal appearance of commonplaces in the First Philippic may suggest that they were not widely used in the oratory of the period.[1] It is the increased threat from Philip in the years immediately following which will stimulate Aeschines and finally Demosthenes to intensity their use of rhetorical resources from the epideictic tradition. Even in this earliest speech against Philip, however, Demosthenes' use of the paradeigma and four commonplaces is effective. With extreme conciseness he celebrates with his audience the loyalty of their ancestors to the City and their willingness to suffer for the common good; he emphasizes the justice of Athens' claims; and he recalls Athens' capacity to defeat even powerful enemies so long as it is true to its best traditions. As his compatriots performed deeds "appropriate" to their civic identity (IV 3, προσηκόντως), so also he expects them to respond to the present

threat with behavior befitting Athenians (IV 50, τὰ προσήκοντα ποιεῖν).

By 344, when Demosthenes delivered the Second Philippic, Aeschines had delivered his speeches invoking the heroes of the Persian war, Isocrates had issued his Address to Philip, and panhellenic slogans were in the air. Demosthenes opens his speech with a reference to φιλανθρώπους λόγους, which may well have been deliberative speeches on panhellenic themes. In this speech, therefore, he employs a paradeigma more unambiguously drawn from the Persian wars than we will find in any of his later speeches. Among the commonplaces here there is no talk of victory. Philip has been victorious, and Athens is living under the Macedonian imposed Peace. The commonplaces Demosthenes adduces here stress the justice of the panhellenic cause and the Athenians' singular willingness to sacrifice everything (VI 11, παθεῖν ὁτιοῦν) on its behalf. Here, as in the First Philippic, the commonplaces are few in number and confined to a single section of the speech. As interpretations of the embassy of Alexander I, an incident rich in panhellenic meaning, they reveal Demosthenes' response to the example of other public speakers as well as to the changed circumstances of Athens under the Peace with Philip.

The lack of either clear paradeigmata or commonplaces in the speech On the Chersonese we have also seen to reflect Demosthenes' response to what was appropriate to the speech situation. The disposition of Diopeithes' orders in the north did not call for the epideictic treatment of which Demosthenes will prove himself capable only a few weeks later in the Third Philippic. On the contrary, the orator

personalizes his images in this speech, commending himself and the accused general as models for the emulation of his fellow Athenians. The fact that Demosthenes uses to describe himself words and phrases which are reminiscent of several commonplaces suggests both how deeply the ideals of epideictic are embedded in Athenian popular values and how clearly Demosthenes perceives himself or intends his audience to perceive him as a faithful exemplar of those accepted values. Although he expresses this point less overtly in the other speeches, in all of them Demosthenes clearly wishes to identify himself with the historic identity to which he is recalling his fellow citizens.

As we have noted in chapter V, the Third Philippic is a radical departure from Demosthenes' earlier oratory. Here, for the first time, epideictic themes, formulas, and stylistic features are pervasive. In fact, the theme of Athenian identity is central to the speech. Through four major paradeigmata dispersed throughout the speech and a dozen commonplaces, many of them repeated several times in the course of the speech, Demosthenes is able to elevate and transfigure the conflict with Philip and to make of it something as grand, heroic, and portentous as the wars with Persia. Among the four illustrations Demosthenes includes the reading of documentary evidence, the decree of Arthmius, the only occasion where he does so in these speeches, and we may well believe that Demosthenes had learned that technique from other speakers such as Aeschines, whose citation of documents Demosthenes notes in his speech On the False Embassy (XIX 303). The commonplaces themselves convey many panhellenic themes, a number of them attributed to the Greeks in general as well as to the Athenians themselves. This

panhellenic thrust appears to have been Demosthenes' means for demonstrating the relevance of Philip's far northern activities. Far from being a provincial matter, they are a threat to the whole Hellenic world. The panhellenism also seems to have derived from Demosthenes' recognition that Athens could not any longer hope to defeat Philip alone. He therefore inspires his fellow Athenians to battle with the hope and desire for a panhellenic coalition consistent with Athens' historic identity. As we have argued, however, the panhellenic themes employed in this speech are in the service of Athens. Demosthenes' interest is the restoration of Athenian hegemony.

The Fourth Philippic has often been perceived as a poorly constructed patchwork of unfinished fragments which is unworthy to be classed alongside the other Philippics. We have seen, however, that it has its own rationale and structure. While the Third Philippic turns outward to the whole Hellenic community, the Fourth Philippic turns inward attacking the materialistic, economic interests which Demosthenes perceives to be obstructing the Athenian response to Philip. Here, more than in the Third Philippic, the commonplaces more clearly support Athens' claim to hegemony. He backs away from the anti-Persian rhetoric of the Third Philippic, drawing instead more heavily on the rhetoric of Athenian preeminence ("Athenians are leaders in Greece." "Athenians are unique." "Athenians have an honored reputation." "Athenians are a democracy." "Athenians are free."). As we have argued in chapter IV, Demosthenes' use of the commonplaces in the Fourth Philippic appears to complement his use of them in the Third, and this speech cannot be understood adequately in isolation from the Third. Delivered only

shortly after the Third Philippic, the Fourth adopts an altogether different tone and style, revealing a directness, a sharp focus on Athenian internal affairs, a candor and bold expression which must have gripped the Athenian audience with startling power after the grandeur of the Third Philippic's vision and tone. The Fourth Philippic and all the speeches studied in the preceding chapters illustrate, therefore, Demosthenes' readiness to experiment with new forms and applications of rhetorical material and his ingenuity in adapting the epideictic genre to the needs of the moment.

When critics have praised Demosthenes' alleged panhellenic consciousness and commitment, they have been led to do so by his use of commonplaces which reflect panhellenic themes. It has been the contention of this study, however, that Demosthenes' image of Athenian identity was shaped far more decisively by his recollection of Athenian hegemony than by commitment to the panhellenic self-sacrifices of the Persian wars. As we have seen, Demosthenes only twice uses paradeigmata from the Persian war period, the embassy of Alexander I in the Second Philippic and the Arthmius decree in the Third. As we have noted, the Arthmius decree itself probably dates from the period of the Delian Confederacy even if the event to which it responds occurred earlier. All other paradeigmata in these speeches are drawn from the period of the Athenian confederacy or empire or of intra-Greek conflict in the early fourth century. The First Philippic draws its single historical example from the conflict between Athens and Sparta which lead finally to the Athenian victory over Sparta in the naval battle at Naxos in 376. None of the commonplaces that Demosthenes associates with this

incident have panhellenic themes. Their point is that when Athens fights for its inherited role as leader of Greeks it wins.[2]

The First Olynthiac contains no paradeigmata. The Second Olynthiac contains the same reference to the rivalry of Athens and Sparta in the early fourth century we have noted in the First Philippic. Here Demosthenes inserts into the phrase, ὑπὲρ τῶν δικαίων, of the earlier speech a reference to the Greeks (II 24, ὑπὲρ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν δικαίων), thereby incorporating a panhellenic dimension into the story. Nevertheless, Demosthenes' use of the example reveals his primary interest in Athenian victory over its traditional rival for supremacy. He refers to "the rights of Greeks" in order to draw a contrast with present Athenians, whom he criticizes for refusing to pay and serve ὑπὲρ τῶν ὑμετέρων αὐτῶν κτημάτων. That is, he uses the panhellenic commonplace not to instill panhellenic sympathies, but to challenge his compatriots to fight for themselves and their "property" (i.e., Olynthus).

The Third Olynthiac, like the Fourth Philippic--both of them the final speech in a series of three delivered in swift succession--, contains many allusions to the commonplaces we find more explicitly in other speeches. The paradeigma in paragraphs 21-26 is drawn from the period of the confederacy and empire once again, here with emphasis on Athens' dominion over Greeks and barbarians (III 24, πέντε μὲν καὶ τετταράκοντ' ἔτη τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἦρξαν ἑκόντων. . . . ὑπήκουε δ' ὁ ταύτην τὴν χώραν ἔχων αὐτοῖς βασιλεύς, ὥσπερ ἐστὶ προσῆκον βάρβαρον Ἕλλησι). Allusions to commonplaces praising Athenian defense of other Greeks are evidence more of Athens'

leading role over them than of its feeling of solidarity with them. Aristides and Miltiades (heroes of Marathon) and Pericles, Nicias, and Demosthenes (leading figures in the Peloponnesian wars at the apex of Athenian imperial power) are praised for enlarging Athens' power, wealth, and reputation while living modestly themselves.[3]

The Second Philippic, Demosthenes' first extant speech attacking Philip after ratification of the Peace, also contains the first example drawn from the Persian wars, the embassy of Philip's ancestor Alexander I. Demosthenes uses the incident to illustrate, with the help of commonplaces, Athens' independence from foreign bribery, its resolute determination to do only what is right, and its willingness to endure whatever dangers may result from that policy. With the reference to the Athenian decision during the Persian wars to withdraw from its own land in order to defend the "common rights of the Greeks," Demosthenes makes his strongest appeal to the Athenians' panhellenic sentiments in the public speeches so far delivered. However, the previous publication of Isocrates' Address to Philip and the wider use of panhellenic themes both for and against Philip probably prompted Demosthenes' own enlistment of an illustration from the Persian campaigns. His use of panhellenic themes is muted however. He does not explicitly make the correlation between the fifth century Persian king and Philip and leaves that for his audience to infer from the paradeigma.

The three final speeches in the series of Philippics which we have surveyed are remarkable for the escalation of passion and, finally, of candor which we observe as we read first the Chersonese speech, then the Third, and finally the Fourth Philippic. The Chersonese speech

contains no historical example of any significance; its allusions to commonplaces refer to Demosthenes' political leadership, not to Athens' corporate policy. As we have noted elsewhere, the Third Philippic represents an astonishing expansion of vision and rhetorical effect. Here again, however, the new profusion of commonplaces is clustered around examples which recall the Athenian struggles for hegemony (IX 22ff., 30ff., 47). Even the Arthmius decree, though a reference to the period of the Persian wars, focuses on a proscription of Arthmius and his family passed by the Athenian assembly and binding on all other Greeks. Hence, even in this speech replete with commonplaces, of which a good number have panhellenic themes, Demosthenes reveals his interest in the restoration of Athenian supremacy.

Finally, in the Fourth Philippic Demosthenes' historical illustrations are again drawn exclusively from the continuing rivalry between Athens and Sparta for Greek preeminence. The commonplace in X 73 which refers to the preservation of Greeks ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων is undoubtedly a reference to the Persian wars, but Demosthenes nowhere in the speech explicitly recalls that great panhellenic struggle. Athens' historic ὑπόθεσις was τὸ προίστασθαι τῶν Ἑλλήνων. Attention to the commonplaces alone in the speeches that we have studied has misled unwary critics. Because they have failed to notice that Demosthenes detaches the commonplaces from the traditional panhellenic subjects, they have found in Demosthenes panhellenic sympathies which a more cautious reading of the speeches belies.

In his defense of his political career, Demosthenes himself

says that an "inherently decent" citizen like himself has the responsibility when in power to defend "without respite a policy in support of the city's inherited and earned preeminence" (XVIII 321):

> Δύο δ', ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸν φύσει μέτριον πολίτην ἔχειν δεῖ (οὕτω γάρ μοι περὶ ἐμαυτοῦ λέγοντι ἀνεπιφθονώτατον εἰπεῖν), ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις τὴν τοῦ γενναίου καὶ τοῦ πρωτείου τῇ πόλει προαίρεσιν διαφυλάττειν, ἐν παντὶ δὲ καιρῷ καὶ πράξει τὴν εὔνοιαν.
>
> There are two traits, Athenians, that characterize the inherently decent citizen (to speak of myself in a way that will be least offensive): when in power to defend without respite a policy in support of the City's inherited and earned preeminence and in every occasion and dealing to preserve his loyalty.

In fact, he says from the beginning of his political career he chose "to nurture, enlarge, and identify with the honor, dominance, and fame of my native city. I do not promenade around the market radiant with joy at the good luck of others" (XVIII 322):

> τὸ γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς εὐθὺς ὀρθὴν καὶ δίκαιαν τὴν ὁδὸν τῆς πολιτείας εἱλόμην, τὰς τιμάς, τὰς δυναστείας, τὰς εὐδοξίας τὰς τῆς πατρίδος θεραπεύειν, ταύτας αὔξειν, μετὰ τούτων εἶναι. οὐκ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ἑτέρων εὐτυχήμασι φαιδρὸς ἐγὼ καὶ γεγηθὼς κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν περιέρχομαι. . . .

Of his political activity Demosthenes explicitly says in the Chersonese speech (VIII 71):

> διαμένω λέγων ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ μὲν πολλῶν ἐλάττων εἰμὶ παρ' ὑμῖν, ὑμεῖς δ', εἰ πείσεσθέ μοι, μείζους ἂν εἴητε.
>
> I persistently propose policies because of which I am less esteemed among you than many others, but through which, if you will take my advice, you would be more prominent [scil. than you are now].

Demosthenes' stock criticism of other politicians is that they increase their own power and prestige while diminishing the city's. Here he prescribes for the "honest citizen" the opposite (VIII 72):

> οὐδ' ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ δικαίου τοῦτ' εἶναι πολίτου, τοιαῦτα πολιτεύμαθ' εὑρίσκειν ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ μὲν πρῶτος ὑμῶν ἔσομαι εὐθέως, ὑμεῖς δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ὕστατοι· ἀλλὰ συναυξάνεσθαι δεῖ τὴν πόλιν τοῖς τῶν ἀγαθῶν πολιτῶν πολιτεύμασι.
>
> Nor indeed do I think that it is the role of an honest citizen to invent policies through which I shall be instantly first among you, but you the least of all states. No, the City ought to gain influence along with the policies of its patriotic citizens.

Although it was convenient for Demosthenes to make the claim in the previous paragraph (VIII 71) that his own political career had not been motivated by desire for gain or prestige (οὐδὲ προήχθην οὔθ' ὑπὸ κέρδους οὔθ' ὑπὸ φιλοτιμίας) and that he had accepted deprivation of honor as the price of his unpopular policies, nonetheless, he here clearly declares that there ought to be a consistency between the fortunes of an individual politician and the state that he serves. Both should seek their ascendancy together. And both ought to seek ascendancy, the politician to be first among politicians, the city to be first among cities. We conclude that Demosthenes had himself thoroughly internalized the values of the Greek agonistic system which pervade the epideictic commonplaces and that the pursuit of the glory of preeminence was of fundamental importance for his own career and for the shaping of his public policy. For one who took such values as seriously as Demosthenes panhellenic collaboration could only be a provisional means for final Athenian ascendancy.

In the service of that ascendancy the epideictic commonplaces function in three ways. First, they recollect and designate Athenian values and behavior that have contributed in the past to Athenian greatness. Hence, the commonplaces serve as a prudential guide to success. It is when Athenians have lived up to the ideals of their city, acted out

of commitment to τὸ δίκαιον endured whatever dangers and ordeals might fall upon them, and gave up personal gain for the sake of freedom and glory that they have been victorious over their enemies and performed exploits that exceeded the power of human speech. It was by following such values that the Athenians became the leaders of Greece, superior to all on land or sea. To invoke the commonplaces of the epitaphioi logoi, therefore, is to tap the collected wisdom of Athenian society and there to find what must be and remain the sources of Athens' good fortune. When joined to paradeigmata illustrating the successful results that followed adherence to the ancient principles, they become precedents for Athenian behavior in the present.

The second function of the commonplaces is to link Athenians of the present generation to their ancestors. They are charged to act in a manner "worthy of their ancestors." It is the ancestors who have handed down a legacy which the present generation is obligated to preserve. To neglect the trust placed with them from previous generations would be an act of impiety and an impudent dishonor to the many dead who have given their lives to assure the continuance of Athenian freedom and preeminence. The invocation of the commonplaces from the epitaphioi logoi, therefore, reminds the Athenians of the solemn obligations they bear toward their city and the ancestors who have delivered the city safely to their care.

The third function of the commonplaces is the most significant of the three and the most difficult to explain. It is also the most thoroughly epideictic of the three functions, most akin to the ritual function of the epitaphioi themselves. For when Demosthenes cites the

traditional commonplaces, the effect is not merely to name or to celebrate the community designated by those traditional phrases; it is to create that community, to call it forth into being. Modern linguistic analysis and communication theory may offer a helpful conceptual framework within which to understand this third function of epideictic oratory.[4] Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, for example, attack the opinion of some theoreticians that epideictic was "a degenerate kind of eloquence with no other aim than to please."[5] They argue the view that epideictic oratory "forms a central part of the art of persuasion."[6] The problem faced by Demosthenes in his speeches against Philip was "not just in getting the Athenians to make decisions in conformity with his wishes, but in urging them, by every means at his command, to carry out the decisions once they were made."[7] Citing Demosthenes' First Philippic (IV 30), they write that the orator "wanted the Athenians to wage against Philip, not 'just a war of decrees and letters, but a war of action.'"[8] Epideictic may help to move an audience from initial resolve to effective action because "it strengthens the disposition toward action by increasing adherence to the values it lauds."[9] As they write a few paragraphs later,

> The purpose of an epideictic speech is to increase the intensity of adherence to values held in common by the audience and the speaker. The epideictic speech has an important part to play, for without such common values upon what foundation could deliberative and legal speeches rest?[10]

The evocation of traditional shared values in epideictic has the effect of both reinforcing those values and of intensifying the relationship between speaker and audience:

> The argumentation of epideictic discourse sets out to increase the intensity of adherence to certain values, which might not be contested when considered on their own but may nevertheless not prevail against other values that might come into conflict with them. The speaker tries to establish a sense of communion centered around particular values recognized by the audience.[11]

In the understanding of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, then, epideictic serves persuasive purposes by recalling to the consciousness of an audience the accepted traditional values shared by both audience and speaker and, by so releasing the power of those shared value, moving the audience to action consistent with them. In particular, by articulating values present in the hearts of his audience although suppressed in the moment of public debate, Demosthenes reminds his hearers of who they are and thereby challenges them to actions faithful to their identity.[12] His invocation of the epideictic commonplaces calls into being the corporate identity that those commonplaces represent.

In a recent article, Walter H. Beale attempts an even more penetrating definition of epideictic. He notes some of the traditional definitions of epideictic but asserts that they point merely to properties and functions without resulting in a "comprehensive defining principle."[13] His own contribution, drawing on the language first proposed by British linguistic philosopher J. L. Austin, is to name epideictic oratory "rhetorical performative discourse," which he defines as

> the composed and more or less unified act of rhetorical discourse which does not merely say, argue, or allege something about the world of social action, but which constitutes (in some special way defined by the conventions or customs of a community) a significant social action in itself. Whereas the deliberative or informative rhetorical act may refer to or propose actions and may in doing so be correct or incorrect, convincing or unconvincing, the performative rhetorical act participates in actions, and in doing so may be appropriate or inappropriate, seemly or unseemly.[14]

To illustrate his definitions Beale invites consideration of a high school basketball coach delivering two speeches, the first to the local school board in support of an expanded athletic program, the second a pre-game "pep-talk" to his basketball team. Both speeches are rhetorical and seek to influence future actions. The first is deliberative, however, and the second epideictic. The first speaks to a situation in which lack of consensus about ends, means, and feasibilities calls for persuasion to a consensus. The second speaks to a team consensus already existing and assumed. The task of the second speech, therefore, is to articulate the team consensus, to recall it to the consciousness of the team members so that the individual members are re-created as a single, coherent team ready for effective action. Through appeals to the loyalties, pride in, and obligations owed to the entire community the coach exploits the already existing team consensus to "make" a team out of its individual members. Hence, Beale writes, "the epideictic or 'rhetorical performative' act is one that participates in the reality to which it refers."[15] The appeals to the loyalties, pride, and obligations--that is, to the already existing consensus of values shared by the team members--profess, celebrate, and begin the enactment of those values that will find their fulfillment in the game shortly to follow. The "pep-talk," a conventional pre-game ritual, does not merely talk about the game; it is a first action of the game that, while still in the locker room, anticipates and imaginatively participates in the forthcoming action on the floor.

Demosthenes' use of the epideictic commonplaces of ancient Athens fulfills, I believe, a similar, though more profound, function.

The power of the epitaphic commonplaces derives from their familiarity as elements of a solemn ceremonial action of the whole Athenian community. To be an Athenian was to participate in such activities, in the course of which the shared Athenian values were expressed, reinforced, and celebrated. Hence, when Demosthenes uses the phrases of that ceremonial occasion, the epitaphios, he is recalling and recreating that occasion and, together with his audience, participating in it once again. The effect is to intensify at that moment his audience's identity with the Athenian community of which it is a part and its identity with the speaker as well. Speaker and audience are bound together in a momentary shared experience of primordial "Athenian-ness." The speaker--Demosthenes--is not "saying, arguing, or alleging" something about Athens when he cites the epideictic commonplaces. He is performing a significant act of Athenian identity in the speaking of those phrases. He is doing what a prominent Athenian ought to do, and the phrases themselves both participate in and evoke the reality to which they refer. The orator unites his audience through the powerful emotional appeal to the Athenian character conveyed in the ceremony of the epitaphioi logoi and binds himself and his audience together by associating himself and his own identity with that common character.

In the Third Philippic, the most thoroughly "epideictic" of the speeches we have studied, this ceremonial "performative" character is also most apparent. Because Demosthenes disperses the epideictic elements throughout the speech, he is continually reinforcing the values expressed and re-creating the ceremonial associations suggested by those elements. The intended effect is both to intensify the

audience's awareness of their identity as Athenians and to establish strong associative bonds with the speaker whose words prompt that awareness. Speaking the words gives to the speaker the character of the words themselves, thereby eliciting trust from the audience which shares emotionally in the power of those words. That is why I say that the use of the epideictic elements creates the community that the elements describe.

What Beale has articulated in the language of contemporary linguistic philosophy appears to me to suggest what Werner Jaeger intended when he wrote of a "mighty alliance" of ethos and pathos in Demosthenes' soul.[16] Jaeger was referring to two "springs" of power which he saw converging in the Third Philippic: "the passionate natural feeling of consanguinity, the very existence of which was imperiled; and the ethos of moral right so unshakable that no other political demand had ever been more firmly backed up."[17] He contrasts Demosthenes, "the champion of liberty," with politicians who are merely the representatives of special interests and for whom language is "nothing but a medium for matter-of-fact elucidation." Demosthenes' task, as Jaeger saw it, was not rational explication, but an assault on the "spiritual resistance" of Athenians to the fulfillment of their destiny:

> Exposition of the technical means and possibilities of building up an armament belonged to a different stage of preparation; there was no place for it in a manifesto appealing exclusively to the national will. . . . Like his earlier speeches against Philip, the oration is primarily a spiritual and moral achievement.[18]

The "spiritual and moral achievement," the "mighty alliance" of pathos and ethos, to which Jaeger points in the Third Philippic rests, I believe, on the "sense of communion" within the audience and between

the orator and the audience which Demosthenes establishes through the use of epideictic elements in the Third Philippic and his other speeches against Philip.[19] When he recalls the familiar phrases of the epitaphioi he both excites the patriotic passions of his audience and elicits the audience's trust in him as a public voice for the patriotic values his audience recognizes and must profess to be truly Athenian. The epideictic commonplaces, therefore, are the means by which Demosthenes transcends merely "matter-of-fact elucidation" or "exposition of technical means" in favor of an emotional appeal to the identity he and his audience together share as Athenians. It is in this appeal to Athenian identity through the use of epideictic commonplaces that I have seen the key to Demosthenes' persuasive strategy. The commonplaces bear the common values and evoke the civic conventions, customs, and rituals which were the foundation of Athenian public life in general and of each deliberative debate in particular. In Demosthenes' skillful use of those commonplaces lies a major clue to the perennially "irresistible," "magical effect" (Brougham) of Demosthenes' oratory.[20]

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER VII

[1]Demosthenes' own earlier speeches do not show the attention to commonplaces which we observe increasingly in the speeches against Philip. They do provide clues, however, that other orators were invoking the Athenian past and may, therefore, have been describing that past through the use of commonplaces. In the early speeches Demosthenes seems to have ridiculed and rejected many such references to Athens' illustrious past. See XIV 1, XV 35, XXIII 124. But cf. XXIII 204-11.

[2]For a vigorous defense of the thesis that Demosthenes used panhellenic themes only in the service of narrow Athenian interests, see H. B. Dunkel, "Was Demosthenes a Panhellenist?" CP 33 (1938): 291-305. A similar point, that Athenians invoked panhellenism for its value as propaganda, is argued by S. Perlman, "Panhellenism, the Polis, and Imperialism," Historia 25 (1976): 1-30.

[3]Cf. XXIII 206-7. XIII 29-31.

[4]See George Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times (Chapel Hill: U. of North Carolina Press, 1980), pp. 74-75.

[5]Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation (Notre Dame: Notre Dame U. Press, 1969), p. 48.

[6]Ibid., p. 49.

[7]Ibid.

[8]Ibid.

[9]Ibid., p. 50.

[10]Ibid., pp. 52-53.

[11]Ibid., p. 51.

[12]Cf. p. 53: "Simone Weil, examining the means that the French in London might have used during World War II to rouse their countrymen in France, included among them

> . . . expression, either officially or under official sanction, of some of the thoughts which, before ever being publicly expressed were in the hearts of the people, or in the hearts of certain active

> elements of the nation. . . . If one hears this thought expressed publicly by some other person, and especially by some one whose words are listened to with respect, its force is increased a hundredfold and can sometimes bring about an inner transformation.

What she brings out so clearly is precisely the role of epideictic speeches: appeal to common values, undisputed though not formulated, made by one who is qualified to do so, with the consequent strengthening of adherence to those values with a view to possible later action."

[13]Walter H. Beale, "Rhetorical Performative Discourse: A New Theory of Epideictic," Philosophy and Rhetoric 11 (1978): 221. Beale, citing Buchheit, writes that "most ancient rhetoricians follow the lead of Aristotle in identifying epideictic as the oratory of 'praise and blame,' at the same time marking the ceremonial of literary encomium as the characteristic epideictic production."

[14]Ibid., p. 225. The division of speech into "performative" and "constative" utterances is discussed by J. L. Austin, How to Do Things With Words, ed. by J. O. Urmson and Marina Sbisà, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 1975). A "constative" utterance is a statement about reality which may be logically judged to be true or false (e.g., "This is my wife."). A "performative" utterance does not merely report or describe something and cannot be judged true or false; it performs what it says so that to utter something is to do it (e.g., "I do [take thee to be my lawfully wedded wife].").

[15]Ibid., p. 226.

[16]Demosthenes, p. 174 (see above, Chapter V, pp. 103-104.)

[17]Ibid., pp. 173-74.

[18]Ibid., p. 174.

[19]"sense of communion," Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, see above, p. 214.

[20]See above, Chapter I, p. 2.

APPENDIX I

EPIDEICTIC COMMONPLACES

OCCURRENCES IN DEMOSTHENES' PHILIPPICS

1. Athenians live up to the ideals of the ancestors and city.

IV 3--προσηκόντως <u>οὐδὲν ἀνάξιον</u> ὑμεῖς ἐπράξατε τῆς <u>πόλεως</u>

X 25--αἰσχρὸν . . . καὶ <u>ἀνάξιον</u> ὑμῶν καὶ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων τῇ πόλει καὶ πεπραγμένων τοῖς προγόνοις, τῆς ἰδίας ῥᾳθυμίας ἕνεκα τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας Ἕλληνας εἰς δουλείαν προέσθαι.

X 73--(mockery of Aristomedes) ἀλλὰ νὴ Δία παππφα σοι καὶ πατρῴα δόξ' ὑπάρχει, ἣν αἰσχρόν ἐστιν ἐν σοὶ καταλῦσαι· τῇ πόλει δ' ὑπῆρξεν ἀνώνυμα καὶ φαῦλα τὰ τῶν προγόνων. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει.

2. Athenians endure (ὑπομένειν) whatever dangers and toils come.

IV 3--<u>ὑπεμείναθ'</u> ὑπὲρ τῶν δικαίων τὸν πρὸς ἐκείνους πόλεμον

VI 11--παθεῖν ὁτιοῦν <u>ὑπομείναντας</u>

3. Athenians act out of commitment to τὸ δίκαιον.

IV 3--ὑπεμείναθ' <u>ὑπὲρ τῶν δικαίων</u> τὸν πρὸς ἐκείνους πολέμον

VI 8--τοῦ δικαίου λόγον ποιούμενοι

VI 12--ἠγεῖτ' οὖν [ὁ Φίλιππος], εἰ μὲν ὑμᾶς ἔλοιτο, φίλους ἐπὶ τοῖς δικαίοις αἱρήσεσθαι, εἰ δ' ἐκείνοις προσθεῖτο, συνεργοὺς ἕξειν τῆς αὐτοῦ πλεονεξίας.

VI 1--ἀεὶ τοὺς ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν λόγους καὶ δικαίους καὶ φιλανθρώπους ὁρῶ φαινομένους.

VI 3--ὡς μὲν ἂν εἴποιτε δικαίους λόγους καὶ λέγοντος ἄλλου συνείητε, ἄμεινον Φιλίππου παρεσκεύασθε.

VI 7--τοὺς λογισμοὺς ἐξετάζων [ὁ Φίλιππος], καὶ οὐχὶ πρὸς εἰρήνην οὐδ' ἡσυχίαν οὐδὲ δίκαιον οὐδέν.

VI 10--μηδενὸς ἂν κέρδους τὰ κοινὰ δίκαια τῶν Ἑλλήνων προέσθαι

VI 35-- [I wish to remind you who it was that] πεποίηχ' ὑμῖν μὴ περὶ τῶν δικαίων μηδ' ὑπὲρ τῶν ἔξω πραγμάτων εἶναι τὴν βούλην.

X 2--ἡμεῖς οὐδαμοῦ πώποτε, ὅπου περὶ τῶν δικαίων εἰπεῖν ἐδέησεν, ἠττήθημεν οὐδ' ἀδικεῖν ἐδόξαμεν

X 3 (ironic)--ἡμεῖς δὲ καθώμεθ' εἰρηκότες τὰ δίκαια, οἱ δ' ἀκηκοότες, εἰκότως, οἶμαι, τοὺς λόγους τἄργα παρέρχεται, καὶ προσέχουσιν ἅπαντες οὐχ οἷς εἰπομέν ποθ' ἡμεῖς δικαίοις ἢ νῦν ἂν εἴποιμεν, ἀλλ' οἷς ποιοῦμεν.

4. Athenians are victorious over their enemies.

IV 3--παραδείγμασι χρώμενοι τῇ τότε ῥώμῃ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, ἧς ἐκρατεῖτ'

IV 24--οἶδ' ἀκούων ὅτι Λακεδαιμονίους παραταττόμενοι μεθ' ὑμῶν ἐνίκων οὗτοι οἱ ξένοι καὶ ὑμεῖς μετ' ἐκείνων

IX 5--νῦν δὲ τῆς ῥᾳθυμίας τῆς ὑμετέρας καὶ τῆς ἀμελείας κεκράτηκε Φίλιππος, τῆς πόλεως δ' οὐ κεκράτηκεν· οὐδ' ἥττησθ' ὑμεῖς, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ κεκίνησθε.

IX 36--ἦν τι τότ' . . . ὃ καὶ τοῦ Περσῶν ἐκράτησε πλούτου . . .καὶ οὔτε ναυμαχίας οὔτε πεζῆς μάχης οὐδεμιᾶς ἠττᾶτο.

X 2 (ironic)--ἡμεῖς οὐδαμοῦ πώποτε, ὅπου περὶ τῶν δικαίων εἰπεῖν ἐδέησεν, ἠττήθημεν οὐδ' ἀδικεῖν ἐδόξαμεν, ἀλλὰ πάντων πανταχοῦ κρατοῦμεν καὶ περίεσμεν τῷ λόγῳ.

X 4 (of Philip's partisans)--οἱ τῆς ἐκείνου προαιρέσεως, οἱ τυραννίδων καὶ δυναστειῶν ἐπιθυμοῦντες, κεκρατήκασι πανταχοῦ.

X 5 (of Philip's partisans)--καὶ κεκρατήκασιν οἱ δι' ἐκείνου τὰς πολιτείας ποιούμενοι πᾶσιν ὅσοις πράγματα πράττεται

X 59--ἡγοῦνται γάρ, ἂν μὲν ὑμεῖς ὁμοθυμαδὸν ἐκ μιᾶς γνώμης Φίλιππον ἀμύνησθε, κἀκείνου κρατήσειν ὑμᾶς.

5. Athenians do not sacrifice freedom, justice, and glory to personal gain.

VI 8-- . . .τῆς ἰδίας ἕνεκ' ὠφελείας . . .

VI 10--. . . μηδενὸς ἂν κέρδους . . .

VI 10--. . . μηδεμιᾶς χάριτος μηδ' ὠφελείας . . .

IX 36--ὃ καὶ τοῦ Περσῶν ἐκράτησε <u>πλούτου</u>

6. Athenians are the only ones to do certain things (μόνοι), among them, to defend all Greeks against the barbarian.

VI 10--κέκρισθε . . .<u>μόνοι</u> τῶν πάντων μηδενὸς ἂν κέρδους τὰ κοινὰ δίκαια τῶν Ἑλλήνων προέσθαι.

VI 17--τούτου δ' ἀνταγωνιστὰς <u>μόνους</u> ὑπείληφεν ὑμᾶς.

X 12--λογίζεσθε γάρ. ἄρχειν βούλεται, τούτου δ' ἀνταγωνιστὰς <u>μόνους</u> ὑπείληφεν ὑμᾶς.

X 30 (ironic)--τοιγαροῦν ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων ἐθῶν <u>μόνοι</u> τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑμεῖς τοῖς ἄλλοις τούναντίον ποιεῖτε· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι πρὸ τῶν πραγμάτων εἰώθασι χρῆσθαι τῷ βουλεύεσθαι, ὑμεῖς δὲ μετὰ τὰ πράγματα.

X 50--πόλιν δ' ἣν ὑπείληφεν, ὃς ἂν τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἄρχειν ἀεὶ βούληται, <u>μόνην</u> ἂν ἐναντιωθῆναι καὶ τῆς πάντων ἐλευθερίας προστῆναι, οὐ μὰ Δί' ἐκ τῶν ὠνίων, εἰ καλῶς ἔχει, δοκιμάζειν δεῖ.

X 66 (ironic)--ἐν <u>μόνῃ</u> τῶν πασῶν πόλεων τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ ἄδει' ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐχθρῶν λέγειν δέδοται, καὶ λαβόντα χρήματ' αὐτὸν ἀσφαλές ἐστι λέγειν παρ' ὑμῖν, κἂν ἀφῃρημένοι τὰ ὑμέτερ' αὐτῶν ἦτε.

7. Athenians make a conscious choice (προαίρεσις) of τὸ καλόν over τὸ σύμφερον.

VI 11--τὴν χώραν ἐκλιπεῖν <u>προελομένους</u> καὶ παθεῖν ὁτιοῦν ὑπομείναντας

8. Athenian exploits are beyond human speech.

VI 11--ἀξίως δ' οὐδεὶς εἰπεῖν δεδύνηται, διόπερ κἀγὼ παραλείψω, δικαίως (ἔστι γὰρ μείζω τἀκείνων ἔργα ἢ ὡς τῷ λόγῳ τις ἂν εἴποι)

9. Athenians are the leaders of Greece.

IX 23--καίτοι προστάται μὲν ὑμεῖς ἑβδομήκοντ' ἔτη καὶ τρία τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐγένεσθε, [προστάται δὲ τριάκονθ' ἑνὸς δέοντα Λακεδαιμόνιοι]

X 46--τὸ μὲν προίστασθαι τῶν Ἑλλήνων . . . περίεργον ἐπείσθητ' εἶναι καὶ μάταιον ἀνάλωμ' ὑπὸ τῶν ταῦτα πολιτευομένων

X 50--πόλιν δ' ἣν ὑπείληφεν, ὃς ἂν τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἄρχειν ἀεὶ βούληται, μόνην ἂν ἐναντιωθῆναι καὶ τῆς πάντων ἐλευθερίας προστῆναι

X 51--τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλον ἅπαντ' εἰς δύο ταῦτα διῄρητο τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ ἡμᾶς, τῶν δ' ἄλλων [Ἑλλήνων] οἱ μὲν ἡμῖν, οἱ δ' ἐκείνοις ὑπήκουον.

X 62--ἄρχειν γὰρ εἰώθατε

X 74--τὴν πόλιν δ', ἣ προειστήκει τῶν Ἑλλήνων τέως καὶ τὸ πρωτεῖον εἶχε, νῦν ἐν ἀδοξίᾳ πάσῃ καὶ ταπεινότητι καθεστάναι

10. Athenians help the victims of aggression.

IX 24--πάντες ᾤοντο δεῖν, καὶ οἱ μηδὲν ἐγκαλεῖν ἔχοντες αὐτοῖς, μετὰ τῶν ἠδικημένων πολεμεῖν . . . πάντες εἰς πόλεμον κατέστησαν, καὶ οἱ μηδὲν ἐγκαλοῦντες αὐτοῖς.

IX 25--ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς αὐτοὶ καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, οὐδὲν ἂν εἰπεῖν ἔχοντες ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὅ τι ἠδικούμεθ' ὑπ'

ἀλλήλων, ὅμως ὑπὲρ ὧν τοὺς ἄλλους ἀδικουμένους ἐωρῶμεν, πολεμεῖν φόμεθα δεῖν.

X 3--ἔστι δὲ ταῦτ' οὐδένα τῶν ἀδικουμένων σῴζειν δυνάμενα

X 46--πᾶσι τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις βοηθεῖν περίεργον ἐπείσθητ' εἶναι καὶ μάταιον ἀνάλωμ'

11. Athenians are nobly born and autochthonous.

IX 30--ὅσα μὲν ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων ἢ ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἔπασχον οἱ Ἕλληνες, ἀλλ' οὖν ὑπὸ γνησίων γ' ὄντων τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἠδικοῦντο . . . ὥσπερ . . . υἱὸς ἐν οὐσίᾳ πολλῇ γεγονὼς γνήσιος . . .

IX 31 (Philip, by contrast)--δοῦλος . . . ὑποβολιμαῖος . . . οὐχ Ἕλληνος ὄντος οὐδὲ προσήκοντος οὐδὲν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ βαρβάρου ἐντεῦθεν ὅθεν καλὸν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ' ὀλέθρου Μακεδόνος . . .

12. Athenians fight for freedom, for all Greeks.

IX 36--τόθ' οὕτως εἶχον ἑτοίμως πρὸς ἐλευθερίαν οἱ Ἕλληνες . . . νῦν πρὸς τὸ δουλεύειν

IX 36--ἐλευθέραν ἦγε τὴν Ἑλλάδα

IX 59--Εὐφραῖός δέ τις ἄνθρωπος καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν ποτ' ἐνθάδ' οἰκήσας, ὅπως ἐλεύθεροι καὶ μηδενὸς δοῦλοι ἔσονται.

IX 70--καὶ γὰρ ἂν ἅπαντες δήπου δουλεύειν συγχωρήσωσιν οἱ ἄλλοι, ἡμῖν γ' ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἀγωνιστέον.

X 14--ἐστὲ γὰρ ὑμεῖς οὐκ αὐτοὶ πλεονεκτῆσαι καὶ κατασχεῖν ἀρχὴν εὖ πεφυκότες, ἀλλ' ἕτερον λαβεῖν κωλῦσαι καὶ ἔχοντ' ἀφελέσθαι καὶ ὅλως ἐνοχλῆσαι τοῖς ἄρχειν βουλομένοις καὶ πάντας ἀνθρώπους εἰς ἐλευθερίαν ἐξελέσθαι δεινοί.

X 25--αἰσχρὸν . . . καὶ ἀνάξιον ὑμῶν καὶ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων τῇ πόλει καὶ πεπραγμένων τοῖς προγόνοις, τῆς ἰδίας ῥᾳθυμίας ἕνεκα τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας Ἕλληνας εἰς δουλείαν προέσθαι

X 50--πόλιν δ' ἣν ὑπείληφεν, ὃς ἂν τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἄρχειν ἀεὶ βούληται, μόνην ἂν ἐναντιωθῆναι καὶ τῆς πάντων ἐλευθερίας προστῆναι

13. Athenians are superior in battle on both land and sea.

IX 36--καὶ οὔτε ναυμαχίας οὔτε πεζῆς μάχης οὐδεμιᾶς ἠττᾶτο

14. Athenians are the salvation of all Greece.

IX 45--οὐκοῦν ἐνόμιζον ἐκεῖνοι τῆς πάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων σωτηρίας αὐτοῖς ἐπιμελητέον εἶναι

IX 74--εἰ δ' οἴεσθε Χαλκιδέας τὴν Ἑλλάδα σώσειν ἢ Μεγαρέας, ὑμεῖς δ' ἀποδράσεσθαι τὰ πράγματα, οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἴεσθε· ἀγαπητὸν γὰρ ἐὰν αὐτοὶ σῴζωνται τούτων ἑκάστοις. ἀλλ' ὑμῖν τοῦτο πρακτέον· ὑμῖν οἱ πρόγονοι τοῦτο τὸ γέρας ἐκτήσαντο καὶ κατέλιπον μετὰ πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων κινδύνων.

X 73--τῇ πόλει δ' ἡμῶν οὓς πάντες ἴσασιν οἱ Ἕλληνες ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων σεσωσμένοι.

15. Athenians die nobly rather than live disgracefully.

IX 65--τεθνάναι δὲ μυριάκις κρεῖττον ἢ κολακείᾳ τι ποιῆσαι Φιλίππου καὶ προέσθαι τῶν ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν λεγόντων τινάς.

X 25--καὶ ἔγωγ' αὐτὸς μὲν τεθνάναι μᾶλλον ἂν ἢ ταῦτ' εἰρηκέναι βουλοίμην.

16. Athenians possess an honored reputation.

IX 70-- . . . ἀξίωμα κάλλιστον . . .

IX 73--ταῦτ' ἐστὶν πόλεως ἀξίωμ' ἐχούσης ἡλίκον ὑμῖν ὑπάρχει

X 16--τῶν δ' Ἀθηναίων λιμένων καὶ νεωρίων καὶ τριήρων καὶ τόπου καὶ δόξης . . . οὐκ ἐπιθυμεῖν

X 71--ὑπὲρ φιλοτιμίας καὶ δόξης ταῦτα πάντα ποιεῖς

X 71--οὐ γὰρ ἐκεῖνό γ' ἂν εἴποις, ὡς σὲ μὲν ἐν τῇ πόλει δεῖ τινὰ φαίνεσθαι, τὴν πόλιν δ' ἐν τοῖς Ἕλλησι μηδενὸς ἀξίαν εἶναι.

X 73 (mockery of Aristomedes)--ἀλλα νὴ Δία παππφα σοι καὶ πατρφα δόξ' ὑπάρχει, ἣν αἰσχρόν ἐστιν ἐν σοὶ καταλῦσαι· τῇ πόλει δ' ὑπῆρξεν ἀνώνυμα καὶ φαῦλα τὰ τῶν προγόνων. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει.

17. The ancestors of the Athenians have handed down (κατέλιπον, παρέδωκαν) a legacy of honor and responsibility.

IX 74--ὑμῖν οἱ πρόγονοι τοῦτο τὸ γέρας ἐκτήσαντο καὶ κατέλιπον μετὰ πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων κινδύνων.

X 46--ἐξέστητ', ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἐφ' ἧς ὑμᾶς οἱ πρόγονοι κατέλιπον

18. Athenians submit to many dangers.

IX 74--ὑμῖν οἱ πρόγονοι τοῦτο τὸ γέρας ἐκτήσαντο καὶ κατέλιπον μετὰ πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων κινδύνων.

X 3 (of Philip)--πᾶσιν τοῖς οὖσιν ἑτοίμως κινδυνεύσων, ἡμεῖς δὲ καθώμεθ'

X 71--ὑπὲρ φιλοτιμίας καὶ δόξης . . . ἅπαντα ποιητέον εἶναι νομίζεις καὶ πονητέον καὶ κινδυνευτέον.

19. Athenians are free.

X 4--τοιγάρτοι διεστηκότων εἰς δύο ταῦτα τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, τῶν μὲν εἰς τὸ μήτ' ἄρχειν βίᾳ βούλεσθαι μηδενὸς μήτε δουλεύειν ἄλλῳ, ἀλλ' ἐν ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ νόμοις ἐξ ἴσου πολιτεύεσθαι

X 14--οὔκουν βούλεται τοῖς αὐτοῦ καιροῖς τὴν παρ' ὑμῶν ἐλευθερίαν ἐφεδρεύειν

20. Athens is a democracy, based on equality.

X 4--καὶ νόμοις ἐξ ἴσου πολιτεύεσθαι. . . . πόλις δημοκρατουμένη βεβαίως οὐκ οἶδ' εἴ τίς ἐστι τῶν πασῶν λοιπὴ πλὴν ἡ ἡμετέρα.

X 13--οὐδὲν ἔστ' αὐτῷ βεβαίως ἔχειν, ἕως ἂν ὑμεῖς δημοκρατῆσθε

X 15--πρῶτον μὲν δὴ τοῦτο δεῖ, ἐχθρὸν ὑπειληφέναι
τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τῆς δημοκρατίας ἀδιάλλακτον
ἐκεῖνον

APPENDIX II

EPIDEICTIC COMMONPLACES

OCCURRENCES IN THE EPITAPHIOI

1. Athenians live up to the ideals of the ancestors and city.

Thucydides II 43.1--καὶ οἵδε μὲν προσηκόντως τῇ πόλει τοιοίδε ἐγένοντο.

Lysias II 61--καινοῖς κινδύνοις τὴν παλαιὰν ἀρετὴν τῶν προγόνων μιμησάμενοι

69--παιδευθέντες μὲν ἐν τοῖς τῶν προγόνων ἀγαθοῖς, ἄνδρες δὲ γενόμενοι τήν τε ἐκείνων δόξαν διασώσαντες καὶ τὴν αὐτῶν ἀρετὴν ἐπιδείξαντες

Plato 237b--τὴν τῶν ἔργων πρᾶξιν ἐπιδείξωμεν, ὡς καλὴν καὶ ἀξίαν τούτων ἀπεφήναντο.

246d--καλῶς αἱρούμεθα μᾶλλον τελευτᾶν, πρὶν ὑμᾶς τε καὶ τοὺς ἔπειτα εἰς ὀνείδη καταστῆσαι καὶ πρὶν τοὺς ἡμετέρους πατέρας καὶ πᾶν τὸ πρόσθεν γένος αἰσχῦναι, ἡγούμενοι τῷ τοὺς αὐτοῦ αἰσχύναντι ἀβίωτον εἶναι.

Demosthenes LX 30--Κεκροπίδαι . . . ἄξια δὴ τούτων πράττειν ὑπελάμβανον αὐτοῖς προσήκειν.

31--Ἱπποθωντίδαι . . . ἄξια δὴ τούτων ᾤοντο δεῖν ποιοῦντες ὀφθῆναι.

31--Αἰαντίδαι . . . τότε τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἀμυνόμενοι τεθνάναι δεῖν ᾤοντο, ὥστε μηδὲν ἀνάξιον αὐτῶν παθεῖν.

31--Ἀντιοχίδαι . . . δεῖν οὖν ἡγήσαντ' ἢ ζῆν ἀξίως τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἢ τεθνάναι καλῶς.

Hyperides VI 3--ἄξιον δέ ἐστιν ἐπαινεῖν τὴν μὲν πόλιν ἡμῶν τῆς προαιρέσεως ἕνεκεν, τὸ προελέσθαι ὅμοια καὶ ἔτι σεμνότερα καὶ καλλίω τῶν πρότερον αὐτῇ πεπραγμένων, τοὺς δὲ τετελευτηκότας τῆς ἀνδρείας τῆς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ, τὸ μὴ καταισχῦναι τὰς τῶν προγόνων ἀρετάς.

2. Athenians endure (ὑπομένειν) whatever dangers and toils come.

Thucydides II 42.5--τὸ δ' ἔργον τῷ σώματι ὑπέμειναν.

Plato 241a--εἶα ἐπίοντα ὑπέμειναν κατά τε γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν

Demosthenes LX 11--πάντας ὅσους συνέβη γενέσθαι κινδύνους ὑπέμειναν.

26--τόν τε προσίοντ' ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων κίνδυνον εὐρώστως ὑπέμειναν.

29--οἱ δὲ τοὺς οἴκοι σύμπαντας γονέας πῶς οὐκ ἤμελλον ὑπὲρ τοῦ σῶσαι πάντα κίνδυνον ὑπομένειν;

Hyperides VI 23--χειμώνων δ' ὑπερβολὰς καὶ τῶν καθ' ἡμέραν ἀναγκαίων ἐνδείας τοσαύτας καὶ τηλικαύτας οὕτως ἐγκρατῶς ὑπομεμενηκέναι.

24--τὸν δὴ τοιαύτας καρτερίας ἀόκνως ὑπομείναι τοὺς πολίτας προτρεψάμενον Λεωσθένη.

3. Athenians act out of commitment to τὸ δίκαιον.

Gorgias 82B 6--σεμνοὶ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς τῷ δικαίῳ, . . . δίκαιοι δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἄστοὺς τῷ ἴσῳ

Lysias II 10--τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ἔχοντες σύμμαχον ἐνίκων μαχόμενοι.

12--ἠξίουν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀσθενεστέρων μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου διαμαχέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς δυναμένοις χαριζόμενοι τοὺς ὑπ' ἐκείνων ἀδικουμένους ἐκδοῦναι.

14--δίκαιον δὲ νομίζοντες εἶναι, . . . οὐδὲ κέρδους προκειμένου πλὴν δόξης ἀγαθῆς, . . . ἡγούμενοι . . . σημεῖον . . . δικαιοσύνης δὲ τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις βοηθεῖν.

17--πολλὰ μὲν οὖν ὑπῆρχε τοῖς ἡμετέροις προγόνοις μιᾷ γνώμῃ χρωμένους περὶ τοῦ δικαίου διαμαχέσθαι. ἥ τε γὰρ ἀρχὴ τοῦ βίου δικαία· οὐ γάρ, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, πανταχόθεν συνειλεγμένοι καὶ ἑτέρους ἐκβαλόντες τὴν ἀλλοτρίαν ὤκησαν, ἀλλ' αὐτόχθονες ὄντες. . . .

46--διδασκόμενοι [οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι] δὲ καὶ νομίζοντες αὐτοὶ μὲν ἀδικά τε ποιεῖν καὶ κακῶς βουλεύεσθαι, Ἀθηναίους δὲ δίκαιά τε λέγειν καὶ τὰ βέλτιστα αὐτοῖς παραινεῖν, ἐβοήθησαν εἰς Πλαταίας.

61--ἐκείνων δὲ τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἄξιον . . . μεμνῆσθαι, οἳ φεύγοντες τὴν δουλείαν καὶ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου μαχόμενοι

Plato 242b--οἱ δ' ἡμέτεροι . . . τοὺς ἀδίκως φεύγοντας δικαίως κατήγαγον

Demosthenes LX 7--ἠδίκησαν μὲν οὐδένα πώποτ' οὐθ' Ἕλλην' οὔτε βάρβαρον, ἀλλ' ὑπῆρχεν αὐτοῖς πρὸς ἅπασι τοῖς ἄλλοις καλοῖς κἀγαθοῖς καὶ δικαιοτάτοις εἶναι

11--ὅπου τὸ δίκαιον εἴη τεταγμένον, ἐνταῦθα προσνέμοντες ἑαυτούς

26--αἱ δὲ δημοκρατίαι πολλά τ' ἄλλα καὶ καλὰ καὶ δίκαι' ἔχουσιν, ὧν τὸν εὖ φρονοῦντ' ἀντέχεσθαι δεῖ

Hypereides VI 5--ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν διατελεῖ τοὺς μὲν κακοὺς κολάζουσα, τοῖς δὲ δικαίοις βοηθοῦσα

20--τὴν Μακεδόνων ὑπερηφανίαν καὶ μὴ τὴν τοῦ δικαίου δύναμιν ἰσχύειν παρ' ἑκάστοις

4. Athenians are victorious over their enemies.

Gorgias 82B 6--τρόπαια ἑστήσαντο τῶν πολεμίων

Thucydides II 39.2--τήν τε τῶν πέλας αὐτοὶ ἐπελθόντες οὐ χαλεπῶς ἐν τῇ ἀλλοτρίᾳ τοὺς περὶ τῶν οἰκείων ἀμυναμένοις μαχόμενοι τὰ πλείω κρατοῦμεν

Lysias II 10--πολλοὺς μὲν πολεμίους κτώμενοι, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ἔχοντες σύμμαχον ἐνίκων μαχόμενοι

15--παραταξάμενοι δ' ἰδίᾳ δυνάμει τὴν ἐξ ἁπάσης Πελοποννήσου στρατιὰν ἐλθοῦσαν ἐνίκων μαχόμενοι

25--ἔστησαν μὲν τρόπαιον ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος τῶν βαρβάρων

26--οἱ αὐτοὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀπήγγειλαν τήν τ' ἐνθάδε ἄφιξιν τῶν βαρβάρων καὶ τὴν νίκην τῶν προγόνων

31--'Αθηναῖοι μὲν ἐνίκων τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ

41--ἐπέδειξαν δὲ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, νικήσαντες τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ, ὅτι κρεῖττον μετ' ὀλίγων ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας κινδυνεύειν ἢ μετὰ πολλῶν βασιλευομένων ὑπὲρ τῆς αὐτῶν δουλείας

46--'Αθηναῖοι δὲ καὶ Πλαταιεῖς πάντας τοὺς "Ελληνας ἐνίκων μαχόμενοι τοὺς ἀπογνόντας τῆς ἐλευθερίας καὶ ὑπομείναντας τὴν δουλείαν

52--ἐνίκων μαχόμενοι ἅπασαν τὴν δύναμιν τὴν ἐκείνων

Plato 240d--στήσαντες τρόπαια τῶν βαρβάρων

242b--οἱ δ' ἡμέτεροι τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ ἐν Οἰνοφύτοις νικήσαντες

242c--νικήσαντες αὐτοὺς ναυμαχίᾳ οἱ ἡμέτεροι

243c--ἄνδρες γενόμενοι ὁμολογουμένως ἄριστοι, νικήσαντες μὲν τοὺς πολεμίους

243d--τῇ μὲν γὰρ ἐκείνων ἀρετῇ ἐνικήσαμεν οὐ μόνον τὴν τότε ναυμαχίαν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν ἄλλον πόλεμον

Demosthenes LX 8--καὶ γὰρ τὸν 'Αμαζόνων στρατὸν ἐλθόντ' ἐκράτησαν

Hypereides VI 11--τοὺς πρώτους ἀντιταξαμένους τῇ τῶν 'Ελλήνων ἐλευθερίᾳ Βοιωτοὺς καὶ Μακεδόνας καὶ Εὐβοέας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους συμμάχους αὐτῶν ἐνίκησε μαχόμενος ἐν τῇ Βοιωτίᾳ

12--τῆς μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν 'Ελλάδα πορείας 'Αντίπατρον ἐκώλυσεν, αὐτὸν δὲ καταλαβὼν ἐν τοῖς τόποις τούτοις καὶ μάχῃ νικήσας, ἐπολιόρκει κατακλείσας εἰς Λαμίαν

15--ὅταν ἐπαινῶ τὴν γεγονυῖαν νίκην, ἅμα τῇ Λεωσθένους ἡγεμονίᾳ καὶ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετὴν ἐγκωμιάζω

38--οὗτος δὲ ἐν τῇ τῶν ἐχθρῶν περιεγένετο τῶν ἀντιπάλων

5. Athenians do not sacrifice freedom, justice, and glory to personal gain.

Thucydides II 40.5--καὶ μόνοι οὐ τοῦ ξυμφέροντος μᾶλλον λογισμῷ ἢ τῆς ἐλευθερίας τῷ πιστῷ ἀδεῶς τινα ὠφελοῦμεν

42.4--τῶνδε δὲ οὔτε πλούτου τις τὴν ἔτι ἀπόλαυσιν προτιμήσας ἐμαλακίσθη οὔτε πενίας ἐλπίδι, ὡς κἂν ἔτι διαφυγὼν αὐτὴν πλουτήσειεν, ἀναβολὴν τοῦ δεινοῦ ἐποιήσατο.

44.4--τὸ γὰρ φιλότιμον ἀγήρων μόνον, καὶ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἀχρείῳ τῆς ἡλικίας τὸ κερδαίνειν, ὥσπερ τινές φασι, μᾶλλον τέρπει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τιμᾶσθαι.

Lysias II 14--οὐδὲ κέρδους προκειμένου πλὴν δόξης ἀγαθῆς

29f.--[by contrast] τῶν μὲν ἀκόντων ὑπακουόντ[ων] τῶν δὲ ἑκόντων προδιδόντων . . . ἀμφότερα δ' ἦν αὐτοῖς τὰ πείθοντα, κέρδος καὶ δέος

33--ἡγησάμενοι κρεῖττον εἶναι μετ' ἀρετῆς καὶ πενίας καὶ φυγῆς ἐλευθερίαν ἢ μετ' ὀνείδους καὶ πλούτου δουλείαν τῆς πατρίδος

Plato 245c--καὶ συνέθεντο καὶ ὤμοσαν . . . σύμμαχοι, εἰ μέλλοι χρήματα παρέξειν, ἐκδώσειν τοὺς ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ Ἕλληνας· μόνοι δὲ ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἐτολμήσαμεν οὔτε ἐκδοῦναι οὔτε ὀμόσαι.

246e--χρὴ . . . ἀσκεῖν μετ' ἀρετῆς, εἰδότας ὅτι τούτου λειπόμενα πάντα καὶ κτήματα καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα αἰσχρὰ καὶ κακά. οὔτε γὰρ πλοῦτος κάλλος φέρει τῷ κεκτημένῳ μετ' ἀνανδρίας

Demosthenes LX 2--εἰδυῖα γὰρ παρὰ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσιν τὰς μὲν τῶν χρημάτων κτήσεις καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον ἡδονῶν ἀπολαύσεις ὑπερεωραμένας, τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς καὶ τῶν ἐπαίνων πᾶσαν τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν οὖσαν

Hypereides VI 5--οὕτως καὶ ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν διατελεῖ . . . τοῖς δὲ ἰδίοις κινδύνοις καὶ δαπάναις κοινὴν ἄδειαν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν παρασκευάζουσα

6. Athenians are the only ones to do certain things (μόνοι), among them, to defend all Greeks against the barbarian.

Thucydides II 40.2--μόνοι γὰρ τόν τε μηδὲν τῶνδε μετέχοντα οὐκ ἀπράγμονα, ἀλλ' ἄχρεῖον νομίζομεν

40.5--μόνοι οὐ τοῦ ξυμφέροντος μάλλον λογισμῷ ἢ τῆς ἐλευθερίας τῷ πιστῷ ἀδεῶς τινα ὠφελοῦμεν

41.3--μόνη γὰρ τῶν νῦν ἀκοῆς κρείσσων ἐς πεῖραν ἔρχεται, καὶ μόνη οὔτε τῷ πολεμίῳ ἐπελθόντι ἀγανάκτησιν ἔχει ὑφ' οἵων κακοπαθεῖ

Lysias II 18--πρῶτοι δὲ καὶ μόνοι ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ χρόνῳ ἐκβαλόντες τὰς παρὰ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς δυναστείας δημοκρατίαν κατεστήσαντο

20--μόνοι γὰρ ὑπὲρ ἁπάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος πρὸς πολλὰς μυριάδας τῶν βαρβάρων διεκινδύνευσαν

57--ὧν ἕνεκα δεῖ μόνους καὶ προστάτας τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ ἡγεμόνας τῶν πόλεων γίγνεσθαι

Plato 237e--μόνη γὰρ ἐν τῷ τότε καὶ πρώτη τροφὴν ἀνθρωπείαν ἤνεγκεν τὸν τῶν πυρῶν καὶ κριθῶν καρπόν, ᾧ κάλλιστα καὶ ἄριστα τρέφεται τὸ ἀνθρώπειον γένος

245c--ὤμοσαν . . . σύμμαχοι, εἰ μέλλοι χρήματα παρέξειν [ὁ βασιλεύς], ἐκδώσειν τοὺς ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ "Ελληνας· μόνοι δὲ ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἐτολμήσαμεν οὔτε ἐκδοῦναι οὔτε ὀμόσαι

245de--ὅμως δ' οὖν ἐμονώθημεν πάλιν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐθέλειν αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἀνόσιον ἔργον ἐργάσασθαι "Ελληνας βαρβάροις ἐκδόντες

Demosthenes LX 4--μόνοι γὰρ πάντων ἀνθρώπων, ἐξ ἧσπερ ἔφυσαν, ταύτην ὤκησαν καὶ τοῖς ἐξ αὐτῶν παρέδωκαν

10--ἐκεῖνοι τὸν ἐξ ἁπάσης τῆς Ἀσίας στόλον ἐλθόντα μόνοι δὶς ἠμύναντο καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν, καὶ διὰ τῶν ἰδίων κινδύνων κοινῆς σωτηρίας πᾶσι τοῖς "Ελλησιν αἴτιοι κατέστησαν

11--οὗτοι δὲ τὸν ἐκ πάσης τῆς ἠπείρου στόλον ἐλθόντα μόνοι. τἆλλα πάντα κατεστραμμένον, οὐ μόνον ἠμύναντο, ἀλλὰ καὶ τιμωρίαν ὑπὲρ ὧν τοὺς ἄλλους ἠδίκουν ἐπέθηκαν

7. Athenians make a conscious choice (προαίρεσις) of τὸ καλόν over τὸ σύμφερον.

Lysias II 62--θάνατον μετ' ἐλευθερίας αἱρούμενοι ἢ βίον μετὰ δουλείας

Plato 246d--ἡμῖν δὲ ἑξὸν ζῆν μὴ καλῶς, καλῶς αἱρούμεθα μᾶλλον τελευτᾶν

Demosthenes LX 26--θάνατον καλὸν εἵλοντο μᾶλλον ἢ βίον αἰσχρόν

28--δεινὸν οὖν ἡγοῦντο τὴν ἐκείνου προδοῦναι προαίρεσιν, καὶ τεθνάναι μᾶλλον ἠροῦνθ' ἢ καταλυομένης ταύτης παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν φιλοψυχήσαντες.

37--τοῦ δὲ τιμίου καὶ καλοῦ τὴν τῶν ἐθελησάντων καλῶς ἀποθνήσκειν αἵρεσιν

Hypereides VI 3--ἄξιον δέ ἐστιν ἐπαινεῖν τὴν μὲν πόλιν ἡμῶν τῆς προαιρέσεως ἕνεκεν, τὸ προελέσθαι ὅμοια καὶ ἔτι σεμνότερα καὶ καλλίω τῶν πρότερον αὐτῇ πεπραγμένων

40--ὧ καλῆς μὲν καὶ παραδόξου τόλμης τῆς πραχθείσης ὑπὸ τῶνδε τῶν ἀνδρῶν, ἐνδόξου δὲ καὶ μεγαλοπρεποῦς προαιρέσεως ἧς προείλοντο, ὑπερβαλλούσης δὲ ἀρετῆς καὶ ἀνδραγαθίας τῆς ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις, ἣν οὗτοι παρασκόμενοι εἰς τὴν κοινὴν ἐλευθερίαν τῶν Ἑλλήνων

8. Athenian exploits are beyond human speech.

Thucydides II 35.2--χαλεπὸν γὰρ τὸ μετρίως εἰπεῖν [But cf. Ziolkowski, pp. 42f.]

Lysias II 1--πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὁ πᾶς χρόνος οὐχ ἱκανὸς λόγον ἴσον παρασκευάσαι τοῖς τούτων ἔργοις

54--καθ' ἕκαστον μὲν οὖν οὐ ῥᾴδιον τὰ ὑπὸ πολλῶν κινδυνευθέντα ὑφ' ἑνὸς ῥηθῆναι, οὐδὲ τὰ ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ χρόνῳ πραχθέντα ἐν μιᾷ ἡμέρᾳ δηλωθῆναι. τίς γὰρ ἂν ἢ λόγος ἢ χρόνος ἢ ῥήτωρ ἱκανὸς γένοιτο μηνῦσαι τὴν τῶν ἐνθάδε κειμένων ἀνδρῶν ἀρετήν;

Plato 246b--πολλαὶ γὰρ ἂν ἡμέραι καὶ νύκτες οὐχ ἱκαναὶ γένοιντο τῷ τὰ πάντα μέλλοντι περαίνειν

Demosthenes LX 1--ἐξετάζων δὲ καὶ σκοπῶν ἀξίως εἰπεῖν τῶν τετελευτηκότων ἔν τι τῶν ἀδυνάτων ηὕρισκον ὄν. . . . πῶς οὐκ ἀνυπέρβλητον παντὶ λόγῳ τὴν αὐτῶν ἀρετην καταλελοίπασιν;

6--τὰ δ' εἰς ἀνδρείαν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν πάντα μὲν κατοκνῶ λέγειν, φυλαττόμενος μὴ μῆκος ἄκαιρον ἐγγένηται τῷ λόγῳ

15--πολλὰ τοίνυν ἔχων εἰπεῖν ὧν οἴδε πράξαντες δικαίως ἐπαινεθήσονται, ἐπειδὴ πρὸς αὐτοῖς εἰμι τοῖς ἔργοις, ἀπορῶ τί πρῶτον εἴπω· προσιστάμενα γάρ μοι πάντ' εἰς ἕνα καιρὸν δύσκριτον καθίστησιν τὴν αἵρεσιν αὐτῶν.

Hypereides VI 2--μάλιστα νῦν φοβοῦμαι μή μοι συμβῇ τὸν λόγον ἐλάττω φαίνεσθαι τῶν ἔργων τῶν γεγενημένων

4--περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς πόλεως διεξιέναι τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον ὧν πρότερον πᾶσαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα εὐεργέτηκεν οὔτε ὁ χρόνος ὁ παρὼν ἱκανός, οὔτε ὁ καιρος ἁρμόττων τῷ μακρολογεῖν, οὔτε ῥᾴδιον ἕνα ὄντα τοσαύτας καὶ τηλικαύτας πράξεις ἐπελθεῖν καὶ μνημονεῦσαι

23--ἐνδείας τοσαύτας καὶ τηλικαύτας οὕτως ἐγκρατῶς ὑπομεμενηκέναι, ὥστε καὶ τῷ λόγῳ χαλεπὸν εἶναι φράσαι

9. Athenians are the leaders of Greece

Lysias II 47--ὑπὸ πάντων ἠξιώθησαν . . . ἡγεμόνες γενέσθαι τῆς Ἑλλάδος

57--τοσαύτην σωφροσύνην καὶ δέος ἡ τούτων ἀρετὴ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις παρεῖχεν. ὧν ἕνεκα δεῖ μόνους καὶ προστάτας τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ ἡγεμόνας τῶν πόλεων γίγνεσθαι.

Plato 240d--ἡγεμόνες καὶ διδάσκαλοι τοῖς ἄλλοις γενόμενοι ὅτι οὐκ ἄμαχος εἴη ἡ Περσῶν δύναμις, ἀλλὰ πᾶν πλῆθος καὶ πᾶς πλοῦτος ἀρετῇ ὑπείκει.

Hypereides VI 10--τὴν μὲν πόλιν ἡμῶν δεομένην ἀνδρός, τὴν δ' Ἑλλάδα πᾶσαν πόλεως, ἥτις προστῆναι δυνήσεται τῆς ἡγεμονίας, ἐπέδωκεν ἑαυτὸν μὲν τῇ πατρίδι, τὴν δὲ πόλιν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν εἰς τὴν ἐλευθερίαν.

10. Athenians help the victims of aggression.

Gorgias 82 B 6--θεράποντες μὲν τῶν ἀδίκως δυστυχούντων

Thucydides II 37.3--οὐ παρανομοῦμεν, τῶν τε αἰεὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ ὄντων ἀκροάσει καὶ τῶν νόμων, καὶ μάλιστα αὐτῶν ὅσοι τε ἐπ' ὠφελίᾳ τῶν ἀδικουμένων κεῖνται

Lysias II 14--ἡγούμενοι . . . σημεῖον . . . δικαιοσύνης δὲ τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις βοηθεῖν

67--οἱ δὲ νῦν θαπτόμενοι, βοηθήσαντες Κορινθίοις ὑπὸ παλαίων φίλων ἀδικουμένοις . . . οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν γνώμην Λακεδαιμονίοις ἔχοντες (οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἀγαθῶν αὐτοῖς ἐφθόνουν, οἱ δὲ ἀδικουμένους αὐτοὺς ἠλέουν. . .)

Plato 242b--οἱ δ' ἡμέτεροι τρίτῃ ἡμερᾳ ἐν Οἰνοφύτοις νικήσαντες τοὺς ἀδίκως φεύγοντας δικαίως κατήγαγον.

244e--ὡς ἀεὶ λίαν φιλοικτίρμων ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ ἥττονος θεραπίς. καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ οὐχ οἷα τε ἐγένετο καρτερῆσαι οὐδὲ διαφυλάξαι ἃ ἐδέδοκτο αὐτῇ, τὸ μηδενὶ δουλουμένῳ βοηθεῖν τῶν σφᾶς ἀδικησάντων, ἀλλὰ ἐκάμφθη καὶ ἐβοήθησεν.

245a--καὶ τοὺς μὲν Ἕλληνας αὐτὴ βοηθήσασα ἀπελύσατο δουλείας

11. Athenians are nobly born and autochthonous.

Thucydides II 36.1--τὴν γὰρ χώραν οἱ αὐτοὶ αἰεὶ οἰκοῦντες διαδοχῇ τῶν ἐπιγιγνομένων μέχρι τοῦδε ἐλευθέραν δι' ἀρετὴν παρέδοσαν.

Lysias II 17--οὐ γάρ, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, πανταχόθεν συνειλεγμένοι καὶ ἑτέρους ἐκβαλόντες τὴν ἀλλοτρίαν ᾤκησαν, ἀλλ' αὐτόχθονες ὄντες τὴν αὐτὴν ἐκέκτηντο καὶ μητέρα καὶ πατρίδα.

20--. . . φύντες καλῶς . . .

Plato 237a--ἀγαθοὶ δ' ἐγένοντο δια το φύναι ἐξ ἀγαθῶν

237b--τῆς δ' εὐγενείας πρῶτον ὑπῆρξε τοῖσδε ἡ τῶν προγόνων γένεσις οὐκ ἔπηλυς οὖσα, οὐδὲ τοὺς ἐκγόνους τούτους ἀποφηναμένη μετοικοῦντας ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ ἄλλοθεν σφῶν ἡκόντων, ἀλλ' αὐτόχθονας καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἐν πατρίδι οἰκοῦντας καὶ ζῶντας, καὶ τρεφομένους οὐχ ὑπὸ μητρυιᾶς ὡς ἄλλοι, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ μητρὸς τῆς χώρας ἐν ᾗ ᾤκουν.

239a--. . . μιᾶς μητρὸς πάντες ἀδελφοὶ φύντες, οὐκ ἀξιοῦμεν δοῦλοι οὐδὲ δεσπόται ἀλλήλων εἶναι . . . καλῶς φύντες . . .

Demosthenes LX 3--. . . γεγενῆσθαι καλῶς . . .

4--ἡ γὰρ εὐγένεια τῶνδε τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐκ πλείστου χρόνου παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἀνωμολόγηται. οὐ γὰρ μόνον εἰς πατέρ' αὐτοῖς καὶ τῶν ἄνω προγόνων

κατ' ἄνδρ' ἀνενεγκεῖν ἑκάστῳ τὴν φύσιν ἔστιν, ἀλλ' εἰς ὅλην κοινῇ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν πατρίδα, ἧς αὐτόχθονες ὁμολογοῦνται εἶναι. μόνοι γὰρ πάντων ἀνθρώπων, ἐξ ἥσπερ ἔφυσαν, ταύτην ᾤκησαν καὶ τοῖς ἐξ αὐτῶν παρέδωκαν, ὥστε δικαίως ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι, τοὺς μὲν ἐπήλυδας ἐλθόντας εἰς τὰς πόλεις καὶ τούτων πολίτας προσαγορευομένους ὁμοίους εἶναι τοῖς εἰσποιητοῖς τῶν παίδων, τούτους δὲ γνησίους γόνῳ τῆς πατρίδος πολίτας εἶναι.

Hypereides VI 7--περὶ δὲ Ἀθηναίων ἀνδρῶν τοὺς λόγους ποιούμενον, οἷς ἡ κοινὴ γένεσις αὐτόχθοσιν οὖσιν ἀνυπέρβλητον τὴν εὐγένειαν ἔχει. . . .

12. Athenians fight for freedom, for all Greeks.

Thucydides II 43.4--οὓς νῦν ὑμεῖς ζηλώσαντες καὶ τὸ εὔδαιμον τὸ ἐλεύθερον, τὸ δ' ἐλεύθερον τὸ εὔψυχον κρίναντες, μὴ περιορᾶσθε τοὺς πολεμικοὺς κινδύνους.

Lysias II 14--ἡγούμενοι ἐλευθερίας μὲν σημεῖον εἶναι μηδὲν ποιεῖν ἄκοντας, δικαιοσύνης δὲ τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις βοηθεῖν, εὐψυχίας δ' ὑπὲρ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων, εἰ δέοι, μαχομένους ἀποθνήσκειν.

34--ὃ τίς οὐκ ἂν ἰδων ἐφοβήθη, ὡς μέγας καὶ δεινὸς τῇδε τῇ πόλει κίνδυνος ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίας ἠγωνίσθη;

42--πλεῖστα δὲ καὶ κάλλιστα ἐκεῖνοι ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίας συνεβάλοντο

44--ἐν μὲν οὖν τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ . . . τῇ ἰδίᾳ ἀρετῇ κοινὴν τὴν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐκτήσαντο

47--βέβαιον μὲν τὴν ἐλευθερίαν τῇ Εὐρώπῃ κατειργάσαντο

55--ἐλευθέραν μὲν ἐποίησαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα

68--ἐτόλμησαν . . . καὶ ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν πολεμίων ἐλευθερίας ἀποθνήσκειν

Plato 239ab--οἱ τῶνδε γε πατέρες καὶ οἱ ἡμέτεροι καὶ αὐτοὶ οὗτοι . . . οἰόμενοι δεῖν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας καὶ Ἕλλησιν ὑπὲρ Ἑλλήνων μάχεσθαι καὶ βαρβάροις ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων

242a--ὑπὲρ τῆς Βοιωτῶν ἐλευθερίας Λακεδαιμονίοις μαχόμενοι

242b--οὗτοι δὴ πρῶτοι μετὰ τὸν Περσικὸν πόλεμον, Ἕλλησιν ἤδη ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας βοηθοῦντες πρὸς Ἕλληνας, ἄνδρες ἀγαθοὶ γενόμενοι καὶ ἐλευθερώσαντες οἷς ἐβοήθουν

242e--πολλοὶ μὲν ἀμφὶ Σικελίαν πλεῖστα τρόπαια στήσαντες ὑπὲρ τῆς Λεοντίνων ἐλευθερίας

246a--ἀγαθοὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ βασιλέα ἐλευθερώσαντες καὶ ἐκβαλόντες ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης Λακεδαιμονίους

Demosthenes LX 23--ἡ πάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀρ' ἐλευθερία ἐν ταῖς τῶνδε τῶν ἀνδρῶν ψυχαῖς διεσῴζετο.

Hypereides VI 10--ἐπέδωκεν ἑαυτὸν μὲν τῇ πατρίδι, τὴν δὲ πόλιν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν εἰς τὴν ἐλευθερίαν

16--οἳ τὰς ἑαυτῶν ψυχὰς ἔδωκαν ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίας

19--καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐλευθερίαν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν πᾶσιν κατέθησαν

24--καὶ διὰ τὴν ἰδίαν ἀρετὴν τὴν κοινὴν ἐλευθερίαν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐβεβαίωσιν

40--ὑπερβαλλούσης δὲ ἀρετῆς καὶ ἀνδραγαθίας τῆς ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις, ἣν οὗτοι παρασχόμενοι εἰς τὴν κοινὴν ἐλευθερίαν τῶν Ἑλλήνων

13. Athenians are superior in battle on both land and sea.

Thucydides II 41.4--ἀλλὰ πᾶσαν μὲν θάλασσαν καὶ γῆν ἐσβατὸν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ τόλμῃ καταναγκάσαντες γενέσθαι, πανταχοῦ δὲ μνημεῖα κακῶν τε κἀγαθῶν ἀίδια ξυνκατοικίσαντες

Lysias II 2--οὔτε γὰρ τῆς ἄπειροι οὔτε θαλάττης οὐδεμιᾶς, πανταχῇ δὲ καὶ παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις οἱ τὰ αὐτῶν πενθοῦντες κακὰ τὰς τούτων ἀρετὰς ὑμνοῦσι

47--καὶ μόνοι καὶ μεθ' ἑτέρων, καὶ πεζομαχοῦντες καὶ ναυμαχοῦντες, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας, ὑπὸ πάντων ἠξιώθησαν . . . ἡγεμόνες γενέσθαι τῆς Ἑλλάδος

Plato 241a--καὶ γὰρ τούτων τῶν ἀνδρῶν πολλὰ μὲν ἄν τις ἔχοι διελθεῖν, καὶ οἷα ἐπιόντα ὑπέμειναν κατά τε γῆν καὶ κατα θάλατταν, καὶ ὡς ἠμύναντο ταῦτα

Demosthenes LX 10--ἐκεῖνοι τὸν ἐξ ἁπάσης τῆς Ἀσίας στόλον ἐλθόντα μόνοι δὶς ἠμύναντο καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν

14. Athenians are the salvation of all Greece.

Lysias II 58--ἐδήλωσεν . . . ὅτι ἡ τῆς πόλεως δύναμις τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἦν σωτηρία.

Plato 241c--τρίτον δὲ λέγω τὸ ἐν Πλαταιαῖς ἔργον καὶ ἀριθμῷ καὶ ἀρετῇ γενέσθαι τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς σωτηρίας, κοινὸν ἤδη τοῦτο Λακεδαιμονίων τε καὶ Ἀθηναίων.

241d--δίκαιον δὴ καὶ τούτων ἡμᾶς ἐπιμνησθῆναι, οἳ τοῖς τῶν προτέρων ἔργοις τέλος τῆς σωτηρίας ἐπέθησαν ἀνακαθηράμενοι καὶ ἐξελάσαντες πᾶν τὸ βάρβαρον ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης.

Demosthenes LX 8--καὶ μὴν καὶ τῶν Ἡρακλέους παίδων, ὃς τοὺς ἄλλους ἔσωζεν, σωτῆρες ὠνομάσθησαν

10--διὰ τῶν ἰδίων κινδύνων κοινῆς σωτηρίας πᾶσι τοῖς Ἕλλησιν αἴτιοι κατέστησαν.

Hypereides VI 5--τοῖς δὲ ἰδίοις κινδύνοις καὶ δαπάναις κοινὴν ἄδειαν τοῖς Ἕλλησι παρασκευάζουσα

15. Athenians die nobly rather than live disgracefully.

Thucydides II 42.4--καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἀμύνεσθαι καὶ παθεῖν μᾶλλον ἡγησάμενοι ἢ τὸ ἐνδόντες σῴζεσθαι

43.6--ἀλγεινοτέρα γὰρ ἀνδρί γε φρόνημα ἔχοντι ἡ μετὰ τοῦ ἐν τῷ μαλακισθῆναι κάκωσις ἢ ὁ μετὰ ῥώμης καὶ κοινῆς ἐλπίδος ἅμα γιγνόμενος ἀναίσθητος θάνατος.

Lysias II 33--ἡγησάμενοι κρεῖττον εἶναι μετ' ἀρετῆς καὶ πενίας καὶ φυγῆς ἐλευθερίαν ἢ μετ' ὀνείδους καὶ πλούτου δουλείαν τῆς πατρίδος

62--θάνατον μετ' ἐλευθερίας αἱρούμενοι ἢ βίον μετὰ δουλείας

Plato 246d--ἡμῖν δὲ ἑξὸν ζῆν μὴ καλῶς, καλῶς αἱρούμεθα μᾶλλον τελευτᾶν

Demosthenes LX 26--θάνατον καλὸν εἵλοντο μᾶλλον ἢ βίον αἰσχρὸν

28--τεθνάναι μᾶλλον ᾑροῦντο ἢ καταλυομένης ταύτης παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ζῆν φιλοψυχήσαντες

31--δεῖν οὖν ἡγήσαντ' ἢ ζῆν ἀξίως τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἢ τεθνάναι καλῶς

37--τοῦ δὲ τιμίου καὶ καλοῦ τὴν τῶν ἐθελησάντων καλῶς ἀποθνήσκειν αἵρεσιν

16. Athenians possess an honored reputation.

Thucydides II 43.2--. . . τὸν ἀγήρων ἔπαινον . . . δόξα . . . αἰεὶ καὶ λόγου καὶ ἔργου καιρῷ αἰείμνηστος καταλείπεται

Lysias II 2--πανταχῇ δὲ καὶ παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις οἱ τὰ αὐτῶν πενθοῦντες κακὰ τὰς τούτων ἀρετὰς ὑμνοῦσι

3--πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τοὺς παλαιοὺς κινδύνους τῶν προγόνων δίειμι, μνήμην παρὰ τῆς φήμης λαβών

5--λόγῳ δὲ περὶ τῆσδε τῆς χώρας ἀκούουσαι κλέος μέγα

6--τῆσδε μὲν τῆς πόλεως διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀθάνατον τὴν μνήμην ἐποίησαν

22--ἔτι δ' αὐτοῖς ἐκ τῶν προτέρων ἔργων περὶ τῆς πόλεως τοιαύτη δόξα παρειστήκει

79--οὐδ' ἀναμείναντες τὸν αὐτόματον θάνατον, ἀλλ' ἐκλεξάμενοι τὸν κάλλιστον. καὶ γάρ τοι ἀγήρατοι μὲν αὐτῶν αἱ μνῆμαι, ζηλωταὶ δὲ ὑπὸ πάντων ἀνθρώπων αἱ τιμαί.

81--ἀθάνατον μνήμην διὰ την ἀρετὴν τὴν αὐτῶν κατέλιπον

Plato 243d--δόξαν γὰρ δι' αὐτοὺς ἡ πόλις ἔσχεν μή ποτ' ἂν καταπολεμηθῆναι μηδ' ὑπὸ πάντων ἀνθρώπων

Demosthenes LX 2--ζῶντες ἐκτήσαντ' εὐδοξίαν

32--πρῶτον μὲν ἀντι μικροῦ χρόνου πολὺν καὶ τὸν ἅπαντ' εὔκλειαν ἀγήρω καταλείπουσιν

36--καὶ πάσῃ τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς ζῶσιν ταῦτ' ἂν ἐνέγκοι πλείστην εὐδοξίαν. . . . ἀγήρως τιμὰς καὶ μνήμην ἀρετῆς δημοσίᾳ κτησαμένους

Hypereides VI 19--τὴν δὲ εὐδοξίαν τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν πράξεων ἴδιον στέφανον τῇ πατρίδι περιέθηκαν

24--ἀθάνατον δόξαν ἐκτήσαντο

42--εὐδοξίαν ἀγήρατον εἰλήφασιν

17. The ancestors of the Athenians have handed down (κατέλιπον, παρέδωκαν) a legacy of honor and responsibility.

Thucydides II 36.1--τὴν γὰρ χώραν οἱ αὐτοι αἰεὶ οἰκοῦντες διαδοχῇ τῶν ἐπιγιγνομένων μέχρι τοῦδε ἐλευθέραν δι' ἀρετὴν παρέδοσαν.

36.2--κτησάμενοι γὰρ πρὸς οἷς ἐδέξαντο ὅσην ἔχομεν ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἀπόνως ἡμῖν τοῖς νῦν προσκατέλιπον

Lysias II 20--ἀείμνηστα δὲ καὶ μεγάλα καὶ πανταχοῦ οἱ ἐξ ἐκείνων γεγονότες τρόπαια διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἀρετὴν κατέλιπον.

23--οἱ δ' ἡμέτεροι πρόγονοι οὐ λογισμῷ δόντες τοὺς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ κινδύνους, ἀλλὰ νομιζοντες τὸν εὐκλεᾶ θάνατον ἀθάνατον παρὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν καταλείπειν λόγον

24--τὴν δ' ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων μνήμην ἰδίαν καταλείψειν

81--ἀθάνατον μνήμην διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν τὴν αὐτῶν κατέλιπον

Plato 246b--. . . μὴ λείπειν τὴν τάξιν τὴν τῶν προγόνων

247b--εἶναι μὲν γὰρ τιμὰς γονέων ἐκγόνοις καλὸς θησαυρὸς καὶ μεγαλοπρεπής· χρῆσθαι δὲ καὶ χρημάτων καὶ τιμῶν θησαυρῷ, καὶ μὴ τοῖς ἐκγόνοις παραδιδόναι, αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἀνανδρον, ἀπορίᾳ ἰδίων αὐτοῦ κτημάτων τε καὶ εὐδοξιῶν.

Demosthenes LX 1--πῶς οὐκ ἀνυπέρβλητον παντὶ λόγῳ τὴν αὐτῶν ἀρετὴν καταλελοίπασιν;

32--πρῶτον μὲν ἀντὶ μικροῦ χρόνου πολὺν καὶ τὸν ἅπαντ' εὔκλειαν ἀγήρω καταλείπουσιν

Hypereides VI 41--χρὴ . . . καὶ μεμνῆσθαι μὴ μόνον τοῦ θανάτου τῶν τετελευτηκότων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἣς καταλελοίπασιν.

18. Athenians submit to many dangers.

Thucydides II 39.1--ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀνειμένως διαιτώμενοι οὐδὲν ἧσσον ἐπὶ τοὺς ἰσοπαλεῖς κινδύνους χωροῦμεν.

39.4--ἐθέλομεν κινδυνεύειν

40.3--κράτιστοι δ' ἂν τὴν ψυχὴν δικαίως κριθείεν οἱ τά τε δεινὰ καὶ ἡδέα σαφέστατα γιγνώσκοντες καὶ διὰ ταῦτα μὴ ἀποτρεπόμενα ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων

42.4--τὴν δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων τιμωρίαν ποθεινοτέραν αὐτῶν λαβόντες καὶ κινδύνων ἅμα τόνδε κάλλιστον νομίσαντες ἐβουλήθησαν μετ' αὐτοῦ τοὺς μὲν τιμωρεῖσθαι, τῶν δὲ ἐφίεσθαι

43.4--μὴ περιορᾶσθε τοὺς πολεμικοὺς κινδύνους

Lysias II 9--πρὸς τοὺς ἑτέρους ὑπὲρ ἀμφοτέρων ἐκινδύνευσαν

12--τὴν Ἡρακλέους ἀρετὴν μᾶλλον ᾐδοῦντο ἢ τὸν κίνδυνον τὸν ἑαυτῶν ἐφοβοῦντο

20--μόνοι γὰρ ὑπὲρ ἁπάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος πρὸς πολλὰς μυριάδας τῶν βαρβάρων διεκινδύνευσαν.

23--οἱ δ' ἡμέτεροι πρόγονοι οὐ λογισμῷ δόντες τοὺς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ κινδύνους

25--μᾶλλον τοὺς παρ' αὐτοῖς νόμους αἰσχυνόμενοι ἢ τὸν πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους κίνδυνον φοβούμενοι

34--ὡς μέγας καὶ δεινὸς τῇδε τῇ πόλει κίνδυνος ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίας ἠγωνίσθη

47--καλλίστην τελευτὴν τοῖς προτέροις ἐπιθέντες κινδύνοις . . . ἐν ἅπασι δὲ τοῖς κινδύνοις δόντες ἔλεγχον τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἀρετῆς

50--ἠξίουν αὐτοὶ μόνοι τὸν κίνδυνον ποιήσασθαι

55--μετὰ πλείστων γὰρ πόνων καὶ φανερωτάτων ἀγώνων καὶ καλλίστων κινδύνων ἐλευθέραν μὲν ἐποίησαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα

63--ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς σώμασι τοῖς ἑαυτῶν κινδυνεύσαντες

68--ἐτόλμησαν γὰρ μεγάλην ποιοῦντες τὴν Ἑλλάδα οὐ μόνον ὑπὲρ τῆς αὐτῶν σωτηρίας κινδυνεύειν

Plato 246c--κινδυνεύσειν ἔμελλον

Demosthenes LX 29--ὁ μὲν οὖν [Acamas] παντὸς ἐπειρᾶτο κινδύνου τοῦ σῶσαι τὴν ἑαυτοῦ μητέρ' ἕνεκα· οἱ δὲ τοὺς οἴκοι σύμπαντας γονέας πῶς οὐκ ἤμελλον ὑπὲρ τοῦ σῶσαι πάντα κίνδυνον ὑπομένειν;

30--κοινοῦ δ' ὄντος ἀμφοτέραις ταῖς πόλεσιν τοῦ παρόντος κινδύνου, ὑπὲρ ἀμφοτέρων ἅπασαν ὤοντο δεῖν ἀγωνίαν ἐκτεῖναι

Hypereides VI 17--πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν ὁρώμενα αὐτοῖς τὰ δεινὰ ἄοκνον παρεῖχε τόλμαν εἰς τὸ κινδυνεύειν προχείρως.

19. Athenians are free.

Thucydides II 36.1--τὴν γὰρ χώραν οἱ αὐτοὶ αἰεὶ οἰκοῦντες διαδοχῇ τῶν ἐπιγιγνομένων μέχρι τοῦδε ἐλευθέραν δι' ἀρετὴν παρέδοσαν.

37.2--ἐλευθέρως δὲ τά τε πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύομεν καὶ ἐς τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους τῶν καθ' ἡμέραν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὑποψίαν

Lysias II 18--πρῶτοι δὲ καὶ μόνοι ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ χρόνῳ ἐκβαλόντες τὰς παρὰ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς δυναστείας δημοκρατίαν κατεστήσαντο, ἡγούμενοι τὴν πάντων ἐλευθερίαν ὁμόνοιαν εἶναι μεγίστην, κοινὰς δ' ἀλλήλοις τὰς ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων ἐπίδας ποιήσαντες ἐλευθέραις ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐπολιτεύοντο

Plato 239a--ὅθεν δὴ ἐν πάσῃ ἐλευθερίᾳ τεθραμμένοι οἱ τῶνδέ γε πατέρες καὶ οἱ ἡμέτεροι καὶ αὐτοὶ οὗτοι

240e--ἐγω μὲν οὖν ἐκείνους τοὺς ἄνδρας φημὶ οὐ μόνον τῶν σωμάτων τῶν ἡμετέρων πατέρας εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας τῆς τε ἡμετέρας καὶ συμπάντων τῶν ἐν τῇδε τῇ ἠπείρῳ.

245c--οὕτω δή τοι τό γε τῆς πόλεως γενναῖον καὶ ἐλεύθερον βέβαιόν τε καὶ ὑγιές ἐστιν καὶ φύσει μισοβάρβαρον

Hypereides VI 19--καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐλευθερίαν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν πᾶσιν κατέθεσαν

20. Athens is a democracy, based on equality.

Gorgias 82 B 6--δίκαιοι δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἄστους τῷ ἴσῳ

Thucydides II 37.1--καὶ ὄνομα μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐς ὀλίγους ἀλλ' ἐς πλείονας οἰκεῖν δημοκρατία κέκληται· μέτεστι δὲ κατὰ μὲν τοὺς νόμους πρὸς τὰ ἴδια διάφορα πᾶσι τὸ ἴσον

Lysias II 18--ἐκβαλόντες τὰς παρὰ σφίσιν αὑτοῖς δυναστείας δημοκρατίαν κατεστήσαντο.

56--τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν ἅπαντας ἀναγκάσαντες

Plato 238c--ἡ γὰρ αὐτη πολιτεία καὶ τότε ἦν καὶ νῦν, ἀριστοκρατία, ἐν ᾗ νῦν τε πολιτευόμεθα καὶ τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον ἐξ ἐκείνου ὡς τὰ πολλά. καλεῖ δὲ ὁ μὲν αὐτὴν δημοκρατίαν, ὁ δὲ ἄλλο, ᾧ ἂν χαίρῃ· ἔστι δὲ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μετ' εὐδοξίας πλήθους ἀριστοκρατία.

239a--οὐκ ἀξιοῦμεν δοῦλοι οὐδὲ δεσπόται ἀλλήλων εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἡ ἰσογονία ἡμᾶς ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἰσονομίαν ἀναγκάζει ζητεῖν κατὰ νόμον.

Demosthenes LX 26--αἱ δὲ δημοκρατίαι πολλά τ' ἄλλα καὶ καλὰ καὶ δίκαι' ἔχουσι, ὧν τὸν εὖ φρονοῦντ' ἀντέχεσθαι δεῖ, καὶ τὴν παρρησίαν ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας ἠρτημένην οὐκ ἔστι τἀληθὲς δηλοῦν ἀποτρέψαι.

APPENDIX III

ALEXANDER'S EMBASSY IN HERODOTUS AND IN POPULAR TRADITION

F. W. Schlatter, in a 1960 Princeton dissertation, argues that Herodotus was familiar only to an elite of historians and literary figures in the fourth century and that the account of Alexander's embassy in Demosthenes rests on independent popular tradition.[1] In this view he follows Kirchhoff and opposes Jacoby.[2] While Schlatter's data may argue against personal acquaintance with Herodotus and literary dependence on him by fourth century orators, they do not seem to necessitate the existence of an independent popular tradition. We may have in the oratorical references evidence for a living popular tradition ultimately dependent on Herodotus but shaped along separate lines by the values and interests of the general population. Demosthenes' own use of the Alexander embassy both here and in his speech On the Crown (XVIII 202), moreover, appears to echo various of Herodotus' details as parallel examples in Isocrates (IV 93-98), Lysias (II 33), and Lycurgus (In Leoc. 71) do not. Of particular interest is the Athenian response to the Spartan embassy, which, in Herodotus' account of the incident, arrives to plead with the Athenians not to accept the Persian proposals. The Athenian speech expresses precisely the thought which Demosthenes intends his paradeigma in VI 11 to document (Her. VIII 144.1):

> οὔτε χρυσός ἐστι γῆς οὐδαμόθι τοσοῦτος οὔτε χώρη κάλλεϊ καὶ ἀρετῇ μέγα ὑπερφέρουσα, τὰ ἡμεῖς δεξάμενοι ἐθέλοιμεν ἂν μηδίσαντες καταδουλῶσαι τὴν Ἑλλάδα.
>
> There is not enough gold anywhere in the world nor any land so exceedingly superior in beauty and prosperity that the gift of it would make us willing to defect to the Persians and cause the enslavement of Greece.

Although Alexander, in Herodotus' account, does not precisely offer the Athenians the opportunity "to rule the other Greeks," as Demosthenes expresses it (VI 11), he does offer return of confiscated Athenian territory as well as choice of another land to be added to their own (VIII 140.2):

> νῦν τε ὧδε, Μαρδόνιε, ποίει· τοῦτο μὲν τὴν γῆν σφι ἀπόδος, τοῦτο δὲ ἄλλην πρὸς ταύτῃ ἑλέσθων αὐτοί, ἥντινα ἂν ἐθέλωσι, ἐόντες αὐτόνομοι.

While Isocrates mentions only the offer of τιμὰς ἐξαιρέτους and δωρεάς (IV 94) and Lysias mentions only the choice of "joining the barbarians in the enslavement of the Greeks" (II 33: μετὰ τῶν βαρβάρων γενομένους καταδουλώσασθαι τοὺς Ἕλληνας), Demosthenes appears to recall the Persian offer of land to control. In the speech On the Crown the verbal echo is clear (XVIII 202):

> παρὰ τοῦ Περσῶν βασιλέως μετὰ πολλῆς χάριτος τοῦτ' ἂν ἀσμένως ἐδόθη τῇ πόλει, ὅ τι βούλεται λαβούσῃ καὶ τὰ ἑαυτῆς ἐχούσῃ τὸ κελευόμενον ποιεῖν καὶ ἑᾶν ἕτερον τῶν Ἑλλήνων προεστάναι;

I conclude that the Athenian traditions about Persian embassies to Athens during the Persian war may be dependent at least in part on Herodotus and that Demosthenes may have been personally familiar with Herodotus' history. To the extent that Herodotus' narrative lay behind Athenian popular traditions we may legitimately ask whether an additional part of the Athenian answer to the Spartans may have been included in popular

memory of Alexander's embassy. I refer to the second reason the Athenians offer for their refusal to defect to the Persians (the first is their obligation to avenge the desecration of their temples)(VIII 144.2):

> αὖτις δὲ τὸ Ἑλληνικόν, ἐὸν ὅμαιμόν τε καὶ ὁμόγλωσσαν, καὶ θεῶν ἱδρύματά τε κοινὰ καὶ θυσίαι ἤθεά τε ὁμότροπα, τῶν προδότας γενέσθαι Ἀθηναίους οὐκ ἂν εὖ ἔχοι.

If these strong panhellenic sentiments expressed in Herodotus' account of the incident were known to Demosthenes and his audience, it becomes an even more appropriate selection for evocation of the persuasive image of Athens he is attempting to call forth.[3]

FOOTNOTES--APPENDIX III

[1]F. W. Schlatter, "Salamis and Plataea in the Tradition of the Attic Orators" (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1960), pp. 149-152. Schlatter's argument has received support from Stewart Flory, "Who Read Herodotus' Histories?" AJP 101 (1980): 12-28, who concludes that Herodotus' histories were too long and unwieldy to have become popular in their author's own day and that even in the late fifth century evidence that they were widely known is unconvincing.

[2]Schlatter, p. 18, "In the last century Kirchhoff maintained that the work of Herodotus lost its public with the passing of the old order in the Peloponnesian war. The general tenor of his remark has continued to hold sway during the years in the treatment of the subject, notwithstanding Jacoby's vigorous representation of the opposite view for half a century." The reference to Kirchhoff is to A. Kirchhoff, Über die Entstehungszeit des Herodotischen Geschichtswerkes 2d ed. (Berlin, 1878), p. 9. For Jacoby, cf. RE Suppl. 2, s.v. Herodotos cols. 505-08. See Flory for references to the more recent discussion.

[3]More detailed study of Herodotus VIII 140-44 may reveal further evidence of possible dependence by Demosthenes on Herodotus. For example, if Calhoun is correct in his conjecture that the Second Philippic is Demosthenes' response to a Spartan embassy, the role of the Spartan embassy in Herodotus' account of this incident becomes more significant. The offer from Philip for an amendment of the Peace simultaneous with a Spartan plea for rejection of such an offer and for Athenian assistance against Philip's threatened attack prompts, in Demosthenes' imagination, a remarkable replay of negotiations surrounding the offer transmitted to Athens through Philip's ancestor.

APPENDIX IV

THE ARTHMIUS DECREE

References to Arthmius' transport of Persian gold into Greece and to the Athenian decree of outlawry are to be found in Dem. XIX 271-272, IX 41-44; Aeschin. III 258-259; and Dinarchus II 24-25, among fourth century orators. Later writers, who ascribe the decree either to Themistocles (Plut. Them. 6.4; Ael. Arist., De Quattuor 2.287, 392 Dindorf and schol. Ael. Arist. 3.327 Dindorf) or to Cimon (schol. M on Ael. Arist. [2.287 Dindorf; Wilamowitz, Ind. Lect. Götting. 1884, p. 10ɔ), demonstrate the durability of the story after the fourth century. (Cf. also Harpocration s.v. Ἄρθμιος and ἄτιμος.) Aeschines reports that Arthmius had been proxenos of Athens and was living in the city when banished ἐκ τῆς πόλεως καὶ ἐξ ἁπάσης ἧς ἄρχουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι.

The date and authorship of the decree and the date and historical details of the incident of espionage to which the decree refers have prompted spirited scholarly controversy. R. J. Lenardon follows Plutarch in placing the incident within the career of Themistocles and suggests that it may have occurred not immediately before Salamis (so Plutarch) but during Themistocles' archonship in the 490's.[1] M. B. Wallace dates the incident during Xerxes' invasion and proposes that Arthmius may have been "the Persian agent chiefly involved in securing

Argive neutrality in 480."[2] The decree itself, however, he dates to 466 or 465, a time when "Kimonian conservatism, friendship for Sparta, and undying opposition to Persia seem to have produced what in contemporary terms we may call the first attested judicial witch-hunt in western history."[3] Several scholars associate Arthmius' intrigues with Pausanias' machinations at Byzantium or Themistocles' at Argos in the late 470's or early 460's.[4] Others have seen in Arthmius' expedition a relationship to Megabyzus' attempt to induce the Spartans to invade Attica during Athens' Egyptian adventure in the mid-450's.[5] Still others argue for c. 450, presupposing that Cimon had not been recalled from exile after Tanagra (357) and pointing out that Persia had renewed its attempts to influence Sparta at this time.[6] In the latest full discussion of the decree, Noel Robertson argues that neither Themistocles nor Cimon was author of the decree and that "only the years 408 and 407 offer a likely setting for Arthmius' errand."[7] The most radical approach to the decree has been taken by C. Habicht, who has declared this decree and eight others cited by orators in the 340's and thereafter to be forgeries.[8] In his recently published commentary on Plutarch's Themistocles, F. J. Frost follows Meiggs in rejecting Habicht but refuses to choose among the proposals for "the true circumstances of Arthmius' journey."[9]

Habicht's charge of forgery against the Arthmius decree rests, as in the case of the other eight decrees cited in his article, first of all, on its appearance for the first time in the middle of the fourth century:

> Alle neun Stücke treten in der Gestalt von Urkunden erst um die Mitte oder nach der Mitte des 4. Jhs. auf. Dies bedeutet, dass für sie alle die literarische wie die . . . epigraphische Bezeugung einhundert bis einhundertfünfzig Jahre später ist als das für die Entstehung der Originalurkunden vorauszusetzende Datum. Bei dieser Sachlage liegt das kardinale Problem auf der Hand: sind diese Urkunden in der Substanz getreue Kopien zeitgenössischer Originale oder etwa spätere Schöpfungen, denen der Charakter der Urkundlichkeit durchaus mangelt?[10]

As Berve points out in his critique of Habicht, this argument from silence is "hardly conclusive" ("wenig beweiskräftig").[11] In the case of the Arthmius decree, moreover, Habicht's most important evidence in favor of his charge of forgery is a single anachronism in the wording of the decree as quoted by Demosthenes in IX 41. Kolbe had demonstrated that πολέμιος appeared in a similar context with similar meaning for the first time in a document dated to 411, while five earlier inscriptions from the period 450/49 to 423/2 show exclusively ἄτιμος.[12] Although Kolbe had suggested that the offending word be stricken from the text, Habicht calls such a resolution of the problem "unwarranted" ("unzulässig") and concludes without further argument that the anachronism "proves on the contrary that Demosthenes' document is in any case more recent than 423/2 and probably is a product of the fourth century."[13]

Berve's rebuttal to Habicht's appeals to anachronisms rests on the "fact" that the Greeks, when committing a document to stone or bronze, often aimed to provide only the essence of its subject matter and not its precise wording:

> Vor jeder Erörterung diese Problems ist es zunächst nötig, der Tatsache eingedenk zu sein, dass bei den Griechen die Widergabe von Urkunden auf Stein häufig nicht den genauen Text des im Archiv bewahrten Originaldokumentes brachte, sondern sich darauf beschränken konnte, in Anlehnung an jenes Dokument das Wesentliche seines Inhaltes zu bieten.[14]

Furthermore, when inscriptions recording a decree were made some years after the decree itself, the wording would be modernized to make the language consistent with current usage. Hence, orthographic and stylistic considerations, modernizations, omissions, and abridgements are only inconclusive evidence for or against the genuineness of a document.[15] Such considerations cannot prove, therefore, that a given decree is altogether the product of a forger. "Vielmehr ist es hier möglich, wo nicht gar wahrscheinlich, dass die spätere Fixierung oder Neufixierung auf Stein inhaltlich ein echtes Psephisma aus der ersten Hälfte des 5. Jahrhunderts brachte."[16]

In support of the genuineness of this decree one may point to the emphasis with which Demosthenes in both the speech On the False Embassy (XIX 272) and the Third Philippic (IX 41) describes the location of a bronze stele containing an inscription of the decree in the Acropolis. In both passages he clearly indicates his understanding that the stele in the Acropolis in his day had been placed there by a previous generation at the time the decree was ratified.[17] If the decree were, indeed, his own fabrication and, in fact, no such stele existed, Demosthenes would hardly have provided precise directions to its prominent, but fictitious, location. Anyone who wished could see for himself whether the orator was telling the truth, and proof of brazen deception could have been used by his opponents to discredit him.[18]

Habicht argues, furthermore, that the fabrication of this and other such documents is to be inferred from their sudden appearance in the oratory of the period. To be sure, Aeschines' use of the decrees of Miltiades and Themistocles and of the oath of the Ephebes in 348,

Demosthenes' use of the Arthmius decree in 343 and 341, and Aeschines' enlistment of it against Demosthenes in 330 do suggest an unprecedented interest in the use of early fifth century documents for the purposes of fourth century oratory. The way that Demosthenes introduces the Arthmius decree may argue for its authenticity, while lending weight to Habicht's claim that the other documents of the period were forgeries. Demosthenes' detailed description of the bronze stele on which the Arthmius decree was said to have been engraved and of its location in the Acropolis probably served to strengthen the authority of the decree by evoking its fifth century associations and suggesting its importance, as we have argued in chapter V. It may also represent, however, the orator's attempt to establish the authenticity of the decree by providing empirical proof of its existence and prominence. The need to establish its authenticity, of course, would imply that the question of the authenticity of such documents was being raised and would support the contention that others besides Aeschines were practicing the fabrication of fifth century documents for rhetorical purposes, and that at least the more knowledgeable inner circle of prominent political leaders knew the technique. Therefore, even if Habicht is right about the other documents which he treats, the Arthmius decree may be authentic.

On the other hand, the sudden, unprecedented appearance of these documents in the debate about Philip need not imply that they were forgeries. Orators debating the appropriate Hellenic response to Philip--not least of all Aeschines--were drawing parallels with the fifth century. It is altogether possible that a somewhat pedantic "bookworm"

like Aeschines, whose previous occupation as a secretary to the Boule would have produced both a familiarity and a fascination with the decrees of the Athenians, conceived the value of quotations from the historic decrees and researched the texts of the useful ones, either among the stelae on the Acropolis or in the state archives.[19] Scholars have noted Aeschines' love of quotations. Mathieu refers to "cette sorte de manie d'érudition oratoire dont il était possédé," and he suggests that Demosthenes' accusation in XIX 16 that Aeschines had forbidden appeals to the past is intentionally ironic--Aeschines was acting out of character.[20] Pearson points out that, "apart from Isocrates, Aeschines is the only other orator who seems willing to give lessons in history to his audience":

> In giving his account of the second embassy to Philip, on which he served together with Demosthenes, he tells how he instructed Philip in the traditions and history of the Amphictyonic League: "I told him the story from the beginning: the foundation of the temple and the first meeting of the Amphictyons, and I read to him the oaths by which the men of old bound themselves." [Italics mine.][21]

It is unnecessary to assume that Aeschines fabricated the documents for which he appears to have developed a fondness during this period. It is at least as likely that Aeschines, whom Demosthenes credits with having first made the connection between Philip and the Persian king of the fifth century, also exploited his antiquarian interests to seek out decrees which would evoke the spirit of the period. There is no need to posit either a collection of decrees (forged or genuine) published at this time or any fabrication by Aeschines himself. We may assume that appropriate fifth century texts were at hand and that Aeschines brought them to public recognition.

Having granted the genuineness of the Arthmius decree we must determine its historical circumstances. Until the 1980 article by Robertson all previous studies had dated the event and decree to the first half of the fifth century, from the 490's to the 450's. Robertson argues that both the incident and the decree may best be set in 408-407, when Sparta and Persia were negotiating support for Sparta's continuing war with Athens. "By late 407 Persian money had turned the tide against Athens," and it was Arthmius, Robertson suggests, who delivered the windfall to Sparta.[22]

Robertson finds the license to move the incident and its accompanying decree down intc the late fifth century by initially dispensing with both Themistocles and Cimon as authors of the decree. His argument is that (1) Demosthenes makes it clear that the decree was available on the Acropolis for all to see. With that contention I agree. (2) He asserts that even an abridged text must have included the mover's name at the end of the prescript and that, therefore, the name of Cimon would have appeared on the inscription if Cimon were, indeed, its author. I accept Robertson's point here. (3) He continues that if Cimon's name appeared on the inscription, Demosthenes would have recognized Cimon as the mover of the decree and would surely have mentioned his authorship when citing the decree in 343 and 341:

> In the later fourth century both Themistocles and Cimon were heroic names (the former invoked by Aeschines in this very context), and the ascription of the decree to either of them would have greatly assisted the lesson which the orators are at pains to draw. They all enlarge on the stern temper and noble purpose evinced by the decree; could they have cited the magic name of Themistocles or Cimon, they would not have been content to speak simply of "your ancestors" or "the Athenians of that time."[23]

At this point Robertson is, I believe, in error. In the first place, it is not certain that naming either Themistocles or Cimon would have "greatly assisted the lesson which" Demosthenes was "at pains to draw." In both XIX and IX his purpose is to draw the contrast between an earlier generation of Athenians and his own. He is not acclaiming the wisdom or special insight of a particular leader, but the clear vision and sound prudence of the earlier Athenians as a whole. To have named the mover of the decree would have diffused rather than assisted Demosthenes' purpose, for Demosthenes' audience would have attended to the "great name" and neglected to reflect on their own departure from the wisdom of earlier Athenians like themselves.

More seriously, however, Robertson has misconstrued Cimon's actual status in mid-fourth-century Athens. In fact Demosthenes mentions "the magic name" only twice in all of his speeches: XXIII 205, where he is recalled as a hero discredited and fined despite his public services because he had "subverted the ancestral constitution" (τὴν πάτριον μετεκίνησε πολιτείαν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ); XIII 29, where he is introduced alongside Themistocles and Aristides as a famous man who nonetheless lived modestly.[24] He is not invoked for the example of his exploits themselves, for his political leadership, or his patriotism--for his "stern temper," perhaps, but not for his "noble purpose." The fact is that Cimon is rarely mentioned in fourth-century oratory, "there is no consensus of opinion about him, and there is no feeling that here is an outstanding personality and an important period in Athenian history."[25] Pearson explains that Cimon "was probably under suspicion as the least democratically inclined of the heroes of the

Pentacontaetia."[26] Perlman adds that not much was known about Cimon and that "in the fourth century he remained a controversial figure as he probably was already at the end of the fifth century."[27] Given Cimon's controversial history and associations with anti-democratic aristocracy, it would not be surprising if Demosthenes and the other orators citing this decree were to suppress his name as its mover. There is a further piece of evidence, both contemporary and curious, which may suggest a further reason why Demosthenes might have chosen quite deliberately not to mention Cimon in association with a decree on bribery. Theopompus refers to Cimon as a thievish sort of person often convicted of financial malpractice and implicated in bribery:

> γράφει δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ Θεόπομπος, ὡς καὶ κλεπτίστατος γένοιτό τις καὶ λημμάτων αἰσχρῶν ἡττώμενος οὐχ ἅπαξ ἐξήλεγκται καὶ τὸ τῆς δωροδοκίας μάθημα παρ' αὐτοῦ καὶ πρώτου τοῖς Ἀθήνησι στρατηγοῖς ὁρᾶται ἐνσκῆψαι.
>
> But Theopompos writes concerning him that he both was a most thievish sort of person and was convicted more than once of yielding to opportunities for shameful profitmaking. And the lesson of bribery from him first of all appears to have dawned on the generals at Athens.[28]

Even though Theopompos was probably recognized even in his own day as a curmudgeon whose pleasure was to deflate the reputations of past heroes, his attacks may provide a clue to the kind of gossip which attached to the major figures of the Athenian past, and Theopompos may not have been the only fourth-century Greek to have perceived in Cimon "a shrewd and ambitious politician" who perhaps earned the ostracism to which Demosthenes himself refers.[29] If the term δωροδοκία was bandied about at all in association with Cimon, Demosthenes would have been a fool to mention him as the mover of the Arthmius decree. His

audience would have been confused about his intent and distracted from the point to which the decree as a paradeigma was leading. I conclude, therefore, that Cimon's name could well have appeared on the stele bearing the inscription of the Arthmius decree, that Demosthenes would have read the name and, for sound rhetorical reasons, suppressed it. Cimon, therefore, remains the likely mover of the decree and an obstacle to Robertson's attempted late dating.[30]

There remains one additional piece of evidence that Demosthenes at least understood the decree to date from the early fifth century. I have already mentioned the association which he emphasizes between the decree and the Athena Promachos, the outstanding victory memorial of the Persian wars.[31] More significant, perhaps, is the order of the incidents which he relates in the speech On the False Embassy to illustrate past Athenian treatment of bribery. He adduces four illustrations in the following order: Arthmius (XIX 271-272), Callias (XIX 273-275), Epicrates (XIX 277-279), and Thrasybulus (XIX 280-281). Demosthenes adduces the example of Epicrates, whom he identifies as one of the freedom fighters who gathered under Thrasybulus in the Peiraeus in 404 to plot the overthrow of the Thirty, to illustrate the willingness of the Athenians to condemn even a public figure who had proved his commitment to the Athenian demos by acts of heroism on its behalf. He served on an embassy in 392/1 which apparently accepted the terms of a peace sent down from the Persian King even though they included a provision which would have retained Greek settlements in Asia under Persian control. The Athenians rejected the peace, Callistratus indicted the members of the embassy, and they fled into exile rather than risk standing

trial.[32] The Thrasybulus to whom Demosthenes makes passing allusion in XIX 280 is the son of the Thrasybulus who led the revolt against the Thirty; he is mentioned only because of the reputation of his famous father.[33] Epicrates' democratic heroism may be dated, therefore to the final decade of the fifth century, i.e., to precisely the same period as Robertson proposes for the Arthmius affair, and his unfortunate embassy and condemnation occurred only slightly more than a decade later. The examples of Epicrates and Thrasybulus are separated from those of Arthmius and Callias by paragraph 276.

> οὐ τοίνυν τὰ παλαί' ἂν τις ἔχοι μόνον εἰπεῖν καὶ διὰ τούτων τῶν παραδειγμάτων ὑμᾶς ἐπὶ τιμωρίαν παρακαλέσαι· ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὑμῶν τουτωνὶ τῶν ἔτι ζώντων ἀνθρώπων πολλοὶ δίκην δεδώκασιν, ὧν ἐγὼ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους παραλείψω, τῶν δ' ἐκ πρεσβείας, ἣ πολὺ ταύτης ἐλάττω κακὰ τὴν πόλιν εἴργασται, θανάτῳ ζημιωθέντων ἑνὸς ἢ δυοῖν ἐπιμνησθήσομαι.
>
> One would not have to speak only about the olden days, however, and to appeal to you for punishment on the basis of these historic examples. No, within your own lifetimes, during this very period of people alive today, many have been called to justice. Of these let me pass over the others and remind you of one or two sentenced to death because of an embassy that damaged the City much less by far than this one.

The period from Epicrates to Thrasybulus Demosthenes here includes within current events, while both Arthmius and Callias he assigns to the "olden days."[34] Similarly, in the Third Philippic his reason for introducing the Arthmius affair is that it represents the ethos of the good old days (τὰ δ' ἐν τοῖς ἄνωθεν χρόνοις) . If Demosthenes had understood the Arthmius affair to have occurred at the end of the fifth century, as Robertson proposes, he would not have grouped it with and ahead of Callias among τὰ παλαί'.

For our own dating of the incident we are left, then, with the

possibilities outlined earlier in the first half of the fifth century. Among the arguments for dating the incident itself anywhere from 490 to 450 none is finally conclusive. Because the decree, as all scholars have noted, contains a reference to Athens' allies which can only make sense after the establishment of the Delian Confederacy, the decree itself (whatever the date of the incident) must have been passed by the Assembly sometime after 477. Aeschines' addition to the decree of the phrase, πόλεις ὅσων Ἀθηναῖοι ἄρχουσι (Aeschin. III 258), a developed imperial formula, is probably his own elaboration of an original ἐξ ἁπάσης ἧς ἄρχουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι; "the reference is not to the allies but to territory directly controlled by Athens: there is no objection to dating the decree before 450."[35] Because of Demosthenes' association of the event with the Persian wars my inclination is to follow Wallace in assigning the Arthmius affair to the 480's, but to locate the decree within the career of Cimon, probably in 466 or 465, during the "witch-hunt" which apparently counted as its casualties Pausanias; Themistocles; Gongylos, an Eretrian; and, Wallace posits, Arthmius.[36] This somewhat conservative interpretation accords as well with what we know of early fifth-century history as any of the alternatives, conforms best to the use of the incident by Demosthenes and Aeschines, and does not require that we reject the account of the incident in Plutarch's Themistocles VI 4.[37]

FOOTNOTES--APPENDIX IV

[1]R. J. Lenardon, "The Archonship of Themistocles, 493/2," Historia 5 (1956): 410-11. Lenardon does not discuss the date of the decree itself. In The Saga of Themistocles (London: Thames and Hudson, 1978): 227, n. 47, Lenardon continues to suggest a dating in the 490's, "perhaps in the very year of Themistocles' archonship, rather than in the 480's before Salamis."

[2]M. B. Wallace, "Early Greek Proxenoi," Phoenix 24 (1970): 202.

[3]Ibid. Wallace associates Arthmius with the proceedings for medism against Pausanias, Themistocles, and Gongylos, "the only Eretrian exiled for medism, Xenophon says."

[4]M. Cary, "Arthmius of Zeleia," CQ 29 (1935): 177-80, who conjures Arthmius as a go-between from Pausanias to Themistocles. In other essentials he follows the position of Grote. H. Schaefer, Hermes 71 (1936): 145-46. Jacoby, FGrH 342 F 14 (3b, p. 107): "Viel wahrscheinlicher ist der ansatz in den 60er jahren und die zeit von Kimons eigentlicher 'staatsleitung' (wenn man diesen ausdruck brauchen darf), zwischen der schlacht am Eurymedon 469 (?) und dem ostrakismos Kimons 461, und dann wohl näher dem ersten termin." R. Meiggs, The Athenian Empire (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972), p. 512: "Arthmius may have taken money to Argos where Themistocles was living since his ostracism. If the main objective was to help Pausanias Arthmius may have called at Athens, where as proxenos he must have had connections, to sound the followers of Themistocles. On this hypothesis Arthmius' mission may have been in the early sixties and may have been followed by the recall of Pausanias from Colonae."

[5]G. Colin, "La déformation d'un document historique dans une argumentation d'orateur," RevPhil 7 (1933): 237-60. W. Kolbe, "Die Anfänge der attischen Arché," Hermes 73 (1938): 259-60. A. W. Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1956), p. 327, n. 1.

[6]K. J. Beloch, Griechische Geschichte, 2d ed., 4 vols. (Strasbourg, Berlin, and Leipzig, 1912-1927) 2.1:175, n. 1. H. T. Wade-Gery, "The Question of Tribute in 449/8," Hesperia 14 (1945): 222, n. 22. Athenian Tribute Lists (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950) 3:171, n. 42.

[7]Noel Robertson, "The Sequence of Events in the Aegean in 408 and 407 B.C.," Historia 29 (1980): 300.

[8]Christian Habicht, "Falsche Urkunden zur Geschichte Athens im Zeitalter der Perserkriege," Historia 89 (1961): 1-35.

[9]F. J. Frost, Plutarch's Themistocles, A Historical Commentary (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 98. "There is no reason to doubt the authenticity of the episode; I follow the arguments of Meiggs, Athenian Empire 510f., opposing Habicht. . . ." (p. 98, n. 7).

[10]Habicht, p. 19.

[11]Helmut Berve, "Zur Themistokles-Inschrift von Troizen," SBBayer, 1961, Heft 3, p. 43.

[12]Kolbe (see above n. 5), pp. 263-64 and 264 n. 3.

[13]Habicht, p. 24.

[14]Berve, pp. 4-5. In support of this claim he cites (p. 5, n. 6) A. Wilhelm, Beiträge zur griechischen Inschriftenkunde (1909), pp. 227ff. and ZöstG (1913): 673ff., 682. L. Robert, Etudes épigraphiques et philologiques (1938), p. 303. G. Klaffenbach, Griechische Epigraphik (1957), pp. 51-52, and "Bemerkungen zum griechischen Urkundenwesen," SBBerl, Kl. für Sprache, Literatur u. Kunst (1960), Heft 6, pp. 34-35.

[15]Berve, p. 5. Cp. A. J. Podlecki, The Life of Themistocles, A Critical Survey of the Literary and Archaeological Evidence (Montreal and London: McGill-Queen's U. Press, 1975), p. 166, "The existence of multiple versions of ancient documents, all of them 'authentic' in content but not necessarily identical in phrasing, suggests that we may have to adjust our expectations of what constituted an 'official' text in fifth-century Athens. Verbal accuracy does not seem to have counted for much. . . . It follows, then, that discrepancies of phrasing in public documents of which several copies exist, or which have gone through stages of transmission which cannot now be traced, do not in themselves constitute grounds for suspecting forgery. We must be willing at least to entertain the concept of authenticity of substance, which need not have been impaired by the (conscious or unconscious) tendency of any later writer, from the mere scribe to the most artful man of letters, to 'modernize' the phrasing of what he saw before him, even to substitute usages and turns of phrase which were more familiar to him."

[16]Berve, p. 46. It is to be noted, however, that Habicht's article cannot be easily dismissed. As Berve's own argument indicates, discussions of the authenticity of ancient documents must rely largely on possibilities. Even if the argument in this and the following

paragraphs strengthens the probability that the Arthmius decree is genuine, Habicht may yet be right in his judgment about the fourth century origin of the other eight documents with which he deals.

[17]XIX 272, παρὰ τὴν χαλκῆν τὴν μεγάλην Ἀθηνᾶν ἐκ δεξιᾶς ἕστηκεν. . . . τότε μὲν. . . . IX 41, γράμματα τῶν προγόνων τῶν ὑμετέρων ἀκεῖνοι κατέθεντ' εἰς στήλην χαλκῆν γράψαντες εἰς ἀκρόπολιν. . . .

[18]Lionel Pearson, "Historical Allusions in the Attic Orators," CP 36 (1941): 219, "[The Athenian democrat] distrusted orators who were 'too clever' or appeared to be 'deceiving' him."

[19]Dem. XVIII 209, κατάρατε καὶ γραμματοκύφων, a person who pours over decrees, not one who forges them. On Aeschines' pedantry, cf. Blass, Die attische Beredsamkeit 3.2:185, who calls Aeschines "den Typus des ὀψιμαθής;" Schaefer, Demosthenes und seine Zeit, 1:236, "Es blickt bei ihm ein gewisser Stolz auf mühsam erworbene Kenntnisse"; and G. Mathieu, "Survivances des luttes politiques du V[e] siècle chez les orateurs attiques du IV[e] siècle," RevPhil 38 (1914): 204-05.

[20]Mathieu, p. 204.

[21]Pearson, p. 213. He might also have mentioned Andocides, whose speech On the Peace with Sparta--delivered about fifty years earlier than Aeschines' speech On the False Embassy, which Pearson here quotes--is replete with historical recollections. One of them, the lengthy, inaccurate summary of Athenian policy from the time of Salamis to the fall of the Thirty (And., De Pace 3-9), is repeated almost verbatim by Aeschines in his own speech (II 172-76). Andocides, however, unlike Aeschines, is careful not to imply that he is offering his audience superior knowledge. When he describes the advantages to Athens that came from the peace of Nicias he inserts into his narrative, οἶμαι δ' ὑμᾶς ἅπαντας εἰδέναι τοῦτο, ὅτι . . . , an expression of modesty and deference to the audience which Aeschines omits. A more extensive study of Aeschines' method of citing past history might show that he is less sensitive to the expectations of the Athenian audience than Andocides. Cf. Pearson, pp. 228-29, "Few speakers cared to offer [their audience] much new information or to attempt a sketch of the development or change in policy over a period of years. Isocrates and Aeschines, who occasionally allow themselves longer digressions, were probably less closely in touch with the temper of their public than the others."

[22]Robertson (see above, n. 7), p. 301.

[23]Ibid., pp. 294-95.

[24]On Organization (XIII), it may be noted, is a speech the authenticity of which has been contested by many modern critics.

[25]S. Perlman, "The Historical Example, Its Use and Importance as Political Propaganda in the Attic Orators," Scripta Hierosolymitana 7 (1961): 157, n. 32.

[26]Pearson, p. 227.

[27]Perlman, p. 157, n. 32. He continues, "Andocides mentions him twice (And. III 3; cf. Aesch. II, 172 and Andoc., IV, 33). In both cases the strong aristocratic bias of the speaker is evident. Cimon is either praised or at least his ostracism is explained on private, moral and non-political grounds. Demosthenes (XXIII, 205) says that Cimon was fined fifty talents because he aimed at the overthrow of the πάτριος πολιτεία." (Cf. above, p. 257 .)

[28]FGrH F 90. Translation by W. R. Connor, who discusses this fragment in Theopompus and Fifth Century Athens (Washington, D.C.: Center for Hellenic Studies, 1968), pp. 37-38, and, more fully, in "Theopompus' Treatment of Cimon," GRBS 4 (1963): 107-14.

[29]Quote from Connor, GRBS, p. 112. He notes that "antiquity's judgment of Cimon was by no means unanimously favorable" (p. 109, cf. n. 113). In his Theopompus Connor notes the historian's use of "tales more closely resembling gossip, political pamphlets, and the personal invective of comedy," and he points to the common interest in the themes of "bribery, thievery, personal corruption, and bad ancestry" evidenced by both Theopompus and Old Comedy (p. 102).

[30]One might ask why Plutarch ascribed the authorship of the decree to Themistocles if Cimon's name appeared on the stele bearing the inscription of the decree and if he was therefore widely known to be its author. Even if his name did appear, however, we cannot safely conclude that many Athenians, including the orators, paid attention to the decree or its prescript. In neither XIX or IX does Demosthenes provide any clue that the inscription would be widely familiar to his audience. He does not, for example, say "You will all have seen the stele . . . " nor does he apologize for quoting information already familiar to them. There is no reason, therefore, to assume, as Robertson apparently does, that the Athenians would have stumbled into the stele whenever they passed through the Acropolis. (Cf. Robertson, p. 295, n. 37, "We may grant that the manner of citing the decree quickly became a commonplace; yet this need not have led the orators, still less other Athenians, to avert their eyes from the stele whenever they passed it.") It is likely, in fact, that neither the decree nor its author was widely known. Both Jacoby, FGrH IIIb Kommentar 2.73, nn. 116b, 117, and

Habicht, pp. 23-24, maintain that Demosthenes is the only direct witness to the decree and that Aeschines depends on Demosthenes and Deinarchus on both Demosthenes and Aeschines. If the decree was not generally familiar, if only Demosthenes among orators citing the decree actually consulted the stele itself, and if the other orators who use the decree depend on Demosthenes, who does not mention its author, we may assume that its author was not widely known in antiquity. We do not know the source of Plut., Them. 6, and may assume that the source, which may have been dependent on the orators, did not contain Cimon's name. Plutarch will have supplied the name of Themistocles to fit a context in the war with Xerxes. Jacoby, FGrH IIIb Kommentar 1.106, comments, "dann kamen als antragsteller nur Aristeides oder Themistokles in frage. Es is vermutlich reiner zufall, dass man sich für den letzteren entschied."

[31]See above, p. 127.

[32]Demosthenes calls Epicrates τῶν ἐκ Πειραιῶς καταγαγόντων καὶ ἄλλως δημοτικός. Cf. Xen., Hell. II 4. On the embassy see Xen., Hell. IV 8.12-15. Philochoros, fr. 149, confirms Epicrates as a member of the embassy and suggests a significant revision in the account of the incident provided by Xenophon. See Jacoby, FGrH IIIb (Supplement) 1.515-21 and notes.

[33]On the elder Thrasybulus, see Thuc. VIII, Xen., Hell. I-IV, Diod. XIII-XIV, Nep., Thrasybulus. Nothing is known of the younger Thrasybulus or of the reason for which he was ordered to pay a fine of ten talents (τάλαντα δέκ' ὠφληκέναι).

[34]On the chronological referent for τὰ παλαία , see K. Jost, Das Beispiel und Vorbild der Vorfahren, Rhetorische Studien, Heft 19 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1936), pp. 168-69, 191-92.

[35]So Meiggs (see above, n. 4), p. 511.

[36]Wallace (see above, n. 2), p. 202.

[37]Frost, however (see above, n. 9), pp. 97-98, appears to reject Plutarch's assignment of the event to the time of Themistocles: "In the centuries between Craterus and Plutarch, the episode found its way into the lexica to the orators and probably the rhetorical handbooks as well. But, first, popular history had its way with the story, pulled the context back to the time of the Persian wars, and inserted the name of Themistocles."

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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT

The subject of this dissertation is Demosthenes' use for persuasive purposes of twenty epideictic commonplaces in his four Philippics and his speech On the Chersonese. The commonplaces, which are derived from the five extant epitaphioi logoi and the surviving fragment of Gorgias' epitaphios, are considered to be representative of a traditional epideictic vocabulary of praise of Athens.

Demosthenes delivered his speeches against Philip with the aim of persuading his Athenian audience to mobilize for war against Macedon. Repeatedly in the course of these speeches, however, he berates his fellow citizens for their neglect of public duty. How could such a censorious approach to his audience be effective in persuading them? It is demonstrated in this dissertation that Demosthenes prepared his audience for his harsh criticisms by invoking their common Athenian identity and recalling to their memory an affirming vision of Athens at the peak of its imperial power. These recollections Demosthenes clothed in familiar patriotic phrases heard by Athenians year after year in epitaphioi logoi at the annual commemoration of their fallen warriors. He thereby evoked the patriotic feelings associated with those solemn state ceremonies, strengthened the bonds between himself and his audience who together participated in those civic rituals, and, through appeal to the bravery,

nobility, and justice of the Athenian character, sought to move his audience to active retaliation against Philip.

Demosthenes' development in his use of epideictic commonplaces from the First Philippic (351) to the Fourth (341) is described and analyzed in the five central chapters of the dissertation. The setting of each speech is ascertained so far as possible so that Demosthenes' persuasive strategy in each speech may be discussed as a response to its rhetorical situation. In general, it is argued, following Cawkwell and other scholars, that Demosthenes' rhetorical dilemma in his speeches against Philip was posed by the Macedonian's obvious military superiority, by his avoidance of overt violation of the Peace of Philocrates, and by his diplomatic skill in gaining the respect if not friendship of many Greeks. It is apparent also that Athens was enjoying its highest level of prosperity at this time under the leadership of Eubulus, perhaps since the fifth century. In short, Athens had little motive to seek a war with Philip.

Demosthenes' response is to reassert the values of Athenian hegemony, to recall continually the days when Athens was leader among Greeks and victorious champion of Greek liberties. In the First and Second Philippics these values, and the commonplaces that express them, are clustered around a single paradeigma (see IV 3; VI 8-10). In the Third and Fourth Philippics, however, the commonplaces are pervasive. In the Third Philippic Demosthenes unites paradeigmata and commonplaces with epideictic style to transfigure the conflict with Philip and to make of it something as grand and heroic and momentous as the wars with Persia. In the Fourth Philippic, delivered in its present

unrevised form within a few weeks of the Third, Demosthenes openly attacks the pragmatic, commercial values which he sees as dominant in Athens under Eubulus' leadership. These values he claims to be contradictory to the Athenian character and destructive of the Athenian identity.

Although the intent of this dissertation is to gain an increased understanding of the means of persuasion used in Demosthenes' deliberative speeches, it also provides evidence for the mixing of oratorical genres in antiquity. In The Art of Demosthenes (1976), Lionel Pearson demonstrated that in his Philippics Demosthenes adapted narrative from forensic oratory for portrayal of Philip' character and indictment of his "aggressions" against Greece. It is argued in this dissertation, following V. Buchheit, that "epideictic" is to be defined more in terms of content than of style, as the oratory of praise and blame and only secondarily as the oratory of display. Hence, the conventional vocabulary of the epitaphioi logoi may aptly be termed "epideictic", and in using these epitaphic commonplaces he is adapting elements of epideictic oratory to deliberative purposes.